IN RE: JUDICIARY COMMISSION File Nos. 25-342 & 25-420 (2026)

This matter arises from complaints of judicial misconduct filed with the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) against two judges. The Commission dismissed the complaints without formal investigation. Complainant now seeks relief in this court.

Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 3(a) provides that the Commission shall conduct an inquiry into a complaint alleging “facts indicating that a judge has engaged in willful misconduct relating to his or her official duty, or willful and persistent failure to perform his or her duty, or persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, or malfeasance while in office․”

While legal errors generally do not require an investigation under Rule XXIII, Sec. 3(a)(3), this provision is directed only at reasonable exercises of discretion used in the deliberative process concerning cases. Nothing in Rule XXIII or our Code of Judicial Conduct immunizes the dereliction of duties related to the administration of justice. Even in the context of a legal error, an investigation is warranted when the error was part of a pattern and practice, was egregious, or constituted malfeasance. See La. S.C. Rule XXIII, Sec. 3(a)(3). Malfeasance in office is “misconduct by a judge in an official capacity that seriously undermines public confidence in the judiciary, including ․ any intentional or other failure to perform any duty required by law.” See La. S.C. Rule XXIII, Sec. 3(a)(6). A repetitive disregard for duties and obligations, even in a single case, could give rise to “persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office in disrepute.” See La. S.C. Rule XXIII, Sec. 3(a)(1).

We find the facts alleged in the complaints at issue rise to a level justifying further inquiry and investigation. Accordingly, acting pursuant to the provisions of La. Const. Art. V, § 25(C) and Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 3(a), we remand this matter to the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana for a formal investigation of the complaints filed herein.  ¹ Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 23, all filings in this matter shall remain confidential, but this order shall be public.²

REMANDED ³

I concur in the decision to remand, but dissent from the denial of the motion to seal for the reasons assigned by Justice Guidry.

The citizens who wrote and enacted the Constitution established the Judiciary Commission to protect them from acts of justices and judges that violate the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the Constitution and laws of this State. The 2024 constitutional amendments to the Judiciary Commission provisions reinforce this concept. The Judiciary Commission cannot make “administrative” or “institutional” determinations as to what matters it will or will not evaluate, but must follow the applicable constitutional provisions and the rules established by the Supreme Court.

Every case brought before the Judiciary Commission requires some degree of legal analysis. The Judiciary Commission is staffed with attorneys, and an overwhelming number of Commissioners are attorneys, with many being judges or retired judges. The determination not to make an inquiry, investigate, or call for a response from a justice or judge, adversely impacts the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Such a determination is equivalent to a football team punting on first down.

Rule V of the Rules of the Judiciary Commission provides, in part, that “[a]ll complaints received by the Commission shall be answered in writing with such commentary or explanation as the Commission may deem advisable.” (Emphasis added.) Rule VI of the Rules of the Judiciary Commission provides, in part, that “[t]he preliminary inquiry shall ordinarily consist of Special Counsel sending the respondent judge a copy of the written complaint and inviting the respondent judge to provide a written response to the allegation in the complaint. ․ Instead of inviting the respondent judge to respond to the allegation in the complaint with a written response, Special Counsel may invite the respondent judge at his or her option to provide a ‘documentary response’ ․.” (Emphasis added.)

Louisiana S.Ct. Rule XXIII, Sec. 3a(1) states the Judiciary Commission “shall make a preliminary inquiry.” (Emphasis added.) Merriam-Webster Dictionary,¹ provides three definitions for “inquiry”² : “a request for information,” “a systemic investigation often of a matter of public interest,” and “examination into facts or principles: RESEARCH.” Regardless of the definition applied, the mandatory inquiry must occur. “Shall” deployed in Rule XXIII, Sec. 3a(1) means “mandatory.” See La. R.S. 1:3. Thus, the Judiciary Commission is not provided with discretion to refuse to conduct any inquiry whatsoever. The Judiciary Commission members cannot have confidential conversations among themselves and then refuse to act, except in limited circumstances detailed herein. Confidential conversations cannot be what is meant by the rule that mandates a “preliminary inquiry” when one considers the dictionary definition of inquiry.

The jurisdictional limitations on the Judiciary Commission are established by the Constitution and Rule XXIII, sec. 3a(1). The Judiciary Commission is not authorized to simply pick and choose what matters it refuses to evaluate. Such a system would introduce inconsistency, a lack of objectivity, and unfortunate subjectivity that would be inappropriate and enable an investigatory body to deprive the Supreme Court of its authority to adjudicate. The limitations on conducting a preliminary inquiry are established by Rule and not by the Commission. The only limitation is as follows:

The Commission, upon receiving a complaint that is not obviously unfounded or frivolous, or conclusionary or contradictory on its face, and alleges facts indicating a judge has engaged in willful misconduct related to his or her official duty, or willful and persistent failure to perform his or her duty, or persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, ․ or has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, SHALL make a preliminary inquiry to determine whether further investigation of the allegations of judicial misconduct ․ is warranted.

