STATE v. JOSEPH (2026)

Writ granted. Relief denied. Defendant was charged with second degree murder by grand jury indictment on September 5, 2018. As this Court previously explained:

[T]he State must commence trial within two years of the date of institution of the prosecution. La. Code Crim. P. art. 578(A)(2). The limitation period may be extended by the effect of suspension or interruption. See, e.g., La. Code Crim. P. arts 578, 580; State v. Mouton, 23-723 (La. 5/10/24), 384 So. 3d 845, 848. A preliminary plea or motion filed by the defendant suspends the limitation period until the trial court rules thereon; however, in no case shall the State have less than one year after the ruling to commence trial. La. Code Crim. P. art. 580. A preliminary plea is any plea filed after the prosecution is instituted and before the trial that causes the trial to be delayed, including motions to quash, motions to suppress, or motions for continuance, as well as applications for discovery and bills of particulars.1 Mouton, 382 So. 3d at 848. The limitation period is interrupted if the defendant cannot be tried because of insanity or because his presence for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other cause beyond the State's control. La. Code Crim. P. art. 579 (A)(2). Once the cause of interruption no longer exists, the time period commences to run anew. La. Code Crim. P. art. 579(B). When the defendant shows the State has failed to bring him to trial within the time specified by Article 578, the State bears the heavy burden of demonstrating either an interruption or a suspension of the time limit extended the time to commence trial. State v. Morris, 99-3235 (La. 2/18/00), 755 So. 2d 205, 205 (per curiam).

State of Louisiana v. Travis Demond Joseph, 25-206 (La. 6/25/25), 412 So.3d 216.

As of the filing of defendant's Motion to Quash on September 18, 2024, more than two years had passed since the indictment and trial had not begun. Thus, on its face, defendant's Motion to Quash had merit and the State bore the heavy burden of showing the limitation had not expired when the motion was filed via either interruption or a suspension of the time limit. State v. Morris, 99-3235 (La. 2/18/00), 755 So. 2d 205 (per curiam).

The trial court denied defendant's Motion to Quash, stating in its oral reasons: “The court feels that the delay in bringing this matter to a resolution or trial has not been caused by the state and defense has failed to show otherwise.” The court of appeal denied defendant's writ application, and defendant sought review in this Court.²

This Court issued a Per Curiam on June 25, 2025, cited supra, correcting the error in placing any burden on the defense and instructing the trial court to provide reasoning to this Court as to the relevant events which constituted the delay in prosecution. This Court also instructed the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing (if necessary) to complete the record.³ Declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the trial court thereafter submitted its own per curiam to this Court on September 3, 2025.

Having reviewed the voluminous record in this matter and the trial court's Per Curiam, we conclude the trial court ultimately reached the correct result in denying defendant's Motion to Quash and therefore deny defendant's writ application. Specifically, we find that the record does not reflect that any, much less all, of the various Motions filed by defendant in Case #18-161 (Second Degree Murder) on January 3, 2020, were ever ruled upon or otherwise resolved before defendant filed the Motion to Quash. The trial court's per curiam confirms this, noting “the minutes are absent as to a resolution.”⁴ As a result, the speedy trial clock in Case #18-161 was suspended as of January 3, 2020, and remains so. Therefore, based upon the record before this Court, we find the trial court correctly denied defendant's Motion to Quash the indictment for Second Degree Murder.

Despite this conclusion, we find it prudent to address several serious misstatements in the trial court's reasons set forth in its own Per Curiam responding to this Court's remand. Initially, we note the trial court failed to identify defendant's date of indictment for Second Degree Murder (September 5, 2018), as the beginning of the time period for prosecution pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 578 under the facts of this case. As noted above, La. C.Cr.P. art. 578(A)(2) provides that in a non-capital felony case, the State must commence trial within two years of the date of institute of the prosecution. The “institution of prosecution” in this matter began when defendant was indicted for Second Degree Murder on September 5, 2018. Thus, the trial court's calculation of the running of time from the defendant's charge for manslaughter (in Case #18-101) on May 29, 2018, is incorrect.

The trial court's per curiam also incorrectly finds that a defense Motion for Discovery filed in Case #18-101 (Manslaughter) suspended the running of the prescriptive period (as of June 19, 2018) and remained so indefinitely as to both the Manslaughter (#18-101) and Second Degree Murder (#18-161) charges. These motions were filed before the murder indictment was even returned. Their continuance thereafter could only suspend the time to try the murder charge if the defense converted them into applying to the murder charges. There is no evidence of that in this record.

Finally, the trial court per curiam repeatedly incorrectly states that defendant's filing of a Motion to Consider Bond in Case #18-161 “continued to suspend the running of time.” As noted above, a preliminary plea or motion filed by a defendant suspends the limitation period until the trial court rules on said motion. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 580. A preliminary plea “is any pleading or motion filed by the defense which has the effect of delaying trial.” State v. Brooks, 02-792, p. 6 (La. 2/14/03), 838 So.2d 778, 782. Preliminary pleas include “properly filed motions to quash, motions to suppress, or motions for a continuance, as well as applications for discovery and bills of particulars.” Id. Joint motions to continue are also included as preliminary pleas, but motions to reduce bond, motions for speedy trial, and motions to continue status conferences that do not affect the trial date are not. See State v. Bessard, 20-84 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/18/20), 307 So.3d 1158; State v. Barnett, 50,213 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/12/15), 174 So.3d 748; State v. Tillman, 43,569 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/22/08), 997 So.2d 144, writ denied, 08-2836 (La. 9/25/09), 18 So.3d 85 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court erred in finding that defendant's Motion to Consider Bond suspended the running of time under La. C.Cr.P. art. 580.

Consequently, while we ultimately conclude there is no merit to defendant's writ application and hereby deny relief, we caution the trial court not only in its assessment of speedy trial calculations but also proper record keeping of dispositions occurring within its court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Prosecution is instituted “on the date when the indictment is returned or the bill of information is filed.” State v. Smith, 07-959 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/08), 982 So. 2d 831, 834.

2.   State v. Travis Demond Joseph, 24-1222 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/17/25) (unpub'd). Judge Miller dissented and would deny the writ on the showing made, finding the record did not contain sufficient information to determine the disposition of the various motions.

3.   Chief Justice Weimer dissented and assigned reasons, with which Justices Griffin and Guidry joined. The dissenting justices would have granted defendant's Motion to Quash, finding the State did not meet its heavy burden of proving the prescriptive period was interrupted or suspended.

4.   The keeping of minutes in this case should be improved. There was often no reference as to what particular motion was being heard or its disposition.

PER CURIAM

Guidry, J., dissents.