RICHMOND BOYD JR v. KENNETH JOHNSON (2026)

These consolidated cases are before us on appeal by Kenneth P. Johnson, who appeals the trial court's October 27, 2023 judgment that denied Johnson's motion to dissolve or modify permanent protective orders issued on February 6, 2018, and granted rules for contempt filed by Richmond Boyd, Jr. (“Richmond”) and Kaina J. Boyd (“Kaina”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 29, 2018, Richmond filed a “Petition for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunction,” against Johnson alleging, in pertinent part, that Johnson had followed him, harassed him, and went to Richmond's workplace and church. Also on January 29, 2018, Richmond's wife, Kaina, filed a separate “Petition for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunction,” alleging Johnson had followed her, went to her workplace and church, sent messages to her, and videotaped her.² The trial court did not grant Richmond's and Kaina's requests for ex parte temporary restraining orders against Johnson, but set both petitions for a rule to show cause hearing on February 6, 2018.

At the February 6, 2018 hearing,³ Richmond, then a member of the Lafourche Parish School Board for the district representing Thibodaux, Louisiana, testified that he knew Johnson, who disputed Richmond's qualification to serve on the Lafourche Parish School Board. Johnson apparently disputed that Richmond resided in Thibodaux. Richmond recalled that in October 2017, Johnson went to the restaurant Richmond owned in Raceland, Louisiana, K & R Wings, and began making threatening comments and gestures to Richmond, specifically threatening, “Ima get you, Ima get you.” Richmond filed a police report as a result of the October 2017 incident, and another police report was filed when Johnson returned to K & R Wings a few days later shaking his fist at Richmond. Richmond testified that Johnson “follow[ed] us everywhere we go” and would take photographs of Richmond with his phone.

Richmond testified that Johnson had filed a request for a protective order against him previously, but his request was dismissed and the parties were advised by the trial court to stay away from one another. However, according to Richmond, after the dismissal of Johnson's petition for a protective order, Johnson showed up at Richmond's brother's funeral in January 2018 and whispered to him “ima get you, ima get you, ima get you.” Richmond stated that after the funeral, Johnson came to Richmond and Kaina's church and parked his vehicle to block Johnson's vehicle so they could not leave after the service. According to Richmond, Johnson rolled his window down, repeated his threat to “get” Richmond, and drove away.

Kaina testified at the February 6, 2018 hearing that Johnson came to her workplace, the Raceland Public Library, in September or October of 2017. Johnson spoke to Kaina about an issue between his cousin and Richmond, and Kaina told Johnson he should not have come to her work to discuss the issue with her. In January 2018, Johnson came back to the library and “looked and giggled” at Kaina. Kaina testified she felt threatened when Johnson came to the library.

Johnson testified and admitted he was “obsessed” with proving Richmond did not live at his stated address of residence in Thibodaux. Johnson denied shaking his fist at Richmond or stating he would “get” him. Johnson admitted going to Richmond's brother's funeral and the church that Richmond and Kaina attended.

Following the hearing, the trial court granted Richmond and Kaina permanent protective orders against Johnson pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3601, et seq. In doing so, the trial court found the testimony of Richmond and Kaina to be credible and found Johnson's testimony to not be credible. The trial court noted that despite being warned to stay away from each other following the dismissal of Johnson's request for a protective order, Johnson went to Richmond's brother's funeral, K & R Wings, and Kaina's workplace. The trial court found Johnson's actions constituted stalking. The protective orders issued in favor of Richmond and Kaina ordered Johnson not to “abuse, harass, assault, stalk, follow, track, monitor, or threaten” Richmond and Kaina. The protective order issued in favor of Kaina ordered Johnson not to contact her or go within 50 feet of her. The protective order issued in favor of Richmond ordered Johnson not to contact Richmond, except in his capacity as a public official, and not “to go within 50 feet of Richmond, except during school board meetings or public functions involving [Richmond] as a public official.” Johnson was ordered not to go to Richmond's and Kaina's home or workplace, and was ordered not to contact their immediate family. The protective orders were signed by the trial court, Johnson, Richmond, and Kaina, respectively, in court immediately following the February 6, 2018 hearing. The trial court noted it was providing the parties with copies of the protective orders so that the sheriff would not have to serve them.

Thereafter, Johnson filed a slew of motions related to the February 6, 2018 protective orders.⁴ On March 1, 2018, Johnson filed a “Motion for Return Date of Writ and Notice of Intent to File Writ of Certiorari to the First Circuit Court of Appeal” advising of his intent to seek supervisory review of the February 6, 2018 protective order issued in favor of Richmond. The trial court set a return date for Johnson to file his writ application, but no writ application was filed. On April 3, 2018, Johnson filed a “Consolidated Motion to Amend Judgment Pursuant to LSAC.C.P. Art. 1951 and Motion for New Trial” arguing that newly discovered evidence demonstrated that he did not harass Richmond at his church and asserting the trial court erred by making the protective orders permanent. On April 18, 2018, the trial court denied Johnson's motion. Johnson did not seek supervisory review of the trial court's April 18, 2018 ruling.

On February 17, 2021, Johnson filed a “Motion to Annul and/or Dissolve Permanent Protective Order” arguing the delay for him to appeal the February 6, 2018 protective orders never commenced because notice of judgment of the protective orders was never mailed by the trial court clerk of court. On February 18, 2021, the trial court denied the motion, interpreting it as an untimely motion for new trial and/or motion to appeal, and explaining that “[d]elays commenced upon the service of the permanent injunction in open court by the deputy sheriff/bailiff on February 6, 2018.” On February 22, 2021, Johnson filed a motion to appeal the February 6, 2018 protective order issued in favor of Richmond, the February 5, 2021 judgment denying his motion to dissolve the protective order issued in favor of Richmond, and the February 18, 2021 judgment denying his motion to annul and/or dissolve the protective order. On February 22, 2021, the trial court denied the motion to appeal, explaining the motion was untimely as to the February 6, 2018 protective order, and the February 18, 2021 judgment was reviewable by supervisory writ application. Johnson did not file an application for supervisory review seeking review of the February 18, 2021 judgment.

On March 2, 2021, Johnson filed a “Petition for Writ of Mandamus” directed toward the trial court clerk of court and requested that the trial court issue an order for her to “show cause why the record is devoid of a Notice of Mailing of Judgment of the permanent protective [order] rendered on February 6, 2018.” Following a hearing, on May 4, 2021, the trial court denied Johnson's petition for writ of mandamus.⁵ Johnson appealed the trial court's May 4, 2021 judgment, but his appeal was dismissed by this Court on December 15, 2021, because Johnson failed to timely file an appellate brief.

On March 16, 2023, Johnson filed motions to dissolve the February 6, 2018 protective orders.⁶ Johnson requested the protective orders be dissolved because he “poses no threat” to Richmond or Kaina. Kaina and Richmond filed oppositions to Johnson's motions to dissolve, noting that although Richmond has not served on the Lafourche Parish School Board since December 31, 2018, Johnson “continues to stalk the Boyds and harass them both in person and online, some five years later.” Richmond and Kaina alleged that Johnson had recently followed them into the clerk of court's office while they were obtaining passports and stood behind them while they waited. Richmond and Kaina further asserted that Johnson had posted statements on social media regarding the Boyds’ address, photographs of them, and personal information about Kaina. The Boyds also argued the motion should be denied as res judicata because Johnson had previously filed motions to dissolve the February 6, 2018 protective orders.

On September 21, 2023, Richmond and Kaina filed rules for contempt and sanctions against Johnson, alleging he violated the February 6, 2018 protective orders by taking the following actions: (1) posting over 70 photographs of documents and photographs related to the Boyds on social media, some of which contained personal information; (2) following Richmond and Kaina into the clerk of court's office on April 28, 2023 when they were obtaining passports and positioning himself directly behind the couple as they waited; and (3) repeatedly driving by Kaina's workplace and, on one occasion, looking at Kaina in an intimidating manner while driving past her workplace. Richmond and Kaina also alleged Johnson harassed them through the judicial system, noting that in addition to all the filings made in the instant proceedings, Johnson had filed a federal suit against them and the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office that was subsequently dismissed.

On October 24, 2023, a hearing was held on Johnson's motion to dissolve and Richmond's and Kaina's rules for contempt and sanctions.⁷ Following the hearing, the trial court dismissed Johnson's motions to dissolve and granted Richmond's and Kaina's rules for contempt, finding Johnson “continues to be completely obsessed by a situation that may or may not have occurred in February of 2018 when Mr. Boyd may or may not have lived in two separate residences.”⁸ The trial court noted the February 6, 2018 protective orders are permanent and final judgments that may not be amended in order to change their substance. The trial court found evidence presented at the hearing, including the testimony of Richmond and Kaina, demonstrated Johnson was in violation of the February 6, 2018 protective orders.

On October 27, 2023, the trial court signed a written judgment denying Johnson's motion to dissolve and/or modify the protective order and granting Richmond's and Kaina's rule for contempt.⁹ The trial court ordered Johnson to serve 30 days in jail for violation of the protective order, but suspended the sentence pending Johnson's completion of one year of unsupervised probation. The trial court also ordered Johnson to pay Richmond's and Kaina's attorneys fees in the amount of $1500.00, along with court costs. Johnson now appeals the October 27, 2023 judgment.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Johnson asserts the following assignments of error:

(1) The trial court committed reversible legal and procedural error by sua sponte converting a hearing on a temporary restraining order into a trial for a permanent protective order, in direct violation of the mandatory bifurcated hearing procedure established by La. R.S. 46:2136(F) and in violation of [Johnson's] due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard.

(2) The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the evidence presented was sufficient to establish “stalking” under La. R.S. 14:40.2, where [Richmond's and Kaina's] case rested on a subjective interpretation of ambiguous statements and isolated public encounters that do not constitute a pattern of harassing conduct.

(3) The trial court erred by failing to recognize that Mr. Johnson's conduct constituted protected political activity and legitimate observation related to his residency challenge of an elected official, his ownership of nearby property, and his familial ties to the area.

(4) The trial court committed legal error by applying an improper subjective legal standard for intent, focusing on how [Richmond and Kaina] might interpret Mr. Johnson's actions rather than the objective “reasonable person” standard required by La. R.S. 14:40.2.

(5) The trial court abused its discretion by issuing a permanent protective order that is impermissibly overbroad and unconstitutional, as it creates a de facto ban on Mr. Johnson's access to a public library, imposes unworkable restrictions on his right to political participation, and is of a permanent duration unsupported by statutory authority.

(6) The trial court committed legal error on [May 4], 2021, by denying Mr. Johnson's Writ of Mandamus, thereby ratifying the Clerk of Court's failure to comply with the mandatory notice requirements of La. C.C.P. Art. 1913 and perpetuating the denial of Mr. Johnson's right to appeal.

DISCUSSION

Five of Johnson's six assignments of error relate entirely to the February 6, 2018 protective orders, not the trial court's October 27, 2023 judgment—the judgment on appeal before this Court. Johnson's sixth assignment of error pertains to the trial court's May 4, 2021 judgment denying his petition for writ of mandamus. Johnson argues throughout his brief that his appeal of the February 6, 2018 protective orders is timely because the trial court clerk of court did not mail notice of judgment of the protective orders. The record of this matter does not contain an order granting Johnson an appeal of the February 6, 2018 permanent protective orders.

The jurisdiction of an appellate court attaches upon the granting of the order of appeal. La. C.C.P. art. 2088(A); see also La. C.C.P. art. 2121. There can be no appeal absent an order of appeal because the order is jurisdictional. Voelkel v. State, 95-0147 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95), 671 So. 2d 478, 480, writ denied, 95-2676 (La. 1/12/96), 667 So. 2d 523. This lack of jurisdiction can be noticed by the appellate court on its own motion at any time. La. C.C.P. art. 2162; Voelkel, 671 So. 2d at 480. As the record does not contain an order of appeal for the February 6, 2018 protective orders, we have no jurisdiction over Johnson's assignments of error relating to those final judgments. We further find we have no jurisdiction over the appeal of the May 4, 2021 judgment because Johnson's appeal of that judgment was dismissed on December 15, 2021.

In Voelkel, the appellant filed a motion to appeal a judgment purportedly rendered on or about August 30, 1994. The trial court granted the motion and thereafter signed a final judgment on September 30, 1994. The appellant treated the appeal as if it were an appeal of both judgments. Id. at 479. On appeal, the appellee argued this Court had no jurisdiction over the appeal of the September 30, 1994 judgment because there was no order granting an appeal of that judgment. Id. at 479-80. This Court agreed, finding it had no jurisdiction because there was no order of appeal of the final judgment. Id. at 480. However, this Court further found the September 30, 1994 judgment was not final because notice of judgment was not sent by the clerk of court as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1913(B). Therefore, pursuant to its authority under La. C.C.P. art. 2162,¹⁰ this Court remanded the case to the trial court to afford the appellant an opportunity to appeal the September 30, 1994 judgment. Voelkel, 671 So. 2d at 480.

As noted by Johnson, at the time the February 6, 2018 protective orders were granted, La. C.C.P. art. 1913 stated,¹¹ in pertinent part:

A. Except as otherwise provided by law, notice of the signing of a final judgment, including a partial final judgment under [La. C.C.P. art.] 1915, is required in all contested cases, and shall be mailed by the clerk of court to the counsel of record for each party, and to each party not represented by counsel.

* * *

D. The clerk shall file a certificate in the record showing the date on which, and the counsel and parties to whom, notice of the signing of the judgment was mailed.

In 2018, La. C.C.P. art. 1974 provided that the delay for applying for a new trial shall be seven days, exclusive of legal holidays, with the delay commencing to run on the day after the clerk has mailed the notice of judgment required by La. C.C.P. art. 1913.¹² Once the seven-day period for filing a motion for new trial has passed, and no motion for new trial is filed or said motion is untimely filed, the judgment becomes final, and appellate delays begin to run. See La. C.C.P. art. 2087(A)(1) and La. C.C.P. art. 2123(A)(1). Louisiana courts, including this Court, have held that actual knowledge alone of the signing of a judgment, absent compliance with mailing or service requirements when notice is required, is generally not sufficient to cause the new trial and appeal delays to commence. See 9029 Jefferson Highway, L.L.C. v. S & D Roofing, L.L.C., 13-588 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/14), 136 So. 3d 313, 316; Jackson v. Slidell Nissan, 96-1017 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/9/97), 693 So. 2d 1257, 1260 n.3; Johnson v. East Carroll Detention Center, 27,075 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/95), 658 So. 2d 724, 727. However, in certain circumstances, Louisiana courts have recognized that a party may file motions on the record in the trial court by which he may be deemed to either have notice or waive notice of the judgment. See Loyola v. Loyola, 18-554 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/18), 262 So. 3d 983, 985, writ denied, 2019-0079 (La. 3/6/19), 264 So. 3d 1196. See also Albitar v. Albitar, 16-167 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/30/16), 197 So. 3d 332, 340 (explaining “if a party moves for and is granted an appeal prior to service of notice of judgment, he is deemed to either have notice or to waive notice.”); Bank of America, N.A. v. Clower, 44,749 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/23/09), 24 So. 3d 911, 916, writ denied, 2009-2330 (La. 1/8/10), 24 So. 3d 873 (finding the defendant had actual notice of the judgment, as evidenced by pleadings filed in the underlying action and a companion suit).

