DONOVAN AVRIE AS NEXT FRIEND OF HIS MINOR CHILD v. ASCOT SPECIALTY INSURANCE TRIPLE TRUCKING FREEDOM TRUCKS LLC AND LAKENDRICK EARL WILSON (2026)

Plaintiff, Donovan Avrie, on behalf of his minor child, A.A., appeals the trial court's judgment granting exceptions of no right of action, improper venue, and prescription filed by defendants, Ascot Specialty Insurance Company; Triple L. Trucking, LLC; Freedom Trucks, LLC; and Lakendrick Earl Wilson, and dismissing plaintiff's claims against defendants with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand this matter to the trial court for transfer to a parish of proper venue.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about October 27, 2023, Adrienne Manuel was traveling eastbound on Interstate 10 in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, when Lakendrick Earl Wilson, who was driving a tractor-trailer, collided into the rear of Manuel's vehicle. Manuel was severely injured in the accident and subsequently died as a result of her injuries. On October 15, 2024, Donovan Avrie, on behalf of his minor child, A.A. (“Avrie”), filed suit in East Baton Rouge Parish against Wilson; his employer, Triple L. Trucking, LLC; the owner of the tractor-trailer driven by Wilson, Freedom Trucks, LLC; and Triple L. Trucking, LLC's insurer, Ascot Specialty Insurance Company (collectively “defendants”). Avrie asserted a wrongful death claim for the death of A.A.’s mother, Manuel.² Avrie alleged venue was proper in East Baton Rouge Parish pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 42(7) because Ascot Specialty Insurance Company (“Ascot”) is a foreign insurer.

On December 2, 2024, defendants filed peremptory exceptions of no right of action and prescription and a declinatory exception of improper venue.³ Defendants’ exception of no right of action was directed at Avrie's claims against Ascot based on Louisiana's Direct Action Statute, La. R.S. 22:1269. Defendants argued that prior to the filing of Avrie's petition, La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) was amended to provide that, except under certain circumstances, an injured person shall have no right of a direct action against an insurer. Defendants argued none of the exceptions set forth in La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) applied and none were alleged by Avrie. Therefore, defendants argued, Avrie did not have a right of action against Ascot. Defendants argued their exception of no right of action should be granted and Avrie's claims against Ascot dismissed with prejudice.⁴

As to their exception of improper venue, defendants argued that since Avrie had no right of action against Ascot, venue was improper in East Baton Rouge Parish. Defendants noted that Avrie filed in East Baton Rouge Parish pursuant to former La. C.C.P. art. 42(7), which allowed a foreign insurer to be sued in East Baton Rouge Parish. Defendants noted that La. C.C.P. art. 42(7) and the corresponding venue provisions in the former version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) were repealed effective August 1, 2024, before Avrie filed suit on October 15, 2024. Defendants asserted there was no other basis for venue in East Baton Rouge Parish and therefore, Avrie filed his action in the wrong venue. Defendants argued the trial court should dismiss Avrie's suit instead of transferring it to a court of proper venue because his claims against defendants had prescribed.

As to their exception of prescription, defendants argued Avrie filed his suit in an improper venue, failed to serve defendants within one year of the date of the accident, and therefore, prescription was not interrupted pursuant to La. C.C. art. 3462. Defendants attached two documents to their exceptions, a document titled “Corporate Service Center Service of Process Confirmation Form” purportedly showing that Triple L. Trucking, LLC was served on November 4, 2024, and an affidavit by Fredrick B. Feeney, II, the registered agent for service of process for Freedom Trucks, LLC, who attested to the fact that he received service of Avrie's petition on November 5, 2024. Defendants did not provide proof of service on Wilson, but stated in their memorandum in support of their exceptions that “[u]pon information and belief, Mr. Wilson received citation from a process server on November 25 or 26, 2024[.]”

Avrie filed an opposition to defendants’ exceptions arguing he has a right of action against Ascot under La. R.S. 22:1269 because at the time of the underlying accident, when his claim arose, La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) had not yet been amended and allowed for his claim against Ascot. Avrie argued that since his claim accrued before the amendment to La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1), he had a right of action against Ascot and retroactive application of the amended version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) would improperly divest him of his vested rights. Avrie further argued that since he had a right against Ascot under the former version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1), then venue was proper in East Baton Rouge Parish, and his action had not prescribed.

Defendants filed a reply to Avrie's opposition, arguing the Direct Action Statute grants a procedural right of action and that courts had recently held it is only when a plaintiff files suit against an insurer before August 1, 2024, the effective date of the amendment to La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1), that the plaintiff maintains a procedural right of action against the insurer under the former version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1).

On April 7, 2025, a hearing was held on defendants’ exceptions of no right of action, improper venue, and prescription. During the hearing, no evidence was introduced. Following argument, the trial court granted defendants’ exceptions of no right of action, improper venue, and prescription. The trial court signed a written judgment on April 7, 2025, granting defendants’ exceptions of no right of action, improper venue, and prescription, and dismissing Avrie's claims against defendants with prejudice.⁵

Avrie appeals, asserting the following assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred by retroactively applying the repeal of the insurer-specific venue provisions of La. R.S. 22:1269, while applying the repeal of the substantive right of action prospectively, resulting in an absurd result and depriving him of a remedy; (2) the trial court erred in granting Ascot's exception of no right of action because Avrie had a vested substantive right of direct action at the time of the accident; (3) the trial court erred in granting defendants’ exception of improper venue because the insurer-specific venue provisions were in effect when the cause of action accrued; and (4) the trial court erred in granting defendants’ exception of prescription because filing in a proper venue under the law as it existed when the claim vested interrupted prescription.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Exception of No Right of Action

In his first and second assignments of error, Avrie argues the trial court erred by granting defendants’ exception of no right of action because Avrie had a vested substantive right of action against Ascot that accrued at the time of the accident. Avrie asserts that the amendment to La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) did not express retroactive intent, nor did it serve to eliminate a cause of action. Avrie argues that La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1), prior to its amendment on August 1, 2024, provided a substantive right and the repeal of a substantive right only applies prospectively, unless the legislature clearly states otherwise. Avrie argues that since his substantive right to bring a cause of action against Ascot accrued prior to August 1, 2024, then the amended version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) does not apply to his direct action against Ascot.

The standard of review of a ruling on an exception of no right of action, which presents a question of law, is de novo. Shepherd v. Baton Rouge Cardiology Center, 2019-0802 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/12/20), 300 So. 3d 893, 896. The function of an exception of no right of action is a determination of whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the petition. The exception of no right of action serves to question whether the plaintiff in the particular case is a member of the class of persons that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Bureau, Inc., 2005-0612 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So. 2d 1211, 1217.

Prior to its amendment, La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) provided as follows:

The injured person or his survivors or heirs mentioned in Subsection A of this Section, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy; and, such action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly and in solido, in the parish in which the accident or injury occurred or in the parish in which an action could be brought against either the insured or the insurer under the general rules of venue prescribed by Code of Civil Procedure Art. 42 only; however, such action may be brought against the insurer alone only when at least one of the following applies:

(a) The insured has been adjudged bankrupt by a court of competent jurisdiction or when proceedings to adjudge an insured bankrupt have been commenced before a court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) The insured is insolvent.

(c) Service of citation or other process cannot be made on the insured.

(d) When the cause of action is for damages as a result of an offense or quasi-offense between children and their parents or between married persons.

(e) When the insurer is an uninsured motorist carrier.

(f) The insured is deceased.

Effective August 1, 2024, La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) was amended and reenacted by Acts 2024, No. 275, § 1, and now provides:

The injured person or, if deceased, the persons identified in Civil Code Articles 2315.1 and 2315.2, shall have no right of direct action against the insurer unless at least one of the following applies:

(a) The insured files for bankruptcy in a court of competent jurisdiction or when proceedings to adjudge an insured bankrupt have been commenced before a court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) The insured is insolvent.

(c) Service of citation or other process has been attempted without success or the insured defendant refuses to answer or otherwise defend the action within one hundred eighty days of service.

(d) When the cause of action is for damages as a result of an offense or quasi-offense between children and their parents or between married persons.

(e) When the insurer is an uninsured motorist carrier.

(f) The insured is deceased.

(g) When the insurer is defending the lawsuit under a reservation of rights, or the insurer denies coverage to the insured, but only for the purpose of establishing coverage.

