MOSES v. STATE (2026)

Writ granted. The court of appeal's ruling is reversed and the district court's ruling that denied the State's motion in limine is reinstated. See La. R.S. 15:572.8(D) (“The court may consider any relevant evidence regardless of whether it was admissible in, or excluded from, the criminal trial in which the petitioner was convicted.”); State v. Stewart, 16-2154 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So.3d 985 (recognizing that in ruling on a petition for wrongful conviction compensation, the district court is not limited to consideration of the evidence presented at the hearing, and instructing it “to consider the entirety of the record, including evidence previously admitted as part of defendant's post-conviction proceedings). We hereby lift the stay previously imposed.

The wrongful conviction compensation statute, La. R.S. 15:572.8, is sui generis and the only authority governing petitions for compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Jones v. State, 22-1455, p. 4 (La. 5/5/23), 362 So.3d 341, 344. The statute sets forth the process and details specific requirements to obtain relief, providing in part:

A. A petitioner is entitled to compensation in accordance with this Section if he has served in whole or in part a sentence of imprisonment under the laws of this state for a crime for which he was convicted and: (1) The conviction of the petitioner has been reversed or vacated; and (2) The petitioner has proven by clear and convincing scientific or non-scientific evidence that he is factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.

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C. All petitions for compensation as provided in this Section shall be filed in the district court in which the original conviction was obtained, hereinafter referred to as “the court”, and shall be governed by procedures outlined herein and randomly re-allotted by the court.

D. The court shall render a final decision on all petitions for compensation filed in accordance with the provisions of this Section and shall be tried by the judge alone. The court may consider any relevant evidence regardless of whether it was admissible in, or excluded from, the criminal trial in which the petitioner was convicted.1

E. The attorney general shall represent the state of Louisiana in these proceedings. The court shall serve a copy of any petition filed pursuant to this Section upon the attorney general and the district attorney of the parish in which the conviction was obtained and upon the court that vacated or reversed the petitioner's conviction or upon the pardon board if the conviction was vacated through executive clemency within fifteen days of receiving such petition. Upon receipt of the petition and of confirmation of service on the attorney general's office, the court shall ask the state, through the attorney general's office, to respond to the petition within forty-five days of service of the petition. A maximum of two extensions of thirty days may be granted by the court upon written request by the state for cause shown. The court shall set a hearing within forty-five days of the attorney general's response. Unless otherwise provided herein, the Louisiana rules of evidence shall apply.

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(Emphasis added.)

Section (D) clearly allows the court to consider all relevant evidence, regardless of its admissibility. Although Section (E), provides that the rules of evidence “shall apply,” this does not negate the provision in Section (D). Importantly, the mandate that the rules of evidence apply is prefaced by “unless otherwise provided herein.” Section (D) of the statute does just that—provides herein—by unambiguously stating that all relevant evidence can be considered. Reading the statute as a whole and harmonizing its provisions is consistent with our rules of statutory interpretation. As this court has explained:

[C]ourts are bound, if possible, to give effect to all parts of a statute and to construe no sentence, clause, or word as meaningless and surplusage if a construction giving force to, and preserving, all words can legitimately be found.

Furthermore, a statute should be construed in such way as to reconcile, if possible, apparent inconsistencies so that each part is given effect. Since the meaning is to be determined from a general consideration of the act as a whole, all parts, provisions, or sections must be read together; each must be considered with respect to, or in the light of, all the other provisions, and construed in harmony with the whole.

Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Jackel Int'l Ltd., 19-0749, p. 8 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So.3d 572, 577-78 (internal citations omitted).

Such a reading is also aligned with the legislative intent. As originally enacted in 2005, the statute contained no reference to the rules of evidence. It provided only that in rendering a decision the court could consider “any relevant evidence regardless of whether it was admissible in, or excluded from, the criminal trial in which the applicant was convicted.” See La. Acts 2005, No. 486, § 1 (effective September 1, 2005). When the statute was amended in 2007, the legislature added the language relative to application of the rules of evidence. See La. Acts 2007, No. 262, § 1 (effective August 15, 2007). However, notably, the statute retained the provision liberally allowing consideration of “any relevant evidence regardless of whether it was admissible in, or excluded from, the criminal trial in which the petitioner was convicted.” This legislative action is indicative of its intent to not restrict admissibility by the rules of evidence.

This court has previously recognized that in meeting his evidentiary burden under the statute, a petitioner is “aided by liberal evidentiary rules allowing the presentation of any relevant scientific or non-scientific evidence regardless of whether it was admissible in the criminal trial wherein the petitioner was convicted.” Jones, 22-1455 at 5, 362 So.3d at 344-45. However, despite this liberal allowance of evidence, the statute does not dictate the weight, if any, the court may afford it. Such determination is properly left to the discretion of the judge at the hearing. Moreover, it should also be noted that the state will be permitted to rebut the evidence.

For the above reasons, and finding the words of the statute unambiguous, I agree with the per curiam opinion.

Affidavits and other exhibits were admitted at Moses's criminal post-conviction relief hearing by joint stipulations between the district attorney and defense. Those stipulations were specifically limited in their application to the post-conviction relief hearing. I believe the Court of Appeal was correct in ruling that the stipulations from the previous criminal matter are not binding in this civil compensation proceeding. See La. R.S. 15:572.8 (providing the Louisiana rules of evidence apply at the contradictory hearing on the petition for wrongful conviction compensation). I disagree that this Court's writ action in State v. Stewart, 16-2154 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So.3d 985, created an exemption that requires admission of all evidence from the post-conviction relief hearing at the compensation hearing, without analysis of its admissibility under the rules of evidence.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A post-conviction proceeding is sui generis and has both criminal and civil legal characteristics. The proceeding allows the petitioner to challenge the legality of his confinement, and ultimately results in the criminal conviction being upheld or reversed. See State v. Harris, 18-1012, pp. 10-11 (La. 7/9/20), 340 So.3d 845, 853. Accordingly, the post-conviction proceeding operates as an extension of the criminal trial in which the petitioner was convicted, and is an adjunct to “the criminal trial in which the petitioner was convicted.” See also State v. Stewart, 16-2154, p. 1 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So.3d 985 (“the district court is not limited to consideration of the evidence presented at the hearing, but is instructed to consider the entirety of the record, including evidence previously admitted as part of defendant's post-conviction proceedings.”).

PER CURIAM

Weimer, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. McCallum, J., dissents. Griffin, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by Chief Justice Weimer. Guidry, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by Chief Justice Weimer. Cole, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Penzato. Penzato, J., dissents and assigns reasons.