IN RE: Edmond H. KNOLL (2022)

Petition for permanent resignation from the practice of law in lieu of discipline granted. See order.

ORDER

We previously accepted a petition for consent discipline and suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day, fully deferred, subject to a period of probation to coincide with the term of his recovery agreement with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (“JLAP”). In re: Knoll, 22-0107 (La. 3/15/22), 333 So. 3d 1238. Our order provided that “[a]ny failure of respondent to comply with the terms of the agreement may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.”

Respondent has now advised JLAP and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) that he will no longer participate in JLAP monitoring, and for that reason wishes to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent's petition.

Having considered the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Edmond H. Knoll, Louisiana Bar Roll number 29046, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Edmond H. Knoll for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Edmond H. Knoll shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _ day of _, 2022.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ _

JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

Attorney Disciplinary Proceeding

Because I find this to be a premature disposition of respondent's case, I would reject the petition for permanent resignation from the practice of law. In my view, a decision of such magnitude requires thoughtful deliberation, and the information presented to this Court at this juncture is insufficient to warrant permanent resignation. See In re Paul E. Brown, 17-1930 (La. 9/18/18), 252 So.3d 468 (Crichton, J., dissenting, finding respondent's suspension a premature disposition of respondent's case and would remand for an evidentiary hearing); and In re Paul E. Brown, 17-1930 (La. 12/5/18), 319 So.3d 251 (mem.) (reh'g denied) (Crichton, J., would grant rehearing and remand for an evidentiary hearing, noting the lack of information regarding defendant's substance abuse evaluation.). Based on the circumstances of this case, however, I would order interim suspension pending further proceedings. See La. Const. art. V, § 5(B) (“The supreme court has exclusive original jurisdiction of disciplinary proceedings against a member of the bar.”); In re Matthews, 21-1078, p. 5 (La. 1/28/22), 333 So.3d 422, 426 (“This Court has supervisory and plenary authority over all other courts and original jurisdiction in all disciplinary matters related to the bench and bar.”); and Bester v. Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, 00-1360, p. 3 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 715, 717 (internal citations omitted) (“This Court has exclusive and plenary power to define and regulate all facets of the practice of law․”) Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's order of permanent resignation from the practice of law.

Crichton, J., would reject the petition for permanent resignation and assigns reasons. Genovese, J., recused.