DARLENE BRADFORD GREEN AS SUCCESSION REPRESENTATIVE OF HAZEL BRADFORD DECEASED v. ACADIAN AMBULANCE SERVICE INC UNKNOWN DRIVER AND ABC INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

This appeal is from an April 1, 2025 judgment dismissing the tort suit filed by Plaintiff—Darlene Bradford Green (“Ms. Green”)—as abandoned pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 561.¹ This appeal is before this Court on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court. Bradford v. Acadian Ambulance Serv. Inc., 25-0649 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/13/26), ___So.3d ___, 2026 WL 412214, writ granted, decision vacated sub nom., Green v. Acadian Ambulance Serv., Inc., 26-00350 (La. 5/27/26), ___ So.3d ____, 2026 WL 1480701 (“Bradford I”).² For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

Factual and procedural background

The factual and procedural background is set forth in this Court's prior opinion in Bradford I as follows:

According to the petition, in April 2018, Hazel Bradford was being transported by ambulance when the unknown driver struck something in the road. As a result, Hazel Bradford was tossed around and sustained injuries, including a broken hip. Three months later, Hazel Bradford died. In April 2019, [Ms. Green], as her mother's succession representative, filed this suit against Acadian as the ambulance's owner and operator. Acadian answered the petition, and the parties engaged in discovery.

Thereafter, in July 2024, Acadian filed an ex parte motion to dismiss with prejudice on the basis of abandonment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 561. In its motion, Acadian alleged that no party had taken any step in the prosecution of this matter for more than three years. Although Acadian supported its ex parte motion with its counsel's affidavit and requested an ex parte order of dismissal, the trial court denied the motion. In so doing, the trial court found a contradictory hearing was required. In response, Acadian filed a rule to show cause why its motion to dismiss should not be granted. Following several continuances, the trial court held the contradictory hearing in March 2025. At the close of the hearing, the trial court orally ruled in Acadian's favor, granting the motion to dismiss, but dismissing without prejudice. This appeal followed.[3]

25-0649, pp. 1-2, So.3d at ___, 2026 WL 412214, at *1 (internal footnote moved to end). As noted at the outset, this matter is before this Court on remand from the Supreme Court to address the merits—whether the suit was properly dismissed by the trial court as abandoned.

Standard of review and abandonment principles

Whether a suit has been abandoned is a question of law, which is reviewed under a de novo standard. See Juengain v. Tervalon, 17-0155, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/26/17), 223 So.3d 1174, 1178 (citing Delacruz v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 14-0433, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/3/14), 157 So.3d 790, 795 n.9). But, “[t]he question of whether a step in the prosecution or defense of a case has occurred, within a three year period, is a question of fact which is subject to a manifest error analysis.” Sutton v. Adams, 19-0394, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/29/19), 273 So.3d 1276, 1278 (citing R.L. Lucien Tile Co. v. Solid Rock Co., 16-0690, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/29/17), 215 So.3d 710, 713-14).

Suits—other than succession suits—are abandoned “when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or defense in the trial court for a period of three years.” La. C.C.P. art. 561(A)(1). The “step” which interrupts the accrual of the abandonment period can be either “[i] a formal move or action before the court which is intended to hasten the suit toward judgment, or [ii] any formal discovery authorized by the Code [of Civil Procedure] served on all parties.” 1 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Procedure § 10:4 (2d ed. Dec. 2025 Update); see Padua v. Gray, 08-0582 (La. 5/16/08), 980 So.2d 699 (observing that “[a]ny formal discovery served on all parties, whether or not filed of record, is a step in the prosecution of an action” and citing La. C.C.P. art. 561(B)).⁴

Construing La. C.C.P. art. 561, the Supreme Court, in Clark, observed that this article imposes the following three requirements on a plaintiff to avoid abandonment:

First, plaintiffs must take some “step” towards prosecution of their lawsuit. In this context, a “step” is defined as taking formal action before the court which is intended to hasten the suit toward judgment, or the taking of a deposition with or without formal notice. Second, the step must be taken in the proceeding and, with the exception of formal discovery, must appear in the record of the suit. Third, the step must be taken within the legislatively prescribed time period of the last step taken by either party; sufficient action by either plaintiff or defendant will be deemed a step.

Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 00-3010, p. 6 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So.2d 779, 784 (footnotes omitted); see also La. Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Oilfield Heavy Haulers, L.L.C., 11-0912, pp. 4-5 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So.3d 978, 981 (citation omitted).

