STATE v. REED (2025)

Granted. The district court is ordered to recall the warrant of execution issued on March 31, 2025. In State v. Reed, 2014-1980, p. 70 (La. 9/7/16), 200 So.3d 291, 338, this Court ordered the following,

For the reasons assigned herein, the defendant's conviction and death sentence are affirmed. This judgment becomes final on direct review when either: (1) the defendant fails to petition timely the United States Supreme Court for certiorari; or (2) that Court denies his petition for certiorari; and either (a) the defendant, having filed for and been denied certiorari, fails to petition the United States Supreme Court timely, under its prevailing rules, for rehearing of denial of certiorari; or (b) that Court denies his petition for rehearing, the trial court shall, upon receiving notice from this Court under La.C.Cr.P. art. 923 of finality of direct appeal, and before signing the warrant of execution, as provided by La. Rev. Stat. 15:567(B), immediately notify the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board and provide the Board with reasonable time in which: (1) to enroll counsel to represent the defendant in any State post-conviction proceedings, if appropriate, pursuant to its authority under La. Rev. Stat. 15:178; and (2) to litigate expeditiously the claims raised in that application, if filed in the state courts.

(Emphasis added). In accordance with this decree, the district court is ordered to establish a briefing schedule, subject to amendment only for good cause, so that defendant may file a counseled supplement to his pro se post-conviction application. Thereafter, the district court may rule on any procedural objections raised by the state, including but not limited to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(B), and then, if appropriate, hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930 to address the merits of defendant's claims for relief.

Death penalty litigation has and continues to be an ever-evolving and complex part of our system of justice. For far too many reasons, this matter has lingered without resolution and at too high a cost. I understand and appreciate that this matter should be litigated and resolved expeditiously, and from the perspective of the family of the victim, justice delayed is often justice denied. However, while setting an execution date might serve a laudable goal of expediting the proceeding, doing so in this case and thereby forcing the implementation of all the protocols related to a death sentence before evaluating whether that can be realistically accomplished, only creates other delays and burdens the system with additional costs

In my view, the most expedient procedure is for the district court to set a status conference, set all motions for hearing, set deadlines, ensure these deadlines are followed, and move the matter to a just conclusion ensuring that all rights recognized by the law are being afforded to the state and the defendant.¹

Time and time again the United State Supreme Court has reminded us “death is different” because that sentence, once imposed, cannot be rectified. It is incumbent on our system of justice to ensure the imposition of the sentence is properly applied, not in haste, but without delay for the sake of delay. Prudence dictates that proceedings must be expedited in a logical manner which ensures the rights of both the state and the defendant are properly protected and not lost in an effort to hastily resolve the matter.

I agree with the reasons expressed by Justice Cole. The majority vacates an execution of sentence that is eight years after the finality of defendant's conviction and sentence. They do that with a motion pending in the trial court where evidence can be taken relative to any prejudice to the state that has resulted from these inordinate delays. See La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 930.8(B). There is no reason to act at this time. In fact, should the trial court determine that a post-conviction relief application pursued at this date results in prejudice to the state, the application will be dismissed. Id. Should the trial court reach that conclusion, the present writ application will be rendered moot. Again, there is no legal reason for this Court to act at this time. I dissent.

The majority has acted in haste and in doing so prevented the able trial court from properly addressing motions that were pending before it. The resolution of those motions may have very well made the matter before us moot. Execution of justice will now be delayed even further.

I agree with the Court's order instructing the trial court to craft a prompt briefing schedule to address the pending matters before it. However, I disagree with the Court's recall of the death warrant, as I believe it is premature.

In 2013, defendant was convicted of the August 10, 2010, first degree murder of brothers Jeremiah Adams, Jarquis Adams, and Gene Adams. The trial court sentenced defendant to death in accordance with the jury's verdict and denied defendant's motion for new trial on January 21, 2014. This Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. State v. Reed, 2014-1980 (La. 9/7/16), 200 So.3d 291, reh'g granted in part, relief denied, State v. Reed, 2014-1980 (La. 10/19/16), 213 So.3d 384. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Reed v. Louisiana, 580 U.S. 1166, 137 S.Ct. 787, 197 L.Ed.2d 258 (2017).

Defendant now urges this Court to intervene because he has a pending post-conviction relief application. The parties recognize it was filed eight (8) years ago as a “shell” application that contains no specific information or substantive complaint. Defendant asserts that before signing warrant of execution, the trial court shall provide time for post-conviction counsel to enroll and to litigate post-conviction claim. See State v. Thibodeaux, 98-1673 (La. 9/8/99), 750 So.2d 916, 940. However, post-conviction counsel has long been enrolled and has had 8 years to litigate defendant's post-conviction claims. A deadline was initially set for supplementing the shell petition more than six (6) years ago.¹

There are presently several pending matters in the trial court: a motion to dismiss the post-conviction application on procedural grounds, a pending request for the trial court to set a briefing schedule, and a motion to recall the death warrant. There are eight weeks until the effective date of that warrant, which seems sufficient for the trial court to provide an orderly schedule to resolve these matters. It is no surprise that a looming deadline generates appropriate urgency. I am troubled by the lack of progress over the last 8 years.

This Court will inevitably receive writ applications concerning all the trial court's decisions on the pending motions. In my view, it is not necessary to grant defendant's writ application to immediately recall the warrant. This Court should allow the trial court to rule on the pending motions. There has been no showing as to why due consideration to the pending matters and any post-conviction application cannot be provided by the trial court, and this Court, prior to the previously set execution date; provided the courts and all interested parties work diligently toward a resolution.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the defendant does not have a right to post-conviction proceedings according to the United States Constitution, the states can, and Louisiana has, established this right, which should be afforded to the defendant unless that right has been abused. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 924 et seq.

1.   Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to post-conviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–57, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1995, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide” avenues for collateral attack of a conviction). This rule is applicable to all prisoners, including those sentenced to death. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2770, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

PER CURIAM

Weimer, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Crain, J., dissents for reasons assigned by Justice Cole and assigns additional reasons. McCallum, J., dissents for reasons assigned by Justice Cole and assigns additional reasons. Cole, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.