La. S.Ct. Rule XXIII, Sec. 3a(1) (emphasis added).

As indicated, “shall” is mandatory. See La. R.S. 1:3. The Judiciary Commission is not afforded discretion to do nothing unless the complaint is “obviously unfounded or frivolous, or conclusionary or contradictory on its face.” “Allegations” are sufficient to prompt the mandatory inquiry. The Supreme Court Rule mandates a “preliminary inquiry.” The Constitution presumes and the public expects the Commission will proceed if the complaint carefully lays out facts and supported allegations that clearly demonstrate the matter is worthy of investigation, based on the words of the Rule.

Nothing in the Constitution allows the Judiciary Commission to shirk its responsibility to make an inquiry. Indeed, the Constitution suggests an investigation should occur, providing the scope of this court's power to act “after an investigation by the Judiciary Commission.” See La. Const. art. § 25(C) (2024).³ The Constitution prevails over any Rule to the contrary. The Supreme Court Rule requires, at a minimum, an “inquiry.” Rule XXIII, Sec. 3a(1) places limitations on what mandates a “preliminary examination,” but nothing in the Rule places a limitation on investigating the facts established and documented in a complaint. Stated another way, unless the facts of the complaint are “obviously unfounded or frivolous, or conclusionary or contradictory on its face,” the “preliminary examination” is required.

The Judiciary Commission often states in brief and argument that it protects the judiciary and the taxpaying public. With that, I agree. The Judiciary Commission is also part of our system of checks and balances. But the Commission cannot do so if it fails to make an inquiry, despite having the authority and, I suggest, the obligation to do so. The Commission is not an adjudicatory body and is “only an investigatory and accusatory body” which “is not a court.” In re Whitaker, 463 So.2d 1291, 1296-97 (La. 1985). The Commission is empowered to investigate disciplinary cases within the judiciary and recommend disciplinary action. Id. at 1296. If the Commission ignores the mandatory obligation to conduct an inquiry and does not investigate or accuse, then it does nothing to protect the public and the judiciary from abuse by those elected to serve, and who are instead self-serving and take advantage of the public fisc.

It is the obligation of each public official to serve and to not be served. It is unconscionable for anyone elected to public office to take advantage of the public who elected them. Those without power, prestige, or pecuniary wealth trust public officials to be public servants and hold those who take advantage of the system accountable. The Judiciary Commission was created to apply the Constitution, laws, rules, and Code of Judicial Conduct as written to protect the public and the public.

A Judiciary Commission's decision not to exercise the legally conferred jurisdiction enables those few in power from being called to task for taking advantage of the public they were elected to serve. The Commission's essential role is to prevent those in power from abusing that power to the detriment of the public. When those with judicial power are not subjected to an inquiry or interviewed or investigated, or called on to respond–except when the complaint is obviously unfounded or frivolous, or conclusionary or contradictory on its face–there is a failure in our system of check and balances.⁴

Louisiana State University Professor Lee Hargrave was the coordinator of legal research for the Constitutional Convention of 1973 and conducted research for the Judiciary Committee. His law review article titled “The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974” is the seminal article addressing the judiciary in the constitution. See 37 La. L. Rev. 765.

Professor Hargrave observed:

By the language of [La. Const.] Article V, Section 25, the supreme court cannot act on its own initiative to discipline a judge, but must respond to recommendation of the commission. The court, of course, is not bound to accept the commission's recommendations; the reference is that the court may impose discipline. Since the reference is to disciplining “a judge,” without that term being qualified, the disciplinary procedure extends to all judges. This would include judges of the supreme court, since the terminology of the article is to use the term “judge” all-inclusively and not to make a technical distinction between judges and justices. [Footnote omitted; emphasis added; 37 La. L. Rev. at 828-29.]

Professor Hargrave quotes the clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution and makes the following observations that the grounds for discipline are “expanded” and the standards of conduct are “more stringent.”

Continued as grounds for discipline are “willful misconduct relating to his official duty” and “persistent failure to perform his duty.” The prior ground, “conviction, while in office, of a felony” is expanded to encompass “conduct while in office which would constitute a felony” even if a judge is not actually tried and convicted, as well as “conviction of a felony” regardless of the time the conviction or the conduct occurred. The more stringent standards of conduct the [constitutional] convention adopted are also reflected in the new ground for discipline based on less serious infractions: “persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.” ․ [37 La. L. Rev. at 829.]

The Constitution was made “more flexible” and “expands the range of disciplinary sanctions.”

Section 25 is more flexible than the predecessor provision in that it expands the range of disciplinary sanctions. It continues the prior sanctions of removal from office and involuntary retirement, but also adds provisions for censure and suspension from performance of duties with or without salary. ․

․

These Changes give the commission and the court broader powers and more flexibility. The broader range of sanctions, particularly in allowing less drastic ones, will allow action in less serious cases of misconduct than before. ․[5] [La. L. Rev. at 829; emphasis added.]

