STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DARRELL DEWAYNE DRAUGHN (2025)

I agree with the Court's order instructing the trial court to craft a prompt briefing scheduled to address the pending matters before it. However, I disagree with the Court's recall of the death warrant, as I believe it is premature.

In 2003, the defendant was convicted of the April 10, 2000, first degree murder of Loretta White, a vicious crime where he robbed and attacked her in her home before stabbing her over sixty times. The trial court sentenced defendant to death in accordance with the jury's verdict. This Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583. The United States Supreme Court denied review. Draughn v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007).

The defendant now urges this Court to intervene because he has a pending post-conviction relief application. The parties recognize it was filed seventeen (17) years ago as a “shell” application that contains no specific information or substantive complaint. Defendant asserts that before signing warrant of execution, the trial court shall provide time for post-conviction counsel to enroll and to litigate post-conviction claim. See State v. Thibodeaux, 98-1673 (La. 09/08/99), 750 So.2d 916, 940. However, post-conviction counsel has long been enrolled and has had 17 years to litigate defendant's post-conviction claims. A deadline was initially set for supplementing the shell petition more than fourteen (14) years ago.¹

There are presently several pending matters in the trial court: a motion to dismiss the post-conviction application on procedural grounds, a pending request for the trial court to set a briefing schedule, and a motion to recall the death warrant. There are seven weeks until the effective date of that warrant, which seems sufficient for the trial court to provide an orderly schedule to resolve these matters. It is no surprise that a looming deadline generates appropriate urgency. I am troubled by the lack of progress over the last two decades.

During the 17 years this matter has been pending with various appointed counsel, the State of Louisiana has invested many tens of millions of dollars into organizations solely to provide counsel for death penalty post-conviction relief. This is distinct from the larger amount invested in the defense of death penalty trials and direct appeals. A review of a multitude of these post-conviction files shows that despite the appointment of qualified counsel, considerable resources invested, and years--sometimes decades--passing that very little substantive progress has been made. As in this case, most have no court-filings by those long appointed counsel.

To be clear, I understand these to be diligent attorneys, so one can only assume this to be part of a strategy deployed on behalf of their clients. However, the time has come for the trial courts of Louisiana to bring these important matters to a conclusion. This Court should not insert itself to cause further delay before this well-respected trial court has had an opportunity to address how it will handle these important matters.

This Court will invariably receive writ applications concerning all the trial court's decisions on the pending motions. In my view, it is not necessary to grant the defendant's writ application to immediately recall the warrant. This Court should allow the trial court to rule on the pending motions. There has been no showing as to why due consideration to the pending matters and any post-conviction application cannot be provided by the trial court, and this Court, prior to the currently set execution date; provided the courts and all interested parties work diligently toward a resolution.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to post-conviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–57, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1995, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide” avenues for collateral attack of a conviction). This rule is applicable to all prisoners, including those sentenced to death. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2770, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

COLE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons: