STATE v. SHIRLEY (2024)

Writ granted. The State alleges that Marshall Rayburn, while wearing a court-ordered electronic ankle monitor, repeatedly breached the perimeter of the residence of Peggy Rayburn, from whom he had been ordered to stay away. Ultimately, Marshall Rayburn shot and killed Peggy Rayburn, and attempted to kill her neighbor Lanie Cathey. The State further alleges that defendant, as an employee of the electronic monitoring company, was aware of the perimeter breaches but never attempted to inform law enforcement of them.

A grand jury indicted defendant for negligent homicide, La. R.S. 14:32(A)(1), based on defendant's criminal negligence. Defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment, which the district court denied. The court of appeal reversed and quashed the indictment. State v. Shirley, 23-1242 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/29/24), 2024 WL 323625 (unpub'd). The court of appeal found that the conduct alleged by the State did not provide a legal basis for the crime charged. The court of appeal erred.

The motion to quash is essentially a mechanism by which to raise pre-trial pleas of defense, i.e., those matters which do not go to the merits of the charge. La.C.Cr.P. art. 531–534. It is treated much like an exception of no cause of action in a civil suit. State v. Gerstenberger, 260 La. 145, 255 So.2d 720 (1971). In considering a motion to quash, a court must accept as true the facts contained in the bill of information and in the bills of particulars and determine as a matter of law and from the face of the pleadings, whether a crime has been charged. While evidence may be adduced, such may not include a defense on the merits. State v. Ponthieux, 254 La. 482, 224 So.2d 462 (1969). The question of factual guilt or innocence of the offense charged is not raised by the motion to quash. State v. Rembert, 312 So.2d 282 (La. 1975); State v. Patterson, 301 So.2d 604 (La. 1974).

Here, defendant's arguments ultimately pertain to defendant's acts or omissions, the existence of a duty and its scope, and the degree of negligence, which issues relate to factual guilt or innocence, i.e. the merits of the charge. Cf. State v. Legendre, 362 So.2d 570, 571 (La. 1978) (pre-trial motion to quash on grounds of a defense going to the merits appropriate remedy only if charges based “upon an allegation of fact which cannot conceivably satisfy an essential element of the crime”). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to quash. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal. We reinstate the indictment and the district court's ruling, which denied the motion to quash. We remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

The defendant, Deborah Shirley, was charged with negligent homicide when Marshall Rayburn (“Rayburn”), while out on bond for raping his wife, Peggy Rayburn, killed Ms. Rayburn. At the time Ms. Rayburn was killed, Ms. Shirley was an employee of a monitoring company that was responsible for monitoring Rayburn to make sure he did not go near the marital home while out on bond.

On the night Ms. Rayburn was killed, the defendant fell asleep, thus, failing to alert the police. The defendant filed a motion to quash the charging instrument, which was denied by the trial court and reversed by the court of appeal.

I agree with the court of appeal's reversal of the trial court. The defendant's conduct constituted simple and ordinary negligence at best. The crime of negligent homicide is “the killing of a human being by criminal negligence.” La. R.S. 14:32(A)(1). Falling asleep on the job does not constitute criminal negligence. Criminal negligence goes beyond carelessness, mistake, error in judgment, or omission of a duty. See State v. Bowie, 95-795 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/13/96), 684 So.2d 68, writ granted on other grounds, 96-2987 (La. 1/31/97), 687 So.2d 369. It is more than the mere failure to do something which a reasonable and prudent man would do. Id. Consequences alone do not determine the criminal culpability of an actor. Id. Ordinary negligence cannot trigger or form the basis of negligent homicide.

I fully agree with the court of appeal and would deny this writ.

PER CURIAM:

Genovese, J., dissents and assigns reasons.