Pursuant to the amended version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1), a plaintiff may not directly sue a defendant's liability insurer unless certain specific conditions apply.

The legislature is free, within constitutional confines, to give its enactments retroactive effect. Louisiana Revised Statutes 1:2 provides that “[n]o Section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated.” Moreover, La. C.C. art. 6 mandates that “[i]n the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretive laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.” La. R.S. 1:2 has been construed as co-extensive with La. C.C. art. 6. See Rochelle v. LeBlanc, 2010-1901 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/6/11), 65 So. 3d 240, 242.

In determining whether a newly enacted provision is to be applied prospectively only, or may also be retroactive, La. C.C. art. 6 requires a two-fold inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the amendment to the statute expresses legislative intent regarding retroactive or prospective application. Rochelle, 65 So. 3d at 243. Second, if no such intent is expressed, the court must determine whether the amendment is substantive, procedural, or interpretive. Id. Substantive laws establish new rules, rights, and duties, or change existing ones, while procedural laws prescribe a method for enforcing a substantive right and relate to the form of the proceeding or the operation of the laws. Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dardar, 2013-2351 (La. 5/7/14), 145 So. 3d 271, 283.

Recently, in Vascocu v. Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange, 2025-1141 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/24/26), --- So. 3d ---, ---, 2026 WL 1113376, *3-4, this Court applied the amended version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) to a plaintiff's direct claims against an insurer where the underlying accident occurred prior to August 1, 2024, the effective date of the amendment to La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1), but suit was not filed until after the effective date. In doing so, this Court explained that the Direct Action Statute, La. R.S. 22:1269, grants “a procedural right of action against an insurer where the plaintiff has a substantive cause of action against the insured.” Vascocu, --- So. 3d at ---, 2026 WL 1113376, at *3 (quoting Soileau v. Smith True Value and Rental, 2012-1711 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So. 3d 771, 775); see also Descant v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 93-3098 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So. 2d 246, 249 (“The direct action statute does not create an independent cause of action against the insurer, it merely grants a procedural right of action against the insurer where the plaintiff has a substantive cause of action against the insured.”).

In Hurel v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 2025-0049 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/11/25), 414 So. 3d 778, 786-87, the Fourth Circuit found the amended version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) applied to a matter where the underlying accident occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment, but suit was not filed until after the effective date. In doing so, the court explained that the Direct Action Statute is a procedural statute and “procedural statutes․become operative only when and if the remedy they serve to facilitate is invoked.” Hurel, 414 So. 3d at 786 (quoting Church Mut., 145 So. 3d at 287). The court in Hurel found that the plaintiff's substantive claims against the tortfeasor defendant accrued and became vested on the day of the accident, but her procedural right of action against the tortfeasor defendant's insurer “became operative only when, and if, the remedy served by the Direct Action Statute was invoked timely, i.e., before the amendment removed the procedural right of action against an insurer.” Hurel, 414 So. 3d at 786 (emphasis added). Therefore, as the plaintiff filed suit after August 1, 2024, when the amended version of La. R.S. 22:1269 was effective, the plaintiff had no right of action against the insurer. Hurel, 414 So. 3d at 786-87. Cf. Rogers v. Griffin, 24-537 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/24), 410 So. 3d 890, 895 (finding the trial court properly denied the insurer's exception of no right of action where the “plaintiffs invoked their right to name [the] insurer as a co-defendant by filing suit before the amendments to the Direct Action Statute became effective.”)

As noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court and this Court, the Direct Action Statute is a procedural statute. See Soileau, 144 So. 3d at 775; Vascocu, --- So. 3d at ---, 2026 WL 11133 76, at *3. Prior to its amendment, effective August 1, 2024, La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) granted a plaintiff a procedural right to name an insurer as a party to litigation where a substantive cause of action against the insured already existed. The amended version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) allows a plaintiff to name a defendant's liability insurer, but only where certain specific conditions apply. Applying Vascocu, as we are required to do, we find that La. R.S. 22:1269 is procedural in nature, and considering Act 275 contains no legislative expression indicating otherwise, we find La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1), as amended, may be applied retroactively. See La. C.C. art. 6; Vascocu, --- So. 3d at ---, 2026 WL 1113376, at *3-4.

