STATE OF LOUISIANA v. PRESTON HIGGS (2026)

Defendant's, Preston Higgs (“Higgs”), conviction and sentence for second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, are affirmed.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

Higgs was indicted for second degree murder (La. R.S. 14:30.1) of his girlfriend with an axe. In pre-trial proceedings, Higgs filed a motion to exclude a 911 call from Higgs’ uncle in which the uncle stated that Higgs had confessed to killing his girlfriend. The trial court denied the motion.

At trial, the 911 call was introduced into evidence, over the objections of Higgs’ counsel. A forensic pathologist testified that the victim had “multiple sharp force injuries,” including damage to the brain, a partial right middle amputated finger and multiple defensive injuries. She opined that the axe recovered from the scene was a weapon which could have caused the victim's death. The lead detective testified regarding surveillance camera video footage of Higgs outside the home he shared with the victim and the contents of cell phones recovered. The victim's brother identified her handwriting to authenticate notes introduced into evidence wherein the victim described her relationship with Higgs.

Higgs elected to testify at trial. He admitted that he killed the victim with an axe, in self-defense. After the cumulative testimony and evidence was heard,¹ the jury found Higgs guilty as charged of second-degree murder.

On October 3, 2024, the trial court sentenced Higgs to life imprisonment without probation or suspension of sentence. On that same date, the trial court denied Higgs motion for new trial and motion for reconsideration of his life sentence.  ²

This timely appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Higgs’ counselled assignments of error contend:

1. The trial court erred in admitting a 911 call made by Higgs’ non-witness uncle in violation of the prohibition against hearsay testimony and the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

2. The trial court erred in allowing the introduction of unauthenticated documents purportedly written by the victim which had not been timely produced to the defense.

3. The trial court erred in denying Higgs’ motion for mistrial in that it allowed the State to resume direct examination of a witness it had tendered.

Higgs pro se assignment of errors contend:

1. The trial court erred in denying his motion for new counsel and forcing him to proceed with his court appointed attorney.

2. Higgs’ conviction should be reversed due to the State's misconduct in attacking his credibility, violating a “pre-trial agreement,” and making improper burden-shifting arguments.”

3. The cumulative effect of alleged errors requires reversal of his conviction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's ruling as to the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Morgan, 2023-0534, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/6/23), 376 So.3d 280, 283, writ denied, 2023-01386 (La. 1/10/24), 376 So.3d 137 (citing State v. D.D., [20]18-0891, p. 36 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/19), 288 So.3d 808, 838)).

DISCUSSION/COUNSELED ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Admissibility of 911 Call

Higgs alleges the admissibility of the 911 call amounted to prejudicial hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clause of the United States.

Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 801(C)2 provides “[h]earsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” However, the record herein shows that the trial court did not admit the 911 call to prove the truth of the matter asserted; instead, the court found the call was relevant because the uncle was reporting an ongoing emergency and the call explained law enforcement's initial involvement in the case. The trial court reasoned as follows:

The Court will allow the 911 call from Mr. Higgs, the uncle of Preston Higgs, as it sounds like it was an ongoing emergency when he made the call. Mr. Higgs was not aware of what the condition was at the time, and it sounds like that was the impetus of what created the New Orleans Police Department to go and start the investigation.3

However, notwithstanding whether the 911 call violated any prohibitions against the admissibility of hearsay testimony pursuant to La. C.E. 801(C)(2), we nevertheless find that the trial court erred in admitting the call into evidence. First, the call did not meet the jurisprudential prerequisites of an “on-going emergency” to overcome a defendant's right to confront his accuser under the Confrontation Clause; and moreover, even if relevant, the 911 call was more prejudicial than probative.

A defendant's right to confront his accuser was discussed in Morgan, 2023-0534, pp. 3-4, 376 So. 3d at 283, as follows:

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee an accused in a criminal prosecution the right to confront witnesses against him.” State v. White, [20]14-0397, p. 25 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/29/15), 174 So.3d 177, 193. Therefore, an out-of-court “testimonial” statement against a criminal defendant is inadmissible unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id.; see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, L.Ed. 2d 224 (2006).

In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-2274 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), the Court applied the above-enunciated rule regarding the right to confrontation in the context of 911 calls, providing this guidance:

Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

Although the uncle's 911 call in the case at bar described a matter that required an expeditious investigation, at the time of the call, there was no longer an objective on-going emergency. Instead, according to the uncle, the “emergency,” i.e., Higgs’ killing of the victim, had taken place the day before. The uncle specifically stated that his nephew (Higgs) “hurt his girlfriend yesterday” and that the girlfriend was dead. Thus, the primary purpose of the uncle's 911 call was for the police to investigate past events in order to confirm whether the information the uncle had received from family members was correct. Under these particular set of facts, the 911 call was testimonial and its admission constituted a violation of the Confrontation Clause.⁴

Additionally, La. CE. art. 403 provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.” Here, the trial court, in part, admitted the 911 call into evidence because it was relevant to explain police involvement in the case. In a related matter, State v. McQuarter, 2000-1553, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/6/01), 788 So.2d 1266, 1270, this Court found a 911 call relevant as the State's “only purpose in introducing the tape and complaint history was to explain police involvement.” In considering La. C.E. art. 403, the McQuarter Court concluded that the defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the 911 tape. 2000-1553, p. 6, 788 So.2d at 1270. However, in contrast to McQuarter, in this matter, we find the prejudicial effect of the 911 tape outweighed its probative value.

The 911 call revealed that the uncle said that his nephew, later identified as Higgs, “hurt his girlfriend yesterday” and that the uncle “needed the police to go over there to look into this.” According to the uncle, Higgs and his girlfriend “got into it and he hit her with an axe.” The uncle said he knew about the incident because “the whole family [has] been telling us ․ [but] nobody ․ made a report and that's why [he] was calling, to make the report.” The uncle stated his belief that the girlfriend was dead and that Higgs was “on the run.” The uncle explained that he “was just going on by what my family called me and told me last night ․ my sister called and told me that Preston had killed his girlfriend.”

In employing the balancing test of La. C.E. art. 403, “[t]he term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” State v. Rose, 2006-0402, p. 13 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1236, 1244 (citation omitted). The 911 call herein effectively conveyed Higgs’ confession to killing the victim and his status as a fugitive, notwithstanding that the uncle was not a witness and had no direct communication with Higgs or the victim. As such, the substance of the allegations made in the call offer little probative value, but are extremely prejudicial. These are the type of revelations sufficient to “lure” the jury into finding guilt in the absence of specific proof of the charged offense. Hence, the trial court erred in admitting the call into evidence.

However, notwithstanding that the 911 call should not have been admitted into evidence, the admission of erroneous evidence is subject to the harmless error analysis. See State v. Falkins, 2012-1654, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/23/14), 146 So.3d 838, 850 (citation omitted). Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 921 states that “[a] judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights of the accused.” Thus, we must now examine whether the 911 call's admission into evidence amounted to harmless error.

In State v. Thomassie, 2016-0370, pp. 11-12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/21/16), 206 So.3d 311, 317-318, this Court discussed the harmless error standard as follows:

“ ‘Harmless error analysis begins with the premise that the evidence is otherwise sufficient to sustain the conviction if viewed from the perspective of a rational fact finder and asks whether beyond a reasonable doubt the error could not have contributed to the verdict actually returned by the defendant's jury.’ ” [State v.] Campbell, [20]15-0017, p. 27 [(La. App. 4 Cir. 6/24/15),] 171 So.3d [1176,] 192 (quoting State v. Gibbs, 41,062, p. 8 (La .App. 2 Cir. 6/28/06), 935 So.2d 349, 354); [State v.] Dove, [20]15–0783, p. 30 [(La. App. 4 Cir. 5/4/16)], 194 So.3d [92], 112, n. 3. See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Stated otherwise, harmless error exists when the guilty verdict actually rendered was “surely unattributable” to the error. State v. Higginbotham, [20]11–0564, p. 3 (La. 5/6/11), 60 So.3d 621, 623. “A trial error ․ may ‘be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Merwin, [20]15–0681, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 186 So.3d 759, 769 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308–09, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). [Emphasis added.]

In the present matter, Higgs’ testimony encompassed the allegations made in the 911 call. Higgs testified that the victim and he argued on the date of the killing. Higgs maintained the victim cut him on his arm with a small knife after he refused to leave their residence. He said he then armed himself with the axe and swung it at the victim, and “hit her more times than even [he] could remember.” Higgs admitted that he drove away after he left the victim for dead and called his family to tell them he had killed the victim.

Testimony improperly introduced into evidence amounts to harmless error where the evidence is cumulative and corroborative of other properly admitted evidence and did not contribute to the verdict. See Falkins, 2012-1654, pp. 18-19, 146 So.3d at 851. Here, Higgs’ own properly admitted testimony was cumulative and corroborative of the 911 call. When asked if anything the uncle said was untrue, Higgs admitted, “[n]o I can't say it was untrue.” Notably, the 911 call did not cast any doubt or address Higgs’ claim that he killed the victim in self-defense.

Higgs’ own testimony established that the guilty verdict was not attributable to the improper admission of the 911 call or any violation of Higgs’ Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Higgs’ testimony, standing alone, would have been sufficient to render a guilty verdict. Therefore, the admission of the 911 call into evidence amounted to harmless error and does not warrant reversal of the verdict.

Admissibility of Documents Written by Victim

Higgs’ next counseled error argues the trial court erred in admitting the State's Exhibit 6, landscape plans of the home of the victim's brother, Michael Quackenbush, which purportedly contained the victim's handwriting; and thereafter, permitting Mr. Quackenbush to authenticate the victim's handwriting on other handwritten notes introduced into evidence. The victim's handwritten notes discussed arguments between the victim and Higgs and described Higgs as “abusive and weird.” Higgs claims the documents were not timely submitted to the defense and Mr. Quackenbush lacked the expertise to authenticate the victim's handwriting.

Higgs complains the production of the home landscape plans exhibit was untimely as the exhibit was received just prior to his testimony, in violation of the State's obligation for timely discovery disclosure.

The State has a duty to disclose evidence when it comes within its control. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 718;⁵ see also generally State v. Felo, 454 So.2d 1150, 1158 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1984). In this matter, the record reflects that the State had only recently obtained “control” of the landscape plans. Indeed, defense counsel's objection verified that the document was “given to the district attorney, or brought down from Minnesota within the past day.”

As discussed in State v. Hudson,

Louisiana's criminal discovery rules, La. C.Cr.P. art. 716 et seq., are “intended to eliminate unwarranted prejudice arising from surprise testimony and evidence, to permit the defense to respond to the State's case, and to allow a proper assessment of the strength of the State's case.” State v. Girard, 12-0790, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/6/13), 110 So.3d 687, 690. In the event the State fails to comply with the discovery rules, “[i]t is within a trial court's discretion to exclude evidence or enter any appropriate order to remedy a party's violation of a discovery right.” Girard, 12-0790, p. 5, 110 So.3d at 690 (citing State v. Lee, 00-2429, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/4/01), 778 So.2d 656, 666). Generally, “discovery violations do not provide grounds for reversal unless they have actually prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Garrick, 03-0137, p. 5 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 990, 993.

2019-0761, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/22/20). In the present matter, Higgs not only does not demonstrate the State failed to timely disclose evidence, but he also fails to establish any prejudice as a result of any untimely disclosure. Consequently, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the landscape exhibit.

Notwithstanding, Higgs also contends the exhibit should not have been introduced because Mr. Quackenbush did not have the requisite expertise to authenticate his sister's handwriting. We disagree.

Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 901 allows for the authentication of handwriting through non-expert opinion as long as the familiarity with the handwriting was not acquired for purposes of the litigation.⁶ Mr. Quackenbush testified that he and the victim grew up together during which time he viewed her handwriting on multiple occasions, stating, “from crayons to calligraphy, I got to see it all.” Mr. Quackenbush expressly identified the handwriting as belonging to the victim. As he established a familiarity with the victim's handwriting—that was not acquired for the purpose of testifying at trial—Mr. Quackenbush had the authority to authenticate the victim's handwriting in the exhibits the State introduced into evidence.

Moreover, Higgs again demonstrates no prejudice by the introduction of the exhibit. As referenced, the evidence's introduction did not undermine his self-defense claim and Higgs’ own testimony established that he and the victim had a troubled relationship and that he killed the victim. Therefore, even assuming any error, which this Court does not find, the error was harmless. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Order of Testimony

In this last counseled error, Higgs contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to resume examination of its forensics expert witness, Dr. Marianna Sandormirsky, after she had been tendered for cross-examination; and further, in permitting the State to resume its cross-examination of Higgs after he had been tendered for re-direct examination. The trial court overruled Higgs’ objections and denied the defense's motion for a mistrial.

Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 611(A) provides, in pertinent part, the following:

The court, however, shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of the interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:

(1)Make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth;

(2)Avoid needless consumption of time; and

(3)Protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.‘

In exercising this authority, the trial court is afforded great discretion to control the extent of examination of witnesses. State ex rel. Nicholas v. State, 520 So.2d 377, 380 (La. 1988).

Here, in both instances where the State resumed its examination of Dr. Sandormirsky and Higgs, the defense had not yet begun its cross-examination or re-direct examination. Therefore, any claim that the trial court permitted the State to exceed the scope of its right to examine the witnesses is moot. This argument is further undermined by the fact that “Louisiana courts have long permitted the recall of witnesses even after they have been dismissed after direct and cross-examination.” State v. Hunter, 2018-0206, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/22/18), 252 So.3d 1053, 1064.

Based on our review of the facts herein, the defense has failed to demonstrate any prejudice. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to resume interrogation of the Dr. Sandormisky and Higgs. This assignment of error is without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Request for New Counsel

Higgs complains that the trial court improperly denied his request for new counsel, which was made approximately a month before trial. Higgs made this request in a handwritten letter. Higgs maintained counsel did not timely provide him with a complete copy of the State's discovery responses and alleged trial counsel “has some type of disdain” towards him. Higgs also relayed that he felt like trial counsel intentionally give him bad legal advice and that counsel was unfit.

On appeal, Higgs also represents that at the start of trial, he told trial counsel that he personally knew juror number 52, but counsel took no action to exclude this juror. Higgs contends this claim is supported by counsel's notation on the seating chart that the “juror knows him.” However, the trial record is devoid of any communication between Higgs and counsel with regards to Higgs’ acquaintance with a potential juror and Higgs offers no documentation on appeal to support this claim.

While a defendant may represent himself, hire counsel, or, as in this case, have counsel appointed if he is indigent, “a criminal defendant is not entitled to choose his appointed private counsel or the appointed public defender.” State v. Reeves, 2006-2419, p. 39 (La. 5/5/09), 11 So.3d 1031, 1058. “The question of withdrawal of counsel largely rests with the discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.” State v. Leger, 2005-0011, p. 43 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 142. Here, Higgs’ written request for removal of counsel failed to provide any specifics as to how he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged failure to provide complete discovery responses or counsel's “bad legal advice.” Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying Higgs’ request to remove counsel.

Nevertheless, although unsubstantiated by the present record, we note that Higgs’ pro se allegations that counsel was “unfit” or gave “bad legal advice” raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims. “ ‘[A]s a general rule, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are more properly raised by application for post-conviction relief in the trial court where a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted if warranted.’ ” State v. Williams, 2017-0544, p. 23 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/14/18), 240 So.3d 355, 368 (quoting State v. Quezada, 2013-1318, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/21/14), 141 So.3d 906, 914) (additional quotation omitted). Therefore, Higgs may urge any ineffective counsel claims in an application for post conviction relief pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8.⁷

State Misconduct

Higgs’ second pro se error contends the State committed misconduct in calling him a liar; characterizing his testimony as a “convenient truth, making sarcastic remarks, and violating a pre-trial agreement by introducing all autopsy photographs.

Higgs maintains the State's cross-examination of him demonstrated improper credibility/character attacks and constituted impermissible burden shifting. Particularly, Higgs cites the State's intimation that Higgs had lied on direct examination regarding his past criminal offenses.

When a defendant testifies at trial, his credibility is put at issue; therefore, the prosecution is entitled to impeach his credibility. See State v. Davis, 375 So.2d 69, 73 (La. 1979) (citation omitted). Hence, the State's intimation that Higgs’ direct testimony was a “lie” or represented a “convenient truth” is not impermissible burden shifting, but rather, falls within the State's purview to challenge a defendant's testimony and credibility on cross-examination.

Moreover, the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection to the State's characterization of Higgs’ testimony as a “convenient truth.” The trial court specifically advised jurors that “[y]ou may not consider evidence ․ to which an objection was sustained.” Accordingly, Higgs’ claim that the State's cross-examination of him was an impermissible character attack and resulted in improper burden shifting has no merit.

