KORTNEY HICKENBOTTOM v. JUVENILE JUSTICE INTERVENTION CENTER (2026)

This is a civil service disciplinary matter. Appellant, the Juvenile Justice Intervention Center (“JJIC”), seeks review of the September 2, 2025 decision rendered by the Civil Service Commission of the City of New Orleans (“Commission”), which reversed the disciplinary action it imposed against its employee—Appellee, Kortney Hickenbottom (“Ms. Hickenbottom”). For the following reasons, we affirm the Commission's decision.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 23, 2024, Ms. Hickenbottom received a request from the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court to transport a juvenile at the JJIC, C.T., to court.¹ Ms. Hickenbottom was a court liaison and served not only as a senior social worker for the JJIC but also had the designation of “Direct Care Worker,” which meant she had the authority to transport juveniles to and from their court proceedings. According to the record, Ms. Hickenbottom nevertheless requested the assistance of a correctional officer, but none were available to help her at that time. Therefore, Ms. Hickenbottom transported C.T. to court on her own, but he ultimately escaped from the courtroom and from Ms. Hickenbottom's custody.

Notice of Suspension

Subsequently, on October 3, 2024, the JJIC issued a “Notice of Suspension Without Pay” letter (“Notice of Suspension”), thereby notifying Ms. Hickenbottom that it was suspending her without pay for thirty workdays because of the incident involving C.T. As explained therein, the JJIC conducted an internal investigation and concluded that Ms. Hickenbottom had violated the JJIC's policies and procedures and that these violations “allowed [C.T.] to escape custody.” Specifically, the Notice of Suspension contended Ms. Hickenbottom violated the JJIC's policies and procedures when she failed to exit the courtroom upon the conclusion of C.T.’s hearing and to thereafter secure him with restraints; call for assistance when C.T.’s behavior presented risks; and use adequate radio communication to identify an emergency and provide her location. Ms. Hickenbottom appealed her suspension to the Commission and requested rescission of and back-pay for her suspension.

Commission Hearing

At the March 17, 2025 hearing before the Hearing Examiner, the JJIC presented the testimony of Ms. Hickenbottom; Lee Reisman, Ms. Hickenbottom's supervisor and the Superintendent of the JJIC (“Ms. Reisman”); Kelsey Route, JJIC Grounds Patrol Officer (“Officer Route”); and Dichelle Williams, Executive Director of the JJIC (“Director Williams”). Ms. Hickenbottom also testified on her own behalf.

Additionally, the JJIC offered three exhibits into the record. The first was an email detailing the JJIC's policies for transporting juveniles to and from court and the use of restraints in transporting juveniles (“JJIC-1”), and the second was an email from Ms. Hickenbottom acknowledging her receipt of aforesaid policies (“JJIC-2”). JJIC-1 stated, in pertinent part:

- Restraints are to be place [sic] on youth at their residential unit or location of movement start

․

- Restrains [sic] remain on until youth has entered the court back door

- Restraints are removed inside the back entrance and youth walks unrestrained to the defendant's table

․

- Restraints are place [sic] on prior to exiting back door of the court room [sic].

The third exhibit was surveillance video footage from the date of the incident (“JJIC-3”). In lieu of viewing JJIC-3 at the hearing, the parties stipulated that the videos in that exhibit showed Ms. Hickenbottom and C.T. went to a back room off of the courtroom at the conclusion of his court proceeding before C.T. subsequently returned to the courtroom—still unrestrained—to speak to his counsel in an apparently agitated state. As described by Ms. Reisman during her subsequent testimony, the back room was for juveniles to enter and exit the courtroom and where the JJIC staff removed and placed the juveniles’ restraints before they entered and after they exited the courtroom, respectively. Our review of JJIC-3 revealed Ms. Hickenbottom tried (unsuccessfully) to place the restraints on C.T. while he was in the courtroom speaking with his attorney. Additionally, JJIC-3 showed Ms. Hickenbottom speaking with C.T. and placing a hand on his shoulder in a comforting effort seemingly to calm him down as he cried and held his face in his hands. JJIC-3 also included a surveillance video of the exterior of the courtroom, which depicted a young black male run out of the courthouse, scale a tall fence, and then run out of view. Seconds later, Ms. Hickenbottom emerged from the same exit; spoke into a radio; and exited the fence through a gate, with several correctional officers soon following no more than thirty seconds later.

