NEW LIVING WORD SCHOOL v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DEPARTMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA AND JOHN WHITE IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (2026)

Following a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, awarding New Living Word School (“the School”) $2.5 million in damages against the Louisiana Department of Education (“the Department”) and denying the Department's claim for reimbursement against the School. The Department appealed, seeking review of two interlocutory judgments, the denial of its motion for directed verdict, and the judgment entered on the jury verdict.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the May 26, 2017 and November 2, 2023 interlocutory judgments and find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Department's motion for directed verdict on the same issue. However, we find the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Department's motion for directed verdict on the detrimental reliance and breach of contract claims brought by the School. We grant the motion for directed verdict in part and reverse and vacate the portions of September 9, 2024 judgment, rendered in accordance with the jury verdict, finding the School satisfied all elements of its claims and awarding $2.5 million in damages in favor of the School and against the Department. Finally, we affirm the portion of the September 9, 2024 judgment denying the Department's claim for reimbursement.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The School filed suit against the Department, seeking damages for detrimental reliance and breach of contract.² The School's claims arise out of its participation in and subsequent removal from the Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence Program (“scholarship program”) administered by the Department.³ Additionally, the Department filed a reconventional demand against the School, seeking to recover $378,200.00, the amount it allegedly overpaid the School due to the School's acceptance of in-kind donations in lieu of cash tuition for non-scholarship students.

The Scholarship Program

The Louisiana Legislature amended and reenacted the scholarship program, effective August 1, 2012, which provided scholarships to eligible students to attend participating schools. La. R.S. 17:4011, et seq. The Department was responsible for administering the program. La. R.S. 17:4014 and 17:4015.

Under the reenacted legislation, public and nonpublic schools interested in participating in the scholarship program were required to submit an annual notice of intent to the Department, which stated the number of available seats per grade. La. R.S. 17:4013(3), 17:4015(2), and 17:4020(B). A school had to meet the eligibility and participation criteria set forth in the governing statutes. La. R.S. 17:4020-4022. Pertinently, participating schools were required to submit to the Department an independent financial audit of the school conducted by a certified public accountant approved by the legislative auditor. La. R.S. 17:4022(3). The scope of the audit was statutorily limited to those records necessary for the Department to make scholarship payments to the school. La. R.S. 17:4022(3).

Students were also required to apply to participate and meet eligibility criteria. La. R.S. 17:4013(2) and 17:4015(3)(a). Parents/legal guardians were required to indicate their choice of participating school in the students’ program applications. La. R.S. 17:4015(3)(a). The Department notified parents/legal guardians and students whether they were awarded a scholarship and remitted scholarship payments to participating schools on behalf of scholarship recipients. La. R.S. 17:4015(4) and (5). The amount to be paid for a scholarship was divided into four equal payments made to each participating school in September, December, February, and May of each school year. La. R.S. 17:4017. If the maximum amount of tuition, fees, and costs charged by a school to non-scholarship students was less than the per-pupil amount allocated by the Department, the school was required to return any remaining funds to the state or to the local school system. La. R.S. 17:4016(A).

The Department was statutorily required to develop criteria for participation in the scholarship program on or before August 1, 2012. La. R.S. 17:4015(9). The State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education was also required to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act to implement the provisions of the scholarship program. La. R.S. 17:4025(A). Bulletin 133, published in Title 28, Part CLIII, § 101, et seq. of the Louisiana Administrative Code (cited herein as “Bulletin 133”), was promulgated in December 2012 in accordance with La. R.S. 17:4025(A). See 38:12 La.Reg. 3129.

For the most part, Bulletin 133 echoed the requirements set forth in the scholarship program statutes. However, several provisions, distinct from the statutes, are pertinent to this appeal. On the issue of tuition and fees, Bulletin 133, § 1303(A) stated,

Tuition and fees received through the scholarship program for participating students shall not exceed tuition and fees charged to enrolled students not participating in the program. Tuition and fees shall be defined as the total payment charged to enrolled students not participating in the scholarship program[ ] and paid on behalf of those students. Scholarship funds may not be used to pay tuition and fees for students not participating in the scholarship program.

Bulletin 133 further provided that the financial audits (established by La. R.S. 17:4022(3)) shall address rules of financial practice contained in the bulletin and warned that evidence of “gross fiscal irresponsibility” may result in penalties, including the school being declared ineligible to participate. Bulletin 133, § 1303.

New Living Word School

New Living Word Church, Inc. (“the Church”) offers several community ministries in Ruston, Louisiana. From 2005 through 2009, the Church ran a school ministry, first offering an after-school program, then catering to students who were expelled or suspended from the parish school system. In 2010, the ministry became a state-approved nonpublic school. In May 2012, the School became incorporated as an entity separate from the Church and submitted a notice of intent to participate in the newly reenacted scholarship program. The School satisfied the statutory eligibility criteria and was approved for program participation.

The School's notice of intent stated that it had a total of 315 seats available in grades K-12. However, the Department determined the School did not have adequate facilities to serve 315 students and sought the School's agreement to receive fewer students than the number of stated available seats.⁴ The Department and the School entered into a Partnership Agreement, effective July 23, 2012 and terminating September 23, 2013, unless extended by the Department. The Partnership Agreement pertinently stated,

The purpose of this Partnership Agreement is to establish a set of standards, in addition to, rather than in lieu of, any and all other standards established by law, for the New Living Word School's (School) participation, and continued participation, in the Student Scholarships for Education Excellence Program (Scholarship Program).

* * * *

New Living Word School agrees to participate in academic reviews and site visits, to be conducted on at least a quarterly basis at the discretion of the State Superintendent of Education.

* * * *

New Living Word School agrees to be assigned 165 students․ This reflects a smaller number of students than originally requested (315), but also a number significantly lower than the number listing New Living Word as the number one choice (440).

* * * *

New Living Word School agrees to acquire additional facilities capacity no later than the start of the 2013-2014 school year in order to be able to provide for the number of any additional Scholarship students it serves in future years an adequate physical plant.

The School enrolled 93 scholarship students for the 2012-2013 school year.

The School's notice of intent also stated that its baseline tuition was $8,500.00 per student for the 2012-2013 school year. However, students did not pay this amount in money to attend the School. Instead, students paid what they were able, and the School otherwise operated “by faith” and in-kind donations, like donations of teachers’ time and use of facilities. The School represented that its baseline tuition was $8,500.00 per student on its notice of intent, because this was the amount the Lincoln Parish School Board determined it costs to educate a child in the area. When the 2012-2013 school year began, the Department agreed to remit $6,300.00 in tuition to the School for each scholarship student.

In the spring of 2013, at the Department's request, Postlethwaite & Netterville, A Professional Accounting Corporation (“P&N”) conducted an agreed-upon procedures review of 52 schools participating in the scholarship program, including the School.⁵ The parameters of P&N's review were established by the Department and included examining whether tuition and fees received for scholarship students exceeded tuition and fees charged to non-scholarship students. After reviewing the School's financial statements and tuition revenue, P&N observed that scholarship payments made to the School exceeded non-scholarship revenue by approximately $395,250.00 for all scholarship students through the third installment payment.

After being advised of this discrepancy, the Department notified the School of P&N's findings, which suggested “gross fiscal irresponsibility” to the Department, and invited the School to review P&N's report and respond to its findings. The School took the position that no program rules were violated by the acceptance of in-kind donations of time, labor, facilities, and other services as tuition. On June 28, 2013, the Department reaffirmed to the School that the law and Bulletin 133 mandated that tuition charged to scholarship students be no greater than tuition paid on behalf of non-scholarship students. The Department advised the School of its finding of “gross fiscal irresponsibility” and declared the School was no longer eligible to participate in the scholarship program.

As stated, the School filed suit against the Department in October 2013, seeking damages for detrimental reliance and breach of contract (the Partnership Agreement). In October 2016, the Department filed an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, urging it is entitled to sovereign immunity as to the School's detrimental reliance claim. The exception was denied in a judgment signed on May 26, 2017. In April 2023, the Department filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting it is entitled to discretionary immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1. The Department relied on Brown v. White, 2022-1122 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/14/23), 366 So.3d 626, 639, wherein this court concluded that the statutes governing the scholarship program, La. R.S. 17:4011, et seq., and Bulletin 133 gave the Department the discretion to terminate the plaintiff school's program eligibility. The trial court denied the Department's motion in a judgment signed on November 2, 2023.

The matter proceeded to trial before a jury in August 2024. The School sought to persuade the jury that former Superintendent John White required the School to construct a building to house future students in order to participate in the program for the 2012-2013 school year as well as future years. According to the School, this requirement was set forth in the Partnership Agreement. The School further sought to prove that Superintendent White promised Pastor Jerry Baldwin, the School's principal, that it would be allowed to participate in the program and enroll more students at least through the 2013-2014 school year. The School maintained that it relied on Superintendent White's promises, to its detriment, by incurring debt for the construction of a new school building before being removed from the scholarship program and barred from participating during the 2013-2014 school year. Finally, the School sought to establish the Department breached the Partnership Agreement by removing it from the program prior to the 2013-2014 school year.

After the School completed its presentation of evidence, the Department moved for directed verdict, urging the trial court to dismiss the School's claims. See La. C.C.P. art. 1810.⁶ The Department maintained it was entitled to discretionary immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1 and further asserted the School failed to satisfy its burdens of proof on its claims for detrimental reliance and breach of contract. The motion was denied, and the Department presented its evidence to the jury. In addition to defeating the School's claims, the Department sought to convince the jury it was entitled to reimbursement of $378,200.00 from the School, the amount of the purported tuition overpayment less the School's fourth installment payment retained by the Department.⁷

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the School on all claims submitted, awarded the School special damages in the amount of $2.5 million, and found the Department was not entitled to reimbursement. The trial court signed a written judgment in conformity with the jury verdict on September 9, 2024. The Department then filed this suspensive appeal, seeking review of the trial court's interlocutory judgment denying its exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the interlocutory judgment denying its motion for summary judgment, the denial of its directed verdict, and the judgment entered on the jury verdict.⁸

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

On appeal, the Department urges this court to reverse the May 26, 2017 interlocutory judgment denying its exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As it did before the trial court, the Department argues that detrimental reliance is quasi-contractual and was not included in the limited constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity for suits in tort or contract.

