STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DARRELL DEWAYNE DRAUGHN (2025)

Eighteen years ago this Court affirmed defendant's first-degree murder conviction and death sentence and ordered the expeditious litigation of any post-conviction relief claims. State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So. 2d 583, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007). Defendant filed a pro se “shell” application for post-conviction relief without specific information or substantive complaint, which in my opinion does not constitute an application, that has languished for seventeen years. Earlier this month, this Court prematurely ordered the district court to recall the warrant of execution and order a briefing schedule, subject to amendment for good cause, to allow defendant to file a counseled supplement to the “shell” application. State v. Draughn, 2025-00424 (La. 4/11/25), ___ So. 3d ___ (2025 WL 1095719). In compliance with this Court's directive, the district court established a briefing schedule that allowed defendant twenty nine days to file a counseled supplement. Now, without the slightest suggestion of error in either his conviction or sentence to warrant relief, the majority again hastens to disrupt these proceedings and cause further delay by vacating the briefing schedule.

The majority concludes the district court allowed too short a time for defendant to file a counseled post-conviction application simply because this is a capital case, ignoring that defendant has had nearly two decades to supplement his “shell” application. In State v. Reed, 2025-00423 (La. 4/11/25), ___ So. 3d ___ (2025 WL 1095302), this Court similarly ordered the district court to recall a warrant of execution and establish a briefing schedule to allow the defendant to file a counseled supplement to his pro se “shell” post-conviction relief application. Reed's counseled supplement was filed seven days after his death warrant was signed, and before this Court issued its ruling. That is not to say all counseled applications for post-conviction relief in capital cases can be filed in that time frame. Rather, the prompt filing in Reed undermines the majority's conclusion that a twenty-nine-day deadline is per se unreasonable and more time is required for defendant to file his counseled application.

When the majority last intervened in this matter, it did so while a motion to dismiss the “shell” application on procedural grounds was pending in the district court. The majority's action prevented the State from presenting evidence at that time of prejudice caused by the inordinate delays in this case. Here, the majority again ignores the rights of the State in its representation of the people of Louisiana. There is no legal reason to grant relief to defendant at this time and on this record. I dissent.

CRAIN, J., dissenting.