IN RE: COMMITTEE ON BAR ADMISSIONS CFN-665798 (2024)

Bar Admissions Proceeding

Supreme Court Rule XVII requires that all applicants for admission to the bar of this state must pass the essay portion of the bar examination (Part I of the bar exam) as well as the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, which is administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners (Part II of the bar exam). Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 8(C) provides that a passing score on both Part I and Part II of the bar exam “shall be valid for a period of five (5) years from the date of the examination.”

Petitioner's scores on both Part I and Part II are expired. However, because petitioner's score on Part I was valid at the time he filed his application for a commissioner, we find it timely.

Petitioner's score on Part II was expired at the time he applied for a commissioner. Therefore, we find the five-year limitation as to Part II expired. Petitioner must retake and successfully pass Part II in order to be eligible for admission.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the petition is granted in part and denied in part. The time requirement of Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 8(C) as to Part II expired. Petitioner is not eligible for admission until he successfully passes Part II.

The court's judgment in In re: Committee on Bar Admissions CFN-6654798, 22-1693 (La. 11/8/23), 372 So.3d 801, was limited to a finding that the petitioner was not ineligible for admission on the grounds of character and fitness. That judgment did not reach, nor even consider, whether the petitioner satisfied the other requirements for admission set forth in Supreme Court Rule XVII. Section 8(C) of this Rule provides that a passing score for the multi-part written examination (Part I of the bar exam) and a passing score for the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (Part II of the bar exam) each “shall be valid for a period of five (5) years from the date of the examination.” La. Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 8(C). As the majority correctly concludes, the petitioner's scores on both Part I and Part II are now expired.

However, I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority's decision finding petitioner's score on Part I of the examination timely on the basis that the score was valid at the time petitioner filed his application for a commissioner. The majority decision essentially adds nonexistent language to Rule XVII, § 8(C). Without expressly stating so, this decision effectively waives the five-year limitation as to the petitioner's score for Part I of the bar exam, giving him “a pass” that is not provided for by rule. The court's judgment in In re: Kott, 08-2174 (La. 1/7/09), ––– So.2d ––––, and its judgment in In re: Boyett, 06-0887 (La. 5/26/06), 930 So.2d 5, resolved the bar applicants’ question of character and fitness favorably, but denied their requests for waiver as to Part II of the bar exam because their scores were outside of the five-year period of Rule XVII. Although the date of this petitioner's passing score on Part I was within the five-year period of Rule XVII at the time the petitioner filed his application for a commissioner, there is no provision for suspension of the five-year period of Rule XVII, § 8(C), and no provision for waiver within the Rules themselves. Consistency dictates the same result here. Until the petitioner establishes compliance with all applicable requirements of Supreme Court Rule XVII, he is not entitled to admission to the bar. It was not this court's delay but the petitioner's delay in resolving his character and fitness issues which created this situation.

For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.

PER CURIAM

Weimer, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.