Higgs’ other “misconduct’ allegation rests on his contention that the State did not abide by a pre-trial agreement to limit autopsy photographs it would publish to the jury. However, a review of the record cited by Higgs does not support any violation of an agreement. Instead, the trial colloquy indicates that in response to a defense objection to the introduction of autopsy photographs, the State specifically stated, ‘[w]e don't plan on showing every single gruesome autopsy photograph.” The record supports that the State introduced only a select few of the autopsy photographs, to which the defense did not lodge any specific objections.

Higgs has failed to provide evidence of the scope of any alleged pre-trial agreement with the State and any resulting violation. Hence, this pro se error does not have merit.

Cumulative Error

Higgs last pro se assignment of error contends the cumulative effect of the trial court's alleged errors warrants relief. However, as the Louisiana Supreme Court observed in State v. Holliday, 2017-01921, p. 87 (La. 1/29/20), 340 So.3d 648, 714:

Although the Court has often reviewed cumulative error arguments, it has continually rejected them. Instead, the Court has consistently found that harmless errors, however numerous, do not aggregate to reach the level of reversible error. See, e.g., State v. Strickland, [19]93-0001, pp. 51–52 (La. 11/1/96), 683 So.2d 218, 239; State v. Taylor, [19]93-2201 (La. 2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364 (unpub'd app'x.); State v. Tart, [19]94-0025, p. 55 (La. 2/9/96), 672 So.2d 116, 164; State v. Copeland, 530 So.2d 526, 544–45 (La. 1988) (citing State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123, 137 (La. 1982)); State v. Sheppard, 350 So.2d 615, 651 (La. 1977)). Other courts have reached the same conclusion in addressing this issue. See, e.g., Mullen v. Blackburn, 808 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (court rejects cumulative error claim and finds that “twenty times zero equals zero”); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1303 (Miss. 1994) (finding no “near errors” and rejecting cumulative error analysis).

In this matter, having found that any trial court errors amounted to harmless error, the cumulative effect of any errors does not warrant reversal of Higgs’ conviction. Consequently, this pro se assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

Based upon the foregoing reasons, we affirm Higgs’ conviction and sentence.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED

I concur in the result.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Other witnesses who testified included Detective Alan Seaton with the New Orleans Police Department's Digital Forensics Unit; United States Marshal Brian Fair; and the victim's mother. Detective Seaton downloaded the video of the victim's residence which captured the period during which the murder took place. Marshal Fair testified that he participated in the manhunt for Higgs and advised that Higgs was captured on a bus in Indiana, where he “provided a false name, false identity, to the investigators.” The victim's mother offered testimony regarding the impact of the victim's death on the family.

2.   An error occurred when the trial court sentenced Higgs on the same date, October 3, 2024, as the court denied Higgs’ motion for new trial and motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 873 provides, in pertinent part, “If a motion for new trial ․ is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled.” If the defendant expressly waives a delay provided for in this article or pleads guilty, sentence may be imposed immediately.” The Louisiana Supreme Court has found that a defendant's failure to waive the twenty-four hour period is grounds to void the sentence if the defendant challenges his sentence. However, where, as in this case, the defendant does not challenge his sentence on appeal or raise the failure to observe the twenty-four-hour delay as error, any error is harmless. State v Celestine, 2000-2713, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/13/02), 811 So.2d 44, 47. As such, no corrective action will be taken. See State v. Simmons, 2024-0722, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/21/25), 424 So.3d 1187, 1191.

3.   The trial court did redact references from the 911 call that referenced Higgs’ criminal history.

4.   We further note that the record does provide a reason for the uncle's unavailability for trial. Instead, the transcript of the motion in limine indicated the State did not know if the uncle would actually come to trial. The State advised of its intent to have the 911 custodian testify if he did not.

5.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 718 states the following:Subject to the limitation of Article 723 of this Code, and except as otherwise prohibited by law, upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall order the district attorney to permit or authorize the defendant to inspect and copy, photograph or otherwise reproduce law enforcement reports created and known to the prosecutor made in connection with the particular case, and to permit or authorize the defendant or an expert working with the defendant, to inspect, copy, examine, test scientifically, photograph, or otherwise reproduce books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, places, or copies or portions thereof that are within the possession, custody, or control of the state, and that are intended for use by the state as evidence in its case in chief at trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.

6.   Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 901 states, in relevant, part:B. Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this Article:(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation.

7.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 930.8, provides, in pertinent part, the following:“No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922, ․ ”

Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins

DYSART, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT.