BRODEN v. PRIORITY MANAGEMENT GROUP (2026)

We ordered briefing in this matter to consider whether defendant Priority Management Group, L.L.C. (“PMG”) is entitled to summary judgment, based on PMG's argument that it is a “qualified heath care provider” under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“Act”) and that the allegations against it sounded in medical malpractice. See La. R.S. 1231.1, et seq. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and grant summary judgment.¹

The Legislature enacted the Act in response to a “perceived medical malpractice insurance ‘crisis.’ ” Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., L.L.C., 2015-1754 (La. 3/15/16), 187 So. 3d 436, 439. The legislature “intended the [Act] to reduce or stabilize medical malpractice insurance rates and to assure the availability of affordable medical service to the public.” Id. To achieve these goals, the Act provides two advantages to providers that qualify as “qualified health care providers” under the Act: a limit on the amount of damages, and the right to an opinion from a medical review panel before a plaintiff may proceed in litigation. Id.

Plaintiffs alleged PMG intentionally underfunded a nursing home it manages, co-defendant Riverlands Home Group, LLC d/b/a Chateau St. James Rehab and Retirement (“Chateau”), which led to understaffing and inadequate care provided to Russell Alexander, who was a Chateau resident for several months before his death. Plaintiffs argue their claims against PMG are administrative negligence claims that do not involve healthcare and are therefore not subject to the Act. PMG, in its motion for partial summary judgment, contends that the allegations fall squarely within the protections afforded by the Act, as they are “malpractice” claims under the definitions set forth in the Act and qualify as “health care” rendered to Mr. Alexander. PMG further argues that plaintiffs “purposefully characterized” the claims against PMG as administrative negligence claims to avoid the Act's cap on damages. La. R.S. 40:1231.2.

As an initial matter, PMG met its burden of proof to establish a prima facie case that it is a “qualified health care provider” under the Act. Since 2003, the definition of a qualified provider under the Act has expressly included health care management companies, as well as any officer, employee, partner, member, shareholder, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his employment. La. R.S. 40:1231.1(A)(10). PMG enrolled as a qualified health care provider and held a certificate of enrollment from the Patient's Compensation Fund for the relevant time period in this case. Because PMG is a qualified health care provider, and plaintiffs did not refute this, the question becomes whether the claims constitute medical malpractice within the meaning of the Act or are more properly characterized as general negligence.

At the time of the alleged acts and omissions at issue here, the Act defined “malpractice” as:

[A]ny unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient, including failure to render services timely and the handling of a patient, including loading and unloading of a patient, and also includes all legal responsibility of a health care provider arising from acts or omissions during the procurement of blood or blood components, in the training or supervision of health care providers, or from defects in blood, tissue, transplants, drugs, and medicines, or from defects in or failures of prosthetic devices implanted in or used on or in the person of a patient.

La. R.S. 40:2131.1(13) (emphasis added).² The Act also defined “health care” as “act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement․” La. R.S. 40:2131.1(9).

Plaintiffs cause of action against PMG arises directly from “health care” performed by PMG—specifically, by acts PMG took or failed to take during Mr. Alexander's care. Any determination as to whether PMG breached its duty of care to Mr. Alexander ultimately turns on the level and adequacy of the health care provided to him. Rather than analyzing these facts in light of the statutory definitions, the trial court improperly focused on whether PMG must have rendered “core” medical treatment to a patient for its actions to be considered medical malpractice.³ In doing so, the trial court disregarded the plain language of “health care” and “malpractice” under La. R.S. 40:2131.1(A) and presupposed a “hands on treatment” requirement that does not exist. Returning to first principles and reviewing the plain language of “health care” and “malpractice” in the Act, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the claims here are medical malpractice claims, and PMG is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C. art. 966.

Although the statutory language alone answers the question presented here, understanding that the statute cannot provide an outline of every possible medical malpractice situation, this Court has set forth six factors to assess whether the conduct at issue sounds in medical malpractice or general negligence, as outlined in Coleman v. Deno, 01-1517 (La. 1/25/02), 813 So. 2d 303.⁴ While the issue in this case typically presents on an exception of prematurity, reviewing courts also use to Coleman factors in the summary judgment context. Billeaudeau v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth., 16-0846, p.12 (La. 10/19/16), 218 So. 3d 513, 521.

The claims against PMG meet the first two factors of Coleman, “whether the particular wrong is treatment related or caused by a dereliction of professional skill,” and “whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached.” Coleman, p. 17, 813 So.2d at 315. The claims of understaffing and poor staffing directly relate to the degree of care that was, or should have been, provided to Mr. Alexander. Importantly, expert medical evidence will be required to establish both the standard of care for the sufficiency of nursing staff based on Mr. Alexander's needs, whether those medical needs were properly assessed, and whether PMG breached the standard of care by failing to ensure Chateau had sufficient resources to care for Mr. Alexander in accordance with his needs.⁵ Compare, e.g., Williamson v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson, 04-0451, p.11-12 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So. 2d 782, 790 (finding that while expert testimony could be necessary to establish whether wheelchair maintenance was proper, expert medical testimony was not required).⁶

The claims against PMG also satisfy the remaining Coleman factors. The alleged acts or omissions of PMG, including the failure to provide sufficient competent staff to meet Mr. Alexander's needs, would require an assessment of his condition and plan of care during his stay at Chateau. Likewise, the injuries to Mr. Alexander would not have occurred if he had not sought treatment at Chateau, a nursing home managed by PMG. Finally, though Plaintiffs allege the underfunding of Chateau was “intentional,” this does not establish an intentional tort sufficient to circumvent the requirements and protections of the Act.⁷

The Act grants qualified health care providers certain limitations on liability for unintentional torts that constitute medical malpractice as defined in the Act. To summarize, our review of this case indicates that the claims against PMG, a qualified health care provider, which allegedly caused the injuries to and death of Mr. Alexander, are “health care” and “malpractice” under the definitions set forth in La. R.S. 40:2131.⁸ The claims do not sound in general negligence, but rather embody the very policies the Act is meant to promote. See Dupuy, supra. For these reasons, we reverse the denial of summary judgment and grant summary judgment in favor of PMG, finding these claims subject to the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant. La. C.C. art. 966. “A summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate; i.e. whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Schultz v. Guoth, 10-0343, p.6 (La. 1/19/11), 57 So. 3d 1002, 1005-06.

2.   The parties argue the effect of Act 342 of the 2025 Regular Session, effective August 1, 2025, which changed the language of La. R.S. § 40:1231.1 to amend the Act's definitions of healthcare provider and malpractice to include certain additional types of negligence. Specifically, La. R.S. 40:1231.1(13) states that “malpractice” “includes all acts associated with the medical treatment of an individual, whether directly related to clinical care or performed in an administrative or managerial capacity necessary for the delivery of such care.” The amendment also changed the definition of “heath care” and “health care provider” under La. R.S. 40:1231.1(9) and (10). While the new amendments clarify the existing law, they do not impact our analysis here, which finds that these claims were—under either version of the law—medical malpractice claims.

3.   The trial court found in conclusory manner that the wrongful conduct complained of was not directly related to the treatment for which Mr. Alexander was admitted to Chateau as “the determination and provision of medical care, staff, and staffing are not at the very core of the treatment of a patient” and that a review of Coleman factors was “unnecessary.”

4.   The Coleman factors are: (1) whether the particular wrong is treatment related or caused by a dereliction of professional skill; (2) whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached; (3) whether the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the patient's condition; (4) whether an incident occurred in the context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to perform; (5) whether the injury would have occurred if the patient had not sought treatment; and (6) whether the tort alleged was intentional.

5.   See generally Douglas Pathway Management of La. LLC, 56-040 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/25), 408 So. 3d 1186 (“[T]he administrative claims of understaffing set forth in plaintiff's petition tend to show the degree of care which was, or should have been, provided to plaintiff, and the appropriate standard of care are questions which require expert medical knowledge ․ Likewise, the opinion of experts will be required to determine if [the management company] breached the standard of care by, inter alia, failing to ensure [the nursing home] had sufficient resources to maintain adequate staffing to meet plaintiff's needs in accordance with her plan of care.”); Patterson v. Claiborne Operator Group, LLC, 55-264, p.14 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/23), 374 So. 3d 299, 310 (examining understaffing and inadequate staffing claims and finding that “they are all related to an alleged failure to provide care, which is the very essence of the LMMA”) (emphasis in original).

6.   See also Blevins v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 07-0127 (La. 6/29/07), 959 So. 2d 440, 442, 443 (equipment in a proper working condition).

7.   Intent for these purposes requires that the person committing the action “consciously desires the physical result of his act” or that the injuries were “substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be.” Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 481 (La. 1981). In this context, that would require proving PMG consciously desired the injuries or death of Mr. Alexander or that the same was substantially certain to follow its conduct, which they did not do in this case. Simply using the word “intentional” does not convert a medical malpractice claim into an intentional tort.

8.   This case is distinct from Billeaudeau v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth., 16-0846 (La. 10/19/16), 218 So. 3d 513. Unlike the allegations in Billeaudeau, the allegations here do not involve PMG's failures to follow its own bylaws or review compliance with professional education requirements. As noted in Thomas v. Reg'l Health Sys. of Acadiana, LLC, 2019-00507 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So. 3d 595, 602, the Billeaudeau allegations “could be asserted against any number of employers not just in the realm of healthcare for negligently hiring an unqualified professional.” Id.

PER CURIAM

Griffin, J., dissents and would deny.