Subject matter jurisdiction is the “legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted.” La. C.C.P. art. 2. “The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action or proceeding cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. A judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or proceeding is void.” La. C.C.P. art. 3. The defense of sovereign immunity is a challenge to the exercise of a state court's subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Murphy Cormier General Contractors, Inc., 2015-111 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/3/15), 170 So.3d 370, 375, writ denied, 2015-1297 (La. 9/25/15), 178 So.3d 573. Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed on appeal under the de novo standard of review. Lassalle v. Napoleon, 2022-0460 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/22), 356 So.3d 74, 77.

“Sovereign immunity bars a court from exercising jurisdiction in suits against the state unless the state has elected to waive its immunity.” Lassalle, 356 So.3d at 77. Louisiana Constitution Article XII, Section 10(A) contains an unequivocal, self-executing waiver of the state's sovereign immunity as to suit and liability in contract and tort cases. Fulmer v. State, Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries, 2010-2779 (La. 7/1/11), 68 So.3d 499, 503. In Canal/Claiborne, Ltd. v. Stonehedge Development, LLC, 2014-0664 (La. 12/9/14), 156 So.3d 627, 632, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity was not waived as to suits asserting a quasi-contractual claim for unjust enrichment. Therefore, the state department defendant in Canal/Claiborne enjoyed sovereign immunity, and state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment. Canal/Claiborne, 156 So.3d at 640.

Louisiana Civil Code article 1967 concerning detrimental reliance pertinently states that a party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Unlike claims for unjust enrichment, claims for detrimental reliance are contractual, evidenced by the placement of La. C.C. art. 1967 in Book III, Title IV. Conventional Obligations or Contracts; Ch. 5. Cause.⁹ See Lassalle, 356 So.3d at 78; State v. Murphy Cormier General Contractors, 170 So.3d at 381. Revision Comments—1984, Comment (d) to La. C.C. art. 1967 states, “Under this Article, a promise becomes an enforceable obligation [a contract] when it is made in a manner that induces the other party to rely on it to his detriment.” This court has recognized that “[d]etrimental reliance is an equitable rule inserted in our Civil Code, which must be construed in conjunction with the rules of contracts.” Marshall v. Franklin, 2022-1160 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/14/23), 370 So.3d 486, 491.

Finally, Louisiana courts have adopted a heightened burden of proof specifically applicable to detrimental reliance claims against government defendants, including state agencies, indicating such claims are not barred by sovereign immunity.¹⁰ See Showboat Star Partnership v. Slaughter, 2000-1227 (La. 4/3/01), 789 So.2d 554, 557.¹¹ Thus, we find no merit in the Department's assertion of sovereign immunity as to the School's detrimental reliance claim and decline to reverse the interlocutory judgment denying its exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY

The Department argues it is entitled to discretionary immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1, and the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment and denying its motion for directed verdict, both urging entitlement to immunity.

Standard of Review

The de novo standard of review is not pertinent to our review of the denial of a summary judgment after trial on the merits. Naquin v. Church Mutual Ins. Co., 2024-0303 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/24), 403 So.3d 1188, 1201, writ denied, 2025-00144 (La. 9/10/25), 415 So.3d 1279. However, a motion for directed verdict challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence and is subject to the de novo standard of review applicable to all legal issues. Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 2003-1734 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90, 99; Lewis v. State National Ins. Co., Inc., 2025-0041 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/12/25), 2025 WL 3158501, *3 (unpublished).

A trial court has much discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for directed verdict. Cane v. O'Brien, 2023-0718 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/23/24), 3 84 So.3d 1003, 1009, writ denied, 2024-00478 (La. 6/25/24), 3 86 So.3d 1082. The appellate court must determine if the record supports the granting of a directed verdict based on a sufficiency of the evidence determination (a question of law), not on a credibility determination (a factual issue). Durkheimer v. Landry, 2022-418 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/10/23), 366 So.3d 674, 690, writs denied, 2023-00737, 2023-00797 (La. 10/3/23), 3 70 So.3d 1073, 1075. The question to be asked by the reviewing court is not whether the plaintiff proved his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Instead, the question is whether the trial court, upon reviewing the evidence submitted, could conclude that reasonable persons could not have reached a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Spann v. Gerry Lane Enterprises, Inc., 2016-0793 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/24/10), 256 So.3d 1016, 1027, writ denied, 2018-1584 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So.3d 194, and writ denied, 2018-1649 (La. 12/17/18), 258 So.3d 599.

Generally, a motion for directed verdict is appropriately granted when, after considering all evidentiary inferences in the light most favorable to the opponent, it is clear the facts and inferences are so overwhelmingly in support of the moving party that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Jenkins v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation and Development, 2006-1804 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/19/08), 993 So.2d 749, 756, writ denied, 2008-2471 (La. 12/19/08), 996 So.2d 1133. If there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion, i.e., evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motion should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. Jenkins, 993 So.3d at 756. The propriety of a directed verdict must be evaluated in light of the substantive law underpinning the claims. Cane, 384 So.3d at 1009-10.

Discretionary Immunity

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2798.1 exempts public entities, including the Department, from liability for their employees’ discretionary or policymaking acts. Specifically, under La. R.S. 9:2798.1(B), public entities are immune from tort claims based on their policymaking decisions or discretionary acts carried out within the course and scope of their employment. Dominique v. Parish, 2019-0452 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/20), 313 So.3d 307, 314, writ denied, 2020-01202 (La. 12/22/20), 307 So.3d 1045. However, this immunity does not extend to acts or omissions not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or discretionary power exists or to acts or omissions that constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct. La. R.S. 9:2798.1(C).

To determine whether immunity under La. R.S. 9:2798.1 applies, the court must first determine whether a statute, regulation, or policy requires the government employee to follow a particular course of action.¹² Brown, 366 So.3d at 639. If not and the exercise of discretion is involved, the court must then determine whether that discretion is the kind that is shielded by the exception. Brown, 366 So.3d at 639. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2798.1 only confers immunity for discretionary decisions based on social, economic, or political concerns. When the government acts negligently for reasons unrelated to public policy considerations, it is liable to those it injures. Aucoin v. Larpenter, 2020-0792 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/16/21), 324 So.3d 626, 638, writ denied, 2021-00688 (La. 9/27/21), 324 So.3d 87.

Whether a choice made by a governmental entity is a policymaking decision as contemplated by the discretionary immunity statute is a question of fact. Williams v. City of Monroe, 27,065 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/3/95), 658 So.2d 820, 828, writs denied, 95-1997, 95-1998 (La. 12/15/95), 664 So.2d 451, 452; Cash v. Office of Group Benefits, 2025-0356 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/19/25), 2025 WL 3687238, *6 (unpublished). In Brown, 366 So.3d at 641, this court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Department and Superintendent White, finding the same social, economic, and political policy considerations that served as the impetus for the scholarship program formed the basis of the Department's discretion and the exercise thereof to determine the plaintiff school's continued program eligibility. Brown, 366 So.3d at 641.

Here, after a de novo review of the evidence presented by the School in its case-in-chief, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to justify the trial court's denial of the Department's motion for directed verdict on the issue of discretionary immunity. See Jenkins, 993 So.2d at 757. Reasonable and fair-minded jurors, in the exercise of impartial judgment, might reach different conclusions on the factual issue of whether Superintendent White removed the School from the program for reasons unrelated to the public policy considerations behind the scholarship program.¹³ See Aucoin, 324 So.3d at 638; Williams, 658 So.2d at 828.

A reasonable juror could find that witness testimony presented by the School supported the conclusion that Superintendent White was influenced by political pressure to remove the School from participating in the scholarship program. For instance, testimony established that the School received substantial and immediate negative media attention when it became a program participant. Concerned state senators were vocal on the issue and critical of the School during Superintendent White's confirmation hearing.

Richard Gallot, a former state senator who testified at trial, stated that Superintendent White initially spoke favorably about the School during the hearing, but his tenor seemed to change as political pressure mounted. Pastor Baldwin and Kia Baldwin Richardson, who was involved in the School's operation and program participation, offered similar testimony on behalf of the School concerning the pressure Superintendent White was under before and after the confirmation hearing due to the School's involvement in the program.

Although Superintendent White's testimony established his legitimate, policy-based reasons for terminating the School's program participation, a reasonable juror could have credited the other witnesses’ testimony. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for directed verdict on the issue of discretionary immunity. This contradictory testimony also reveals a genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment in the Department's favor. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

BREACH OF CONTRACT

The Department asserts the trial court erred by denying its motion for directed verdict concerning the School's breach of contract claim. The Department maintains the evidence presented by the School was legally insufficient to satisfy all elements of its burden of proof.¹⁴ As set forth above, we review the School's evidence de novo to determine whether the Department was entitled to a directed verdict as to the School's breach of contact claim. See Hall, 874 So.2d at 99. Additionally, this claim is based on the Partnership Agreement, which both parties agree is clear and unambiguous. When the words of a contract are clear and unambiguous, issues pertaining to its proper interpretation involve questions of law, which are reviewed utilizing the de novo standard of review. Gulf States Contractors, L.L.C. v. Davie Shoring, Inc., 2024-1315 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/8/25), 418 So.3d 1106, 1112, writ denied, 2025-01136 (La. 11/19/25), 420 So.3d 1185.¹⁵

Applicable Law

Contracts have the effect of law for the parties, and the interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties. La. C.C. arts. 1983 and 2045; Bonilla v. Verges Rome Architects, 2023-00928 (La. 3/22/24), 3 82 So.3d 62, 65. “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.” La. C.C. art. 2046. Common intent is determined, therefore, by the general, ordinary, plain, and popular meaning of the words used in the contract. Bonilla, 382 So.3d at 65. “Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.” La. C.C. art. 2050.

The essential elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) the obligor undertook an obligation to perform, (2) the obligor failed to perform the obligation (the breach), and (3) the failure to perform resulted in damages to the obligee. Moore v. Vauthier, 2023-1046 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/19/24), 3 89 So.3d 872, 878. See La. C.C. art. 1994.

The Partnership Agreement

The School maintains the Partnership Agreement obligated the Department to allow it to continue to participate in the scholarship program, at least through the 2013-2014 school year. The School asserts the Department breached this obligation by removing it from the program at the end of the 2012-2013 school year. Conversely, the Department argues no duty was imposed upon it in the Partnership Agreement, which served only to impose additional criteria on the School's participation in the scholarship program. We agree with the Department.

There is no provision in the Partnership Agreement that obligated the Department to allow the School to continue to participate in the scholarship program, particularly after the Department determined the School violated program rules. Therefore, the Department did not breach the Partnership Agreement by removing the School.

Additionally, the Partnership Agreement did not require the School to construct, purchase, or acquire additional facilities as a condition of its participation in the scholarship program for any school year.¹⁶ The Partnership Agreement explains that the School agreed to accept fewer students than initially requested and fewer than the number that named the School as their school of choice. The School further agreed to “acquire additional facilities capacity no later than the start of the 2013-2014 school year in order to be able to provide for the number of any additional Scholarship students it serves in future years[.]” (Emphasis added.) Reading these provisions together, additional facilities were required if the School served more than 165 students in future school years. The Partnership Agreement does not contain a mutual agreement that the School would acquire additional facilities and the Department would allow it to remain in the program. For this additional reason, the Department did not breach the Partnership Agreement by removing the School from the scholarship program prior to the 2013-2014 school year and after the School purportedly incurred debt to construct a new building.

For completeness, we find the School likewise failed to present sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proving the damages element of its breach of contract cause of action. The School proved that the Church secured a bank loan during the 2012-2013 school year to fund the construction of a new school building. The School and the Church entered a lease agreement on August 10, 2012, wherein the School agreed to pay $250,000.00 in rent to the Church for use of the Church's property. Through the lease, the School acquired use of the property, inclusive of all furniture, utilities, maintenance, repairs, and insurance. The School was required to pay the full amount of the agreement, $250,000.00, by June 30, 2013. Notably, though, the new building constructed by the Church using funds from the bank loan was not completed until August 2013, after the lease expired. Use of the yet-to-be-constructed building was not the subject of the 2012 lease agreement. Additionally, the School offered no evidence that it satisfied its payment obligations under the lease, that it made any lease payments to the Church, or otherwise paid the Church's debt.¹⁷

The other damage purportedly incurred by the School was the loss of scholarship tuition dollars for future school years. In Brown, 366 So.3d at 636, this court recognized that the scholarship program statutes and Bulletin 133 made it clear that scholarship funds were awarded to students, not participating schools. Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:4013(5) defined “scholarship” as “the funds awarded to a parent or other legal guardian on behalf of an eligible student to attend a participating public or nonpublic school.” “Scholarship recipient” meant an eligible student who was awarded a scholarship. La. R.S. 17:4013(6); Bulletin 133, § 101. See also La. R.S. 17:4015(3)(a) (Department shall “award scholarships to eligible students.”) It is apparent that scholarship program funds were not awarded directly to the schools but were merely disbursed to schools on behalf of student scholarship recipients. See La. R.S 17:4015(5) (requiring the Department to “[r]emit scholarship payments to participating schools on behalf of a scholarship recipient.”) See also Bulletin 133, § 303(A)(6); Brown, 366 So.3d at 636. Thus, the School had no right to or interest in the scholarship funds and failed to show it sustained damages as a result of the Department's alleged breach of contract.¹⁸

After our de novo review of the evidence presented by the School, we conclude the evidence was legally insufficient to satisfy its burden of proof against the Department. Because the School failed to satisfy all elements of its breach of contract cause of action, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Department's motion for directed verdict on this claim.

DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE

The Department also asserts the trial court erred by denying its motion for directed verdict concerning the School's detrimental reliance cause of action. The Department maintains the evidence presented by the School was legally insufficient to satisfy all elements of the burden of proof on a detrimental reliance cause of action against government defendants. We again review the School's evidence de novo to determine whether the Department was entitled to a directed verdict. See Had, 874 So.2d at 99.¹⁹

The doctrine of detrimental reliance is not favored in Louisiana law, and all claims must be examined strictly and carefully. Harris v. Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges, 2021-0844 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/25/22), 340 So.3d 1121, 1126. A claim for detrimental reliance against a non-government defendant requires a party to prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a representation by conduct or word, (2) justifiable reliance, and (3) a change in position to one's detriment because of reliance. Harris, 340 So.3d at 1126.

