STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TRAVIS DEMOND JOSEPH (2025)

Writ application granted. See per curiam.

JDH

WJC

JBM

CRC

Supreme Court of Louisiana June 25, 2025

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-KK-00206

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

TRAVIS DEMOND JOSEPH

On Supervisory Writ to the 23rd Judicial District Court, Parish of Assumption

PER CURIAM

In a non-capital felony case, the State must commence trial within two years of the date of institution of the prosecution. La. Code Crim. P. art. 578(A)(2). The limitation period may be extended by the effect of suspension or interruption. See, e.g., La. Code Crim. P. arts. 578, 580; State v. Mouton, 2023-00723 (La. 5/10/24), 384 So. 3d 845, 848. A preliminary plea or motion filed by the defendant suspends the limitation period until the trial court rules thereon; however, in no case shall the State have less than one year after the ruling to commence trial. La. Code Crim. P. art. 580. A preliminary plea is any plea filed after the prosecution is instituted and before the trial that causes the trial to be delayed, including motions to quash, motions to suppress, or motions for continuance, as well as applications for discovery and bills of particulars. Mouton, 384 So. 3d at 848. The limitation period is interrupted if the defendant cannot be tried because of insanity or because his presence for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other cause beyond the State's control. La. Code Crim. P. art. 579(A)(2). Once the cause of interruption no longer exists, the time period commences to run anew. La. Code Crim. P. art. 579(B). When the defendant shows the State has failed to bring him to trial within the time specified by Article 578, the State bears a heavy burden of demonstrating either an interruption or a suspension of the time limit extended the time to commence trial. State v. Morris, 99-3235 (La. 2/18/00), 755 So. 2d 205, 205 (per curiam).

In this case, prosecution was instituted by grand jury indictment on September 5, 2018. As of September 18, 2024, when defendant filed the motion to quash, trial had not commenced. On its face, the motion to quash had merit; therefore, the State bore the burden of showing the limitation had not expired when the motion was filed. See Morris, 755 So. 2d at 205.

The trial court denied the motion to quash. The court of appeal denied writs, with one judge stating he would deny on the showing made because the record did not contain sufficient information to determine the disposition of the various motions.

We remand this matter to the trial court, which is ordered to file a per curiam with this Court on or before August 29, 2025, explaining its ruling. In the per curiam, the trial court is ordered to detail the relevant events that prompted the delay in prosecution, specifically identifying each filing by caption and date, with an explanation of the interruptions and/or suspensions resulting from each. If necessary, the trial court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to complete the record, a transcript of which shall be attached to the per curiam filed with this Court.

Finding defendant's motion to quash should have been granted, I must respectfully dissent from the decision to remand this matter to the district court.

It is undisputed that defendant was indicted by a grand jury on September 5, 2018, and has yet to go to trial. Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 578(A)(2), the State had two years from the date the prosecution was instituted to commence defendant's trial–i.e., September 5, 2020. Since the two-year time-period was exceeded, defendant's motion to quash appears to have merit on its face. As noted in the Per Curiam decision, when a defendant brings an apparently meritorious motion to quash, the State bears a heavy burden to demonstrate either an interruption or suspension of time such that the limitation period has not expired. State v. Morris, 99-3235, p. 1 (La. 2/18/00), 755 So.2d 205, 205 (emphasis added):

The trial court erred in giving the state the benefit of the doubt on the issue of prescription. Once the accused shows that the state has failed to bring him to trial within the time periods specified by La. C.Cr.P. art. 578, the state bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that either an interruption or a suspension of the time limit tolled prescription. [citations omitted].

Here, the district court erred by failing to shift the burden of proof to the State, and instead finding the defendant had failed to prove the delay in bringing the matter to trial was caused by the State. The district court explained its ruling, stating: “[t]he court feels that the delay in bringing this matter to a resolution or trial has not been caused by the state and defense has failed to show otherwise.”

Moreover, a review of this matter makes clear the State failed to meet its heavy burden. No evidence was introduced at the hearing on the motion to quash. The State essentially argued the delay in prosecution was caused by defendant repeatedly firing counsel and enrolling new counsel, filing his own pro se motions, and that defendant had not made a prima facie showing of prescription. The State simply attached a series of minute entries to its opposition to the motion to quash. Even accepting that the district court was allowed to take judicial notice of its own proceedings,¹ the record in this case ² fails to independently satisfy the State's burden.

Because the State has the burden in this case, the State was required to prove the prescriptive period was interrupted or suspended. The State introduced no evidence and simply relied on record entries, without sufficiently connecting items in the record with its position. While the record demonstrates when certain motions were filed, the record is unclear regarding if or when some motions were ruled on by the district court. Some rulings are not reduced to orders, and the minute entries do not always clearly reflect which motions were addressed at a particular hearing. Moreover, the State's arguments rely, in part, on motions filed by defendant under docket numbers other than the one at issue on the motion to quash.³ In sum, the State's showing fell short and defendant's motion to quash should have been granted.

The State now literally dumps a stack of documents in this court's lap in its attempt to show the statutory time-period had not expired. By attaching the district court record to its opposition in this court, the State apparently expected this court to conduct a de novo review and sort through the various record deficiencies noted above to establish the correct timeline and outcome of relevant motions. However, it is not this court's obligation to manufacture a solution to the State's failure to submit sufficient evidence to meet its heavy burden. Instead, it is this court's role to follow the law, specifically, the correct burden of proof under the applicable standard of review, wherever that leads.

There is no justification to remand this matter to the district court. Although the majority apparently recognizes the lack of sufficient proof in the record, rather than simply reverse the district court's ruling and grant defendant's motion to quash, the majority essentially orders the district court to fix the State's mistakes thereby providing the State with a proverbial “second bite at the apple” to satisfy its heavy burden, a remedy to which the State is not entitled, and a remedy rarely, if ever, afforded to a defendant. By doing so, the majority opinion effectively replicates the district court's error of shifting the burden to the defendant. Instead, defendant's motion to quash should be granted on the record before this court as it currently exists.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See, e.g., State v. Hotoph, 99-243, p. 30 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/10/99), 750 So.2d 1036, 1053.

2.   The State submitted what it purports to be a full copy of the record as an exhibit in the Appendix filed in this court. There is no evidence these documents were introduced into evidence during the hearing, or that this exhibit constitutes a complete record.

3.   Defendant faced charges under three docket numbers.

Weimer, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons. Griffin, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Chief Justice Weimer. Guidry, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Chief Justice Weimer.