STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ANDRE JOHNSON (2025)

Writ application granted. See per curiam.

PDG

JLW

JDH

JMG

Supreme Court of Louisiana March 18, 2025

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 24-KP-1175

STATE OF LOUISIANA

v.

ANDRE JOHNSON

ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF OUACHITA

PER CURIAM:

Writ granted. In 1997, an Ouachita Parish jury found applicant guilty of second degree murder. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The court of appeal affirmed. State v. Johnson, 97-30290 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/21/98), 709 So.2d 1102 (table), writ denied, 98-0481 (La. 6/26/98), 719 So.2d 1056. In February 2024, applicant filed a counselled application for post-conviction relief into the district court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

Applicant has adequately demonstrated that his application for post-conviction relief overcomes the post-conviction procedural bars, as the state filed a written notice into the district court on February 26, 2024, waiving any and all procedural bars which may limit his application pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. arts. 930.4(G) (eff. until 8/1/24) and 930.8(D) (eff. until 8/1/24). The waiver was express, in writing, and filed by the state into the district court record, as required by those provisions.

While the legislature has since added a provision to those articles making the procedural bars mandatory, see La.C.Cr.P. arts. 930.4(G) & 930.8(E), at the time applicant filed his post-conviction application and the state filed its waiver, the district court was free to consider the application on the merits. If a district court was mandated to decline to consider every application for post-conviction relief that was filed outside of the two-year time period mandated in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, absent the exceptions listed in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1)–(6), the legislature would have had no reason or purpose to enact the provision that allowed the state to waive the procedural bars. To say otherwise would mean the addition of the provision to allow the state to affirmatively waive procedural bars was effectively meaningless, and the legislature added an unnecessary provision to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. See generally R.S. 14:3; State v. Palermo, 00-2488, p. 5 (La. 5/31/02), 818 So.2d 745, 749 (“In construing statutes, courts must endeavor to give an interpretation that will give them effectiveness and purpose, rather than one which makes them meaningless.”); Boudreaux v. La. DPSC, 12-0239, p. 5 (La. 10/16/12), 101 So.3d 22, 26 (“Every word, sentence, or provision in a law is presumed to be intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed.”).

As we have previously observed, if a defendant seeks post-conviction relief based on the finding of a legal defect pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3, a district attorney is not required by this decision to oppose the application. “For example, if a defendant claims his conviction was obtained in violation of the constitution, pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3(1), because he was denied effective assistance of counsel [․], the district attorney may choose not to raise procedural objections even when they apply.” State v. Lee, 22-1827, p. 10 (La. 9/1/23), 370 So.3d 408, 416.

Furthermore, after reviewing the application, we find the district court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing. See generally La.C.Cr.P. art. 929(A)(“ If the court determines that the factual and legal issues can be resolved based upon the application and answer, and supporting documents, including relevant transcripts, depositions, and other reliable documents submitted by either party or available to the court, the court may grant or deny relief without further proceedings.”); see also State ex rel. Tassin v. Whitley, 602 So.2d 721, 722 (La. 1992). Here, the factual and legal issues cannot be resolved based solely on the available documents. Accordingly, we reverse the district court ruling that summarily denied relief, and we remand with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on applicant's ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim.

Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief is reviewable only because it was filed during a brief window of time when the legislature allowed the state to waive certain procedural objections in post-conviction proceedings. See 2021 La. Acts 104 (effective 8/1/21); 2024 La. Acts 10 (effective 8/1/24). That window is now closed. If filed today, defendant's petition could not be considered by the court. Our holding allows an evidentiary hearing on the petition but makes no findings on its merits.

Our criminal justice system is designed as an adversarial process with the state and victims postured adversely with the accused, and the judiciary serving as the neutral arbiter, with checks throughout the process for protection of those interests. See La. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 13-20, 25; art. V; La. Code Crim Pro. arts. 17, 61-66; La. R.S. 46:1841-46. If those checks are realigned, the system of criminal justice risks failing. Another check against that potential failure is the constitutional authority for the Attorney General to intervene in proceedings as necessary for the protection of the state's interest. See La. Const. art. IV, § 8; State v. Lee, 22-01827 (La. 9/1/23), 370 So. 3d 408, 412, n.4, reh'g denied, 22-01827 (La. 10/19/23). For these reasons, I concur.

I concur in the Court's decision to remand this matter to consider the merits. The legislature recently acted to make the two-year deadline unwaivable. See Acts 2024, 2nd Ex. Sess., No. 10, § 1, eff. Aug. 1, 2024. However, the defendant's motion was filed prior to that change in the law.

The prior law enables a district attorney to waive procedural objections like timeliness, but the underlying motion still must be heard on the merits at the trial court. The waiver establishes, or at least strongly intimates, that the local district attorney supports the underlying motion. That could be entirely appropriate in the present case. However, I am concerned with the State's ability to preserve its interest in maintaining this long-final conviction through a meaningful representation in the normal adversarial process.

The Louisiana Constitution provides for the “fairness, dignity, and respect” of any person who is a victim of a crime.” La. Const. art. I, §. 25.¹ In my view, when a district attorney fails to oppose a post-conviction motion vacating an otherwise final conviction, he or she is taking a view contrary to that of the factfinder and the appellate courts, thus providing a reasonable basis for the state to consider an intervention. La. Const. art. IV, §. 8. If the victim does not join in the request for relief, it intensifies the concern that an intervention is justified to ensure all the state's interests are properly represented. There is no intervention motion pending, but if one is filed on remand, the trial court should carefully consider it.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to La. R.S. 46:1844, the victim or designated family member of the victim has the right to be present at all “critical stages” of the prosecution. See La. R.S. 46:1842(4) (“ ‘Critical stage’ means any judicial proceeding at which there is a disposition of the charged offense or a lesser offense, or a sentence imposed pursuant thereto.”)

Crain, J., concurs and assigns reasons. McCallum, J., dissents. Cole, J., concurs and assigns reasons.