As discussed, a procedural statute will not be applied retroactively if doing so would disturb a litigant's vested rights. Here, however, Avrie filed suit on October 15, 2024, after the effective date of the amendment to La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1). Therefore, his right of action against Ascot, the insurer of Triple L. Trucking, LLC, had not yet vested at the time the amendment eliminated the procedural right of action contained in the prior version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1). See Hurel, 414 So. 3d at 786. As such, La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1), as amended, applies to Avrie's claims against Ascot. Avrie's petition does not allege any of the exceptions to the general rule that precludes him from bringing a direct action against Ascot. See La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(a)-(g). Accordingly, we find the trial court correctly granted defendants’ exception of no right of action and dismissed Avrie's claims against Ascot.

Exception of Improper Venue

In his first and third assignments of error, Avrie argues the trial court erred by granting defendants’ exception of improper venue. Avrie argues his cause of action against Ascot accrued on the date of the accident. Therefore, Avrie asserts the preamendment version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) applies, which provides that a direct action against an insurer may be brought in the parish in which the accident or injury occurred or in the parish in which an action could be brought against either the insured or the insurer under the general rules of venue provided in La. C.C.P. art. 42. Avrie argues that the former version of La. C.C.P. art. 42(7) allowed him to file suit against Ascot, foreign insurer, in East Baton Rouge Parish and that he “relied on this vested venue right when filing suit.” Avrie further argues that if venue is improper in East Baton Rouge Parish, then his suit should have been transferred to court of proper venue and not dismissed.

“Venue” is defined as the parish where an action or proceeding may properly be brought and tried under the rules regulating the subject. La. C.C.P. art. 41. A suit against two or more defendants must be brought in a proper venue as to all defendants. See La. C. C. P. art. 463(2). Venue is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo by the appellate court. Alost v. Lawler, 2018-1271 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/8/19), 277 So. 3d 329, 334.⁶ Choice of venue is a gateway consideration that is separate from the merits of the case and addresses only the initial inquiry of where to litigate. Land v. Vidrine, 2010-1342 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So. 3d 36, 40.

The general rules for venue are contained in La. C.C.P. art. 42. Prior to its repeal, effective August 1, 2024, La. C.C.P. art. 42(7) provided that an action against “[a] foreign or alien insurer shall be brought in the Parish of East Baton Rouge.” See Acts 2024, No. 595, § 3 (repealing La. C.C.P. art. 42(7) and amending La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) to remove language referring to La. C.C.P. art. 42(7)). Act 595 does not contain a legislative expression regarding prospective or retroactive application of the amendments to La. C.C.P. art. 42 and La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1).

In Sawicki v. K/S Stavanger Prince, 2001-0528 (La. 12/7/01), 802 So. 2d 598, 603, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether a statute involving the enforceability of a forum selection clause could be applied retroactively. The supreme court explained that issues of venue and the enforcement of forum selection clauses are procedural, not substantive. Id. at 604. As there was no legislative expression regarding prospective or retroactive application of the portion of the statute involving forum selection clauses, and the supreme court determined the provision was procedural, the supreme court found the provision applied both prospectively and retroactively. Id. Additionally, the supreme court held that retroactive application of the provision would not disturb vested rights because “no one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure.” Id. at 605 (Internal citations omitted). See also Blow v. OneBeacon American Ins. Co., 2016-0301 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/16), 193 So. 3d 244, 256, writ denied, 2016-0954 (La. 9/6/16), 204 So. 3d 1002 (finding changes to venue provisions in the Direct Action Statute were procedural and thus applied retroactively).

As discussed, Avrie did not exercise his procedural right of action against Ascot until after the effective date of the amendment to La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) and therefore, the amended version La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) applies to Avrie's suit and he has no right of action against Ascot. As such, Avrie's purported basis for venue in East Baton Rouge Parish, a claim against Ascot under La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1), did not exist at the time he filed suit. Therefore, we find the amended version of La. C.C.P. art. 42, including the repeal of subsection (7), and the amended version of La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) without reference to La. C.C.P. art. 42(7), apply to Avrie's suit. Accordingly, our de novo review indicates the trial court correctly granted defendants’ exception of improper venue.

Exception of Prescription

In his fourth assignment of error, Avrie argues the trial court erred by granting defendants’ exception of prescription because he filed suit in a proper venue under the law as it existed when his claim vested. Avrie also argues equitable tolling principles prohibit using the procedural repeal to extinguish his vested rights.

Appellate review of a judgment ruling on exceptions of peremption and prescription depends on the manner in which the exceptions are heard. Ticker v. State Through Department of Transportation and Development, 2024-0775 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/14/25), 410 So. 3d 983, 988. When a peremptory exception is pleaded at or before trial, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the exception when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition. La. C.C.P. art. 931. In the absence of evidence, the exception must be decided on the facts alleged in the petition, and the court accepts those factual allegations as true. Ticker, 410 So. 3d at 988. Further, where no evidence is introduced to support or controvert the exception, the manifest error standard of review does not apply, and the appellate court's role is to determine whether the trial court's ruling was legally correct. Id. Evidence not properly and officially offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record. Denoux v. Vessel Management Services, Inc., 2007-2143 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So. 2d 84, 88. Moreover, documents attached to memoranda do not constitute evidence and cannot be considered as such on appeal. Id. at 88. As discussed, no evidence was introduced during the April 7,2025 hearing on defendants’ exceptions. Therefore, we are limited to the facts alleged in Avrie's petition to determine whether the trial court's ruling was legally correct. See Ticker, 410 So. 3d at 988.

At the time of the underlying accident and when Avrie filed his wrongful death suit, La. C.C. art. 2315.2(B)⁷ provided that an action for wrongful death “prescribes one year from the death of the deceased.” The wrongful death action does not arise until the injured person dies. Taylor v. Giddens, 618 So. 2d 834, 840 (La. 1993); In re Brewer, 2005-0666 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/5/06), 934 So. 2d 823, 827, writ denied, 2006-1290 (La. 9/15/06), 936 So. 2d 1278. Notably, Avrie's petition does not allege a specific date of death for Manuel. The petition alleges she was involved in the underlying accident on October 27, 2023, and “[a]fter some time, as a result of her injuries, Manuel passed away.” Therefore, the petition does not allege a date when Avrie's wrongful death claim accrued and when the one-year prescriptive period commenced. See La. C.C. art. 2315.2(B); Taylor, 618 So. 2d at 840.

Ordinarily, the exceptor bears the burden of proof at the trial of the peremptory exception. However, if the plaintiff's claim is perempted or prescribed on its face, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the action is not perempted or prescribed. Ticker, 410 So. 3d at 988-89. Here, where the petition does not allege a date of death for Manuel, Avrie's petition alleging a wrongful death action is not prescribed on its face. See La. C.C. art. 2315.2(B). As such, defendants retained the burden of proving Avrie's wrongful death claim prescribed. Defendants failed to introduce any evidence, including when Avrie's wrongful death claim accrued or prescribed. Based on the wrongful death claims alleged in Avrie's petition, we know Manuel must have died prior to the filing of the petition on October 15, 2024. Additionally, as discussed, we find Avrie filed his petition in an improper venue. Therefore, Avrie's suit filed against defendants did not interrupt prescription. See La. C.C. art. 3462. However, if an action is commenced in an improper venue, prescription is interrupted as to a defendant served by process within the prescriptive period. Id. Here, no evidence was introduced by defendants regarding service of Avrie's suit on defendants and, as noted, there is no evidence to determine the date prescription commenced in this matter. As such, we find defendants failed to meet their burden of proving Avrie's claims prescribed and the trial court erred by granting the exception of prescription.

Dismissal of Avrie's Claims Against Defendants

In its April 7, 2025 written judgment, the trial court dismissed Avrie's claims against defendants “[c]onsidering the granting of Defendants’ Peremptory and Declinatory Exceptions[.]” Avrie argues on appeal that the trial court erred by dismissing his claims against defendants. He argues that if venue is improper, then the trial court should have transferred the case to a court of proper venue.

As discussed, we find the trial court properly granted defendants’ exception of no right of action and dismissed Avrie's claims against Ascot with prejudice. We also find the trial court properly granted defendants’ exception of improper venue. However, we find the trial court incorrectly granted defendants’ exception of prescription. Therefore, Avrie's claims against Triple L. Trucking, LLC, Freedom Trucks, LLC, and Lakendrick Earl Wilson, should not have been dismissed as prescribed.