Testimony of Ms. Hickenbottom

Ms. Hickenbottom testified that prior to C.T.’s escape she received a call from a juvenile court judge's staff informing her that the judge was ready for C.T., whereupon she requested the assistance of a JJIC correctional officer to transport C.T. to court. According to Ms. Hickenbottom, however, she did not receive the requested assistance when she called at approximately 12:30 p.m. because all correctional officers were busy overseeing the juveniles’ “lunch feed-up,” which lasted until 1:00 p.m. Therefore, Ms. Hickenbottom testified she proceeded independently with the transport by placing C.T. in leg restraints per JJIC policy and noted that C.T. initially cooperated with her directives. Ms. Hickenbottom testified that upon their arrival at juvenile court, she removed C.T.’s leg restraints in the back room before he entered the courtroom. Then, as explained by Ms. Hickenbottom, she and C.T. exited the courtroom at the conclusion of the hearing, whereupon she made several attempts to place the leg restraints on C.T. in the designated area for doing so. Ms. Hickenbottom testified that C.T. resisted her attempts to place the restraints; returned to the courtroom whereupon he became “uncooperative” and “irate” as he spoke with his attorney;² ignored her directives to return to the back room and continued to resist her attempts to place the restraints; and, ultimately, fled the courtroom.³ According to Ms. Hickenbottom, she radioed for assistance after C.T. fled the courtroom and attempted to “call a Code Blue” to indicate a juvenile had escaped but could not “get through” over the radio. As Ms. Hickenbottom explained, because her radio did not work at that time, she instead “called and asked [the supervisor of the correctional officer department] to give [her] a 21” and subsequently received support from the New Orleans Police Department and called Ms. Reisman to inform her of what had transpired.

When Ms. Hickenbottom's counsel asked her about this experience with C.T. compared with her prior experiences transporting youth to court, the following colloquy occurred:

Q You gave [C.T.] directives; you attempted to put the restraints on. He kept moving his feet and [would not] allow you to do so?

A Correct.

Q Had you ever had that problem when you were accompanied by a correctional officer?

A No.

Q In fact, had you ever had an escape when you were accompanied by a correctional officer?

A No.

Q When [you are] accompanied by a correctional officer, who usually does the restraints, the social worker or the correctional officer?

A When [we are] together, [it is] the correctional officer.

When asked why she did not wait for a correctional officer to become available before transporting C.T., Ms. Hickenbottom explained that “when the courts call, they expect [an] immediate response.”

Testimony of Ms. Reisman

Ms. Reisman identified herself as Ms. Hickenbottom's supervisor and as the Superintendent of Youth Support Services for the JJIC. Ms. Reisman explained that the JJIC's standard practice was for staff not to transport high-risk youth to court alone so that they do not end up in “vulnerable situations”; and she identified high-risk youth as those who are “aggressive, violent or ha[ve] a history of being aggressive or violent.” Regarding C.T., Ms. Reisman identified him as a “high-risk youth” because he had been in JJIC custody on more than ten occasions over the course of three or four years; he “had a reputation for being violent and aggressive towards staff”; he had caused “excessive property damage in the [JJIC] facility”; and he had previously attempted to escape. When asked why the JJIC's standard practice of more than one staff member transporting a high-risk youth did not occur on the date of C.T.’s escape, she responded: “I [do not] know. I [did not] give a directive for Ms. Hickenbottom to transport [C.T.] independently, and through my investigation, no JJIC supervisor gave her the directive to transport him independently. So [it is] my assumption that Ms. Hickenbottom made that judgment on her own.” Nonetheless, Ms. Reisman confirmed that Ms. Hickenbottom's status as a Direct Care Worker meant that she had authority to transport juveniles to and from court on her own. Finally, Ms. Reisman discussed the JJIC's “radio codes” and identified “Code Black” or a “10-10” as the one used to alert staff of an escape. Additionally, Ms. Reisman admitted that although the JJIC does not have any reported consistent issues with its radios, if someone else radioed dispatch at the same time as Ms. Hickenbottom, then her call may not have gone through.

Testimony of Officer Route

Officer Route, a Grounds Patrol Officer for the JJIC, explained she was responsible for patrolling the JJIC facility and escorting guests in and out of the buildings. According to Officer Route, she did not hear a “Code Black” from Ms. Hickenbottom on the radio on the day of C.T.’s escape but did recall hearing Ms. Hickenbottom ask for the supervisor of the correctional officers “to give her a 21” or a phone call. As Ms. Reisman testified, Officer Route likewise confirmed that if two individuals attempted to radio at the same time, the second transmission would be blocked by the first.

Testimony of Director Williams

Director Williams explained she ultimately decided to suspend Ms. Hickenbottom for thirty-days after reviewing JJIC-3 and Ms. Reisman's notes regarding her investigation into this incident. According to Director Williams, Ms. Hickenbottom violated JJIC policy by failing to immediately place the leg restraints on C.T. following his juvenile court hearing and for missing multiple opportunities to call for additional support from JJIC staff. Director Williams further justified the suspension by noting that C.T.’s escape caused the public to lose confidence in the JJIC; resulted in public safety concerns; and required the JJIC to temporarily shut down or reduce some of its normal operations such as the education, visitation, and programming and therapeutic services normally available to the other juveniles at the Center.

The Commission's Decision

Following the hearing, the Hearing Examiner recommended that Ms. Hickenbottom's appeal be granted. The Hearing Examiner concluded that the JJIC “ha[d] not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the discipline was imposed for cause.” Agreeing with the Hearing Examiner's recommendation, the Commission granted Ms. Hickenbottom's appeal, finding the JJIC did not carry “its burden of showing cause for” Ms. Hickenbottom's suspension and finding the “JJIC ․ failed to carry its burden of showing the occurrence of the complained-of conduct.” Specifically, the Commission found that the JJIC erroneously assumed that Ms. Hickenbottom made the decision to transport C.T. alone without the assistance of a correctional officer, yet the hearing revealed Ms. Hickenbottom requested but did not receive assistance. The Commission found that the presence of a correctional officer, as Ms. Hickenbottom originally requested, would have prevented C.T.’s escape. Additionally, the Commission explained it “credit[ed] the testimony of Ms. Hickenbottom that she was unable to reach the dispatcher with her radio” after C.T.’s escape, “so she used her cell phone to” get help. The Commission ordered the JJIC to reimburse Ms. Hickenbottom for back pay during her thirty-day suspension, along with all emoluments of employment and ordered the discipline removed from her personnel file. The JJIC's timely appeal to this Court followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, the JJIC asserts two assignments of error:

I. The Commission abused its discretion by determining the JJIC has not carried its burden of showing cause the complained-of conduct occurred [sic].

II. The Commission abused its discretion by granting Ms. Hickenbottom's appeal, based upon its determination the presence of a correctional officer would have prevented C.T. from resisting [Ms.] Hickenbottom, re-entering the courtroom, and ultimately escaping.

Before addressing the JJIC's assignments of error, we begin with a discussion of the legal principles and standard of review applicable to civil service matters.

DISCUSSION

Governing Legal Principles

Louisiana Constitution Article X, Section 8(A) provides:

No person who has gained permanent status in the classified state or city service shall be subjected to disciplinary action except for cause expressed in writing. A classified employee subjected to such disciplinary action shall have the right of appeal to the appropriate commission pursuant to Section 12 of this Part. The burden of proof on appeal, as to the facts, shall be on the appointing authority.

As delineated in the above constitutional provision, any permanent status classified state or city employee who is “subjected to disciplinary action by his or her appointing authority has the right to appeal to the Commission.” Hardy v. Juv. Just. Intervention Ctr., 2021-0715, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/15/22), 342 So.3d 1076, 1079 (citing Honore’ v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 2014-0986, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/29/15), 178 So.3d 1120, 1126). See also Civil Service Rule II, § 4.1.⁴ The appointing authority then has the burden to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence good or lawful cause for taking disciplinary action.” Hardy, 2021-0715, p. 3, 342 So.3d at 1079 (quoting Honore’, 2014-0986, p. 8, 178 So.3d at 1126-27). In particular, “the appointing authority ․ has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) the occurrence of the complained of activity; and 2) that the conduct complained of impaired the efficiency of the public service in which the appointing authority is engaged.” Crayton v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 2023-0728, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/9/24), 398 So.3d 68, 72-73 (quoting Clark v. Dep't of Police, 2018-0399, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/10/18), 257 So.3d 744, 747). See also Jones v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 2022-0121, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/31/22), 351 So.3d 788, 796 (quoting Bell v. Dep't of Police, 2016-0677, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/22/17), 216 So.3d 819, 823). The Commission must thereafter “decide independently from the facts presented whether the appointing authority has good or lawful cause for taking disciplinary action and, if so, whether the punishment imposed is commensurate with the dereliction [or the complained-of activity].” Jones, 2022-0121, p. 13, 351 So.3d at 796-97 (alteration in original) (quoting Saacks v. City of New Orleans, 1995-2074, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/27/96), 687 So.2d 432, 440). Nevertheless, “[i]t is not the job of the Commission to decide who should be disciplined how” because “[t]he appointing authority is charged with the operation of [its] department ․ an obviously necessary part of which is dismissing or disciplining employees.” James v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 505 So.2d 119, 121 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987). Thus, while the appointing authority cannot dismiss or discipline an employee “without cause, [it] may, and indeed must, within the exercise of sound discretion, dismiss or discipline an employee for sufficient cause.” Id.

Standard of Review

This Court has also laid out the appellate standard of review in civil service disciplinary matters. First, this Court has explained that “an appellate court reviewing a [Commission] decision employs a mixed standard of review.” Jones, 2022-0121, p. 14, 351 So.3d at 797 (citing Morrison v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 2022-0051, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/13/22), 344 So.3d 259, 265). In particular, the Commission's “factual findings are afforded deference and should not be disturbed unless they are manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Id. (citing McGaw v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 2020-0564, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/9/21), 323 So.3d 901, 906). However, when reviewing whether the Commission correctly determined “the disciplinary action was based both on legal cause and commensurate with the infraction, an appellate court should not modify the decision unless it is arbitrary or capricious (meaning there is no rational basis for the action) or constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. “Arbitrary or capricious means the absence of a rational basis for the action taken; abuse of discretion generally results from a conclusion reached capriciously or in an arbitrary manner.” Jackson v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 2024-0801, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/25/25), 414 So.3d 984, 989 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hardy, 2021-0715, p. 4, 342 So.3d at 1080).

Assignment of Error Number One: Whether the JJIC Carried its Burden of Proof

Failure to Exit the Courtroom

In its first assignment of error, the JJIC asserts it presented adequate evidence of the complained-of conduct and cause for suspending Ms. Hickenbottom because she failed to follow the JJIC's policies thereby leading to C.T.’s escape. Within this assignment of error, the JJIC first argues that Ms. Hickenbottom violated JJIC policy by failing to remove C.T. from the courtroom immediately upon the conclusion of the juvenile court proceedings. However, nothing in the record lists a policy requiring JJIC staff to immediately remove juveniles from the courtroom upon the conclusion of their proceedings. Neither JJIC-1 nor the hearing testimony established such a policy. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.

Failure to Properly Restrain C.T.

Next, the JJIC argues that Ms. Hickenbottom violated JJIC policy due to her “failure to secure [C.T.] with restraints,” whereupon he returned to the courtroom and spoke—unrestrained—with his attorney, another violation of JJIC policy. The Commission found that Ms. Hickenbottom requested but did not receive assistance from a correctional officer because all were assisting with the juveniles’ lunch hour. Further, the Commission found the presence of a correctional officer would have prevented C.T. from resisting Ms. Hickenbottom, re-entering the courtroom, and ultimately escaping. In other words, the Commission reasoned the JJIC's failure to provide Ms. Hickenbottom with the support she needed in transporting this high-risk youth is what led to the purported violation(s) of JJIC policy, not the actions Ms. Hickenbottom took or failed to take.

