STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JULES CLINTON JOHNSON (2026)

The defendant, Jules Clinton Johnson, was charged by grand jury indictment with one count of second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (count one) and one count of illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count two). He entered a plea of not guilty to the charges and, following a jury trial, was unanimously found guilty as charged on both counts. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count one and to twenty years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count two. Both sentences were to run concurrent with each other and the defendant was given credit for all time served. The defendant orally made a motion to reconsider sentencing, which was denied. The defendant now appeals, alleging the trial court erred in allowing the State to redact the State's discovery without a hearing; in denying the motion to suppress the photographic lineup; and in allowing five felony offenses to be included by the State in count two of the indictment. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On May 19, 2019, around 1:30 a.m., Melvin Webb ¹ was shot and killed outside Gloria's Bayou Lounge (“the lounge”) located off Salmen Street in Slidell, Louisiana. Melvin and his wife, Gloria, arrived at the lounge together before separating inside. Later, Melvin approached Gloria and told her he recognized an individual the couple associated with the defendant. Gloria then walked outside and noticed that the individual had exited the lounge with a second individual who Gloria also associated with the defendant. Gloria subsequently went inside and told Melvin they needed to leave because it looked “like a setup.” Gloria exited the lounge and walked into the parking lot, but Melvin finished his pool game before leaving. When Melvin approached the couple's car he noticed his cousin, Archie Ambo, standing near the side of the lounge. Melvin walked over to speak to Archie while Gloria waited near the car. At that point, Gloria saw the defendant walk up and shoot Melvin before running away. The shooting was recorded on the lounge's video surveillance footage. Immediately following the shooting, Gloria called 911 and identified the shooter as the defendant.²

In the weeks leading up to the murder, Gloria and Melvin had noticed a tall, muscular built individual with long dreads and dark skin across the street from their home, who Gloria identified as the defendant. According to Gloria, Melvin was concerned about the defendant and their safety. Prior to the shooting, Gloria talked to the lounge's security guard, Kelli Holmes, and told her to be on the lookout for the defendant. She showed Kelli the defendant's Facebook page. Gloria reviewed a photographic lineup and positively identified the defendant with one hundred percent certainty as the person who shot Melvin.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to redact the State's discovery responses regarding witness information without an ex parte hearing and documentation of proof in accordance with La Code Crim. P. art. 729.7.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 729.7(A) states:

A. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the district attorney or the defendant may delete or excise from any information required to be disclosed herein any information which identifies a witness if such party believes the witness's safety may be compromised by the disclosure. If a party objects to the deletion or excision, he must do so by written motion. The court shall maintain the deletion or excision if, at an ex parte proceeding which shall be recorded and maintained under seal, the party excising or deleting such information makes a prima facie showing that the witness's safety may be compromised by the disclosure.

When a party files a written motion objecting to the redaction of discovery, the trial court must conduct an ex parte proceeding maintained under seal.

The defendant filed a written motion objecting to the State's discovery redactions. The trial court held a hearing on the defendant's written motion on September 19, 2023, at which time the following dialogue transpired:

DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL:

Judge, I did file that motion. I'm in discussions with the State. And I believe we've come to – we're coming to a compromise on that issue. I'd ask for this motion to be continued. In the event that we can't come to an agreement, I would ask the Court to rule on that specific motion. But for right now – I can refile if there's an issue, Judge. We can say this motion is satisfied for the time being. If there's an issue down the road, I can refile this motion.

THE COURT:

And the Court would allow you to do so. That satisfies that motion.

(Emphasis added.)

The hearing transcript reflects defense counsel told the trial court that the discovery redactions by the State were satisfied for the time being and, if there were further issues, he would refile the motion. No subsequent written motions were filed by the defendant objecting to the State's redacted discovery. Based on the record before us and the statements made by the defendant's attorney, it is clear a hearing was held in accordance with La. Code Crim. P. art. 729.7 and that the matter was considered satisfied.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the photographic lineup on the grounds that there was no suggestive procedure in connection with this identification. Specifically, the defendant contends the reliability of the identification was tainted because two of the six individuals in the lineup wore jail clothing.

Generally, the defendant has the burden of proof on a motion to suppress an out-of-court identification. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(D). A defendant attempting to suppress an identification must prove the identification was suggestive and that there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification as a result of the identification procedure. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1232-1233, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005); State v. Barnett, 2014-1458 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/24/15), 2015 WL 1884351, *2 (unpublished), writ denied, 2015-0985 (La. 4/15/16), 191 So.3d 1033. An identification procedure is suggestive if it displays the defendant so that the witness's attention is unduly focused on the defendant. State v. Becnel, 2023-0769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/27/23), 381 So.3d 78, 81-82 writ denied, 2024-00070 (La. 10/8/24), 394 So.3d 266.

A suggestive identification procedure alone does not indicate that the defendant's right to due process was violated. The issue to review is the likelihood of misidentification that violates due process, not merely the suggestive identification procedure. State v. Reed, 97-0812 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/98), 712 So.2d 572, 576, writ denied, 98-1266 (La. 11/25/98), 729 So.2d 572. Courts look to several factors to determine, from the totality of the circumstances, if the suggestive identification presents a substantial likelihood of misidentification. These factors include: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the defendant at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the defendant; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation; and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). In Manson, the Supreme Court allowed evidence of a suggestive identification by an undercover police officer, concluding, “reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.” Id.

Trial courts are vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to suppress. State v. Long, 2003-2592 (La. 9/9/04), 884 So.2d 1176, 1179, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 977, 125 S.Ct. 1860, 161 L.Ed.2d 728 (2005). When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 281. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. State v. Hunt, 2009-15 89 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751. When determining whether the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress was correct, we are not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion. We may consider all pertinent evidence given at the trial of the case. Becnel, 381 So.3d at 82.

On September 19, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress identification. Daniel Bucker, a St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office detective, testified that he administered a six-person photographic lineup for Gloria.³ Det. Buckner testified he did not know the names or identities of any potential suspects and he did not compile the photographic lineup. Prior to administering the lineup, Det. Buckner read aloud the cautionary instructions on the lineup form, including that “the perpetrator may or may not be present in the identification procedure.”

Gloria reviewed the lineup and circled image number three, a photograph of the defendant. Gloria indicated on the form she was one hundred percent confident in her identification and wrote on the lineup form, “[t]his is the guy who be (sic) across the street from my house with Shawn Miller[,] I know this person as Pop[,] Facebook name, Safe Johnson.” At trial, Det. Buckner testified the lineup was considered a “double blind lineup,” meaning neither the detective who created the lineup, nor the detective who showed the lineup to Gloria, knew anything about the case.

Strict identity of physical characteristics among the persons depicted in a photographic array is not required; however, there must be sufficient resemblance to reasonably test the identification. State v. Bright, 98-0398 (La. 4/11/00), 776 So.2d 1134, 1145; Barnett, 2015 WL 1884351 at *3. A review of the lineup itself displays six individuals with long stranded hair, similar complexion, and similar body type. The photographs are black and white and relatively similar in size. Each of the six individuals are in front of similar backgrounds. Despite these similarities, we note that two individuals were wearing striped shirts, similar to that of a traditional prison uniform. The defendant and another person were in striped shirts while the other four wore plain white shirts, making striped shirt pictures distinctive.

We note, however, that appellate courts have declined to find lineups containing similarly mis-matched photographs to be unduly suggestive. See State v. Aldridge, 2022-0245 (La. App. 4th Cir. 5/18/22), 340 So.3d 1188, 1193-1194, writ denied, 2022-00964 (La. 9/7/22), 345 So.3d 427. In Aldridge, the individuals in the photographic lineup were African-American males roughly the same age, skin tone, facial features, hair-styled in dreadlocks, and sporting light/sparse mustaches. The defendant was depicted in an orange jumpsuit and another individual wore the same orange jumpsuit with a collar. Of the remaining men, two wore white t-shirts and two wore shirts with black collars. The Fourth Circuit found the mismatched photos, alone, were not enough to show the lineup was impermissibly suggestive. Id. at 1193-1194.

Assuming arguendo that the photographic lineup in the instant case was suggestive, the defendant failed to show there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification resulting from the identification procedures. Gloria identified the defendant at their neighbor's home in the weeks leading up to Melvin's murder. The Webb's home surveillance footage shows the couple identifying the defendant prior to the murder. When the couple arrived to the lounge on the night of the shooting, Gloria warned the security guards about the defendant and showed photographs from his Facebook page. During the shooting, Gloria immediately recognized the defendant despite being across the parking lot. Gloria also identified the defendant as the shooter in her 911 call.⁴ Gloria and Holmes both described the shooter as wearing a black basketball jersey with black pants, and described him having a unique walk. Other witnesses corroborated this description and positively identified the defendant as the shooter. Further, Gloria expressed one hundred percent confidence in her identification given five hours after the shooting.

We find that the lineup procedure did not cause a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Gloria was familiar with the defendant in the weeks leading up to her husband's murder. She reviewed the lineup and identified the defendant with one hundred percent certainty that he was the shooter. Based on the totality of the facts and evidence it is clear that the identification of the defendant was reliable.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE

In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to include five felony offenses on count two of the indictment, to support the charge of felon in possession of a firearm.

La. R.S. 14:95.1(A) states it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of certain felonies to possess a firearm. To show a violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, the State must prove: (1) the defendant's status as a convicted felon; and (2) that the defendant was in possession of a firearm. See State v. Loper, 2010-0582 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/29/10), 48 So.3d 1263, 1266.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to preclude the State from listing more than one predicate felony to support his status as a felony offender, and offered to stipulate to being a prior felony offender. The trial court heard oral arguments and denied the motion. The defendant now argues he was unnecessarily prejudiced, indicating that the use of five felony predicate offenses in count two of the indictment “lure[d] the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the charge.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 650, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has long held that “[e]vidence of both of defendant's previous felony convictions was admissible at trial as proof of an element of the crime charged and the manner in which the present offense was committed, proof of either prior conviction being sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for the present offense.” State v. Sanders, 357 So.2d 492, 494 (La. 1978).

This court has recognized that a convicted felon's specific prior offense was necessary to fully charge the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, therefore, it must be contained in the charging instrument and read to the jury. State v. Sims, 2007-0786 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/21/07), 2007 WL 4480808, *8 (unpublished), writ denied sub nom., State ex rel. Sims v. State, 2008-0420 (La. 11/10/08), 996 So.2d 1062 (citing State v. Ball, 99-0428 (La. 11/30/99), 756 So.2d 275). This concept applies even when the defendant offers to stipulate that he had been convicted of a prior felony. “[T]he prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly, that a criminal may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the government chooses to present it.” Ball, 756 So.2d at 280 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186-187, 117 S.Ct. at 653).

Examination of the existing jurisprudence supports the State's use of all five prior felony convictions as proof of the charge of felon in possession of a firearm. See State v. Bienemy, 2023-0271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/4/23), 3 82 So.3d 1011, 1016-1017, writ denied, 2024-00050 (La. 6/19/24), 3 86 So.3d 673 (relying on Sanders when refusing to quash an indictment that listed seven prior felonies in support of a charge of felon in possession of a firearm); State v. Willis, 36,759 (La. App. 2d Cir. 4/9/03), 843 So.2d 592, 599, writ denied sub nom., State ex rel. Willis v. State, 2004-1219 (La. 4/1/05), 897 So.2d 593 (the use of all three prior felonies was appropriate to prove the defendant was a convicted felon); see also State v. Cox, 2017-508 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2/21/18), 239 So.3d 465, 475-476, writ denied, 2018-0455 (La. 1/14/19), 261 So.3d 782.

Proving the defendant committed prior felonies is essential in proving he violated La. R.S. 14:95.1(A). Considering that multiple courts have allowed the introduction of multiple prior convictions to prove a defendant's status as a convicted felon, we find the State was authorized to include all prior felonies committed by the defendant on the indictment, pursuant to Sanders.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 3 85 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found two patent errors.

First, it appears the sentence on count two, felon in possession of a firearm, is illegally lenient, as the trial court failed to impose a mandatory fine of not less than one thousand and not more than five thousand dollars, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:95.1(B).⁵ However, because this potential illegality inures to the defendant's benefit in this case, we elect not to amend or remand for correction of the sentence. See State v. Price, 2005-2514 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/06), 952 So.2d 112, 124-125 (en banc), writ denied, 2007-0130 (La. 2/22/08), 976 So.2d 1277.

Second, the record reflects, after the trial court imposed the sentences herein, it advised the defendant “you have two years after your sentence becomes final to file post-conviction relief.” A defendant generally has two years “after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final” to seek post-conviction relief. La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8(A) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to properly advise the defendant has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence. State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-1143, writ denied sub nom., State ex rel. LeBoeuf v. State, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Accordingly, this error is not reversible, and we decline to remand for resentencing.

Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we instead advise the defendant that La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1143.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, Jules Clinton Johnson's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Since Melvin and Gloria share the same surname, we refer to each by their first name.

2.   Gloria testified she only knew the defendant as “Safe Johnson” from his Facebook page. However, Gloria knew the defendant's father was Sherman Deas. Melvin pled guilty as an accessory in the 2012 murder of Deas and served ten months imprisonment. Melvin's cousin, Dwight Ambo, was convicted of manslaughter of Deas.

3.   A recording of the identification procedure was introduced as State's pretrial Exhibit Two.

4.   At trial, State Exhibit 31 introduced into evidence contained two 911 calls placed by Holmes and Gloria. However, the disc labeled State Exhibit 31 only contains the 911 call placed by Holmes. The record reflects that Gloria identified the defendant by his nickname in her 911 call.

5.   The trial court would have to hold a financial hardship hearing in compliance with the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. art. 875.1, prior to the imposition of such a fine. We note the record does not indicate that a financial hardship hearing was held, or that the mandatory fine was waived as a result of a determination that it would cause substantial financial hardship to the defendant or his dependents.

WOLFE, J.