STATE OF LOUISIANA v. WESLEY JOSEPH JARRELL (2026)

Writ application granted in part. See per curiam.

JMG

JLW

JBM

PDG

CRC

AHP

Supreme Court of Louisiana June 16, 2026

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-K-01464

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

WESLEY JOSEPH JARRELL

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany

PER CURIAM

Writ granted in part. Defendant's sentence for second degree rape is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Defendant argues that the trial court committed an error patent by improperly sentencing him based on the version of La. R.S. 14:42.1(B) in effect at the time of sentencing, rather than the version in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. Prior to amendment by 2020 La. Acts No. 32, § 1, La. R.S. 14:42.1(B) provided that an offender of that statute “shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more than forty years. At least two years of the sentence imposed shall be without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.” (Emphasis added.) However, the current version of that provision, which was in effect at the time of sentencing, states that the offender “shall be imprisoned at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, for not less than five nor more than forty years.” See La. R.S. 14:42.1 (B).

The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years of imprisonment at hard labor and ordered the entire sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Although defendant's sentence is legal under either version of the statute, the record indicates that prior to imposing this sentence, the trial court incorrectly recited the sentencing provision in effect at the time of sentencing, instead of the applicable sentencing provision in effect at the time of the offense. See State v. Sugasti, 01-3407, p. 4 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518, 520.

Because defendant did not make or file a motion to reconsider sentence in the trial court, he is precluded from objecting to his sentence on appeal. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E). Nonetheless, we find this error reviewable as an error patent. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 920(2); see also State v. Spruell, 403 So.2d 63, 64-65 (La. 1981); State v. Thomas, 19-0409, pp. 2, 18-19 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/25/19), 289 So.3d 1030, 1034-35, 1044-45 (Penzato, J., concurred in part; Lanier, J., dissented in part), writ granted in part and remanded on other grounds, 19-01819 (La. 6/22/20), 297 So.3d 727.

In the present matter, the trial court's recitation of the inapplicable sentencing provision suggests that it mistakenly believed it was required to order that the entirety of any sentence be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, as opposed to only two years of the sentence, as required by the applicable provision. For this reason, we find that the trial court's imposition of this sentence is reversible error. See Spruell, 403 So.2d at 64 (“[A] sentence founded on an incorrect view of the law should usually be set aside.”). Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to sentence defendant based on the sentencing provision set forth in the version of La. R.S. 14:42.1(B) in effect at the time of the commission of the offense.

In all other respects, the writ is denied.

Hughes, J., dissents.