CARRIE v. SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY AT NEW ORLEANS (2024)

Granted in part. Because plaintiff failed to pay the required service fees, her initial request for service of her supplemental petition against relators, Lamar Contractors, LLC and The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, was not proper. See Jenkins v. Larpenter, 04-0318 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So.2d 656, 659, writ denied, 05-1078 (La. 6/17/05), 904 So.2d 711 (“[w]e find that a request for service without payment of required fees, or without leave of court excusing such payment because of pauper status, simply is no proper request at all.”).² Plaintiff did not make a proper request for service until more than ninety days after the supplemental petition was filed, in violation of La. Code Civ. P. art. 1201(C).

Accordingly, the writ is granted in part, and judgment is rendered in favor of relators dismissing plaintiffs’ supplemental petition against them without prejudice pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1672(C).

In all other respects, the writ is denied. See Bordelon v. Med. Center of Baton Rouge, 2003-0202 (La. 10/21/03), 871 So. 2d 1075.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Griffin, J. recused.

2.   We acknowledge the court in Walker v. GoAuto Ins. Co., 20-0331 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/10/21), 323 So.3d 918, reached a seemingly different result; however, we find Walker is factually distinguishable. Walker dealt with a factual circumstance where the petitioner sought pauper status and after being denied such status, then remitted the amounts due to effect service to the Clerk of Court as requested. However, the Clerk of Court thereafter failed to inform petitioner that the original amount was insufficient, and that the Sheriff's office was holding service until further payment. After contacting the Clerk of Court for a status update on service, and after being informed of the insufficiency, petitioner immediately paid the additional amounts for service. Service was then made but it was done so after the applicable ninety-day period had lapsed. The trial court subsequently granted defendant's exception of insufficiency of service of process. The Walker court reversed and specifically explained that unlike Jenkins, the plaintiff in Walker “timely forwarded payment to the Clerk of Court after receiving notice of the denial of his request to proceed in forma pauperis.” Walker, 323 So. 3d at 921. These facts where the error was clearly attributable to the Clerk of Court differ with those in the instant case where the plaintiff did not timely forward the payment necessary to effect service on defendants. Therefore, the facts of the instant case are more analogous to Jenkins, in which the fees were not paid.

PER CURIAM 1

Crain, J., concurs. Griffin, J., recused.