However, proving detrimental reliance against a governmental agency, like the Department, is more burdensome. See Luther v. IOM Co. LLC, 2013-0353 (La. 10/15/13), 130 So.3d 817, 825; Showboat Star Partnership, 789 So.2d at 563. To succeed against the Department, the School was required to prove: (1) unequivocal advice from an unusually authoritative source, (2) reasonable reliance on that advice by an individual, (3) extreme harm resulting from that reliance, and (4) gross injustice to the individual in the absence of judicial estoppel. 23rd Psalm Trucking, L.L.C. v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 2024-00808 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 370, 381; Luther, 130 So.3d 817, 825. We consider each element:

Elements One and Two: Unequivocal Advice From an Unusually Authoritative Source and Reasonable Reliance on That Advice By an Individual

Superintendent White gave the School the purported advice at issue, satisfying the “unusually authoritative source” component of this element.

“[U]nequivocal” means “leaving no doubt” or “clear.” Hitachi Medical Systems America, Inc. v. Bridges, 2015-0658 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/9/15), 2015 WL 8479021, *8, writ denied, 2016-0042 (La. 2/26/16), 187 So.3d 1004, citing Webster's Nineth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991), p. 1288. Black's Law Dictionary similarly defines “unequivocal” as “unambiguous; clear; free from uncertainty.” Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).²⁰

The “advice” at issue was given to the School through Pastor Baldwin between May 2012, when the School entered the program, and July 2012, when the Partnership Agreement was entered. Pastor Baldwin testified that, when the School received negative media attention upon entering the program, Superintendent White asked him not to talk to the media and stated that he (Superintendent White) would “handle it.” Pastor Baldwin recalled that Superintendent White said, “I'll take care of you.” According to Pastor Baldwin, Superintendent White indicated to him that the School had to enter the Partnership Agreement to participate currently and to continue to participate in the future and was required to build extra facilities. Pastor Baldwin testified that, in return, Superintendent White promised that he would “see us through it․ And that's what he did.” Superintendent White promised the School would be in the program.

Ms. Richardson testified that, in July 2012, Superintendent White communicated to the School that there would be “some concessions, that he was under pressure.” This led to the Partnership Agreement. However, Superintendent White promised the School, if it worked with him, “he would have our back.” Ms. Richardson recalled Superintendent White assuring that “[h]e would make sure that we were straight.” As the 2012-2013 school year approached, the Department had not told the School the amount of scholarship tuition it was going to be paid. However, the Department told the School to “just trust us. We'll take care of it. Don't worry about it.” Because the program was in its early stages, the School had difficulty communicating with the Department, but was told to trust them, “it's all going to work out.” According to Ms. Richardson, Superintendent White assured the School, “We'll work with you. We'll make sure that we get you across the finish line. Just - you know, just trust me[.]”

After reviewing the entirety of the evidence offered by the School on this issue, we find the School failed to establish that Superintendent White gave the School clear, unambiguous advice concerning its participation in the program, its decision to sign the Partnership Agreement, or its decision to construct a new school facility. No statements attributed to Superintendent White amounted to clear, unambiguous advice that the School's participation in the program was guaranteed, regardless of its compliance with program rules, if it signed the agreement and/or constructed a building.

The School's evidence established that Superintendent White did nothing more than assure the School that he would help it through the initial program process in the midst of public criticism and, ultimately, into the scholarship program. In fulfillment of this reassurance, the School participated in the program during the 2012-2013 school year. Any further reliance by the School on Superintendent White's assurances was not reasonable.

Elements Three and Four: Extreme Harm Resulting From That Reliance and Gross Injustice to the Individual in the Absence of Judicial Estoppel

The School's evidence was legally insufficient to establish elements three and four of the detrimental reliance burden of proof for the same reason the evidence was insufficient to satisfy the damages element of the School's breach of contract cause of action. Most significantly, pursuant to the scholarship program statutes and Bulletin 133, the School had no right to or interest in the scholarship funds, which belonged to student scholarship recipients.

After our de novo review of the evidence presented by the School, we conclude the evidence was legally insufficient to satisfy its burden of proof against the Department. Because the School failed to satisfy all elements of its detrimental reliance cause of action, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Department's motion for directed verdict on this claim.

Consequently, we find the School failed to prove its entitlement to damages by a preponderance of evidence; thus, we reverse and vacate the September 9, 2024 judgment awarding $2.5 million in damages in favor of the School and against the Department.

THE DEPARTMENT'S RECONVENTIONAL DEMAND

Obligation to Restore (Payment of a Thing Not Owed)

In the final issue presented, the Department seeks reversal of the portion of the September 9, 2024 judgment denying its claim for reimbursement against the School premised on La. C.C. art. 2299, payment of a thing not owed. The Department asserts this presents an issue of law, the interpretation of Bulletin 133, and requires our de novo review. We disagree as to the applicable standard of review.

The jury was instructed that, to succeed on its claim for reimbursement, the Department had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) it overpaid the School, (2) it was entitled to reimbursement for that overpayment, and (3) the amount of the overpayment. The jury was also charged with the pertinent text of Bulletin 133, which defined “tuition and fees” as the total payment charged to enrolled students not participating in the scholarship program and paid on behalf of those students. Bulletin 133, § 1301. Neither party objected to these instructions. The jury was not asked to interpret Bulletin 133 but, instead, to apply the applicable law to the facts presented at trial to determine whether the Department proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it overpaid the School for tuition for the 2012-2013 school year. A unanimous jury answered, “No.” This was a factual determination by the jury, which must be reviewed under the manifest error standard.