The record of this matter does not contain a certificate showing notice of judgment for the February 6, 2018 protective orders was mailed by the trial court clerk of court. As noted, Johnson had actual knowledge of the February 6, 2018 protective orders because he was served in court, as evidenced by the transcript of the February 6, 2018 hearing, and signed the protective orders. Furthermore, on March 1, 2018, Johnson filed a notice of intent with the trial court to seek supervisory review of the February 6, 2018 protective order issued in favor of Richmond. Although the trial court set a return date, Johnson failed to file a writ application with this Court. On April 3, 2018, Johnson filed a motion for new trial in relation to the February 6, 2018 protective order issued in favor of Kaina. Johnson did not seek supervisory review of the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial. On February 22, 2021, Johnson filed a motion to appeal the February 6, 2018 protective order issued in favor of Richmond, which was denied as untimely. Again, Johnson did not seek supervisory review of the trial court's denial of his motion to appeal. Johnson simply continued to file various motions with the trial court.

More than eight years have passed since the February 6, 2018 protective orders were signed. We decline to allow Johnson to rely on his failure to receive notice of judgment in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1913 to avoid the new trial and appeal delays. See Bank of America, N.A., 24 So. 2d at 916-17. Thus, under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we find Johnson waived notice of judgment. See Bank of America, N.A., 24 So. 2d at 916-17; Loyola, 262 So. 3d at 985; Albitar, 197 So. 3d at 340. As such, if this Court were to remand this matter, any request for appeal of the February 6, 2018 protective orders would be untimely. As to the trial court's May 4, 2021 judgment denying Johnson's petition for writ of mandamus, Johnson appealed that judgment, but then failed to timely file an appellate brief so his appeal was dismissed as abandoned. See Rule 2-8.6, Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal. Accordingly, we decline to remand this matter to the trial court for Johnson to seek appeal of the February 6, 2018 protective orders or the May 4, 2021 judgment.

As stated, Johnson did not raise an assignment of error pertaining to the trial court's October 27, 2023 judgment in his appellate brief. Thus, there are no issues for us to review in this appeal. See Rule 1-3, Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's October 27, 2023 judgment is affirmed. Despite his pauper status, all costs of this appeal are assessed to Kenneth P. Johnson. See La. C.C.P. arts. 2164 and 5188.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Richmond's and Kaina's petitions were filed in separate trial court docket numbers. Richmond's petition was filed in trial court docket number 134,656 and Kaina's was filed in trial court docket number 134,657.

3.   The parties agreed to consolidate the requests for protective orders for purposes of the hearing.

4.   Some of Johnson's motions were filed in trial court docket number 134,656, some were filed in trial court docket number 134,657, and some were filed in both matters. The cases were not consolidated by the trial court until May 30, 2024.

5.   Johnson did not file a corresponding petition for writ of mandamus in the trial court proceedings related to Kaina's protective order. However, the trial court proceedings related to Kaina's protective order were introduced into evidence and the matters were consolidated for purposes of the mandamus hearing.

6.   Johnson previously filed several motions seeking to dissolve or modify the February 6, 2018 protective orders. The trial court denied all of these motions.

7.   The transcript of the October 24, 2023 hearing is not contained in the record before this Court. The appellant bears the burden of furnishing the appellate court with a record of the proceedings below. When the record lacks a transcript that is pertinent to an issue raised on appeal, the inadequacy of the record is attributable to the appellant. Byrd v. Pulmonary Care Specialists, Inc., 16-0485 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/16), 209 So. 3d 192, 196.

8.   The record contains the transcript of the trial court's oral ruling and reasons for judgment.

9.   As noted, Johnson filed motions to dissolve and/or modify the protective orders granted to Richmond and Kaina, and Richmond and Kaina both filed rules for contempt and sanctions. However, the trial court's October 27, 2023 judgment refers to these filings in singular form. This issue is not raised by the parties and therefore, we do not address the issue.

10.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2162 states in pertinent part that “[i]f an appeal is taken to an appellate court which has no jurisdiction over it, the court may transfer the appeal to the proper court, upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe.”

11.   Effective August 1, 2025, La. C.C.P. art. 1913(A) now provides, in relevant part, that “[d]elivery of the signed judgment in open court shall constitute notice of judgment and shall be documented in the record of the proceeding.”

12.   Effective August 1, 2025, La. C.C.P. art. 1974 now provides that the delay for filing a motion for new trial commences “after the clerk has mailed or delivered in open court, or the sheriff has served, the notice of judgment as required by Article 1913.”

BALFOUR, J.