STATE v. HOFFMAN (2025)

Writ application granted. Trial court affirmed. See per curiam.

Hughes, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

McCallum, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

Griffin, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Guidry and assigns additional reasons.

Guidry, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

Supreme Court of Louisiana March 16, 2025

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court For the Court

On Supervisory Writ to the 22nd Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany

Writ granted. Defendant seeks review of the trial court's order denying his motion to recall a warrant setting a March 18, 2025 execution date. Relying on a preliminary injunction dissolved shortly after issuance in his federal court proceedings, defendant argues Louisiana Revised Statute 15:567C requires the execution date be reset.¹ This argument has no merit. When a federal or state court grants a stay of execution that is dissolved before the execution date, the execution may proceed on the date originally fixed. See State ex rel. Williams v. State, 98-1643 (La. 6/17/98), 747 So. 2d 487 (per curiam). As explained by Justice Lemmon:

The purpose of La. Rev. Stat. 15:567C is to provide the time period for setting a new execution date when such action is necessary; the purpose is not to necessitate a new execution date when the original execution date is reinstated by reversal of an order that stayed the execution on the originally fixed date.

Williams, 747 So. 2d at 487 (Lemmon, J., concurring in denial of reconsideration).

The trial court's March 14, 2025 order denying the motion to recall the warrant is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

I favor the death penalty as a deterrent. Those who would take life should bear in mind theirs may be taken as a consequence. Is the method humane? Is letting babies freeze to death in Gaza humane? Harvesting organs from Uighurs? Let those with a clear conscience flip the switch.

The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty. See, e. g., Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 139 S.Ct. 1112, 1122, 203 L.Ed.2d 521 (2019) (“The Constitution allows capital punishment.”). Federal courts have also repeatedly declined to declare execution by nitrogen hypoxia unconstitutional. See Grayson v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Corr., 121 F. 4th 894 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Grayson v. Hamm, ––– U.S. ––––, 145 S.Ct. 586, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2024); Smith v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 144 S.Ct. 715, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2024); Hoffman v. Westcott, --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 816734 (5th Cir. 3/14/2025) (slip opinion). Therefore, the only request the defendant makes of this Court is the very thing he denied his victim –more time.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the kidnapping, rape, robbery, and murder of Mary “Molly” Elliot, and sentenced to death in 1998. See State v. Hoffman, 1998-03118 (La. 4/11/00), 768 So. 2d 542. He appealed his conviction to finality and has exhausted all of his state and federal post-conviction remedies. See Hoffman v. Louisiana, 531 U.S. 946, 121 S.Ct. 345, 148 L.Ed.2d 277 (2000); State v. Hoffman, 2020-00137 (La. 10/19/21), 326 So. 3d 232, 235-236, 242 (listing the Hoffman post-conviction cases).

The sole issue before the Court is defendant's Request for Stay of Execution and for the issuance of a new death warrant. I agree with all aspects of the Per Curiam and additionally concur as follows.

Defendant's death sentence is scheduled to be carried out on March 18, 2025. A United States District Court Judge enjoined the execution on March 11, 2025, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated that injunction on March 14, 2025. Defendant seeks a stay of the execution by citing La. R.S. 15:567 C, which provides: “If any federal or Louisiana court grants a stay of execution, or if the governor of Louisiana grants a reprieve, the trial court shall reset the execution date at not less than thirty days nor more than forty-five days from the dissolution of the stay order, or termination or expiration of the reprieve.”

It is clear to me that, although a preliminary injunction issued by a federal district court in an action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutes a “stay of execution” within the meaning of the statute, a subsequent reversal of that injunction by an appellate court constitutes “dissolution of the stay order” within the meaning of the statute as well. In circumstances materially identical to the those now before us, this Court held:

When a federal or state district court grants a stay of execution but the order is immediately reversed by the appellate court on the basis that the district court lacked authority, La. Rev. Stat. 15:567 C does not require the setting of a new execution date; the execution may proceed on the date originally fixed.

State ex rel Williams v. State, 1998-1643 (La. 6/17/98), 747 So.2d 487, 487. In Williams, the federal district court's order was reversed five days after it was entered. Here, as in Williams, a federal district court entered an order which prevented an execution from being carried out. That court's order was immediately reversed. In fact, the federal district court's order was reversed only three days after it was entered. As in Williams, the reversal occurred on the basis that the district court lacked authority. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit even noted that the district court acted in a manner that “is not just wrong” but “gets the Constitution backwards” and “contravenes Supreme Court precedent.” Hoffman, --- F.4th at ----, 2025 WL 816734 at *1. The Fifth Circuit went on to specifically hold:

When district courts overstep their bounds and exercise powers that properly belong in another branch of government, it is incumbent on federal appellate courts to right the ship and ensure that the judiciary does not exceed its authority under Article III of the Constitution.

Id., --- F.4th at ----, 2025 WL 816734 at *4.

Louisiana Revised Statute 15:567 C was enacted by the Legislature to facilitate the manner by which executions are to be carried out. The statute was not intended to be an impediment to executions. The legislative history clearly reflects this conclusion. It follows that La. R.S. 15:567 C must be construed with its purpose in mind. The statute is meant “to provide the time period for setting a new execution date when such action is necessary.” Williams, 747 So.2d at 487 (Lemmon, J., concurring). It does “not[ ] necessitate a new execution date when the original execution date is reinstated by reversal of an order that stayed the execution on the originally fixed date.” Id.

There is no need to set a new execution date as the federal district court's injunction was immediately vacated well in advance of the March 18 execution date. Even the defendant observes that no party ever stopped preparing for the execution. Therefore, I join the majority in full agreement that this Court should not stay this execution and certainly, should not order that a new execution date be set.

I agree with Justice Guidry that the plain language of La. R.S. 15:567(C) requires a recall of the death warrant in this matter. Further, the question remains open whether execution by nitrogen hypoxia violates La. Const. art. I § 20, which may provide greater protection than the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Cf. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).

I respectfully dissent from the court's decision affirming the trial court's March 14, 2025 order denying defendant's motion to recall a warrant setting a March 18, 2025 execution date. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:567(C) provides:

If any federal or Louisiana court grants a stay of execution, or if the governor of Louisiana grants a reprieve, the trial court shall reset the execution date at not less than thirty days nor more than forty-five days from the dissolution of the stay order, or termination or expiration of the reprieve.

Under the circumstances, I would find the majority's reliance on State ex rel. Williams v. State, 96-1643 (La. 6/17/98), 747 So. 2d 487, is misplaced. In Williams, this Court stated:

When a federal or state district court grants a stay of execution but the order is immediately reversed by the appellate court on the basis that the district court lacked authority, La.Rev.Stat. 15:567C does not require the setting of a new execution date; the execution may proceed on the date originally fixed.

In my opinion, neither the majority opinion in Williams nor Justice Lemmon's concurrence dictate or guide the outcome of this case. First, in the instant case, the district court's judgment granting a preliminary injunction was not reversed by the appellate court on the basis that the district court “lacked authority” to issue the stay. Rather, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged in its opinion that the district court had authority to grant the injunction to stay the execution, while nevertheless vehemently rejecting its analysis and conclusion. Additionally, there is a clear distinction between a court “lacking authority” to grant a stay and a court erroneously granting a stay. The federal district court presiding over defendant's § 1983 action did not lack authority; it simply made an error of law.

Second, Justice Lemmon's concurrence, which the majority now adopts, disregards the plain language of the La. R.S. 15:567(C). According to the statute's clear and unambiguous language, the injunction issued by the district court mandates the resetting of the execution date no less than thirty days and no more than forty-five days from the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' reversal of the district court's judgment.¹ Furthermore, this result is consistent with the purpose of this provision, which one federal district court described as to ensure access to the courts and afford a prisoner facing execution with an opportunity to seek further review. See generally James v. Edwards, 683 F. Supp. 157 (E.D. La. 1987).

Accordingly, I would reverse the ruling of the trial court denying defendant's Motion to Recall the Death Warrant signed by the trial court on February 12, 2025, setting a March 18, 2025, execution date.

FOOTNOTES

1.   La. R.S. 15:567C provides: “If any federal or Louisiana court grants a stay of execution, or if the governor of Louisiana grants a reprieve, the trial court shall reset the execution date at not less than thirty days nor more than forty-five days from the dissolution of the stay order, or termination or expiration of the reprieve.”

1.   Under the general rules of statutory construction, the interpretation of any statutory provision begins with the language of the statute itself. McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 10-2775, p. 11 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1218, 1227. When the provision is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the statute should be applied as written and no further effort should be made to determine the legislature's intent nor shall the letter of the statute be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. La. C.C. art. 9; R.S. 1:4; See also Milbert v. Answering Bureau, 13-0022 (La. 6/28/13), 120 So.3d 678, 684.

PER CURIAM