STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LUIS OROBIO JR (2026)

Writ application granted. See per curiam.

CRC

JLW

JBM

AHP

Supreme Court of Louisiana March 31, 2026

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-K-01303

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

LUIS OROBIO, JR.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans Criminal

PER CURIAM

Granted. The court of appeal's ruling vacating the defendant's conviction and remanding the matter to the trial court for a new trial is reversed. The jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder is reinstated.

On September 7, 2015, defendant stabbed his girlfriend, Keywanda Mitchell, and her brother, Jeremy Mitchell, who was asleep on a couch in the living room at the time. State v. Orobio, 24-565 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/15/25) (unpub'd). Keywanda survived the attack, but Jeremy died from his injuries two days later. Defendant was indicted on one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted second degree murder.

In May 2016, defendant withdrew his initial plea of not guilty and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court appointed a sanity commission, and in 2023, Dr. Sarah Deland testified at a competency hearing that she found insufficient support to conclude the defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offenses.

Trial began in March 2024. During voir dire, a prospective juror indicated their difficulty accepting the legal concept that a defendant could be deemed not guilty by reason of insanity.¹ The defense moved to strike the potential juror for cause based upon the fact that the potential juror said that he would have a higher standard than probable cause for reaching a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court denied the challenge, and the defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges.

The court of appeal reversed, vacated defendant's convictions, and remanded the matter for a new trial. The majority concluded that despite the potential juror expressing skepticism regarding the defense of insanity, there was no attempt to rehabilitate the potential juror. Relying on several cases ² which found that a juror's “reluctant” responses or misgivings in their ability to apply a presumption of innocence, the court of appeal found that “an unequivocal statement by Prospective Juror that he absolutely could not follow applicable law regarding the defense's burden of proof is not necessary to warrant a granting of a challenge for cause.” State v. Orobio, 24-565, p. 54 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/15/25) (unpub'd). Moreover, the majority found the prospective juror stated he did not believe a plea of guilty by reason of insanity should absolve a person of their crimes, and thus, he would not be able to follow the law. Accordingly, the court of appeal found, the trial court failed in its duty to grant a challenge of cause in this instance. We disagree.

A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and these rulings will be reversed only when a review of the voir dire record as a whole reveals an abuse of discretion. State v. Cross, 1993-1189, pp. 6–7 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 683, 686–87. In order to establish reversible error in the denial of a challenge for cause, a defendant must show that: (1) he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges; and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant his challenge for cause. State v. Juniors, 03-2425, p. 8 (La. 6/29/05), 915 So. 2d 291, 305. Furthermore, “[w]hen assessing whether a challenge for cause should be granted, the trial judge must look at the juror's responses during her entire testimony, not just ‘correct,’ isolated answers; or, for that matter, ‘incorrect,’ isolated answers.” State v. Lee, 559 So. 2d 1310, 1318 (La. 1990) (internal citations omitted). A trial court's refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause is not an abuse of discretion notwithstanding that the juror has voiced an opinion seemingly prejudicial to the defense, when subsequently, on further inquiry or instruction, the juror has demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. Cross, 658 So. 2d at 688; State v. Robertson, 630 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (La. 1994).

During voir dire, defense counsel asked the potential jurors: “If you find it more probable than not that he was insane at the time of the offense, if you believe or again, based on the evidence that's presented by the state and the defense, find it more probable than not that he was insane at the time of the offense, could you vote not guilty by reason of insanity?” A potential juror responded: “I don't know, honestly. I think it would take a lot of convincing to feel like someone should be absolved of their crime for that reason.”³ We agree with Judge Dysart in his dissent that such a statement is not an indication that this potential juror would not have followed the judge's instructions. Notably, this potential juror was never asked whether he would not follow the law, as this standard would have been set forth in the judge's instructions. Although the trial court is in the best position to ask relevant questions as to whether the prospective juror would follow the law as given, this court has instructed that until unequivocal responses indicating impartiality are elicited, the burden remains on the party seeking to exclude the prospective juror to demonstrate impartiality though continued questioning. See State v. Dotson, 16-0473, pp. 12-13 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So.3d 34, 43; State v. Taylor, 99-1311, p. 9 (La. 1/17/01), 781 So.2d 1205, 1214.

In this matter, the burden remained with the defendant, who was obligated to clarify through continued questioning whether the prospective juror would follow the instructions given by the trial court. Defendant did not meet his burden of proving the potential juror lacked impartiality. The potential juror's responses here indicate some misgivings regarding an insanity defense but fall short of indicating an inability to follow the law. Equivocal responses will generally not provide sufficient grounds for removal for cause. See Dotson, 16-473 at 13, 234 So. 3d at 43.

Accordingly, given the vast discretion afforded the trial court, we find no error in its ruling denying the challenge for cause. The court of appeal's decision vacating the defendant's convictions and remanding the matter for a new trial is reversed. Defendant's convictions for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder are hereby reinstated.

REVERSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The relevant portion of the voir dire was as follows:BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:And so[,] I hate to harp on this, but again, if you found that it's more likely than not that he was insane at the time of the offense could you find or vote for a not guilty by reason of insanity?․BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:[Prospective Juror]?BY PROSPECTIVE JUROR:I don't know, honestly. I think it would take a lot of convincing to feel like someone should be absolved of their crime for that reason.BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:And by “a lot of convincing,” would you say that you have a higher standard[,] which is more likely than not?BY PROSPECTIVE JUROR:Yeah.BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:And even if the judge instructed you that it is more likely than not, that you'd have a hard time following that?BY PROSPECTIVE JUROR:Wait, can you - -BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:So again, if the judge told you that that is the standard that you're supposed to follow, again, that it is more likely than not that he was insane at the time of the offense, then you must vote not guilty by reason of insanity, you'd have a hard time following that instruction?BY PROSPECTIVE JUROR:Yeah. Well I just don't think an insanity plea should absolve you of your crime.BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:Okay. And that's why I was talking earlier, though, you're not getting released, you're not going back on the street, you're going to the hospital for, again, potentially for the rest of your life.BY PROSPECTIVE JUROR:Yeah.BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:It all depends when they decide to release you. Well not release you, just step you down to different levels of security ․

2.   See State v. Munson, 12-327 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So. 3d 6, writ denied, 13-1083 (La. 11/12/13), 126 So. 3d 476; State v. Bozeman, 03-897 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/27/04), 866 So. 2d 1029, writ denied, 04-497 (La. 7/2/04), 877 So. 2d 141; and State v. Livas, 00-524 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/17/01), 808 So. 2d 415.

3.   See n. 1, supra.

Hughes, J., dissents and would deny. McCallum, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Griffin, J., dissents and would deny. Guidry, J., dissents and would deny.