JOHN KITE ADMINISTRATOR OF SUCCESSION OFJOHNNIE KETCHUN KITE AND ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN JA LA WANYA BOYD JA MARSHA DEON BOYD AND TAURIEZ KITE v. RAPIDES PARISH SHERIFF DEPARTMENT AND SHERIFF WILLIAM EARL HILTON CITY OF ALEXANDRIA UTILITY DEPARTMENT AND MAYOR JACQUES ROY (2025)

The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana

JOHN KITE, ADMINISTRATOR OF SUCCESSION OF JOHNNIE KETCHUN KITE AND ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN, JA'LA WANYA BOYD, JA'MARSHA DEON BOYD, AND TAURIEZ KITE VS. RAPIDES PARISH SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND SHERIFF WILLIAM EARL HILTON, CITY OF ALEXANDRIA UTILITY DEPARTMENT AND MAYOR JACQUES ROY

LEON BOYD, ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN JA'LA WANYA BOYD, AND JA'MARSHA DEON BOYD, AND ALINE CRAFT ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD TAURIEZ KITE AND RAPIDES PARISH SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND SHERIFF WILLIAM EARL HILTON, CITY OF ALEXANDRIA UTILITY DEPARTMENT AND MAYOR JACQUES ROY

No. 2024-CC-01351

IN RE: City of Alexandria - Applicant Defendant; Earl Williams, Sr. - Applicant Defendant; Henry Jacobs - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Supervisory Writ, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Number(s) 252,993 A C/W 253,035 G, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Number(s) CW 24-00376;

Writ application granted. See per curiam.

JLW

JTK

JBM

Hughes, J., dissents.

Crain, J., concurs.

Griffin, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

Guidry, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court For the Court

We ordered briefing in this matter for the purpose of considering whether the City of Alexandria is entitled to summary judgment on the ground that it was not liable to plaintiffs for injuries caused by an escaped inmate. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the district court and grant summary judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

McKennedy Armstead was an inmate serving a sentence for a narcotics conviction at the Rapides Parish Detention Center in Alexandria. While on a work detail for the City of Alexandria's Lights Department, Mr. Armstead stole a City truck. He went to his mother's house (abandoning the truck two blocks away) and took a gun. At that time, Mr. Armstead's cousin, Antonio Calhoun, drove him to the Grant Parish home of his former girlfriend, Johnnie Ketchun Kite.

Mr. Calhoun subsequently encountered law enforcement officers who were searching for Mr. Armstead. He informed them Mr. Armstead and Ms. Kite were dating and that he believed the two were inside her home. Based on this information, law enforcement officers arrived at Ms. Kite's home with a search warrant. They entered the home and found Mr. Armstead and Ms. Kite dead from gunshot wounds in an apparent murder-suicide.¹

Thereafter, plaintiffs, on behalf of Ms. Kite's minor children, filed the instant wrongful death action against several parties, including the City of Alexandria and its employees, Earl Williams, Sr. and Henry Jacobs (collectively referred to hereinafter as “City”). Plaintiffs alleged, in part, that the City's negligence caused Ms. Kite's death as Mr. Armstead was under its supervision.

The City moved for summary judgment. It argued Mr. Armstead was not in the process of escaping when the murder-suicide occurred, and it was not an integral part of the escape process. Rather, it claims Mr. Armstead completed his escape when he reached the safe haven of his mother's home, and the murder-suicide was a purely personal decision unrelated to the escape. Therefore, the City maintained the risk of harm encountered by Ms. Kite did not fall within the scope of the duty owed by the City.

After a hearing, the district court denied the City's motion for summary judgment. The City applied for supervisory review. The court of appeal denied writs, with one judge voting to grant and docket.

Upon the City's application, we ordered written briefing pursuant to the provisions of La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(H). Having received briefs from both parties, we now review the district court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment on the merits.²

DISCUSSION

A ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed under a de novo standard, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the district court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Diaz-Molina v. Flower, 2023-01135 (La. 12/19/23), 374 So. 3d 950, 952; Catzen v. Toney, 2022-01261 (La. 1/18/23), 352 So. 3d 972, 974; Jones v. Whips Elec., LLC, 2022-01035 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So. 3d 846, 848; Guidry v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 2019-1999 (La. 2/26/20), 289 So. 3d 1026, 1027. Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1), the burden on the party moving for summary judgment “does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense.” See Reynolds v. Bordelon, 2014-2371 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So. 3d 607, 610–11. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. La. Code Civ. P. art. 967(B); Bufkin v. Felipe's Louisiana, LLC, 2014-0288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So. 3d 851, 858. Once a motion for summary judgment has been properly supported by the moving party, the failure of the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion. Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging Inc., 2008-0528 (La. 12/2/08), 995 So. 2d 1184, 1187 (citing Babin v. Winn–Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So. 2d 37, 40).

The leading case addressing the scope of the duty to protect the public from escaped inmates is Wilson v. State Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 576 So. 2d 490 (La. 1991). In that opinion, we explained that although prison authorities have a duty to prevent inmates from escaping, that duty is intended to protect persons from being harmed by escaping inmates while they are in the process of escaping. Id. at. 493. We emphasized that the duty is not intended to protect persons from harm inflicted by inmates who have already escaped and who subsequently commit tortious acts in the furtherance of their own pursuits. Id. Rather than looking to foreseeability or the proximity of time and distance between the escape and the escapee's offense that caused the injury to his victim, we reasoned the proper question to be answered in determining the scope of the duty is whether the offense occurred during, or as an integral part of, the process of escaping. Id.

In the case sub judice, the evidence produced by the City establishes Mr. Armstead left his designated worksite by stealing a City truck. He then went to his mother's house where he retrieved a gun and had his cousin take him to Ms. Kite's house. On its face, this evidence indicates the escape was complete before Mr. Armstead entered Ms. Kite's house.

Because the City properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Plaintiffs assert issues of fact exist regarding whether Mr. Armstead and Ms. Kite had an ongoing relationship, whether Ms. Kite's death was “the result of an interpersonal conflict” with Mr. Armstead and whether Mr. Armstead escaped for the purpose of killing Ms. Kite. Plaintiffs contend there may be multiple explanations for Mr. Armstead's actions and speculate it is possible Ms. Kite may have refused to give Mr. Armstead money to further his escape or told him he was not welcome to stay at her home because he was wanted by the police.

We have long recognized that mere speculation “falls far short of the factual support required to establish that plaintiff will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial.” Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37, 40. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence which would suggest Mr. Armstead's decision to have his cousin drive him to Ms. Kite's home was integral to the process of escape. Rather, the fact that Mr. Armstead left the worksite and retrieved a gun from his mother's home demonstrates he had successfully escaped custody and had freedom of action at the time he chose to enter Ms. Kite's home. The harm in this case falls outside of the scope of the City's duty to prevent inmates from escaping.

In sum, we find the City has satisfied its burden on summary judgment by establishing the absence of factual support for an essential element of plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs have not produced any evidence of a material factual dispute. Summary judgment in favor of the City is therefore mandated.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the writ is granted and made peremptory. The judgment of the district court is reversed. Summary judgment is granted, dismissing the claims of plaintiffs against the City of Alexandria, Earl Williams, Sr. and Henry Jacobs with prejudice.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The bodies of both individuals were found nude, but Mr. Armstead still wearing his prison issued armband

2.   Plaintiffs and the City filed motions for oral argument After careful consideration, we deny the motions.

PER CURIAM