The trial court, in deciding a declinatory exception of improper venue, is afforded discretion in choosing to dismiss the action or transfer it to a proper venue in the interest of justice. See La. C.C.P. arts. 121 and 932(B). Appellate courts review this decision under the abuse of discretion standard of review. DeForest v. Acadian Gardens Condominium Association, 2022-1157 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/28/23), 368 So. 3d 110, 114.

The decision to transfer or dismiss a lawsuit due to improper venue is addressed in La. C.C.P. arts. 121 and 932. Under Article 121, when an action is brought in a court of improper venue, the court may dismiss the action, or in the interest of justice transfer it to a court of proper venue. Similarly, under Article 932(B), if an action has been brought in a court of improper jurisdiction or venue, the court may transfer the action to a proper court in the interest of justice.

A jurisprudential rule has evolved which provides that when a plaintiff does not knowingly file suit in the wrong venue, transfer to the correct venue is proper. Said another way, when a plaintiff is unable to ascertain the correct venue or acts upon incorrect knowledge and erroneously files suit in the wrong venue, the case may be transferred to a court of proper venue pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 121. DeForest, 368 So. 3d at 114. However, when a plaintiff knowingly files suit in the wrong venue, dismissal is proper. Price, 915 So. 2d at 826. Here, there is no allegation that Avrie knowingly filed suit in the wrong venue. Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial court for transfer to a proper venue. See La. C.C.P. arts. 121 and 932(B).

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the portion of the trial court's April 7, 2025 judgment granting the peremptory exception of no right of action and the declinatory exception of improper venue filed by Ascot Specialty Insurance Company; Triple L. Trucking, LLC; Freedom Trucks, LLC; and Lakendrick Earl Wilson. We affirm the portion of the judgment dismissing, with prejudice, the claims of Donovan Avrie, on behalf of his minor child, A.A., against Ascot Special Insurance Company. We reverse the portion of the judgment granting the peremptory exception of prescription filed by Ascot Specialty Insurance Company, Triple L. Trucking, LLC; Freedom Trucks, LLC; and Lakendrick Earl Wilson, and we vacate the portion of the judgment dismissing as prescribed the claims of Donovan Avrie, on behalf of his minor child, A.A., against Triple L. Trucking, LLC; Freedom Trucks, LLC; and Lakendrick Earl Wilson. This matter is remanded to the trial court for transfer to a court of proper venue. Costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to Donovan Avrie, on behalf of his minor child, A.A., and one-half to Ascot Specialty Insurance Company; Triple L. Trucking, LLC; Freedom Trucks, LLC; and Lakendrick Earl Wilson.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Avrie and A.A. are residents and citizens of Arizona.

3.   Defendants also filed a dilatory exception of lack of procedural capacity, but the trial court pretermitted ruling on this exception.

4.   Defendants also requested that Ascot's name be removed from the case caption of the trial court proceedings; the trial court pretermitted ruling on this request.

5.   We note that although the April 7, 2024 judgment's decretal language states only that the claims of the “Plaintiff’ are dismissed, other language in the judgment adequately identifies the plaintiff as Avrie.

6.   An objection of improper venue is raised by a declinatory exception. See La. C.C.P. art. 925(A)(4). Evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the objection when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition. See La. C.C.P. art. 930. If grounds for an objection of improper venue do not appear on the face of the plaintiff's petition, the burden is on the defendant to offer evidence in support of his position. Price v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., 2004-0227 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/27/05), 915 So. 2d 816, 825, writ denied, 2005-1390 (La. 1/27/06), 922 So. 2d 543.

7.   Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.2 was amended pursuant to Acts 2025, No. 176, § 1, effective August 1, 2025, and now provides that a wrongful death claim “prescribes one year from the death of the deceased or two years from the day that injury or damage is sustained, whichever is longer.” Although Avrie did not allege a specific date of death for Manuel, he filed his wrongful death suit on October 15, 2024, prior to the effective date of Act 176. Therefore, we find the pre-amendment version of La. C.C. art. 2315.2 applies.

BALFOUR, J.