We agree. The Commission was not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous in finding Ms. Hickenbottom sought help but received none and in reasoning the result might have been different if she had received help. Ms. Hickenbottom testified that she sought assistance from a correctional officer but did not receive it because of their lunch hour duty, and the JJIC does not dispute or disprove this. Further, the record established Ms. Hickenbottom was permitted as a Direct Care Worker to independently transport juveniles to and from court, and she successfully restrained C.T. for his trip to court. While the record confirms Ms. Hickenbottom did not place restraints on C.T. in the back room before he returned to the courtroom and while he spoke to his attorney, she testified about her attempts to do so but explained she faced resistance from C.T. And, JJIC-3 confirmed this, as well as C.T.’s agitated state. Additionally, Ms. Hickenbottom testified she had never faced such resistance or an escape attempt when transporting youths to the courtroom with the assistance of a correctional officer. Had Ms. Hickenbottom not even attempted to place restraints on C.T., the result would be different. But, we cannot say Ms. Hickenbottom violated the JJIC's policy when she attempted to place restraints but was unable to do so and her inability was the result of things that were not within her control, i.e., C.T.’s resistance and the lack of a correctional officer to assist her. This argument is without merit.

Failure to Follow Proper Communication Procedure

Finally, the JJIC argues Ms. Hickenbottom violated its policy when she failed to properly communicate in the wake of C.T.’s escape. In particular, the JJIC contends Ms. Hickenbottom did not call for assistance when C.T.’s behavior presented risks and failed to use adequate radio signaling to identify his escape. The JJIC argues that JJIC-3 showed Ms. Hickenbottom missed several opportunities to call for assistance when C.T. was “obviously in an agitated state of mind.” Additionally, the JJIC argues that, pursuant to Ms. Hickenbottom's own testimony, she erroneously called a “Code Blue” instead of a “Code Black” over the radio when C.T. escaped. Regarding the communication employed by Ms. Hickenbottom, the Commission “credit[ed] the testimony of Ms. Hickenbottom that she was unable to reach the dispatcher with her radio” after C.T.’s escape, “so she used her cell phone to” get help.

Regarding the allegation that Ms. Hickenbottom should have called for assistance when C.T. was agitated, Ms. Hickenbottom's Direct Care Worker status allowed her to handle juvenile transports to and from the courtroom on her own, and the JJIC neither argued the existence of nor presented a policy that required her to call for assistance upon C.T. becoming agitated and resisting the restraints. Admittedly, Ms. Hickenbottom calling for assistance sooner would have been a good action to take in hindsight. However, contrary to the JJIC's assertion, her failure to do so did not contravene a specific JJIC policy. Further, Ms. Hickenbottom was in a predicament. The evidence demonstrates that instead of initially calling for help when C.T. left the back room and returned to the courtroom to speak with his attorney, Ms. Hickenbottom continued to try to place restraints on C.T. and deescalate the situation, i.e., she tried to ensure compliance with the JJIC's restraint policy. If Ms. Hickenbottom had not continued these attempts, the JJIC would have been able to argue that she did not even attempt to restrain C.T.; and hearing Ms. Hickenbottom call for help might have merely spurred C.T. to run sooner than he did.

Turning to the JJIC's assertion that Ms. Hickenbottom failed to use adequate radio signaling, Ms. Hickenbottom testified that she tried to use her radio when C.T. escaped from the courtroom, and JJIC-3 shows her doing so as she followed him out of the courtroom door. Insofar as the JJIC argues Ms. Hickenbottom used the wrong code and observes that Ms. Hickenbottom herself testified that she tried to radio in “a Code Blue” instead of the correct “Code Black,” the JJIC does not explain the import of this nor can we ascertain any. Assuming Ms. Hickenbottom's testimony was accurate that she used the wrong code, it would not have mattered anyway because she also testified that she could not get through over the radio, such that no one heard the incorrect code anyway. Ms. Reisman and Officer Route both confirmed that Ms. Hickenbottom would have been unable to get a message through on the radio if someone else was doing so at the same time.

