LONGO v. 700B8 LLC LLC LLC GCH LLC HODC LLC (2025)

On Supervisory Writ to the Orleans Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans Civil

We ordered briefing in this matter to determine whether relator is entitled to summary judgment on the ground plaintiff is unable to establish that any action or inaction by relator caused the injury to plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, we conclude summary judgment is warranted.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This lawsuit arises from an accident in which plaintiff, Christian Longo, fell off of the second story screened porch of his leased New Orleans apartment. At the time of the accident, the property was owned by 700B8, LLC (“700B8”). 700B8 hired Preston Tedesco to manage the property. As a licensed real estate agent, Mr. Tedesco was associated with HODC, LLC, d/b/a Keller Williams Realty New Orleans (“Keller Williams”). However, he managed the property through his company, Broadway Management, LLC (“Broadway Management”).

As a result of the accident, plaintiff filed suit against several defendants, including Keller Williams. Plaintiff took the position that Keller Williams was vicariously liable because Mr. Tedesco was acting in the course and scope of his employment.

After discovery, Keller Williams filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Mr. Tedesco was not acting within the course and scope of his contractual relationship with Keller Williams. In support, Keller Williams attached the deposition of Mr. Tedesco in which he testified that Keller Williams had no knowledge of his management of the property, that he did not seek or obtain prior authorization or approval from Keller Williams to manage the property, and that Keller Williams received no financial benefit, compensation, or commission arising out of Mr. Tedesco's management of the property.

Plaintiff opposed the motion, maintaining that under Louisiana law, in order to practice as a real estate agent, one must be sponsored by a broker – here, Keller Williams. During his time with Keller Williams, Mr. Tedesco performed his duties for that company. As a result, plaintiff maintained Keller Williams, as Mr. Tedesco's employer, is vicariously liable for his actions in this case. Moreover, plaintiff submits Mr. Tedesco's knowledge was imputed to Keller Williams as his principal.

After a hearing, the district court denied summary judgment. In oral reasons for judgment, the court stated, in part:

I believe that there is [sic] some general issue of material fact that the jury should be allowed to hear all of the evidence and make credibility determinations whether or not Tedesco was an agent of [Keller Williams] while managing the property. And, Two, whether [Keller Williams] was independently negligent in its failure to oversee its agent.

Keller Williams sought supervisory review of the district court's judgment. The court of appeal denied the writ.

Upon Keller Williams’ application to this court, we ordered written briefing pursuant to the provisions of La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(H). Having received briefs from both parties, we now review the district court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment on the merits.¹

DISCUSSION

A ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed under a de novo standard, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the district court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Diaz-Molina v. Flower, 2023-01135 (La. 12/19/23), 374 So. 3d 950, 952; Catzen v. Toney, 2022-01261 (La. 1/18/23), 352 So. 3d 972, 974; Jones v. Whips Elec., LLC, 2022-01035 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So. 3d 846, 848; Guidry v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 2019-1999 (La. 2/26/20), 289 So. 3d 1026, 1027. Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1), the burden on the party moving for summary judgment “does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense.” See Reynolds v. Bordelon, 2014-2371 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So. 3d 607, 610–11. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. La. Code Civ. P. art. 967(B); Bufkin v. Felipe's Louisiana, LLC, 2014-0288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So. 3d 851, 858. Once a motion for summary judgment has been properly supported by the moving party, the failure of the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion. Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging Inc., 2008-0528 (La. 12/2/08), 995 So. 2d 1184, 1187 (citing Babin v. Winn–Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So. 2d 37, 40).

In its motion for summary judgment, Keller Williams asserted plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of his claim because he is unable to establish that Keller Williams was vicariously liable for Mr. Tedesco's actions. Keller Williams’ motion was supported by the depositions of Mr. Tedesco and John Hamide, the sole member of 700B8, who both testified that Mr. Tedesco alone, and not Keller Williams, financially benefitted from Mr. Tedesco's management of the property at issue. Mr. Tedesco further testified that he was not acting within the ambit of his duties as a real estate agent in managing the property and that he was acting solely on behalf of Broadway Management, as an authorized representative and agent of 700B8.

Because Keller Williams properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifted to plaintiff to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Plaintiff argued the contract between Mr. Tedesco and Keller Williams was one of mandate. As such, plaintiff suggests Keller Williams had exclusive control over Mr. Tedesco as his broker because he would not be able to act as a real estate agent in compliance with Louisiana law without Keller Williams’ sponsorship.

However, plaintiff offered no factual support for his contention that Mr. Tedesco was acting as a real estate agent in managing the property. To the contrary, Mr. Tedesco's testimony clearly established that he was acting solely in his capacity as a representative of 700B8, not as a real estate agent under the ambit of his contract with Keller Williams. Plaintiff produced no affidavits or other evidence which would indicate there is any material factual dispute on this issue.

In sum, we find Keller Williams has satisfied its burden on summary judgment by establishing the absence of factual support for an essential element of plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence of a material factual dispute. Summary judgment in favor of Keller Williams is therefore mandated.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the writ is granted and made peremptory. The judgment of the district court is reversed. Summary judgment is granted, dismissing the claims of plaintiff, Christian Longo, against HODC, LLC, d/b/a Keller Williams Realty New Orleans with prejudice.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff filed a motion for oral argument After careful consideration, we deny the motion.

PER CURIAM