IN RE: DERRICK D.T. SHEPHERD (2026)

Petitioner, who previously had two lawyers representing him, is now represented on rehearing by only one of those two lawyers. In a prior concurrence, I questioned the propriety of the remaining lawyer, who formerly served on this court, now representing a client before this court on matters the lawyer decided twice while he was a justice on this courtBunfavorably to his now client. The rehearing request, unfortunately, largely attempts to justify the former justice's role as an attorney for petitioner in a section entitled “Clarification Regarding Counsel's Participation,” in which he addresses my concurrence and includes a four-page affidavit.

Whether or not the former justice convinced someone to sign a grant of permission enabling his participation in this matter is not dispositive in my view, when professionalism dictates a different outcome.¹ Rather, the issue is that a former justice of this court is essentially taking advantage of inside information as a former justice, including confidential discussions among the justices on this particular case, and potentially trading on his position of service to our system of justice to further enhance his earnings, while also being paid an enhanced pension for that judicial service.

As part of the justification for his involvement, this lawyer lists in his affidavit two other former justices potentially participating,² which only increases the risk that this court's decision will appear to involve influence, politics, pressure, or personalities, as opposed to the impartial application of law. The decision in a case should never be determined based on who a litigant or litigator knows.³

Moreover, there is a claim in the former justice's affidavit that he did not participate personally and substantially in the factual development or adjudication of the issues presently raised. He further states that prior to the present matter, he did not participate in any evidentiary evaluation concerning petitioner's “rehabilitation” or “moral fitness.” I am perplexed by this statement given the prior attempts at “abatement,” and the issue that is again before the court is the petitioner's rehabilitation and termination of the permanency of the disbarment.

The underlying facts demonstrate that in 2008, petitioner, who was then serving as a Louisiana State Senator, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering for using his client trust account to help a convicted bond broker launder nearly $141,000 in fraudulently generated bond fees. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel subsequently filed formal charges against petitioner arising out of his conviction. Following a lengthy disciplinary process, this court rendered a unanimous opinion on June 22, 2012, holding that petitioner=s criminal conduct warranted permanent disbarment under Guideline 6 of the permanent disbarment guidelines (insurance fraud). In re: Shepherd, 11-2011 (La. 6/22/12), 91 So.3d 283. The court's judgment provided in pertinent part:

The record reflects that [petitioner] knowingly laundered $141,000 in insurance proceeds through his client trust account for Ms. Moyo and AA Communications, after they had been ordered to cease and desist from engaging in the business of insurance and after their bank accounts had been seized by state insurance regulators. In doing so, [petitioner] promoted and facilitated the unlawful activity of his co-conspirators. He returned $75,000 to Ms. Moyo and kept the rest of the funds for himself, using $20,000 to retire his campaign debt. To conceal all of this activity, [petitioner] created false billing statements and time records reflecting work his law firm had purportedly done on behalf of his “client,” Ms. Moyo. This reprehensible conduct clearly falls within the scope of the permanent disbarment guidelines.

In re: Shepherd, 11-2011 at 7-8, 91 So.3d at 287.

The court also noted petitioner was a state senator at the time of his misconduct and found his position of public trust required that he be “held to even a higher standard of conduct than an ordinary attorney.” Id., 11-2011 at 8, 91 So.3d at 287. The court reasoned that petitioner breached this standard “by willingly entering into a money laundering scheme and trying to disguise his misdeeds as legitimate legal work,” and that such conduct caused “incalculable harm to the public's perception of the legal profession,” warranting permanent disbarment, notwithstanding the mitigation evidence then offered by petitioner. Id.

In 2020, and again in 2023, petitioner sought “abatement”⁴ of the order of permanent disbarment so that he could apply for readmission. This court denied both petitions.⁵

In March 2026, petitioner filed a “Petition and Motion to Reconsider Permanent Disbarment Order and For Limited Evidentiary Hearing.” Petitioner, through counsel, asked that this court “reconsider” its 2012 judgment of permanent disbarment and remand this matter to a hearing committee “for a limited evidentiary hearing on mitigation, rehabilitation, and sanction.” On May 12, 2026, this court denied the petition, with three Justices voting to grant. I filed a concurring opinion in which I questioned “the appropriateness of a former associate justice of this court actively representing petitioner in this particular matter.”

Petitioner, now represented solely by the former justice, seeks rehearing of the court's ruling.⁶ To the extent the application addresses the merits, counsel for petitioner largely reiterates his prior arguments. He contends rehearing is warranted because the petition presents significant issues concerning the implementation and application of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(A)(1), specifically whether a permanently disbarred lawyer may obtain an evidentiary hearing directed to the codified criteria set forth in the rule. The counsel for petitioner states that based on the information and evidence he has reviewed in the case's current posture, petitioner should be afforded the opportunity for a “limited” evidentiary hearing under Rule XIX, § 10(A)(1). He calls the hearing “limited” because petitioner is not seeking reversal of his disbarment at this time, but only that he may be evaluated under the codified factors of Rule XIX, § 10 (A)(1). The former justice representing petitioner believes that due to Rule XIX being amended May 4, 2022, while he was a member of this court, questions concerning the implementation of newly amended 10(A)(1) should be addressed by this court.⁷

The Rule does not specifically characterize any review as “limited,” as the former justice describes it. There is no explicit provision in the rule for a rehearing, and the Rule does not appear to provide the relief requested within its clear language.

This court did not lightly adopt the sanction of permanent disbarment. Rather, the court's 2001 decision to amend Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10 to specifically provide for the sanction of permanent disbarment was the product of detailed study, including input from the Louisiana State Bar Association and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In its official commentary to the 2001 amendment, the court explained why the sanction of permanent disbarment was necessary.⁸ The comment states, in pertinent part:

In the public interest, the Court has amended Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX to codify Permanent Disbarment as an available sanction for attorney misconduct. While the Court has always had the discretion to deny an application for readmission after the requisite five (5)-year waiting period after disbarment, an attorney who is permanently disbarred under these circumstances will be prohibited from applying for readmission to the bar. The amendments reflect the judgement of the Court that in some instances lawyer misconduct may be so egregious as to warrant a sanction of permanent disbarment based on the facts of an individual case and in consideration of the guidelines set forth in Appendix E [now Appendix D] to the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. The amendments are substantially similar to the recommendations of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the House of Delegates of the Louisiana State Bar Association.

․

The amendments we now adopt recognize that there are some types of misconduct that are so serious that where the sanction of disbarment is imposed, an application for readmission will not be considered. [Emphasis added.]

Petitioner's counsel essentially asks the court to now disregard this long-settled policy and instead give him additional bites at the proverbial apple to relitigate the question this court already definitively decided in 2012—namely, whether permanent disbarment is warranted in his case.  ⁹ I see no basis for petitioner to ask this court to ignore its rules, or redefine the term “permanent” to mean something other than what was clearly intended.

This court's opinion in In re: Shepherd, 11-2011 (La. 6/22/12), 91 So. 3d 283, made a clear finding that petitioner breached the standard of conduct expected of an attorney serving in a position of public trust by engaging in money laundering activities, ironically utilizing his client trust account, while serving as a state senator. These actions undeniably caused harm to the public and the public perception of attorneys. Other than providing a rebuttal to my concurring opinion, petitioner's rehearing application raises no new facts or arguments other than mentioning two retired justices, and there is nothing in the application for rehearing that would cause me to reconsider my decision denying petitioner's latest request for reconsideration of his permanent disbarment. Petitioner's disciplinary matter is long final, and this court should not countenance his repeated attempts to revisit the sanction that was appropriately imposed against him nearly fourteen years ago.

Granting relief in an individual case, as petitioner requests, would only serve to engender chaos and confusion among the profession and the public and potentially require this court to once again review each prior case of permanent disbarment, taking time away from matters much more pressing than whether permanent really means permanent. In my opinion, the amendment to Rule XIX was not designed to rehear each and every permanent disbarment as is being urged by petitioner's lawyer in this matter, and a ruling in favor of petitioner in this matter would open that door wide and would burden this court exponentially. In my view, the amendment to the Rule was designed to be prospective when determining whether to apply permanent disbarment; not as a passkey to reconsider long resolved matters.

While I acknowledge and applaud petitioner's efforts to engage in public service and his efforts to put this incident behind him, I believe any decision that would allow petitioner to resume the practice of law would only serve to undermine the public confidence that the court's 2012 decision sought to insure. I conclude with advice from President Abraham Lincoln, himself an attorney: “Resolve to be honest in all events; and if in your own judgment you cannot be an honest lawyer, resolve to be honest without being a lawyer.”