Thereafter, Ms. Hickenbottom testified she “called and asked [the supervisor of the correctional officer department] to give [her] a 21” and subsequently received support from the New Orleans Police Department and called Ms. Reisman to inform her of what had transported. Officer Route likewise confirmed that Ms. Hickenbottom requested “a 21” or “phone call” and never called in a “Code Black.” Even if this is true, the JJIC again does not point to a policy Ms. Hickenbottom violated by using the wrong code nor does the JJIC even allege there was a delay in responding to the situation because she used the wrong code. In fact, JJIC-3 shows officers exiting the courthouse building and giving chase in the direction C.T. headed less than 30 seconds after Ms. Hickenbottom attempted to call for help on her radio; so the response time was quick even if Ms. Hickenbottom could not get through on the radio as she alleged and/or even if she relayed the incorrect code via the radio or phone. The importance of using the correct code is to receive a quick response to the emergency, which is precisely what happened in the matter sub judice. In other words, the JJIC failed to demonstrate how the incorrect code employed by Ms. Hickenbottom had any bearing on the result. Thus, we hold the evidence supports the Commission's finding that Ms. Hickenbottom called for help (in some way, shape, or form) when her radio did not work and that the JJIC did not prove Ms. Hickenbottom's initial lack of communication and subsequent communication of the wrong code violated JJIC policy and constituted cause for her suspension in light of the quick response time.

In sum, this assignment of error is without merit. The Commission was not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous in its factual findings. Further, we hold the Commission did not abuse its discretion in ruling the JJIC failed to prove Ms. Hickenbottom violated its policies and, correspondingly, that her actions—or lack of certain actions—justified the JJIC imposing a thirty-day suspension.

Assignment of Error Number Two: Whether the Commission Abused Its Discretion by Ruling Based upon Speculation that a Correctional Officer Would Have Prevented C.T.’s Escape

In its second assignment of error, the JJIC argues that “[t]he Commission abused its discretion by granting [Ms.] Hickenbottom's appeal based upon its speculation a correctional officer would have prevented C.[T.] from resisting [her], re-entering the courtroom, and ultimately escaping.” We disagree that this was “speculation.” Apart from the obviousness that a correctional officer is more likely to be able to overcome resistance from a juvenile because of training and experience than a social worker is, Ms. Hickenbottom testified that whenever accompanied and assisted by a correctional officer for transports in the past, she had not experienced an issue with restraining a juvenile or an escape. In fact, Ms. Hickenbottom explained the correctional officer is the one to place the restraints when one is present for the transport.

Also, on the one hand, the JJIC argues that the Commission's finding that a correctional officer's presence would have prevented the escape is mere speculation amounting to a legal error and an abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the JJIC asserts that after initially learning that no one was available to help her, Ms. Hickenbottom should have waited ten to fifteen minutes and asked again for a correctional officer. Essentially, the JJIC tries to “have its cake and eat it too,” so to speak, by discounting that a correctional officer's presence would have thwarted the escape but simultaneously stating that Ms. Hickenbottom should have waited for one anyway. This position is contradictory: if the JJIC believes a correctional officer's presence might not have changed the outcome anyway, then it should not concurrently fault Ms. Hickenbottom for not waiting for one to become available.

Moreover, the JJIC does not offer any suggestion as to what Ms. Hickenbottom was supposed to do if she waited the suggested amount of time and still had no one to help her. And, based on her testimony, this would have been the likely result. According to Ms. Hickenbottom, she called for the help of a correctional officer around 12:30 p.m., but the officers were busy with the “lunch feed-up” until 1:00 p.m. Thus, if Ms. Hickenbottom waited ten to fifteen minutes as suggested by the JJIC, it would have been to no avail; and she would have simply delayed the juvenile court with the same outcome anyway (no correctional officer assistance), all the while knowing the judge was expecting C.T. immediately and that she had the authority to transport him on her own as a Direct Care Worker. According to her testimony, Ms. Hickenbottom would have had to wait at least thirty minutes for help, assuming that a correctional officer would have been immediately available when the “lunch feed-up” ended at 1:00 p.m.⁵ Though Ms. Hickenbottom did not follow the JJIC's “standard practice” of staff not independently transporting high-risk juveniles and “independently” decided to do so, she did not violate an actual JJIC policy by bringing C.T. to court on her own—contrary to the JJIC's contention. Further, while Ms. Reisman testified neither she nor another supervisor authorized Ms. Hickenbottom to transport C.T. to court on her own, the record contains nothing to the effect that Ms. Hickenbottom had to obtain permission to do so. In fact, the record establishes the opposite.

Notably, the JJIC does not provide an amount of time it would have deemed “sufficient” for Ms. Hickenbottom to wait for help without creating an issue for the juvenile court in terms of its schedule. Again, Ms. Hickenbottom was in a predicament. Admittedly, and in hindsight, Ms. Hickenbottom could have informed the juvenile court that she sought assistance to transport C.T. because he was a high-risk youth and asked if the juvenile court was amenable to waiting until such assistance was available at some time after 1:00 p.m. However, that is assuming arguendo that Ms. Hickenbottom learned a correctional officer would definitely be available at 1:00 p.m. and she neglected to inform the juvenile court of same and seek permission for the delay. Rather, the record provides no definitive timeline for how soon someone would have been available to help Ms. Hickenbottom, let alone whether anyone conveyed that information to Ms. Hickenbottom. She merely knew the correctional officers were tied up at a minimum until 1:00 p.m.

This leads to another point raised by the JJIC in this section of its brief: Ms. Hickenbottom “missed multiple opportunities” and “could have summoned support” so that “a correctional officer could have been present in the courtroom ․ when [C.T.] became non-compliant.” This presupposes that such support and assistance would have been available at that time, yet the JJIC provided no evidence to support such a claim. And, as discussed previously, the JJIC presented no evidence that Ms. Hickenbottom's failure to call for help when C.T. became resistant constituted a violation of a specific JJIC policy.

In this section of its brief, the JJIC also again questions the propriety of the Commission's finding that “because Ms. Hickenbottom's radio was not working, Ms. Hickenbottom used her cell phone to request assistance.” The JJIC contends Ms. Hickenbottom did not in fact use her cell phone to call for help and failed to issue the appropriate code for an escape. We already explained in the prior section of this Opinion that the record supports a finding that Ms. Hickenbottom called for and immediately received help despite Ms. Hickenbottom requesting it via an incorrect emergency code, so we need not repeat that discussion. In light of the above, we find no merit to the JJIC's second assignment of error. The Commission did not abuse its discretion.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Commission's September 2, 2025 decision, which granted Ms. Hickenbottom's appeal and reversed the disciplinary action imposed on her by the JJIC.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Orleans Parish Juvenile Court is located within the same complex as the JJIC.

2.   Ms. Hickenbottom testified that C.T. was also not compliant with his attorney, insisting that he needed to talk to her and view certain documents “then and there” in the face of his attorney advising that it was “not the time or the place for that” and that she would set up a time to meet with him later at the JJIC.

3.   Regarding C.T. becoming uncooperative, Ms. Hickenbottom explained that during the hearing C.T. learned that he would be tried as an adult.

4.   Civil Service Rule II, § 4.1 provides in pertinent part: “Regular employees in the classified service shall have the right to appeal disciplinary actions to the Commission, including dismissal, involuntary retirement, demotion, suspension, fine, reduction in pay, or letters of reprimand as defined in Rule I.”The JJIC does not dispute Ms. Hickenbottom's permanent status or her right to appeal to the Commission.

5.   We note that during Ms. Hickenbottom's testimony, her attorney asked if the juvenile court judges “normally call during the luncheon hour[ ] to have transport,” and she responded, “Yes, they do.” Accordingly, this was not a unique situation. The JJIC could have implemented a system or policy for how its court liaison was to handle a request to bring a high-risk juvenile to court during the lunch hour.

Judge Dale N. Atkins