IN RE: JUDGE EBONI JOHNSON ROSE (2025)

Joint petition for consent discipline accepted. See per curiam.

JDH

PDG

JMG

Supreme Court of Louisiana April 23, 2025

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

NO. 2025-O-0390

IN RE: JUDGE EBONI JOHNSON ROSE

JUDICIARY COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA

PER CURIAM

In 2024, the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) received complaints and media reports regarding alleged misconduct by Judge Eboni Johnson Rose in four separate criminal matters. Specifically, in three cases, it is alleged that Judge Rose made a series of serious legal errors regarding relatively straightforward issues of criminal procedure. In the fourth case, it is alleged that Judge Rose made comments in court indicative of bias against the District Attorney's Office and used profane and offensive language, including a racial slur, in doing so. After considering Judge Rose's response to the complaints, the Commission authorized an expedited investigation by the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”). The Commission also requested Judge Rose's interim disqualification, which this court granted on August 6, 2024. In re: Rose, 24-0931 (La. 8/6/24), 390 So. 3d 275. After the OSC completed its investigation, the Commission invited Judge Rose to personally appear before it for questioning, which she did on January 17, 2025. Judge Rose and the Commission then submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which Judge Rose admitted that her conduct violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Judge Eboni Johnson Rose of the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge be suspended from judicial office, without pay, for six months, with all but two months deferred.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judge Rose shall be placed on probation for a period of two years, beginning immediately. The probationary period shall be governed by a monitoring agreement containing the conditions set forth in the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judge Rose be assessed with total costs of $11,196.11 subject to an eighteen-month payment plan. Of this amount, $3,354.50 shall be designated for reimbursement of the Special Counsel's investigative costs and $926.52 shall be designated for the Commission's costs. The remaining $6,915.09 shall be designated as partial repayment for the costs of the pro tempore judges appointed by this court during Judge Rose's disqualification.

Given the significant legal errors that were committed and the offensive language that was employed by the Judge while on the bench, I believe a more substantial sanction should be imposed. The egregious conduct charged in this matter – conduct evidenced in the public record of the cases over which Judge Rose presided – is detailed in Justice McCallum's dissent, and need not be repeated here. As I have previously noted, “[b]y virtue of qualifying, those who seek judicial office, in effect, certify that they are competent and conscientious and have at least rudimentary skills to discharge the difficult duties of a judge. While no one is expected to perform like the biblical Judge Solomon immediately upon taking the oath, each judge must demonstrate basic proficiency and competency in the law regardless of experience.” In re: Fiffie, 24-00976 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So.3d 738, 751 (Weimer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While even experienced judges can make mistakes, the charges here demonstrate repeated mistakes, bias, and racially charged comments which have no place in a court of law, regardless of one's level of experience.

Judge Rose has been interimly disqualified from sitting on the bench for more than eight months while taxpayers have effectively borne the cost of her salary and that of the pro tempore judges who, in her absence, have performed the work she was elected to do. While the members of the Judiciary Commission are volunteers and the tasks they are asked to perform are often difficult and challenging, this matter has lingered far too long, at taxpayers’ expense.¹ Therefore, while I believe it appropriate to reject the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline, along with that rejection I would urge expeditious resolution of this serious and costly matter.

Judge Rose was placed on interim suspension on August 6, 2024. In re: Rose, 24-0931 (La. 8/6/24), 390 So.3d 275. Her interim suspension was based on a finding that she “may pose a substantial threat of serious harm to the public or the administration of justice.” Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXIII, Section 27(a)(2). The suspension was with pay because the Louisiana Constitution requires it. La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). Otherwise, I would have voted to interimly suspend her without pay.

Since her suspension was imposed over eight months ago, Judge Rose has been paid her usual judicial salary while another judge has been paid to perform her job. This is the equivalent of a paid vacation. Judge Rose's disciplinary violations warrant that she be suspended without pay. Consequently, I would now impose a six-month suspension without pay. In the alternative, and if she chooses, I would allow a fully deferred suspension of six months, conditioned upon Judge Rose repaying six months of the cost of the judge covering her docket. This case makes it manifestly apparent why the Louisiana constitution should be amended to address the suspension of judges with and without pay to fix this inequitable burden on the taxpayers.

Question: What sanction should a judge who made a series of serious legal errors regarding routine issues of criminal procedure, made comments in court indicative of bias against the District Attorney's Office, and used profane and offensive language, including a racial slur, receive?¹ Answer: According to the sanction meted out by a majority of this Court, she should receive what amounts to a nine-month paid holiday and a fifteen-thousand-dollar bonus paid in the form of a one-time stipend. This Court has confused a sanction with a reward.

Judge Rose made a series of significant legal errors in three separate cases regarding straightforward issues of criminal procedure, most of which she has acknowledged, raising serious questions about her competency in office. In a fourth case, Judge Rose made comments in court indicative of bias against the District Attorney's Office and used profane and offensive language. Almost all of her conduct, including the use of a racial slur, is recorded in the official transcripts of the court.

Her conduct was so egregious that the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) requested Judge Rose's interim disqualification to prevent further harm. A majority of this court granted that request on August 6, 2024. In re: Rose, 2024-0931 (La. 8/6/24), 390 So. 3d 275. This writer concurred in Judge Rose's immediate disqualification, but “would have made the suspension without pay and the expense of the pro tempore judge her responsibility,” were such options available under the Louisiana Constitution and the Supreme Court rules.²

This matter arises from a joint petition for consent discipline filed by the Commission and Judge Eboni Johnson Rose of the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. In accepting the joint petition, this Court orders only a “partial repayment” for the costs of the pro tempore judge who presided in Judge Rose's absence, as the joint petition did not provide for full restitution for such costs that were borne by the judiciary. Indeed, the amount Judge Rose will pay is a small fraction of the costs incurred to appoint the pro tempore judge. These costs are highlighted even more by the fact that the joint petition lacked any mention of reimbursement of the salary Judge Rose drew or the $15,000.00 stipend she received during her absence from the bench.

The sanctionable actions committed by Judge Rose in the four matters presented for this Court's examination are detailed in the paragraphs that follow.

State v. Bridgette DiGerolamo

In February 2023, Judge Rose presided over a jury trial in State v. DiGerolamo. After the conclusion of a disjointed and error plagued trial, the jury acquitted the defendant. Immediately after the acquittal was recorded in open court, Judge Rose met with the jury outside the presence of counsel. Following her discussion with the jury, she recalled the parties and the jury into the courtroom where she then recorded a different verdict of guilty into the record.

On April 30, 2024, this court unanimously set aside the guilty verdict and reinstated the acquittal. State v. DiGerolamo, 2024-0287 (La. 4/30/24), 383 So. 3d 911. The Court held that Judge Rose erred by allowing the jury to continue to deliberate and change its verdict after a final verdict had been received, stating:

Once final, a verdict of acquittal gives rise to the prohibition against double jeopardy. See U.S. Const. Amendment V; La. Const. art. I, § 15; State v. Gasser, 22-0064 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So. 3d 249, 260; State v. Hurst, 367 So.2d 1180, 1181 (La. 1979). When a defendant is acquitted by a verdict duly returned and received, “the court [can] take no other action than to order his discharge.” Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671; 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195; 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). Here, after receiving a final verdict and retiring the jury, the trial court erred by allowing the jury to continue to deliberate and change its verdict, particularly after the court violated the sanctity of any further deliberations by meeting privately with the jury.

Justice Crichton concurred, stating that Judge Rose's “blatant” violation of the law in the DiGerolamo case “shocks the conscience and implicates Canon 3(A)(1) [a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it] of the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Id., 2024-00287, p.2 (La. 4/30/24), 383 So. 3d 911, 913.

State v. Donald Steele

In March 2024, Judge Rose presided over the bench trial in State v. Steele. The defendant, a former Baton Rouge police officer, was charged with second-degree kidnapping and malfeasance in office after he allegedly engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior during a traffic stop. After deliberating, Judge Rose found the defendant not guilty of second-degree kidnapping but “guilty as to the responsive charge of [misdemeanor] malfeasance in office pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute Title 14:134.”³ However, a simple review of the malfeasance statutes would have revealed that malfeasance in office is a felony, not a misdemeanor. Judge Rose thus convicted the defendant of a crime that does not exist.

On April 18, 2024, after being informed in chambers by both the State and the defense that malfeasance is a felony and cannot be a misdemeanor, Judge Rose vacated her prior verdict of guilty of misdemeanor malfeasance in office and entered a verdict of not guilty on all counts. In doing so, Judge Rose did not address any of the law or arguments made in the post-verdict briefing or cite any specific authority or provisions of law, aside from asserting the court's “own authority and the authority extended by the code of criminal procedure.” Judge Rose's ruling was ultimately contrary to the limitations on acquittals imposed by La. C.Cr.P. art. 778 and the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 821.

State v. Christian King

On May 20, 2024, the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated arson pursuant to a plea agreement. The charge arose from an incident in which the defendant went to the home of his ex-girlfriend, who was also the mother of his child, doused the front door with gasoline, and set it on fire.

Aggravated arson is designated a crime of violence under Louisiana law, the sentence for which cannot be suspended or probated, even if the State agrees to it.⁴ Nonetheless, after an in-chambers conference with the State and the defense, on May 20, 2024, Judge Rose improperly suspended seventeen years of the defendant's sentence.

State v. Dekilo Yancy

The defendant was arrested in February 2021 and charged with aggravated battery and domestic abuse battery involving strangulation. In February 2022, while out on bond pending trial, the defendant was arrested for illegal carrying of a weapon while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”) and possession of a Schedule I CDS. The defendant then obtained a series of continuances or failed to appear at various hearing or trial dates over a two-year period beginning in April 2022.

On April 29, 2024, the cases were again set for trial. The State offered a “combined” plea deal involving the dismissal of all charges in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea to one count of misdemeanor domestic abuse battery and one count of felony possession of a CDS, with the State recommending two years of active probation. After significant back and forth between the defendant, his attorney, and Judge Rose, the defendant decided to accept the State's offer.

Judge Rose began to go through the required Boykin colloquy but stopped when she realized the defendant would not be entitled to have the domestic violence offense expunged. Judge Rose called defense counsel and ADA Chaz Morgan to the bench for a sidebar, and the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: All right. It's not in his interest to plead to something he didn't do. And I don't really care what the State wants. If y'all can't produce a witness today, I'm not going to let him plead on this because what this is going to do is hamper his ability. He won't be able to get this sh*t expunged off his record. And I know that most people don't care about young black men, but I do. He won't be able to have no firearms. And one deal shouldn't be contingent upon the other one. This has been on my trial docket four times. If y'all can't produce a witness, a victim on the [domestic abuse battery], you shouldn't hold that against him on the other charges.

THE COURT: Yes. But [domestic abuse battery] is going to be something that can not be expunged off of his record, ever. This crime can be because I'm going to give him the benefit of the 893. The young man doesn't have any fricking felonies. And I know that the DA probably wants every young black man in prison, but I don't. And I'm going to give these young people the opportunity to have a life. And I hope that that's what y'all want too.

ADA MORGAN: Of course, your Honor.

THE COURT: This is the fourth time. And this case is g**d*** four years old now. And that's the best that y'all can come up with? You're just going to what, stick every n****r in jail?[5]

ADA MORGAN: Your Honor, that is not at all the intention of the District Attorney's Office.

