STATE v. CRAIGHEAD (2025)

Writ granted. For killing his own dog and being held at gunpoint after becoming stuck in the doggie door of the home of a former police officer, this intoxicated and potentially mentally ill first-time-offender was sentenced to 32 years’ imprisonment at hard labor, 5 years’ active supervised probation, and a $5,000 fine.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. In determining whether a sentence is excessive, a reviewing court must first determine whether the record shows that the trial court took cognizance of the sentencing criteria set forth in LSA-La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. Thereafter, the court must determine whether the sentence imposed is too severe, which depends on the circumstances of the case and the background of the defendant. A sentence violates LSA-La. Const. Art. 1, § 20 if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So.2d 355 (La. 1980). Specifically, a sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Hogan, 480 So.2d 288 (La. 1985). A trial judge has broad discretion when imposing a sentence, and a reviewing court may not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed. State v. Pearson, 07-332 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/07), 975 So.2d 646, 656. Nevertheless, even a sentence that falls within statutory guidelines can be excessive if the punishment is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime that it shocks the sense of justice and serves no purpose other than to inflict pain and suffering. State v. Fatheree, 46,686 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/2/11), 77 So.3d 1047. In that vein, the jurisprudence holds that maximum sentences permitted under statute may be imposed only for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders, State v. Easley, 432 So.2d 910, 914 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1983), or when the offender poses an unusual risk to public safety due to his past conduct of repeated criminality. See State v. Chaney, 537 So.2d 313, 318 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 541 So.2d 870 (La. 1989). A trial court's reasons for imposing sentence, as required by LSAC.Cr.P. art. 894.1, are an important aid to this court when reviewing a sentence alleged to be excessive. State v. McKnight, 739 So.2d 343, 349 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1999).

The defendant was sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment permitted by statute for both convictions, consecutively.¹ According to the record, however, at the time of the offenses, the defendant was a middle-aged husband and father with no prior criminal history and an ability to maintain steady employment. The record further establishes that the defendant suffers with mental health and substance abuse issues, and that, while on methamphetamine and after killing his dog, the defendant attempted to enter the home of a former police officer. While attempting to get through the doggie door the defendant became stuck and the victim, having already armed himself, fired a warning shot into the floor. The defendant remained frozen until police arrived. Thereafter, the defendant fully complied with the officers, facilitating his arrest without incident. While the victim testified at the sentencing hearing that the incident scared him, the defendant did not reach a position from which he could threaten or inflict actual physical harm to the victim, nor did the defendant damage the victim's home or steal his property. The record fails to support a determination that this defendant is the worst type of offender, or that the offenses herein are the most serious offenses. As such, the trial court appears to have abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to the maximum allowable sentences for his offenses.

The trial court likewise appears to have misinterpreted and/or misapplied several of the sentencing factors set forth in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 insofar as it concluded that said factors weigh in favor of a more severe punishment in this case. Specifically, although the trial court recognized that the defendant had no prior criminal history and suffered from mental health and substance abuse issues, it nevertheless found that there were no mitigating factors in this case, and that the defendant would not likely respond affirmatively to probationary treatment. Additionally, even though the victim was alone in his home, the trial court found that the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily injury to more than one person. Further, despite that the victim was a former police officer capable of defending himself with firearms and who was able to surprise the defendant, fire a warning shot, and then hold the defendant at gunpoint, all before the defendant could fully enter the house, the trial court determined that the victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age and that this was known to the defendant. And although there was no physical injury to the victim, the trial court found that the victim suffered significant and permanent injuries. Finally, based apparently on the defendant having punched his attorney after the verdict was read (and thus, after the trial was over), the trial court found that the defendant used force or violence with the intent to influence the outcome of the trial. Weighing all of these factors in order to support the need for a more severe penalty, the trial court determined that the defendant should be sentenced to a total of 32 years’ imprisonment at hard labor, followed by 5 years’ probation, and the payment of a $5,000 fine.

It appears the trial court did not properly apply the sentencing criteria required under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. The sentences imposed on the defendant, Justin P. Craighead, are therefore vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to reconsider the sentencing criteria under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1.

WRIT GRANTED; SENTENCES VACATED; and REMANDED.

I agree with the majority to grant the defendant's writ application and remand this matter for resentencing. I write separately to note specifically the trial court's sentence under the facts of this case is excessive in violation of La. Const. art. 1, § 20.²

The record reflects while the crimes involved are serious, the homeowner victim was neither physically harmed nor was anything taken from his home. Notably and importantly, the defendant has no prior criminal history and appears to suffer significant mental health issues. Despite a sanity commission initially finding defendant competent to proceed, his unusual behavior during the commission of these crimes and throughout the proceedings demonstrates abnormal and troublesome conduct. All of these facts should have been given more weight by the sentencing court.

While this Court is ever cognizant of the discretion afforded the trial court in sentencing, “[b]y reason of the constitutional prohibition against excessive sentences provided by Article 1, Section 20, the sentencing judge does not possess unbridled discretion to impose a sentence within statutory limits․” State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 770-71 (La. 1979). There is a total absence of sufficient aggravating circumstances to justify imposing consecutive, maximum sentences. Thus, I find the trial court abused its sentencing discretion. Considering the absence of physical injury to the victim and the defendant's significant mental health struggles, I find the trial court's sentence, as applied to this defendant, too excessive under La. Const. art. 1, § 20. Accordingly, remanding the case for further consideration in resentencing defendant is proper.

The majority begins by saying the defendant is “potentially mentally ill.” The record indicates that the defendant filed a motion to appoint a sanity commission. He was found competent to stand trial. The defendant asked for another examination on the eve of trial. This request was denied as a delay tactic. At sentencing, the defendant's sister testified regarding his mental status. The trial judge had that evidence at the time of sentencing. After sentencing, the defendant was evaluated by a psychiatrist, and the trial court heard her testimony at a re-sentencing hearing. The trial court declined to reconsider the sentences. A reviewing court owes the trial court's determinations as to the defendant's competency great weight, and the trial court's ruling thereon will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Anderson, 2006-2987 (La. 9/9/08), 996 So.2d 973, 992. Nothing suggests the trial judge abused her discretion in determining defendant's competency.

The victim, a man in his 80s, was alerted by his dogs to the defendant, an intruder, in his home. The defendant entered through a doggie door, but one of his feet “hung up” in the door. The defendant was armed with two knives, one a “Bowie-type knife” “twelve to fourteen inches” in length. He had “a lot of blood on him” and had earlier killed a dog by stabbing it multiple times. The victim testified:

“how vulnerable I am, you know. I can't fight, I'm too old. And I -- I'm worried. I'm worried when he gets out, if I'm still alive, what's gonna happen. I believe he'd want to come back after me. Because if it hadn't been -- hadn't caught him he might have killed me. He'd already killed once [the dog].”

The victim told the defendant “don't move” because the knife was near his hand. The defendant grabbed the knife anyway. At that point, to warn the defendant, the victim fired a shot, putting a hole in his floor.

The defendant was charged, and convicted by a jury, of aggravated burglary and aggravated cruelty to animals. After the verdict was read, the defendant punched his attorney in the head.

A sentencing hearing was conducted with the trial judge expressly considering the sentencing guidelines in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1. For the aggravated burglary conviction, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to 30 years at hard labor, with 5 years suspended. For the aggravated cruelty to animals conviction, the defendant was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor, with 3 years suspended. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively, as the crimes were committed separately. La. Code of Crim Proc. art. 883.

Under Louisiana law, aggravated burglary is a crime of violence, with a sentencing range of 1-30 years at hard labor. La. R.S. 14:60(B). Aggravated cruelty to animals has a sentencing range of 1-10 years, with or without hard labor, a fine of $5,000 to $25,000, or both. La. R.S. 14:102.1(B)(6). The trial judge suspended parts of both sentences. I do not consider a suspended sentence to be a “maximum” sentence. By complying with his parole or probation terms, the defendant is not in prison for the suspended portion.

The sentences here are within the sentencing guidelines, and the trial judge clearly articulated her reasoning. A trial judge has wide discretion imposing a sentence within the statutory range, and the sentence should not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of this discretion. State v. Williams, 2003-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So.2d 7, 16. The trial judge is best able to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case, thus, is given broad discretion in sentencing. Williams, 893 So.2d at 16; citing State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

Considering the violent nature of the crimes and the age of the victim, the defendant's sentence is not excessive. If anything is shocking in this case, it is the nature of the crimes - the defendant stabbed a dog to death, then broke into the home of an 80-year-old man while armed with two knives, one a foot-long. The grave nature of the crimes is appropriately reflected in the sentences. Our job is not to determine whether another sentence is more appropriate, but whether the trial court manifestly abused its discretion. Williams, 893 So.2d at 17; Cook, 674 So.2d at 959. There is no abuse of discretion here. I dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 14:60(B), “[w]hoever commits the crime of aggravated burglary shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one nor more than thirty years.” For the aggravated burglary conviction, the defendant was given the maximum sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment albeit with five years suspended. Further, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 14:102.1(B)(6), a person convicted of aggravated cruelty to animals shall be “imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor more than ten years,” and the defendant was sentenced to the maximum term of ten years’ imprisonment at hard labor, albeit with three years suspended.

2.   La. Const. art. 1, § 20 provides: “[n]o law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment. Full rights of citizenship shall be restored upon termination of state and federal supervision following conviction for any offense.”

PER CURIAM

Weimer, C.J., would grant and docket. Knoll, J., concurs and assigns reasons. McCallum, J., dissents. Guidry, J., concurs in the result.