A jury's findings of fact cannot be set aside in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989); Rosehill Construction, LLC v. Ted Hebert, LLC, 2024-0834 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/21/25), 425 So.3d 365, 373. If the factual findings are found to be reasonable and supported by the record, the jury's determinations must be given much discretion, especially regarding the credibility of witness testimony. Rosehill Construction, LLC, 425 So.3d at 373. To reverse a jury's factual finding as manifestly erroneous, an appellate court must find the record, when reviewed in its entirety, (1) contains no reasonable factual basis for the jury's finding and (2) establishes the finding is clearly wrong. Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Buildings, 2012-123 8 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So.3d 175, 186.

After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find a reasonable factual basis exists for the jury's conclusion that the Department did not overpay the School and was not entitled to reimbursement. The evidence established that the School collected some monetary tuition, but non-scholarship students were largely able to attend the School through the School's receipt of in-kind donations. Teachers donated their time. The Church donated the facilities. Ms. Richardson explained that the donations were assigned a monetary value, which was then attributed to the students as tuition. She was part of the School's team that determined the monetary value of donations by researching things like rental rates for commercial property in the area at the time and salaries for teachers with similar education and experience. The jury could have reasonably concluded that the Department did not overpay the School because the School allocated the value of in-kind donations to students as tuition, figuratively converting the donations to dollars.

Thus, we find no manifest error in the jury's verdict, denying the Department's claim for reimbursement pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2299. This portion of the judgment is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's May 26, 2017 and November 2, 2023 interlocutory judgments. We reverse the trial court's ruling on the Louisiana Department of Education's motion for directed verdict in part, finding the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for directed verdict on the detrimental reliance and breach of contract claims brought by New Living Word School. We grant the motion for directed verdict in part and reverse and vacate the September 9, 2024 judgment awarding $2.5 million in damages in favor of New Living Word School and against the Department. We affirm the September 9, 2024 judgment denying the Department's claim for reimbursement.

Each party is cast with 50% of the total appeal costs of $12,739.00. Thus, the Louisiana Department of Education shall pay $6,369.50 of the total appeal costs.

MAY 26, 2017 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; NOVEMBER 2, 2023 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; SEPTEMBER 9, 2024 JUDGMENT REVERSED and VACATED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART; RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Former Superintendent of Education John White was also named as a defendant, but all claims against him were dismissed with prejudice in a judgment signed on November 2, 2023. The same judgment also dismissed the School's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Equal Protection violations.

3.   The scholarship program was also called the “school choice program” or the “voucher program.” See La. Acts 2024, No. 1, § 4, eff. July 1, 2025; Brown v. White, 2022-1122 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/14/23), 366 So.3d 626, 639. Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:4011 through 4013 and 4015 through 4025 governing the scholarship program were repealed by La. Acts 2024, No. 1, § 4. The program was administered by the Department through the end of the 2024-2025 school year. Effective June 30, 2025, the program ceased to operate, and no further scholarships were awarded through the program. See La. R.S. 17:4014, as amended by La. Acts 2024, No. 1, § 1, eff. July 1, 2024. All statutory references and citations in this opinion refer to the program statutes as they existed in August 2012 through June 2013, when the School's participation was terminated.

4.   Superintendent White explained that the School's agreement to accept fewer students was required, because program legislation provided only for a school to be accepted for the number of seats it stated were available. The legislation did not contemplate or provide for a situation where a school stated that it had more available seats than it could physically accommodate, which occurred with the School. However, Pastor Baldwin testified the School could accommodate 315 students.

5.   P&N's report to the Department stated that it did not conduct an “audit, the objective of which would be the expression of an opinion to the information provided.” However, it is apparent from P&N's report and the testimony from its employees connected with the review, that P&N's review was an “audit” within the meaning of La. R.S. 17:4022 and Bulletin 133, as both expressly limit the scope of the required audit, which was the scope of P&N's agreed-upon procedures review.

6.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1810 states,A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict that is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.

7.   After P&N determined in March that the School received an overpayment of scholarship funds, the Department withheld the School's fourth installment payment of program funds, to be paid in May, in the amount of $17,050.00.

8.   Generally, when an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment determinative of the merits, the appellant is entitled to seek review of all adverse and prejudicial interlocutory judgments, in addition to the review of the final judgment. Pontchartrain Natural Gas System v. Texas Brine Co., LLC, 2018-1249 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/20), 317 So.3d 715, 742, writs denied, 2021-00382, 2021-00386 (La. 6/8/21), 317 So.3d 323; Killebrew v. Cook, 2023-0806 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/19/24), 2024 WL 1694060, *5 (unpublished).

9.   Louisiana Civil Code article 2298 regarding unjust enrichment appears in Book III, Title V. Obligations Arising Without Agreement, which specifically refers to offenses and quasi-offenses.