THE COURT: Yeah, I know, I know. But I'm – I'm – I'm just – I'm just – this is a – this is a – this is a piss-poor ass resolution to this case. I just want you to know that, Mr. Morgan. That's how I feel about it considering the fact that y'all can not produce a witness. And I'm asking you all to do what is right. And I know that sometimes people – that's hard for people to do, is the right thing. But we need to look beyond stats. We need to look beyond just making sure that we can convict everybody that comes through the doors and do the right thing. And that's what I'm asking you to do today.

ADA MORGAN: And, your Honor, the State believes we are doing the right thing given that there are four felonies charged. We are offering a plea to one felony and one misdemeanor.

THE COURT: I realize that, but you don't even have the witness here on the other trial that was set on my trial docket.

This Court's recent opinion in In re: Fiffie, 2024-00976 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So. 3d 738 stands in stark contrast to the sanction imposed here. In Fiffie, the judge was charged with mishandling warrants, failing to comply with an order from an appellate court, improperly recalling two bench warrants issued by another judge and failing to cooperate with others in the justice system. Although this writer concurred in the result, it must be said that Judge Fiffie's conduct was less egregious than Judge Rose's conduct in this case. In fact, Judge Fiffie's conduct was never considered so serious as to require an immediate suspension. As a sanction, the Court suspended Judge Fiffie for six months without pay.

We cannot expect better conduct from lawyers unless we demand better conduct from judges. The people of the state of Louisiana have constitutionally given this Court the responsibility to define and to regulate the practice of law and the judiciary.⁶ We would do well to remember that what the people have the power to give they also have the power to take away.

This Court disqualified Judge Rose on an interim basis more than eight months ago. The Louisiana Constitution directs that a period of interim disqualification of a judge is required to be “without loss of salary.” La. Const. Art. V, Sec. 25. In plain terms, this means that during the pendency of these proceedings, this Court—and ultimately the taxpayers of Louisiana—paid over $100,000 of salary to Judge Rose even though she was not working, while also paying approximately $60,000 of salary for pro tempore judges necessary to perform her duties during her suspension.

The record presented to the Judiciary Commission consists of reports about the underlying proceedings, including Judge Rose's own statement, in which Judge Rose admitted certain errors that amount to Canon violations. After reviewing the entire record, it is inexplicable to me how this matter took so long to investigate and return to the Court. The wasted cost to the taxpayers due to the delays in advancing these proceedings exceeds any cost of the State providing additional resources to the Commission to expedite interim disqualification cases.

While the Constitution prohibits the Court from suspending a judge without pay before a formal finding that discipline is warranted, the Constitution does permit the Court to tax costs against any judge ultimately found to be subject to discipline. However, this Court's current rule only authorizes reimbursement for the cost of the pro tempore judges used when a judge is suspended because he or she was “indicted or charged with a serious crime under state or federal law.” La. Sup. Ct. R. XXIII, Sec. 22(c). Therefore, the current rule does not authorize this Court to tax the full cost of the pro tempore judges in the absence of such an indictment or other charge. This provides Judge Rose a fully paid vacation while the Court pays the cost of the replacement judge actually doing her work. I believe this Court should revise this Rule at its earliest opportunity, and further advocate for updating the applicable rules concerning the Judiciary Commission to ensure that unnecessary delays are not repeated in other cases.

In the current case, I feel compelled to apply the clear text of the existing rule and see no benefit to rejecting the proposed discipline and dragging this matter out even further. Under the current rule, that would be a punishment to the taxpayers instead of the Judge. Therefore, I concur in the result of the Court's decision to accept the joint petition for consent discipline.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As my colleague points out, that expense includes not only Judge Rose's monthly salary but a pro rata $14,691.00 “bonus paid in the form of a one-time stipend.” In re: Judge Eboni Johnson Rose, 25-00390 (La. 4/23/25) (McCallum, J., dissenting). The impropriety, indeed the unconstitutionality, of the referenced “up-front lump sum” stipend paid at the beginning of the fiscal year is not only demonstrated in this case. It also benefitted two recently retired Justices of this court (who received $15,280.00 each) and a Court of Appeal Judge (who received $17,680.00). Each voted for and then retired after receiving the full stipend in an “up-front lump sum” without serving for the entire fiscal period the stipend covered. This vote also enhanced their retirement benefits. Other judges similarly benefitted, including a Judge who was suspended without pay for 6 months. See, In re: Fiffie, 24-00976 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So.3d 738. Taxpayers suffered the consequences of the stipend being paid in an “up-front lump sum” payment at the beginning of the fiscal year; consequences that could have been avoided by incremental payments that would have assured the funds were paid only after work was done. In fact, to pass constitutional muster, the stipend should have been paid incrementally, as it was earned; otherwise an unconstitutional donation results. See, La. Const. Art. 7, § 14; Op. Atty's Gen. 2010, 09-0260. See also, CLANCY DUBOS: SIX LOUISIANA JUSTICES FORCE MONEY GRAB ON OTHER JUDGES, THE LAW BE DAMNED, https://www.nola.com/gambit/news/clancy_dubos/clancy-dubos-six-louisiana-justicesforce-money-grab-on-other-judges-the-law-be-damned/article_274adf5c-4abc-11ef-a20fcb5ecd805c8e.html (last visited 4/17/25); Rolfe McCollister, JUDGES BREAKING THE LAW?, Baton Rouge Business Report.Teachers are paid one time stipends which means, in legislative vernacular, that the teachers will not necessarily be paid the amount of the stipend again the next year. But school systems have ensured the constitution, which prohibits the donation of public funds, is followed. Most school systems pay half the stipend half-way through the school year and the rest at the end of the school year to avoid a constitutional violation. If a teacher does not work, there is a “claw back” provision in the contract.

1.   I would note that some of Judge Rose's comments were also blasphemous, as she invoked the name of God in her profanity, in violation of the Third Commandment (while Roman Catholicism and Protestantism each recognize the Ten Commandments, this commandment is considered as the second in Catholic theology). It is an unfortunate commentary that the name of God is so commonly used in this way that it no longer elicits shock or surprise.

2.   La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) directs that the interim disqualification of a judge shall be “without loss of salary.” Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 27, which provides for interim disqualification by consent, allows the respondent judge to consent to interim disqualification with or without pay. However, absent consent of the respondent judge, there is no basis for the court to order the interim suspension be without salary.With regard to the expense of the pro tempore judge, Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 22(c) provides that such costs may be taxed to the respondent judge only in one circumstance: when the judge is on interim disqualification “for being indicted or charged with a serious crime ․ [and] the judge is convicted of the underlying crime and the conviction becomes final.”As regards the Constitution, I would urge the people of Louisiana to amend it. My colleagues and I should likewise change Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 22(c).

3.   Judge Rose had instructed herself, on the record, as to the following regarding the crime of malfeasance in office:So as to the crime of malfeasance in office, this court can render the following verdicts: a verdict [of] guilty of malfeasance in office pursuant to revised statute 14:134.1 or the court can render a responsive verdict to the lesser and included offense of malfeasance in office, misdemeanor grade, which – or the court can render a not guilty verdict.

4.   Aggravated arson is a crime of violence that carries a maximum sentence of greater than ten years. As such, La. C.Cr.P. art. 893(A)(2) prohibits suspension of the defendant's sentence:The court shall not suspend the sentence of a conviction for an offense that is designated in the court minutes as a crime of violence pursuant to Article 890.3, except a first conviction for an offense with a maximum prison sentence of ten years or less that was not committed against a family member or household member as defined by R.S. 14:35.3, or dating partner as defined by R.S. 46:2151. The period of probation shall be specified and shall not be more than five years.

5.   The hearing transcript contains the unaltered words.

6.   La. Const. art. 5, § 5(A-B).

Weimer, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons. Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons. McCallum, J., dissents and assigns reasons. Cole, J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.