WILLIE CALHOUN JR ET AL v. NANCY LANDRY (2025)

Some procedural background is appropriate. Plaintiffs filed a petition seeking declaratory and injunctive relief asserting the proposed constitutional amendment fails to comply with the requirements of the Louisiana Constitution and the Election Code. The Secretary of State and Attorney General (collectively, the “State”) filed various exceptions in response. Although the district court overruled most of the exceptions, the court did not order removal of the proposed amendment from the ballot or take any other action to interfere with the March 29, 2025 election. Thus, the election on the proposed amendment is going forward as scheduled. The district court scheduled a hearing on plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction for March 20, 2025.

The State has now filed a writ application in this court, bypassing the court of appeal, seeking to upend the normal judicial process by asking this court to dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims, summarily, on the merits. The majority of this court does just that.

The orderly administration of justice demands that hearings before trial courts be open to the public and the media. See La. Const. art. I, § 22.¹ When this court rules without a hearing or trial at the district court level, without prior review by the court of appeal, and without oral arguments at this court, the public is largely left out of the process and remains in the dark, except as to any reasons given by this court in summarily ruling. Such a process erodes respect for the fairness and impartiality of the system of justice. I recently dissented in a case wherein the majority of this court chose to exercise its plenary authority to bypass the court of appeal's appellate review of the issues.² Louisiana has a system of justice that allows for public hearings, the right of review by a court of appeal, and then and only then, a request to this court by way of a writ of certiorari to hear the matter. As in that case, I find no compelling reason for this court to act summarily, and without the benefit of a record from a hearing in the district court, and without the court of appeal's considered review. This court does not have any mechanism for hearing evidence, and any evidence the parties intended to introduce will now be essentially swept under the rug.

Historically, this court has rarely taken up matters that bypassed the other courts and then only when there were significant issues needing immediate attention and the facts were stipulated or uncontested.³ Our system of justice provides for deliberation and a defined formal procedure and process, from which this court should rarely, if ever, depart. Once again, this court is being asked to depart from the constitutionally and statutorily established processes and does so without a full and complete record and without stipulated facts.

I find it particularly concerning that the majority does not simply review the district court's ruling, but also addresses and then dismisses all of plaintiffs’ claims on the merits. Neither the district court nor the court of appeal have ruled on the merits of plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory challenges. Plaintiffs are legally entitled to challenge the actions of the legislature in submitting a constitutional amendment to the people, and this matter was brought in a timely manner.⁴ Plaintiffs’ action does not attack the people's right to vote because voting is ongoing. Plaintiffs assert numerous issues with the amendment. The petition alleges the ballot language is misleading and biased, in violation of La. R.S. 18:1299.1, which requires that the ballot language be “simple, unbiased, concise, and easily understood.” Moreover, plaintiffs assert the amendment does not comport with Louisiana Constitution Article XIII, § 1(B), which requires a “proposed amendment shall have a title containing a brief summary of the changes proposed” and be “confined to one object.”

“ ‘Provisions of a constitution regulating its own amendment, ․ are not merely directory but are mandatory; and a strict observance of every substantial requirement is essential to the validity of the proposed amendment.’ ․ Thus, in submitting an amendment to the people, the Legislature is bound by the provisions of our constitution mandating the procedural process for amending the constitution.” Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 04-2477, p. 11 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 715, 723 (internal citations removed). Even a cursory review of the proposed amendment in light of plaintiffs’ challenges demonstrates these challenges are not frivolous and should not be summarily dismissed. Whether the ballot language and proposed amendment comply with the statutory and constitutional requirements is indeed a matter of opinion and subject to debate, and is precisely the type of question that should be analyzed through the normal judicial process, allowing for evidence, public hearing, and publicly-viewed oral arguments prior to ruling on the request for injunction or declaratory judgment.

The optics of this court's ruling does not serve this court or the system of justice well. To the general public, the constraints established by the fundamental concept of separation of powers may well appear out of balance. Compliance with constitutional provisions requiring open-court hearings provides for full transparency, which is essential to our system of a representative government.

For these reasons, I would deny the writ application. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this matter.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.” La. Const. art. I, § 22.

2.   See Scott v. Louisiana State Police, 24-01591, p. 1 (La. 1/9/25), 398 So.3d 634, 635 (Weimer, C.J., dissenting) (involving the State's sweep of the homeless population in New Orleans immediately prior to the Super Bowl).

3.   In Marionneaux v. Hines, 05-1191, pp. 4-5 (La. 5/12/05), 902 So.2d 373, 376-77, this court stated:The Supreme Court of Louisiana has been granted supervisory powers since the Louisiana Constitution of 1879. Albert Tate, Jr., Supervisory Powers of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal, 38 Tul. L. Rev. 429, 430 (1964). Supervisory authority of this court is plenary, unfettered by jurisdictional requirements, and exercisable at the complete discretion of the court. Progressive Security Insurance Company v. Foster, 97-2985 (La.4/23/98), 711 So.2d 675, 678 n.3. This court can intervene under its own plenary supervisory powers, whether or not an intermediate court has properly acted on the matter. Tate, supra, at 430.Although this court does not exercise its supervisory jurisdiction lightly, there are instances in which writs are granted even though the relator has not exhausted available remedies in the lower court. Comment, Supervisory Powers of the Supreme Court of Louisiana Over Inferior Courts, 34 Tul. L. Rev. 165, 171 (1959); see also Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So.2d 577, 578 (La.1975). Due in part to proper deference to the lower courts, this court must remain reluctant to exercise its authority to hear a matter prior to a lower court determination. However, this matter presents itself in a particularly uncommon fashion in that the parties stipulated to all facts and the matter presents only a question of law which affects presently pending legislation and the conduct of the legislature during this session, as well as future legislative sessions. Id. Absent a prompt response by this court, legislative actions now in progress may be invalid, thus spawning future litigation. The ultimate issue of the meaning of “elected members” as used in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 (see Footnote 2, supra ) is an issue that affects a fundamental political process in our representative form of government. The issue affects the entire state, not merely the legislature; it affects the validity of the actions taken by the Senate on bills pending before it that relate to all of the citizens of Louisiana. Further, judicial economy is best served by this court's exercising its supervisory jurisdiction. A matter as heavily impressed with public interest as the debate over the voting requirements for legislative action requires an immediate answer. [Emphasis added.]The need to resolve this matter expeditiously was pointed out by all parties in their briefs to this court. Indeed, the parties stipulated in the district court that “[o]ver one thousand bills and joint resolutions have been introduced or will be considered by the Legislature, including over three hundred bills and joint resolutions currently in the Senate awaiting action by that house.” Additionally, “[a]ppropriations for the operating expenses of state government enacted in the 2004 Regular Session expire on June 30, 2005. House bills appropriating money for the operating expenses of state government for the upcoming fiscal year must be enacted.” [Emphasis added.]Unlike the Marionneaux case quoted above, this matter is being dismissed without a stipulation as to all the facts and without a request by all parties that this court use its plenary power to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction immediately.

4.   See La. R.S. 18:1405(C) (“An action contesting an election on a proposed constitutional amendment shall be instituted not later than 4:30 p.m. of the tenth day after promulgation of the results of the election by the secretary of state.”). The instant suit, filed prior to the March 29, 2025 election date, seems to comply with the statutory requirement that “[a]n action contesting an election on a proposed constitutional amendment” be filed “not later than” 10 days after the election.

WEIMER, C.J., dissenting.