10.   This is particularly true since it is the duty of a court to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the issue is not raised by the litigants. Boudreaux v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 2001-1329 (La. 2/26/02), 815 So.2d 7, 13.

11.   See also 23rd Psalm Trucking, LLC. v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 2024-00808 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 370, 375, n.4; Luther v. IOM Co. LLC, 2013-0353 (La. 10/15/13), 130 So.3d 817, 825; State v. Murphy Cormier General Contractors, 170 So.3d at 381; Eicher v. Louisiana State Police, Riverboat Gaming Enforcement Division, 97-0121 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/20/98), 710 So.2d 799, 804, writ denied, 98-0780 (La. 5/8/98), 719 So.2d 51.

12.   Discretionary immunity is an affirmative defense. The party asserting the defense bears the burden of proof, and immunity statutes are strictly construed against the party claiming immunity. Brown, 366 So.3d at 635.

13.   “It is in the public interest that all Louisiana schoolchildren receive the best education that its citizens can provide, and the state of Louisiana has the right, responsibility, duty, and obligation to accomplish the objective of quality education for all Louisiana children.” La. R.S. 17:4012(1); Brown, 366 So.3d at 641.

14.   The Department additionally urges this court to reverse the trial court's November 2, 2023 interlocutory judgment denying its motion for summary judgment, which sought to dismiss the School's claims for breach of contract and detrimental reliance. Since we resolve these issues after our de novo review of the denial of the Department's motion for directed verdict, we do not address the merits of the Department's motion for summary judgment on these claims.

15.   Where factual findings are pertinent to the interpretation of a contract, those factual findings are not to be disturbed unless manifest error is shown. However, when appellate review is not premised upon any factual findings made at the trial level, but is, instead, based upon an independent review and examination of the contract on its face, the manifest error rule does not apply. In such cases, appellate review of questions of law is whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. Fertitta v. Regions Bank, 2020-0300 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/9/20), 311 So.3d 445, 452-53.

16.   This court must interpret the Partnership Agreement from the four corners of the instrument without looking to extrinsic evidence; the question of contractual interpretation is answered as a matter of law. Fee v. S. Packaging, Inc., 2018-1364 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/24/19), 277 So.3d 787, 797. Therefore, we do not consider witness testimony interpreting the Partnership Agreement or testimony concerning the intent of the parties. See Fee, 277 So.3d at 796-97 (Parol or extrinsic evidence is generally inadmissible to vary the terms of a written contract unless the written expression of the common intention of the parties is ambiguous.)

17.   The School's evidence also established that the Church purchased buses to transport students after the School joined the scholarship program. The School entered another lease agreement with the Church on August 10, 2012, and leased three buses from the Church for $1,500.00 per month per bus through May 31, 2013. Again, the School offered no evidence to establish that it paid any amount to the Church for the lease of the buses. Additionally, the testimony established that the Lincoln Parish School Board stopped providing bus transportation to the School when it entered the scholarship program. No action or inaction by the Department caused this to occur.

18.   Additionally, the School sought to recover lost tuition for 440 students, the number of students who identified the School as their first school of choice. However, this number is based entirely on speculation as to how many students would have sought to attend the School for the 2013-2014 school year, particularly considering only 93 scholarship students attended the School during the 2012-2013 school year, although it was approved for 165 seats. No evidence was offered to establish the number of scholarship students that would have enrolled at the School for the 2013-2014 school year and in future years. Notably, the School's counsel urged the jury to award $6,300.00 each for 440 students through 2014 for a total of $2,772,00.00. The jury awarded nearly this amount, $2.5 million.

19.   Thus, we find no merit in the School's assertion that the manifest error standard controls our review of this issue. We also note the result would be the same if this court reviewed the merits of the jury verdict on the School's detrimental reliance claim. The Department argues on appeal that the trial court failed to charge the jury with the detrimental reliance burden of proof appliable to government defendants, and it is true the trial court instructed the jury on the law applicable to non-government defendants. Although the Department did not contemporaneously object to the instruction, the trial court's jury instructions were incomplete and insufficient and failed to adequately instruct the jury as to the issues before it. See Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Dresser-Rand Co., 2015-2002 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/31/16), 207 So.3d 1131, 113 7, writ denied, 2016-02114 (La. 1/13/17), 215 So.3d 248. The jury instructions contained a “plain and fundamental error,” warranting relaxation of the contemporaneous objection rule. See Berg v. Zummo, 2000-1699 (La. 4/25/01), 786 So.2d 708, 716 n.5; Yokum v. Funky 544 Rhythm & Blues Cafe, 2016-1142 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So.3d 723, 731: see also La. C.C.P. art. 1793(C). Generally, when a legal error, such as inadequate or improper jury instructions, interdicts the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard no longer applies. If the record is otherwise complete, the reviewing court should conduct a de novo review. Georgia-Pacific, LLC, 207 So.3d at 1137.

20.   Merriam-Webster continues to define “unequivocal” as “leaving no doubt; CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS” & “UNQUESTIONABLE.” See http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unequivocal.

HAGGERTY, J.