MELVIN HARPER AND LORENE BANKS v. BROOKSHIRE GROCERY COMPANY (2024)

Writ application denied on the showing made.

I agree with the decision to deny this writ on the showing made, and I join the reasons of Justice McCallum. I write separately to note that, while the parties’ submissions in this matter indicate the plaintiffs have not yet stipulated to the value of their cases, that is not the only method of obtaining the pertinent information. The defendants may engage in discovery through the mechanisms provided for in our Code of Civil Procedure. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1458 (interrogatories); art. 1467 (requests for admission). Here, the defendant's application notes that it has propounded written discovery on plaintiffs, but plaintiffs have not yet responded. Continuing the discovery process is therefore critical in this case.

I concur in the majority's decision to deny the writ application on the showing made. The record before us does not contain sufficient information with which to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to transfer the case to the district court. I would note that this writ application raises an issue that warrants consideration, and it pertains to a defendant's fundamental right to a jury trial.

This suit was filed in Monroe City Court, which, under La. C.C.P. art. 4843 F, has concurrent jurisdiction with the civil district court “where the amount in dispute ․ does not exceed thirty thousand dollars.” Importantly, although Monroe City Court has jurisdiction over disputes that are valued up to $30,000, Monroe City Court is expressly prohibited from conducting jury trials. See La. C.C.P. art. 4871 (“There shall be no trial by jury in any case in a parish court, city court, or justice of the peace court.”). The inherent problem with this statutory scheme is that La. C.C.P. art. 1732 now provides a threshold for jury trials of $10,000. Thus, while a defendant is entitled to a jury trial for all matters whose value exceeds $10,000, it cannot obtain a jury trial in a city court.

A defendant is not without recourse in this situation. Under La. C.C.P. art. 4872 A, “[w]here a principal demand is commenced in a ․ city court in which the defendant would otherwise be entitled to trial ․, the defendant may obtain trial by jury by transferring the action to the district court in the manner provided by Article 4873.” (Emphasis added). The use of the term “may” signifies that the transfer of a case is permissive and not mandatory. See La. C.C.P art. 5052 (“The word ‘shall’ is mandatory, and the word “may” is permissive.”). Where there is no opposition to a defendant's motion to transfer an action to district court, a city court “shall order the transfer to the district court. If an opposition is filed, it shall be tried summarily.” La. C.C.P. art. 4873 A(2). These articles suggest that a city court has discretion in its decision to transfer a case, although there are no statutory or jurisprudential guidelines by which a city court judge is to exercise discretion in transferring a suit. In my view, the decision to deny the transfer of a suit from city court to district court should have some valid basis and not be based on an inarticulable whim.

Plaintiffs may avoid a jury trial and have their case remain in a city court simply by stipulating that their damages do not exceed $10,000. Where, as here, there is no stipulation by the plaintiffs that the value of their claims do not exceed $10,000, a defendant is left with few options, none of which are ideal. First, the defendant may elect to remain in city court. This, necessarily, infringes upon the defendant's fundamental right to a jury trial. See Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 600 So.2d 701, 705 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1992) (“the right to a trial by jury is fundamental”).

Second, a defendant may seek the transfer of the suit to the district court. This is problematic on several levels. By seeking the transfer of the case, a defendant thereby admits that the value of a plaintiff's claim exceeds $10,000. This clearly forces a defendant to make a declaration against its own interest. Even more egregiously, this essentially shifts the burden of proving damages to a defendant. Such a result should not be countenanced as the burden of proving damages rests solely with a plaintiff. See Wainwright v. Fontenot, 00-0492, p. 5 (La. 10/17/00), 774 So.2d 70, 74 (“in a negligence action under article 2315, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving ․ damages”).

Simply put, there is a disconnect in the statutes. City courts have jurisdictional limits of $30,000 while the threshold for a jury trial is $10,000. Despite the fact that its jurisdiction is well within the amount required for jury trials, a city court is expressly prohibited from conducting them. Granting and docketing the case at this point would require judicial legislation. As our case law recognizes, “as a court of law, we cannot legislate; we must interpret the law as promulgated by the legislature, despite the inequities that such interpretation may cause.” Eads Operating Co., Inc. v. Thompson, 93-2155, p. 12 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/7/94), 646 So.2d 948, 955; see also, State v. Brown, 21-0230, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/27/21), 317 So.3d 893, 897 (“[j]udges cannot legislate from the bench.”). This is a matter that begs for legislative attention.

Weimer, C.J., would grant and docket. Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Crain, J., would grant. McCallum, J., concurs and assigns reasons.