In sum, if the Judiciary Commission fails to exercise the full extent of its jurisdiction and screens out cases that are “not obviously unfounded or frivolous, or conclusionary or contradictory on its face” without the mandatory preliminary inquiry, it in turn adversely limits the adjudicative authority of the Supreme Court.

Preliminarily, I dissent from the denial of the motion to seal as it relates to the order released by this court, which I believe violates this court's rules regarding confidentiality. I find it curious that the majority would seal the other filings in this matter but make public this court's order, particularly because this court is the final arbiter of the discipline to be imposed, and at this stage of the proceedings, should avoid the appearance of our having prejudged this matter. That is exactly why our own rules regarding directing the Judiciary Commission to conduct investigations require that those orders be issued under seal. Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXIII, Section 3(a)(1) states, in pertinent part, that “The Commission may make such preliminary inquiry ․ upon directive of a majority of the Supreme Court pursuant to Article V, § 25(C) of the Constitution in the form of a sealed order to the Chief Executive Officer or Special Counsel specifying the name of the judge and the allegations to be investigated.” (Emphasis added.) The majority cites this authority as a basis to issue the order yet inexplicably ignores the portion of the rule requiring the order to be sealed. Confidentiality rules serve an important function ensuring that public disclosure occurs only after an investigation demonstrates “probable cause to believe a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct sufficiently serves to warrant a recommendation of discipline has occurred” that helps preserve public confidence in the judiciary. See La. S.C. Rule XXIII, § 4(a). Moreover, confidentiality at the early stages of proceedings protects complainants and witnesses who might otherwise be reluctant to come forward for fear of retaliation or public scrutiny and protects the Commission members from outside pressure.¹

Further, I dissent from the action taken in this matter by the majority, which violates this court's own rules and is premature, unprecedented, and in my opinion, is an unwarranted encroachment on the constitutional authority of the Judiciary Commission.

Under recent amendments promulgated by this court to our Rule XXIII, Section 3(c), an appeal is provided upon a completed investigation. That rule renders this appeal premature, and it should have been dismissed as such. Our exclusive original jurisdiction is not involved here because there has been no recommendation of discipline following an investigation by the Judiciary Commission. Nor does the majority's action comport with the proper exercise of our recently acquired constitutional authority to direct that the Commission institute an investigation. This is an extraordinary authority that should be used judiciously in light of the constitutional role of the Commission. However, that is not procedurally how this matter has presented itself to this court. Further, the per curiam herein recognizes the Judiciary Commission's response in which it details certain developments which occurred after the complaint was dismissed, which in my opinion renders the appeal moot. Yet, despite these developments, the majority nevertheless unexplainably persists in taking this extraordinary and unprecedented action in violation of our own rules, which at this time is not only unwarranted but unnecessary. The public and the judges of our state deserve to be able to rely on consistent and predictable proceedings in which established rules and procedures are adhered to. Anything less undermines confidence in our judicial discipline process. Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would dismiss the appeal as prematurely filed and based on new developments since its filing, as moot.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

1.   We are cognizant of the Judiciary Commission's response in which it details certain developments which occurred after the complaint was dismissed. Despite these developments, we are convinced the interests of justice are best served by a remand to the Commission for a full and complete investigations of the allegations as to both judges.

2.   The Court recognizes that Judiciary Commission Rule IV provides that a complainant can appeal an adverse screening decision only to the Commission and the “decision made by the Commission concerning the appeal shall be final.” We find this provision conflicts with this Court's constitutional authority pursuant to Article V, § 25(C).

3.   The complainant's motion to file a supplemental brief is also granted.

1.   “Dictionaries are a valuable source for determining the ‘common and approved usage’ of words.” Gregor v. Argenot Great Cent. Ins. Co., 02-1138, p. 7 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 959, 964 (citing Louisiana Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Assoc. 1993, Inc. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 02-1928, p. 5 (La. 4/9/03), 845 So.2d 1039, 1042).

2.   Merriam-Webster, est. 1828, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inquiry accessed on March 20, 2026.

3.   The version of this provision prior to the 2024 amendment also presumably contemplated an investigation by the Judiciary Commission as it provided this court had power to act “on recommendation of the Judiciary Commission.”

4.   If the powerful take from the people, and you say you are neutral, the people will never understand or appreciate your neutrality. Inspired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu.

5.   A 2024 constitutional amendment specifically addresses “malfeasance.” However, malfeasance has always been considered a sanctionable offense.

1.   See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835-36, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 1540, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (discussing the reasons behind the “collective judgment that confidentiality promotes the effectiveness ․ of scrutinizing judicial conduct and integrity” by judicial conduct commissions).

PER CURIAM * FN* Judge Allison H. Penzato of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, appointed Justice pro tempore, sitting for the vacancy in the First District.

Weimer, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons. Griffin, J., dissents and would dismiss as moot. Guidry, J., dissents and assigns reasons.