RAFAEL ANTONIO MENA CHAVEZ SERGIO BALBOA INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILDREN INGRID MENA PEREZ AND KELVIN PEREZ AND PLAINTIFF INTERVENORS EMR USA HOLDINGS INC AND SOUTHERN RECYCLING LLC v. METSO MINERALS INDUSTRIES INC METSO OUTOTECH USA INC AND ABC INSURANCE COMPANY (2024)

I would grant rehearing, maintaining my belief that dismissal is an inappropriate sanction in this case.

In my dissenting opinion, I pointed out that dismissing Mr. Chavez's suit due to his use of a true alias failed to address the majority's concern for preserving the integrity of the judicial process. The majority's approach, focusing solely on the “inviolability of the judicial process,” leaves no room for consideration of other fundamental rights. While I absolutely share the majority's belief in the importance of respect for the judiciary, no right is absolute and each right must be balanced against other important considerations. As noted by Justice Holmes long ago:

All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached.

Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).¹ Dismissal of the Mr. Chavez's suit actually diminishes the integrity of our judicial process by rewarding a potentially negligent tortfeasor, overly sanctioning an injured party, and shifting the financial responsibility to taxpayers. A better approach would require courts to consider the particular facts of each case, and balance other rights such as a litigant's constitutional right of access to the courts, with the need to protect the integrity of the judicial system, taking into account the relevancy and harm caused by the litigant's deception in the particular litigation, while ensuring that the punishment appropriately fits the infraction. This balanced and nuanced approach gives each important right its due.

It must be noted that Louisiana courts do not have unfettered inherent power to dismiss a suit as a sanction for contempt under the guise of protecting the integrity of the judicial process. Our constitution recognizes that courts’ power to punish for contempt is limited by law. La. Const. art. 5, § 2. See also, State ex rel. Morton v. Meyers, 131 So. 31, 32 (La. 1930) (“The accepted jurisprudence of this country is that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all of its courts and its legislative bodies, whether with or without constitutional grant, but the Constitutions of the several states contain provisions designed to limit the extent to which that power may be exercised.”).² The majority opinion effectively makes dismissal obligatory and mandatory, imposing the most severe sanction in all cases regardless of the facts and circumstances, and in the absence of any law requiring dismissal. While courts must, of course, protect the integrity of the judicial process, there is a more balanced way to do so. By failing to take into account any other rights, and failing to impose a sanction tailored to the actual harm caused, the majority opinion effectively absolves the defendant of its potential liability, releasing the defendant of any obligation to care for this worker who was unquestionably severely injured. Such a result is not warranted and should not be tolerated in our system of justice.

For these reasons, and for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion, I would grant rehearing.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This quote is cited in plaintiff's application for rehearing.

2.   Notably, although the majority opinion cites to this exact language from Morton, the majority opinion only quoted the first part of this sentence, and omitted the entire second part of the sentence which clearly recognizes Louisiana's constitutional limitations on punishment for contempt.

WEIMER, C.J., would grant rehearing.