STATE v. TATE (2025)

Granted in part. The district court's ruling granting the State's procedural objections to applicant's post-conviction claims is vacated with respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as well as the Brady and Napue claims. The matter is remanded to the district court for resolution of these claims on their merits after the State has an opportunity to file an answer. In all other respects, the writ application is denied.

The writ application is properly granted in part. As Justice Guidry points out in his concurrence, this court has long had a practice of addressing post conviction relief matters following a capital conviction without input from the court of appeal. Like Justice Guidry, I have expressed criticism when this court has exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to bypass the court of appeal's review. However, over a substantial period of time, parties to post conviction litigation have sought relief in this court without complaint that the matter should be first heard by the court of appeal. I would not refer to the parties’ actions as “disingenuous,” but, rather, as strategic decisions. Because of the nature of capital litigation, ultimately these cases will come to this court for consideration. If a party to a post conviction relief action decides to appeal to the court of appeal prior to filing a writ in this court, the party clearly can do so. It is then that the parties can present contrasting arguments about whether the court of appeal should or should not address the merits. Without contradictory argument, this court should not bind itself to a decision without hearing from both sides. In this matter, both sides opted to come to this court for resolution of their differences. This fact distinguishes my dissenting opinions in Calhoun v. Landry, 25-00316 (La. 3/18/25), 403 So.3d 521 and Scott v. Louisiana State Police, 24-01591 (La. 1/9/25), 398 So.3d 634, noted and quoted in Justice Guidry's concurrence, and I stand by my decisions in those matters. Different circumstances, dictated by the voluntary actions of the parties in this case, dictate a different result. For these reasons, I respectfully additionally concur in the per curiam.

I agree with granting in part the defendant's writ application to remand the identified claims to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. I write separately to express my disagreement with this Court's practice of allowing parties to bypass the court of appeal and seek direct review by this Court of rulings on capital applications for post-conviction relief.

While this Court has direct appellate jurisdiction over capital appeals pursuant to La. Const. art. V § 5(D), no similar provision in the constitution gives this Court sole jurisdiction to review capital post-conviction cases. In addition, La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.6(A) provides that “[t]he petitioner may invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the court of appeal if the trial court dismisses the application or otherwise denies relief on an application for post conviction relief.” Furthermore, La. Const. art. V § 10(A) gives the court of appeal “supervisory jurisdiction over cases which arise within its circuit.” State v. Anthony, 22-01615, p. 1 (La. 11/7/22), 349 So. 3d 975.

As has been recognized by members of this Court, to the extent it is not mandated or otherwise necessary, this Court should not forsake the benefit of having the intermediate appellate court flesh out the issues raised. See Calhoun v. Landry, 25-00316, pp. 2-3 (La. 3/18/25), 403 So.3d 521, 525-26 (Weimer, C.J., dissenting)(“Historically, this court has rarely taken up matters that bypassed the other courts and then only when there were significant issues needing immediate attention and the facts were stipulated or uncontested. Our system of justice provides for deliberation and a defined formal procedure and process, from which this court should rarely, if ever, depart”), reh'g denied, 25-00316, p. 2 (La. 3/22/25), 403 So.3d 599 (Weimer, C.J., dissenting)(“[D]eparting from the deliberative process set forth constitutionally and statutorily does a disservice to our system of checks and balances.”); Scott v. Louisiana State Police, 24-01591, p. 1 (La. 1/9/25), 398 So.3d 634, 635 (Weimer, C.J., dissenting) (“I respectfully dissent from the court's decision to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to bypass the court of appeal's appellate review of the issues presented in this case. Rather than short circuit the normal appellate process, I would remand this matter to the court of appeal for expedited briefing, arguments and decision.”).

It has been recognized that while the United States Supreme Court has held that under the Eighth Amendment, death penalty cases require a heightened standard of reliability,¹ procedurally, courts merely claim to abide by such standard while applying the same procedural standards as used in noncapital cases. Hence, the mere pronouncement by courts that they are following heightened standards “creates a veneer of legitimacy and procedural caution that does not match the substantive analyses the courts are undertaking.” Anna VanCleave, The Illusion of Heightened Standards in Capital Cases, 2023 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1289, 1293 (2023).

Even more problematic, some courts are using the Eighth Amendment's requirement of heightened standards to justify denying certain procedural protections for capital defendants. These courts invoke heightened reliability standards to justify giving the government more leeway on procedures like evidentiary rules, appellate procedures, and jury instructions. At state and federal levels, in other words, the requirement of heightened reliability often not only adds little or no meaningful process but can actually undermine certain specific rights of capital defendants.

Id. (Footnotes omitted.)

This Court has embarked on a practice that has resulted in the parties applying to this Court and bypassing the normal judicial process of this state of having an intermediate appellate court first review rulings on applications for post-conviction relief prior to seeking review by this Court. You are never too far down a wrong road to turn around. I urge this Court to break from such practice. Further, it is disingenuous to suggest the parties are choosing to come directly to this Court, when in fact, they are simply doing what this Court has sanctioned as the procedure in these matters. This is our allowed procedure, and we must own it as such.

The issues raised in capital post-conviction applications are identical to the issues raised in non-capital post-conviction applications, so there is no disadvantage to the parties or the courts in having capital post-conviction rulings reviewed first by the intermediate appellate courts. The irony is that we are giving capital post-conviction applications less deliberative attention resulting in a less reliable record in capital post-conviction matters than in non-capital post-conviction cases. Whereas, invoking and adhering to the normal appellate process of intermediate appellate court review will provide a heightened standard of reliability and contribute to assuring that the death penalty is being applied only in instances where the accused is truly guilty and culpable of such punishment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976).

PER CURIAM

Weimer, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Hughes, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by Justice Guidry. Guidry, J., concurs and assigns reasons.