STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DARRELL DEWAYNE DRAUGHN (2025)

Writ application granted. See per curiam.

JMG

JLW

PDG

Supreme Court of Louisiana April 28, 2025

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-KD-00505

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

DARRELL DEWAYNE DRAUGHN

On Supervisory Writ to the 1st Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo

PER CURIAM

Writ granted. In 2003, applicant/defendant was convicted of the April 10, 2000 first degree murder of Loretta White, in violation of R.S. 14:30(A)(1). The trial court sentenced him to death in accordance with the jury verdict. The conviction and death sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007). In 2007, applicant/defendant filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief. While collateral review was not yet complete, the district court signed a warrant of execution setting the execution date for May 28, 2025. We ordered the warrant be recalled and instructed the district court to “to establish a briefing schedule, subject to amendment only for good cause, so that defendant may file a counseled supplement to his pro se post-conviction application.” State v. Draughn, 25-00424 (La. 4/11/25), ___ So.3d ___ (available at 2025 WL 1095719).

On remand, the district court set the deadline for the filing of the counseled supplement to be May 16, 2025, and gave the state 28 days from then to file its opposition. Applicant/defendant seeks review of that ruling, contending, inter alia, that it will be impossible to conduct an investigation and complete the supplemental post-conviction application within the time afforded. We agree.

After careful review, we find that the district court abused its discretion in requiring applicant to file a counseled supplement to the pro se application in a capital case within just 29 days and mere weeks after current counsel enrolled in the case. Death penalty litigation has and continues to be an ever-evolving and complex part of our system of justice. For many reasons, this matter has lingered without resolution and at too high a cost. While it should be litigated and resolved expeditiously, we note that 29 days is less than the time that would be afforded to apply for discretionary appellate review of a misdemeanor conviction.

Time and time again the United States Supreme Court has reminded us “death is different” because that sentence, once imposed, cannot be rectified. See e.g. Woodson v. N. Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). This Court has acknowledged there is a “heightened need for reliability in the determination that a death sentence is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” State v. Coleman, 14-0402 p. 79-80, (La. 02/26/16), 188 So.3d 174. It is incumbent on our system of justice to ensure the imposition of the sentence is properly applied, not in haste, but also without delay for the sake of delay. Prudence dictates that proceedings must be expedited in a logical manner which ensures the rights of both the State and the defendant are properly protected and not lost in an effort to quickly resolve the matter.

Under the circumstances here, we find that a briefing deadline of 180 days for applicant/defendant to file his counseled post-conviction application is necessary to satisfy the goals enumerated above. Cf., e.g., State ex rel. Wearry v. State, 08-2673 (La. 6/26/08), 12 So.3d 968. We vacate the trial court's briefing schedule order and remand with instructions for the trial court to set a new briefing schedule consistent with the views expressed herein.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Implicit in this court's ruling ordering that the prematurely issued warrant of execution be recalled and instructing the district court “to establish a briefing schedule, subject to amendment only for good cause” was the direction that the briefing schedule for the counseled capital post-conviction supplement set by the district court be a reasonable one. See, State v. Draughn, 25-00424, p. 1 (La. 4/11/25), __ So.3d __. Based on this court's experience with capital post-conviction matters, the briefing schedule set by the district court on remand is neither reasonable nor realistic.

I agree that this matter has lingered for far too long, but the responsibility for the delay does not lie solely with the defendant. All participants in the system – from the prosecution to the defense to the courts – share some degree of responsibility for the delays that have occurred in this case. Those delays – which are in the past – cannot be cured by depriving the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to pursue the post-conviction avenue granted by law.

What this court can do, and what the district court must do, is to ensure that, henceforth, the post-conviction process proceed in an orderly, rational and fair manner that grants both the State and the defendant sufficient time and opportunity to advance their respective positions. The briefing schedule set by the district court does not accomplish that. And, the defendant is not the only party to have recognized this fact: when the district court initially suggested that it was considering setting a briefing schedule of three weeks for the defendant followed by 10 days for the State to respond, the State objected. While the State's objection was heeded, and it was afforded additional time for its response, the defendant's request for additional time was denied, despite the State's concession that the record in this case is “rather voluminous.” Notably, through no fault of his own, the defendant has been without formally enrolled representation from 2011 until March of this year, when present counsel enrolled. The 29 days allowed the defendant by the district court's briefing schedule is simply not sufficient time under these circumstances for full and fair collateral review by newly enrolled counsel, especially given the State's admission as to the “rather voluminous” nature of the record.

I share the frustration of my colleagues with protracted delays, but setting unrealistic time lines is counterproductive to moving forward, as this application demonstrates. Rather than addressing the merits of the defendant's case, counsel have had to devote time and valuable resources to the pursuit of interlocutory relief in this court. There is an old saying: haste makes waste. This case illustrates the continued relevance of that adage.

I concur only because applicant's former attorneys are long gone and new counsel only enrolled in March. While 29 days is too short, I'm not sure 180 days is necessary. One side is pushing and the other will delay in any way possible. The trial court must enforce reason to resolve this matter as soon as possible without unnecessary litigation.

Eighteen years ago this Court affirmed defendant's first-degree murder conviction and death sentence and ordered the expeditious litigation of any post-conviction relief claims. State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So. 2d 583, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007). Defendant filed a pro se “shell” application for post-conviction relief without specific information or substantive complaint, which in my opinion does not constitute an application, that has languished for seventeen years. Earlier this month, this Court prematurely ordered the district court to recall the warrant of execution and order a briefing schedule, subject to amendment for good cause, to allow defendant to file a counseled supplement to the “shell” application. State v. Draughn, 2025-00424 (La. 4/11/25), ___ So. 3d ___ (2025 WL 1095719). In compliance with this Court's directive, the district court established a briefing schedule that allowed defendant twenty nine days to file a counseled supplement. Now, without the slightest suggestion of error in either his conviction or sentence to warrant relief, the majority again hastens to disrupt these proceedings and cause further delay by vacating the briefing schedule.

The majority concludes the district court allowed too short a time for defendant to file a counseled post-conviction application simply because this is a capital case, ignoring that defendant has had nearly two decades to supplement his “shell” application. In State v. Reed, 2025-00423 (La. 4/11/25), ___ So. 3d ___ (2025 WL 1095302), this Court similarly ordered the district court to recall a warrant of execution and establish a briefing schedule to allow the defendant to file a counseled supplement to his pro se “shell” post-conviction relief application. Reed's counseled supplement was filed seven days after his death warrant was signed, and before this Court issued its ruling. That is not to say all counseled applications for post-conviction relief in capital cases can be filed in that time frame. Rather, the prompt filing in Reed undermines the majority's conclusion that a twenty-nine-day deadline is per se unreasonable and more time is required for defendant to file his counseled application.

When the majority last intervened in this matter, it did so while a motion to dismiss the “shell” application on procedural grounds was pending in the district court. The majority's action prevented the State from presenting evidence at that time of prejudice caused by the inordinate delays in this case. Here, the majority again ignores the rights of the State in its representation of the people of Louisiana. There is no legal reason to grant relief to defendant at this time and on this record. I dissent.

Although the defendant's pro se post-conviction application has been pending for seventeen years, it was not “left” to languish. Rather, the defendant was without enrolled counsel to investigate and draft a “counseled” supplement to his pro se application for post-conviction relief for most of those years. So, while counsel in State v. Reed, 25-00423 (La. 4/11/25), ____ So. 3d ____, 2025 WL 1095302, filed a supplement to the defendant's pro se, “shell” post-conviction application shortly after the death warrant was issued in that case, Reed's counsel has been enrolled longer than counsel for the defendant herein. Reed's present counsel enrolled in June 2024, well over nine months before filing the counseled supplement to Reed's pro se post-conviction application on April 7, 2025. Counsel for the defendant herein enrolled last month in March 2025. Additionally, prior counsel for Reed had completed a significant portion of the post-conviction investigation for Reed's case in 2018 and 2019. The delay in filing Reed's counseled supplement was due to the State's action of having Reed's prior counsel disqualified in 2019.

Thus, under the circumstances of this case, it is eminently proper to minimally allow the defendant's present counsel a similar amount of time as that taken by Reed's present counsel to prepare a counseled supplement to the defendant's pro se post-conviction application.

Weimer, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Hughes, J., concurs and assigns reasons. Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons. McCallum, J., dissents. Guidry, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Cole, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Crain.