FOOTNOTES

1.   Rule 1.12(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides:[A] lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding consent after disclosure. [Emphasis added.]As shown by the prior history of this case, former Justice Scott Crichton was not on the court when the original opinion in Shepherd I was rendered in 2012, but he participated in Shepherd II in 2020 and Shepherd III in 2023. In both cases, he voted to deny the request for “abatement.”Interestingly, the same issue arose in 2012, when retired Chief Justice Calogero sought to enroll as counsel for the very same petitioner in this matter during the original proceedings in Shepherd I. After this court allowed him to enroll as counsel, the ODC filed a motion to disqualify based on Chief Justice Calogero's prior participation in Shepherd's 2008 interim suspension. This court granted the motion to disqualify on March 28, 2012. The court's order stated:It is ordered that this court's action of February 13, 2012 granting the motion to enroll Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. and Jennifer Deasy as counsel for respondent be and hereby is recalled. See Rule 1.12 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. It is further ordered that any pleadings filed by respondent's prior counsel shall be withdrawn from this court's records and shall be returned to respondent. Respondent shall be granted forty-five days from the date of this order to enroll substitute counsel and file any relevant pleadings.In a footnote, the court stated:Considering the lack of jurisprudence from this court interpreting Rule 1.12, we find Mr. Calogero and Ms. Deasy acted in good faith in seeking to enroll. Nonetheless, we must conclude that Mr. Calogero, while serving as a member of this court, personally and substantially participated in In re: Shepherd, 08-1890 (La. 8/14/08), 988 So.2d 243, a proceeding arising from the same matter currently before the court. Accordingly, Mr. Calogero is disqualified from serving as counsel pursuant to Rule 1.12(a), and Ms. Deasy is disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.12(c).The facts of the current matter are strikingly similar to the facts which caused the court to disqualify Chief Justice Calogero in 2012. The only difference is that the ODC filed a motion to disqualify Chief Justice Calogero's case. In this matter, particularly with the affidavit suggesting that two other former justices would participate, the appearance of impropriety is striking.

2.   The affidavit indicates former Justices Crain and Genovese are “willing․ to provide testimony or information relevant to the implementation and intent of [La. S.Ct. Rule XIX, § 10(A)(1)].”

3.   The former justice appearing in this matter as petitioner's attorney, along with the two other former justices mentioned in the affidavit, voted to enhance their salaries and retirement benefits, a portion of which was found to be “noncompliance with state law and may be an improper use of state general funds” by the Legislative Auditor in a management letter dated September 20, 2023. See https://lla.la.gov/go.nsf/get?OpenAgent&arlkey=80230012APPP-CVTP2Q (last visited 6/24/26). Please see also the memorandum to the Judicial Compensation Commission, dated December 4, 2025, available on request from the Judicial Administrator who staffs the Commission.Drawing on his inside knowledge of the inner working of the Supreme Court, counsel for petitioner further asks that this matter be resolved by a particular group of justices, following a recent election. I find that request offensive. In my view, invoking intercession of these three former justices of this court does not serve petitioner whatsoever, and implies that influence plays a role in resolution of cases before this court.

4.   The term “abatement” is a term apparently coined for this matter. According to Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.) “abatement” is “[t]he act of eliminating or nullifying,” or “[t]he suspension or defeat of a pending action for a reason unrelated to the merits of the claim.” The word “abatement” does not appear in Rule XIX, § 10(A)(1).

5.   The 2020 petition was denied by an order dated October 20, 2020, with then Chief Justice Johnson and then Justice Crain not signing. The 2023 petition was denied on April 4, 2023, with two Justices voting to grant, and then Justice Crain not signing. In re: Shepherd, 11-2011 (La. 4/4/23), 358 So. 3d 865. Then Justice Genovese, like then Justice Crichton, voted to deny both of petitioner's prior requests for “abatement,” as did a majority of justices.

6.   Ordinarily, the reconsideration of denial of a requested action is summarily dismissed. See, e.g., La. S.Ct. Rule IX, § 1.

7.   This court's records indicate that since the enactment of permanent disbarment in Rule XIX, there have been 169 permanent disbarments as of December 31, 2025. There have been two permanent disbarments so far in 2026. The hearing of “abatement cases” would potentially create employment opportunities for some lawyers.

8.   Then Associate Justice Kimball concurred in part and dissented in part from the order. She would have preferred that all disbarments be permanent, and she would have considered extending the maximum term of a suspension from three years to five years.

9.   It is noted that while petitioner now requests an evidentiary hearing, he specifically did not avail himself of the right to present evidence in connection with his original formal charges. As discussed in the court's 2012 opinion, petitioner was given an opportunity to participate, but he did not do so:[Petitioner] initially failed to file an answer to the formal charges, and as a result, the factual allegations thereof were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. Thereafter, [petitioner] answered the formal charges and admitted his criminal conviction, but denied any misconduct. Accordingly, the deemed admitted order was recalled, and this matter was set for a formal hearing on the merits on September 14, 2010.In June 2010, [petitioner] filed a motion to continue the hearing until April 2011, citing his enrollment in a substance abuse treatment program at the federal penitentiary where he was incarcerated. The hearing committee chair denied [petitioner=s] motion for a continuance, and the hearing proceeded as scheduled on September 14, 2010. [Petitioner] did not appear at the hearing or seek to participate by telephone, nor was counsel present at the hearing to represent him. [Footnote omitted; emphasis added.]

WEIMER, C. J., concurring in denial of rehearing.