WILLIAM ALAN PESNELL AND DOUGLAS WADE PESNELL v. RONNIE WILLIAMS JR AND STACY MCQUEARY (2025)

Writ application granted in part. See per curiam.

PDG

JDH

WJC

JBM

JMG

CRC

Supreme Court of Louisiana October 01, 2025

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-C-00513

WILLIAM ALAN PESNELL AND DOUGLAS WADE PESNELL

VS.

RONNIE WILLIAMS, JR., AND STACY MCQUEARY

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Natchitoches

PER CURIAM

Writ granted in part. Prevailing parties in public records suits shall be awarded attorneys’ fees. La. R.S. 44:35(D)(1). This language is not limited to litigation in the trial court.¹ Prevailing parties include those who are provided with documents after filing suit but before final judgment. Aswell v. Division of Administration, 15-1851, p. 7 (La. App 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 196 So. 3d 90, 94.

La. R.S. 44:35(F) limits fees payable in public records suits to the maximum the Attorney General pays for outside counsel. Thus, while there is no statutory minimum, a fee award this far below the applicable statutory limit is indicative of an abuse of discretion. For attorneys with ten or more years of experience, the Attorney General pays up to $350.00 per hour. The defense does not dispute that Ronald E. Corkern Jr. has practiced law for 50 years and worked 28.3 hours on the appeal below. The court of appeal only awarded Mr. Corkern $70.00 an hour. Under these facts and considering this record, we find the amount awarded to Mr. Corkern is abusively low and increase it to a reasonable rate of $250.00 an hour for a total of $7,075.00. In all other respects the writ is denied.

REVERSED IN PART

I agree with the majority that the attorney's fees awarded below were abusively low. However, consideration of a reasonable attorney fee award should be left to the trial court, on an evaluation of the record, utilizing the “lodestar method” and framework this court adopted in Covington v. McNeese State Univ., 12-2182 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 343, citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) and Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).¹ Thus, I dissent from the setting of the amount of attorney fees and would remand the determination of reasonable attorney fees to the trial court based on the complete record. See Capital City Press v. East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council, 96-1979, p. 13 (La. 7/1/97), 696 So.2d 562, 569; Boren v. Taylor, 16-2078, p. 9 (La. 6/29/17), 223 So.3d 1130, 1135.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Applicant does not request an award of fees for litigation in this Court. Therefore, none are awarded.

1.   Under the lodestar method, the initial estimate of a reasonable attorney fee is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate. A reasonable hourly rate is determined using the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 and 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541. Upward adjustment may be justified in the rare case where the fee applicant offers specific evidence to show that the quality of service rendered was superior to that one reasonably should expect in light of the hourly rates charged and that the success was “exceptional.” Id., at 899, 104 S.Ct., at 1549. While I dissented, in part, in Covington, I did so as I disagreed with cutting the hours expended by a percentage and not identifying specific, redundant or excessive entries, as I found the cut would not produce reasonably predictable results in future cases. Even so, I find the lodestar method is the appropriate analysis for the trial court's evaluation of reasonable attorney fees on remand. The statute in this matter, La. R.S. 44:35, sets forth the maximum the Attorney General pays for outside counsel, thus setting a ceiling but not a floor.

Weimer, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.