STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ROY DAWSON JR (2026)

The State of Louisiana (hereinafter “the State”) appeals the district court's May 23, 2025 ruling granting the motion to quash filed by Roy Dawson, Jr. (hereinafter “Defendant”). After consideration of the record before this Court, and the applicable law, we reverse the district court's ruling granting the motion to quash and remand the matter for further proceedings.

Facts Procedural History

On December 11, 2013, Defendant was charged with one count of sexual battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1, and one count of aggravated incest, a violation of La. R.S. 14:78.1.¹ The bill of information provided that between June 1, 2012 and December 31, 2012, Defendant committed aggravated sexual battery and aggravated incest of a relative, who was twelve years old at the time of the offense. On March 24, 2015, Defendant entered into a plea agreement whereupon he pled guilty to one count of sexual battery and two counts of aggravated incest.² As a part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that the December 11, 2013 bill of information would be amended to remove that the age of the victim was twelve years old and reflect that the age of the victim was “a juvenile under the age of [fourteen].” At the Boykin hearing, Defendant entered a guilty plea and the following colloquy took place:

THE COURT: The amendments have been made to take it from the more severe—amendment to the age of the victim has been made in the bill, I was told, to take the defendant out of the mandatory and more severe sentences for these offenses; is that correct, counsel?

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE: Yes, your Honor.

COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

As part of his plea agreement, upon his release, Defendant was required to register as a sex offender and required to submit to electronic monitoring as part of his home incarceration.³

On or about September 17, 2024, the State alleges that Defendant's electronic monitoring system revealed that he was physically present within one thousand feet of Pratt Park Playground and Holy Cross School. As a result, the State filed a bill of information on November 22, 2024, charging Defendant with a violation of La. R.S. 14:91.2, unlawful presence of a sex offender. The State argued Defendant, as a person convicted of sex offenses when the “victim is under the age of thirteen,” was unlawfully within one thousand feet of a school property. The November 22, 2024 bill of information utilized Defendant's March 24, 2015 plea agreement, wherein he pled guilty to committing a sex offense against a “juvenile under the age of [fourteen],” as the predicate offense. Notwithstanding that his conviction was for committing a sex offense against a juvenile under the age of fourteen, the State maintains that it can and will prove that the victim of the predicate offense was actually under the age of thirteen as required by La. R.S. 14:91.2(A). After a determination of probable cause, Defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars seeking: (1) the subsection of La. R.S. 14:91.2 he allegedly violated; and (2) the manner in which the State intended to prove his predicate offense. On May 12, 2025, the State filed an opposition providing that Defendant violated La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1), which reflected the language in the bill of information; and arguing that it submitted sufficient evidence regarding the predicate offense during discovery, as well as through testimony at motion hearings.

On May 16, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to quash contending that the use of his March 24, 2015 plea agreement, as a predicate offense in the November 22, 2024 bill of information, was improper because the State could not prove that the victim in the predicate offense was under the age of thirteen, as required by La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1). Defendant maintained that based on the March 24, 2015 plea agreement, he was convicted of sex offenses where the age of the victim in the predicate offense was under the age of fourteen. The State opposed the motion to quash, contending that the age of the victim in the predicate offense would be established at trial in order to satisfy the age requirement of La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1). Therefore, according to the State, it was a question for the jury to determine whether the State met its burden in establishing the necessary elements of La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1). The matter went before the district court on May 23, 2025, at the conclusion of which it granted Defendant's motion to quash. The district court found that because the December 11, 2013 bill of information charging Defendant with the predicate offense was amended to reflect that the victim was under the age of fourteen, his guilty plea could not constitute a conviction of a sex offense where the victim was under the age of thirteen. This appeal followed.

Discussion

The State presents three assignments of error:⁴

1. Whether the State adequately alleged that Defendant's prior victim was under thirteen years of age, where the affidavit relied upon by the district court to find probable cause specifically states that she was twelve;

2. Whether the district court mistakenly relied on the list of “aggravated offenses” rather than the list of “sex offenses” in ruling on the motion; and

3. Whether the prohibition on sex offenders in school zones focuses on the facts of the underlying sex offense to determine who is legally prohibited from school zones where children are present, or whether the coverage excludes sex offenders who sexually abused a child under the age of thirteen but were able to secure a favorable plea agreement that avoided the full punishment authorized by law for that conduct.

We find the dispositive issue to be whether the district court erred in granting the motion to quash based on a finding that the December 11, 2013 amended bill of information, which included a reference to the March 24, 2015 plea agreement, failed to establish that Defendant's predicate offense included a victim under the age of thirteen as required by La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1).

Standard of Review

The decision on a motion to quash is based strictly on legal issues and is therefore subject to a de novo standard of review. State v. Hall, 2013-0453, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/9/13), 127 So.3d 30, 38-39. A court considering a motion to quash “must accept as true the facts contained in the bills of information and in the bill of particulars, and determine as a matter of law and from the face of the pleadings, whether a crime has been charged.” State v. Landry, 2013-1030, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/7/14), 144 So.3d 1078, 1081 (citations omitted). “The determination by the trial judge whether to grant or deny a motion to quash is solely a question of law and therefore any defenses on the merits are not valid grounds for quashal.” State v. Brown, 2015-0855, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/21/15), 176 So.3d 761, 764 (citations omitted). “In considering a motion to quash, a court must accept as true the facts contained in the bills of information and in the bill of particulars, and determine as a matter of law and from the face of the pleadings, whether a crime has been charged․ .” State v. Byrd, 1996-2302, pp. 18-19 (La. 3/13/98), 708 So.2d 401, 411 (citations omitted).

Motion to Quash

The State contends the district court erred in granting the motion to quash. It asserts that it will establish, at trial, that Defendant's predicate offense involved a victim under the age of thirteen. The State asserts that the arrest warrant, related to the current charges, specifically identifies Defendant's predicate offense's docket number and states that the victim in that offense was twelve years old. Conversely, Defendant argues that the State failed to establish that his March 24, 2015 plea agreement qualifies as a predicate offense under La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1) because it does not establish that he was convicted of a sex offense involving a victim under the age of thirteen. Therefore, according to Defendant, the State fails to properly allege a necessary element of La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1).

This case presents a res nova issue regarding the statutory interpretation of La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1). “A district court's interpretation and application of a statute is reviewed under a de novo standard of review.” State v. Baker, 2020-0309, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/2/20), 311 So.3d 440, 443 (citations omitted). “When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.” La. C.C. art. 10.

The State charged Defendant with violating La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1), which provides,⁵

A. The following acts when committed by a person convicted of a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541 when the victim is under the age of thirteen years shall constitute the crime of unlawful residence or presence of a sex offender:

(1)The physical presence of the offender in, on, or within one thousand feet of the school property of any public or private elementary or secondary school or the physical presence in any motor vehicle or other means of conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by such school to transport students to or from school or a school-related activity when persons under the age of eighteen years are present on the school property or in a school vehicle.

“When the provision is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, its language must be given effect, and its provisions must be construed so as to give effect to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used.” State v. Oliphant, 2012-1176, p. 5 (La. 3/19/13), 113 So.3d 165, 168 (citations omitted). We do not find that La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1) is ambiguous and the application of La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1) to the current matter rests on whether the stated age, “under the age of thirteen years,” applies to Defendant's predicate offense.

It is undisputed that on March 24, 2015 Defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual battery and two counts of aggravated incest, which are both defined as sex offenses under La. R.S. 15:541. His March 24, 2015 plea agreement was specifically based on the amendment of the December 11, 2013 bill of information to reflect that the victim was under the age of fourteen. A review of the Boykin hearing transcript also provides that the December 11, 2013 bill of information was amended to reflect a different age in order to allow Defendant to be eligible for a lesser sentence. While Defendant pled guilty to a sex offense crime against a “juvenile under the age of [fourteen],” this does not negate the evidence presented by the State to support a finding that the juvenile victim in the predicate offense was twelve years old at the time of the offense. Further, the use of the language “juvenile under the age of [fourteen]” in the amended December 11, 2013 bill of information, does not foreclose the possibility that the victim in the predicate offense was also under the age of thirteen at the time of the offense. The age of the victim in the predicate offense used by the State is a necessary element under La. R.S. 14:91.2, of which the State bears the burden of proving Defendant violated. A review of the record reveals that the officer attested, in the arrest warrant charging Defendant with violating La. R.S. 14:91.2, that the victim in the predicate offense was twelve years old.⁶ A motion to quash is not the proper procedural vehicle to challenge the State's evidence. Finding that the State did not meet its burden regarding a necessary element of La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1), through a motion to quash, would yield an inequitable consequence because the age of the victim in the predicate offense is well documented in the record and falls within the age range set forth in La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1). We find the State validly charged Defendant under La. R.S. 14:91.2(A)(1) and the trial court erred in granting the motion to quash.

Conclusion

The State in this case has submitted sufficient proof of the existence of the predicate offense and prior guilty plea. As such, the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to allow the State an opportunity to meet its burden of proof at trial. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's ruling granting the motion to quash and remand the matter for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   In 2014, all references in Louisiana law to “incest” was changed to “crime against nature” and “aggravated incest” was changed to “aggravated crime against nature.” See La. R.S. 14:89 and La. R.S. 14:89.1.

2.   As a part of the plea agreement, the December 11, 2013 bill of information was amended to add a second count of aggravated incest asserting that between May 1, 2012 and May 31, 2012, Defendant committed the crime of aggravated incest of a relative who was “a juvenile under the age of fourteen.”

3.   Defendant was sentenced to eight years, at hard labor, with the Louisiana Department of Corrections as to count one; four years home incarceration as to count two; and twenty years suspended sentence as to count three.

4.   The State's brief does not list assignments of error but rather, provides “Issues Presented” for this Court to review.

5.   La. R.S. 15:541 defines “sex offense” as “deferred adjudication, adjudication withheld, or conviction for the perpetration or attempted perpetration of or conspiracy to commit human trafficking when prosecuted under” certain enumerated sex crimes. La. R.S. 15:541(24)(a).

6.   The September 19, 2024 arrest warrant was admitted as State's exhibit 1 at the probable cause hearing. The district court, at the probable cause hearing, states that Defendant is “already on supervised—on home incarceration supervision, because of his conviction for the offense of Aggravated Incest. His victim in that case was [twelve] years old.”

Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase