STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ASHLEY ATKINSON (2024)

Crichton, J., would grant and assigns reasons.

I would grant the writ application and reverse the ruling of the trial court denying the state's objection to defendant's purported waiver of jury trial. The motion for bench trial timely filed on behalf of defendant did not include defendant's signature as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 780(B). Thus, the motion was not a valid pre-trial waiver of jury-trial. The subsequently filed “supplement” to that motion containing defendant's signature was untimely filed in violation of La. Const. art. I, § 17 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 780(B). Accordingly, in my view, defendant has failed to properly effectuate a waiver of her right to a jury trial.

As I have written before, the issue of sufficiency of a jury trial waiver effected through counsel continues to appear before this Court even since the legislature amended La. C.Cr.P. art. 780.¹ See e.g. State v. Lastrapes, 2019-01957 (La. 7/31/20), 300 So.3d 397 (Crichton, J., would grant); State v. Spurlock, 2015-1173 (La. 9/25/15), 175 So.3d 955 (Crichton, J., concurring); State v. Bazile, 2012–2243 (La. 5/7/13), 144 So.3d 719; State v. Pierre, 2002–2665 (La. 3/28/03), 842 So.2d 321; State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304 (La. 1978); State v. Muller, 351 So.2d 143 (La. 1977). Considering the sanctity of the jury trial right, it is duty of the trial court to ensure defendant unequivocally understands the right which she is surrendering under La. C.Cr.P. art. 780.

In addition to the La. C.Cr.P. art. 780(B) requirements that the waiver be timely filed by written motion signed by defendant and counsel (unless counsel has been waived), I believe further that, while not absolutely mandated, the preferred method of securing a defendant's waiver of her right to a jury trial is for the trial court (i) to advise the defendant on the record of her constitutional right to a jury trial; (ii) to secure an oral waiver from the defendant herself; and (iii) if warranted, to make a finding that the defendant has intelligently and voluntarily waived her constitutional right to a jury trial. See Lastrapes, Id.; Spurlock, Id.; State v. Brooks, 2001–1138, p.8 (La. App 1 Cir. 3/28/02), 814 So.2d 72, 78, writ denied, 2002–1215 (La.11/22/02), 829 So.2d 1037; Adams, Warden of City Prison of Manhattan, et al. v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277-78, 63 S.Ct. 236, 241, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942). Just as procedure dictates a proper colloquy during a Boykin guilty plea,² such a preservation in the record of the defendant's understanding of a waiver of a jury trial would allow for timely objections, avoid this sort of “eleventh hour” litigation, and aid in appellate review. For these reasons, I continue to urge trial courts to adopt this procedure when faced with motions to waive jury trials pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 780.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See La. Acts 2013, No. 343.

2.   See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (the United States Supreme Court holding, on appeal of a criminal conviction that it was error for the trial judge to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary, and instead, the trial court should “canvass [ ] the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.”).