STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DARRELL DEWAYNE DRAUGHN (2025)

Implicit in this court's ruling ordering that the prematurely issued warrant of execution be recalled and instructing the district court “to establish a briefing schedule, subject to amendment only for good cause” was the direction that the briefing schedule for the counseled capital post-conviction supplement set by the district court be a reasonable one. See, State v. Draughn, 25-00424, p. 1 (La. 4/11/25), __ So.3d __. Based on this court's experience with capital post-conviction matters, the briefing schedule set by the district court on remand is neither reasonable nor realistic.

I agree that this matter has lingered for far too long, but the responsibility for the delay does not lie solely with the defendant. All participants in the system – from the prosecution to the defense to the courts – share some degree of responsibility for the delays that have occurred in this case. Those delays – which are in the past – cannot be cured by depriving the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to pursue the post-conviction avenue granted by law.

What this court can do, and what the district court must do, is to ensure that, henceforth, the post-conviction process proceed in an orderly, rational and fair manner that grants both the State and the defendant sufficient time and opportunity to advance their respective positions. The briefing schedule set by the district court does not accomplish that. And, the defendant is not the only party to have recognized this fact: when the district court initially suggested that it was considering setting a briefing schedule of three weeks for the defendant followed by 10 days for the State to respond, the State objected. While the State's objection was heeded, and it was afforded additional time for its response, the defendant's request for additional time was denied, despite the State's concession that the record in this case is “rather voluminous.” Notably, through no fault of his own, the defendant has been without formally enrolled representation from 2011 until March of this year, when present counsel enrolled. The 29 days allowed the defendant by the district court's briefing schedule is simply not sufficient time under these circumstances for full and fair collateral review by newly enrolled counsel, especially given the State's admission as to the “rather voluminous” nature of the record.

I share the frustration of my colleagues with protracted delays, but setting unrealistic time lines is counterproductive to moving forward, as this application demonstrates. Rather than addressing the merits of the defendant's case, counsel have had to devote time and valuable resources to the pursuit of interlocutory relief in this court. There is an old saying: haste makes waste. This case illustrates the continued relevance of that adage.

WEIMER, C. J., additionally concurs