The jurisprudence has outlined the following general principles on abandonment:

• The purpose of Article 561 is the prevention of protracted litigation filed for purposes of harassment or without a serious intent to hasten the claim to judgment. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Traigle, 436 So.2d 530, 532 (La. 1983). Abandonment is not a punitive concept; rather, it balances two competing policy considerations: (1) the desire to see every litigant have his day in court and not to lose same by some technical carelessness or unavoidable delay, and (2) the legislative purpose that suits, once filed, should not indefinitely linger, preserving stale claims from the normal extinguishing operation of prescription. Clark, 00-3010 at pp. 10-11; 785 So.2d at 787.

• The Louisiana Supreme Court has uniformly held that Article 561 must be liberally construed in favor of maintaining a plaintiff's suit. Oilfield Heavy Haulers, 11-0912 at p. 5, 79 So.3d at 981-82 (citing Clark, 00-3010 at p. 8, 785 So.2d at 785). “Because dismissal is the harshest of remedies, any reasonable doubt about abandonment should be resolved in favor of allowing the prosecution of the claim and against dismissal for abandonment.” Oilfield Heavy Haulers, supra (citing Clark, 00-3010 at p. 10, 785 So.2d at 787).

• “The intention of Article 561 is not to dismiss suits as abandoned based on technicalities․ For the purpose of determining abandonment, the intent and substance of a party's actions matter far more than technical compliance.” Oilfield Heavy Haulers, 11-0912 at pp. 5-6, 79 So.3d at 982 (internal citations omitted).

Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Harris, 13-1335, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/14), 141 So.3d 829, 836.

With these principles in mind, we evaluate whether Ms. Green's suit is abandoned.

Discussion

As the trial court observed, the narrow issue presented here is whether scheduling a Rule 10.1 conference when there were no outstanding responses due and when the Rule 10.1 letter failed to indicate that the responses plaintiff received from her prior discovery request were deficient was a “step.” Answering that question in the negative, the trial court observed that the facts are largely undisputed. Ms. Green propounded discovery on Acadian on July 13, 2020. Acadian responded to the discovery requests on December 3, 2020. No action was taken until June 15, 2023, when Ms. Green sent a Rule 10.1 letter stating that no discovery responses had been produced. Again, the narrow issue is whether that Rule 10.1 letter was a “step.”

Ms. Green contends that she filed what she thought was the next step in the prosecution of the case. She further contends that she made calls to Acadian's counsel to no avail. Finally, she emphasizes that when she sent the Rule 10.1 letter and made the calls she was pro se; her attorney had resigned from the case. Acadian's counsel denies receiving such calls. Regardless, Acadian contends that Ms. Green's Rule 10.1 letter and subsequent calls were insufficient to constitute a “step.” Rather, Acadian contends that the Rule 10.1 letter was a type of “passive and gratuitous filing just to try to interrupt abandonment.” Lewis v. Jones, 16-48, p. 6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/26/16), 193 So.3d 546, 550 (observing that “where no motion to set trial or motion for a scheduling order had been filed by either party, the plaintiffs’ witness list alone was a ‘passive and gratuitous filing just to try to interrupt the abandonment’ ”).

The Supreme Court, in Oilfield Heavy Haulers, held that a Rule 10.1 letter ⁵ sent to all parties was a “step” for purposes of interrupting the abandonment period under La. C.C. art. 561. 11-0912, pp. 9-10, 79 So.3d at 984. The Supreme Court reasoned that “as a practical matter, scheduling a Rule 10.1 conference serves as a step in the prosecution or defense of an action, as it is an essential component of a motion to compel.” Id., at p. 10, 79 So.3d at 984. Distinguishing the Rule 10.1 letter from informal correspondence that has been held not to constitute a “step,” the Supreme Court observed that “[t]o treat OHH's [Rule 10.1] letter as merely informal correspondence ignores the mandatory nature of Rule 10.1” Id.

Here, unlike in Oilfield Heavy Haulers, there undisputedly was no outstanding discovery on which to seek a motion to compel. Citing this fact, the trial court found the Rule 10.1 letter did not hasten the matter to judgment. Rather, agreeing with Acadian's argument, the trial court characterized the Rule 10.1 letter as a type of “passive and gratuitous filing just to try to interrupt abandonment” contemplated by the Lewis case.

In support of its finding, the trial court also cited Segerstrom v. Julian, 15-83, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir 10/28/15), 178 So.3d 1116, 1119, noting that there “the Court also found that a phone call to attempt a [Rule] 10.1 conference where there was no [Rule] 10.1 conference and no objection to the discovery responses provided by the defendant did not constitute a step in the prosecution of the action.” As the trial court observed, in Segerstrom, there was only a telephone call, coming three years after a request for a Rule 10.1 conference; there was no written letter requesting to reschedule the Rule 10.1 conference. The phone call was found to be insufficient to constitute a “step.” Id.

Here, unlike in Segerstrom, Ms. Green sent a Rule 10.1 letter to counsel for the only defendant, Acadian. Although there were no outstanding discovery requests at the time, Ms. Green's counsel suggested at the hearing on the motion to dismiss the suit as abandoned that what Ms. Green meant in her letter was that the discovery response was insufficient. Viewed in that light, we find the Rule 10.1 letter falls within the ambit of Oilfield Heavy Haulers and can be viewed as a step. The following three factors support this finding.

First, “[t]he law does not strictly insist that a party take a ‘right’ step in order to maintain the viability of his suit. He is only required to take an ‘active’ step in the judicial proceeding itself aimed at moving the suit along toward a judgment.” Becnel v. Charlet, 446 So.2d 466, 469 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) (internal citation and quotation removed). Stated otherwise, a party's action does not have to result in a legal effect to constitute a “step.”

Second, “[t]he cases indicate that Louisiana courts continue to struggle with determining when discovery-related matters actually interrupt abandonment”; and given the difficult to reconcile case law, “parties may find it difficult to determine whether a discovery-related matter qualifies as a step in the prosecution sufficient to interrupt an abandonment period.” 1 La. Prac. Civ. Proc. Article 561 (2025 ed.) (citing Segerstrom, supra).

Third, the difficulty here is compounded by Ms. Green's pro se status at the time she sent the Rule 10.1 letter. We recognize, as Acadian points out, that “[c]ourts have held pro-se litigants assume responsibility for their lack of knowledge of the law.” Food Perfect, Inc. v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 12-2492, p. 2 (La. 1/18/13), 106 So.3d 107, 108 (citing Ledbetter v. Wheeler, 31,357, p. 3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/9/98), 722 So.2d 382, 384). Nonetheless, as this Court has acknowledged, “[p]ro se plaintiffs are generally given more latitude than those represented by counsel.” Tatum v. Peoples, 23-0807, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/24), 398 So.3d 723, 729 (emphasis removed) (citing In re Med. Review Panel Claim of Scott, 16-0145, pp. 14-15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/14/16), 206 So. 3d 1049, 1058); Dowl v. Redi Care Home Health Ass'n, 09-1300, 1301, pp. 16-17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/3/10), 31 So.3d 596, 608 (observing that “a pro se plaintiff should be given more latitude than plaintiffs represented by counsel because they lack formal training in the law” (emphasis removed) (citing Bankston v. Alexandria Neurosurgical Clinic, 94-693, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/7/94), 659 So.2d 507, 510-11)).

Taken together, these three factors establish that the trial court erred in finding Ms. Green's Rule 10.1 letter did not constitute a “step” for purposes of interrupting abandonment.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's April 1, 2025 judgment dismissing plaintiff's suit on grounds of abandonment is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   In 2026, the Legislature amended La. C.C.P. art. 561. The amendment does not apply here. All citations to La. C.C.P. art. 561 in this opinion are to the pre-2026 amendment version of the article.

2.   In our prior opinion, this Court found Ms. Green's appeal was filed untimely and thus dismissed the appeal. Disagreeing, the Supreme Court observed that “the grounds cited by the court of appeal for dismissal of the appeal are not free from doubt. The court of appeal therefore erred in dismissing the appeal.” Bradford I, 26-00350, p. 1, ___ So.3d at ____, 2026 WL 1480701, *1.

3.   As this Court observed in Bradford I, 25-0649, pp. 1-2, ___So.3d at ___, 2026 WL 412214, *1:The jurisprudence has held that it is error for a trial court to order a contradictory hearing when an ex parte motion for abandonment is supported. See Feingerts v. Feingerts, 25-0397, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/25), 420 So.3d 264, 270. But, Acadian's motion requested that the dismissal be with prejudice. The jurisprudence also has held that abandonment only results in a dismissal without prejudice. Williams v. Montgomery, 20-01120, p. 11 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 1036, 1044 (quoting Walker v. Archer, 16-0171, 16-0172, 16-0173 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/5/16), 203 So.3d 330, 334-35). Indeed, the trial court's April 1, 2025 judgment, granting Acadian's motion to dismiss, dismissed this suit without prejudice.

4.   La. C.C.P. art. 561(B) provides that “[a]ny formal discovery as authorized by this Code and served on all parties whether or not filed of record, including the taking of a deposition with or without formal notice, shall be deemed to be a step in the prosecution or defense of an action.”

5.   Louisiana District Court Rules, Rule 10.1 provides:Before filing any motion to compel discovery, the moving party or attorney shall confer in person or by telephone with the opposing party or counsel for the purpose of amicably resolving the discovery dispute. The moving party or attorney shall attempt to arrange a suitable conference date with the opposing party or counsel and confirm the date by written notice sent at least five (5) days before the conference date, unless an earlier date is agreed upon or good cause exists for a shorter time period. If by telephone, the conference shall be initiated by the person seeking the discovery responses.

Judge Rosemary Ledet