STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JAMES HUDSON DUDLEY (2023)

In this case, the district court found evidence of a subsequent sexual encounter by the complainant to be admissible at defendant's trial. Relying on La. C.E. art. 412, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision. In my view, the appellate court's ruling excluding this evidence impedes defendant's right to present a defense in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and violates his state constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. La. Const. art. 1 § 16.

I therefore disagree with the majority's decision to deny the defendant's writ application. Like every article in the Code of Evidence, Article 412 is necessarily subject to constitutional requirements. “The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Notwithstanding its worthy legislative aims, La. C.E. art. 412, “cannot be mechanistically applied to deny admission of highly reliable and relevant evidence critical to an accused's defense.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Where “highly relevant evidence is available, the State's need to protect the victim from embarrassing cross-examination must be weighed against the probative value of the evidence to determine whether the right of confrontation is being infringed.” State v. Vaughn, 448 So.2d 1260, 1267 (La. 1983) (on rehearing).

In this case, evidence of the complainant's sexual encounter after the alleged offense is “genuinely relevant, highly probative, and critical to the defense.” Id. at 1262 (original hearing). This subsequent sexual act, hours after the alleged offense, is essential to understanding what occurred between the complainant and defendant, and therefore is part of the narrative of the case.

Additionally, reference to this encounter may be necessary to impeach witnesses against defendant. It is my opinion that the probative value of this evidence outweighs the potential embarrassment of the complainant in this case. Because I believe that exclusion of this evidence violates defendant's right to due process, I would grant defendant's writ application, reverse the decision of the appellate court, and remand the matter to the district court for trial.

CRICHTON, J., would grant and assigns reasons: