ST TAMMANY PARISH GOVERNMENT v. MONTGOMERY (2026)

The Twenty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany (22nd JDC) appeals the grant of a partial declaratory judgment in favor of the St. Tammany Parish Government (STPG) wherein the trial court held, among other declarations, that the operating budget, as adopted, satisfied STPG's statutorily mandated funding obligations. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. STPG filed an answer to the appeal, which is denied. The 22nd JDC filed a motion to dismiss the answer, which is denied.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2023, in its first amended petition, STPG sought a declaratory judgment seeking a determination from the trial court regarding its funding obligations with respect to its operating budgets for fiscal years 2023 and 2024 due to several political subdivisions, including the 22nd JDC.¹ Due to an alleged budgetary shortfall, STPG stated it could not be made to pay the entire budget requested by the 22nd JDC; furthermore, it argued that it has the sole and absolute discretion in determining how it allocates its funds.

STPG explains that it operates under a home rule charter pursuant to Art. 6, Sec. 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. The Louisiana Local Government Budget Act requires STPG to submit a proposed operating budget with total proposed expenditures that “shall not exceed the total of estimated funds available for the ensuing fiscal year.” La. R.S. 39:1305(E). Furthermore, the annual revenues of STPG are required to be dedicated under a legislative priority system which provides that “first, all statutory charges shall be paid from the respective funds upon which they are imposed.” La. R.S. 33:2922(A).

STPG alleges that it should have the discretion to decide how to fund the numerous political subdivisions with its limited available funds. STPG's request for declaratory judgment asked the trial court for a declaration of the following: there exists a shortfall in funding all statutorily mandated items, the amount of the shortfall, and that STPG has discretion to determine allocation of the funds given the shortfall. In the alternative, STPG requested that the trial court declare the priority of payment when paying statutorily mandated expenses.

Specifically, with respect to the 22nd JDC, STPG also sought a declaration regarding the reasonableness of the 22nd JDC's budget requests and the proper allocation of the operating expenses between the STPG and Washington Parish Government. In its answer, the 22nd JDC avers that its entire budget request was both reasonable and necessary. In addition, the 22nd JDC contends that STPG is statutorily required to pay the full amount requested by the 22nd JDC for expenses related to the court and its operations pursuant to La. R.S. 33:4713 and La. R.S. 33:4715 and, STPG's statutorily mandated obligations must be funded regardless of any alleged budget shortfall, failure of tax renewal, or any other reasons STPG alleges.

On May 10, 2024, following a trial on the merits, the trial court signed a partial declaratory judgment, in pertinent part, states:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the annual, statutorily mandated financial obligations of the St. Tammany Parish Government to the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, are as follows:

1) To provide a suitable courthouse building, including furniture and utilities, and to fund the expenses related to the physical operation of the courthouse building in accordance with La. R.S. 33:4713 and La. R.S. 33:4715;

2) To fund, with the Washington Parish Government, all costs incurred, including the salaries, for the provision of one court reporter per judge in accordance with La. R.S. 13:961; and

3) To fund all costs incurred, including the salaries, for the provision of administrative staff for the juvenile judge in accordance with La. Ch. Code art. 419.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that any and all other reasonable and necessary expenses of the 22nd Judicial District Court are not mandated by statute to be funded by the St. Tammany Parish Government, but the Court strongly encourages the St. Tammany Parish Government to continue funding the 22nd Judicial District Court as it has done in the past notwithstanding the lack of statutory obligation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that there is no constitutional requirement that St. Tammany Parish Government fund the 22nd Judicial District Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the St. Tammany Parish Government's 2024 budget, as adopted, satisfies the St. Tammany Parish Government's statutorily mandated funding obligations.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the St. Tammany Parish Government's 2024 budget, as adopted, satisfies the St. Tammany Parish Government's statutorily mandated funding obligations.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court's 2023 and 2024 budget requests to the Washington Parish Government and St. Tammany Parish Government for the statutorily mandated expenses were properly allocated between Washington Parish and St. Tammany Parish.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this Partial Final Declaratory Judgment shall be and hereby is made the final judgment of this Court as to Defendant, the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, with regard to the stated-mandated funding of the Defendant by St. Tammany Parish Government, based on the Court's determination that there is no just reason for delay.

On appeal, the 22nd JDC alleges that the funding of its necessary and reasonable expenses is constitutionally required; STPG should fund the 22nd because it has customarily and historically funded the 22nd JDC's operational expenses as requested, including payroll; and all requested funding is necessary for the successful operation of the 22nd JDC. STPG, in its brief, responds by stating that it is not obligated to pay operating expenses of the 22nd JDC over and above those that are statutorily mandated or, in the alternative, those found by the trial court.

In short, this Court must evaluate the doctrine of separation of powers as established in the Louisiana Constitution, relevant statutes, and jurisprudence to determine to what extent is a parish government obligated to fund operational costs of a district court.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The 22nd JDC's assignments of error challenge both legal and factual determinations made by the trial court in the declaratory judgment. The declaratory judgment action provides a method by which a court may “declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” La. C.C.P. art. 1871. Its purpose “is simply to establish the rights of the parties or express the opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering anything to be done.” MAPP Const., LLC v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., 2013-1074 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/14), 143 So. 3d 520, 528. The purpose of Louisiana C.C.P Articles 1871 through 1883 is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations, and these provisions are to be liberally construed. La. C.C.P. art. 1881; See also Cantrelle v. Lafourche Par. Council, 2021-0678 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/1/22), 340 So. 3d 1059, 1068.

There must exist a concrete, justiciable controversy framing the facts in order to avoid the rendering of an advisory opinion. Terrebonne Par. Consol. Gov't v. Louisiana Dep't of Nat. Res., 2021-0486 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/21), 340 So. 3d 940, 944. In the context of a petition for declaratory judgment, a “justiciable controversy” connotes an existing actual and substantial dispute, as distinguished from one that is merely hypothetical or abstract, and a dispute which involves the legal relations of parties with real adverse interests, upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate through a decree of conclusive character. See Molinere v. Lapeyrouse, 2016-0991 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/17/17), 214 So. 3d 887, 893.

Trial courts are vested with wide discretion in deciding whether to grant or refuse declaratory relief. Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions v. Roberts, 2000-2517 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So. 2d 726, 728. Appellate courts review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a petition for declaratory judgment using the abuse of discretion standard. Mai v. Floyd, 2005-2301 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/6/06), 951 So. 2d 244, 245, writ denied, 2007-0581 (La. 5/4/07), 956 So. 2d 619. Questions of law are reviewed de novo, while questions of fact are subject to a manifest-error standard of review. See Westlawn Cemeteries, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Cemetery Bd., 2021-01414 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So. 3d 548, 559.

Separation of Powers

Our state constitution divides governmental power into separate legislative, executive and judicial branches and provides that no one branch shall exercise powers belonging to the others. La. Const., art. II, §§ 1,2. This trichotomous branching of authority furnishes the basis for the existence of an inherent judicial power which the legislative and executive branches cannot abridge. Hoag v. State, 2004-0857 (La. 12/1/04), 889 So. 2d 1019, 1022. Likewise, the judicial branch is prohibited from infringing upon the inherent powers of the legislative and executive branches. Id. Thus, when litigants seek to invoke the power of the judiciary to compel another branch of government to perform or act, we must closely and carefully examine whether the action is within the confines of our constitutional authority. Id.

Louisiana Constitution Article V, § 1 states, “[t]he judicial power is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts, and other courts authorized by this Article.” Louisiana Constitution Article V, § 15(A) further states, “[t]he district, family, juvenile, parish, city, and magistrate courts existing on the effective date of this constitution are retained.” Clearly, the Courts are established by our constitution and have a right to exist.

One of the most basic and fundamental features of our governmental system is the vesting of power in three “coordinate, independent, coequal and potentially coextensive” branches. McCain v. Grant Par. Police Jury, 440 So. 2d 1369, 1371 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983). And, an indispensable ingredient of the concept of coequal branches of government is that each branch must recognize and respect the limits on its own authority and the boundaries of the authority delegated to the other branches. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 228, 101 S.Ct. 471, 487, 66 L.Ed 2d 392 (1980). This Court has held that local government funding of the judicial branch of state government is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. See Twenty-First Judicial Dist. Court v. State, through Guste, 563 So. 2d 1185 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1990), writs denied, 568 So. 2d 1082, 1088.

In Konrad v. Jefferson Parish Council, 520 So. 2d 393, 397 (La. 1988), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under the doctrine of inherent powers, courts have the power, in addition to those powers expressly enumerated in the constitution and by statute, to do all things reasonably necessary for the exercise of their functions as courts. The doctrine is a corollary of the concepts of separation of powers and of judicial independence, in that other branches of government cannot, by denying resources or authority to the court, prevent the courts from carrying out their constitutional responsibilities as an independent branch of government. Id. “The inherent powers of the judicial branch necessarily encompass the authority to administer the business of the courts.” Fisher v. Harter, 2024-00359 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So. 3d 806, 811.

Courts have long upheld the inherent authority of the courts to compel payment of those expenses necessarily incurred by such courts in the discharge of their duties. See generally, Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Inherent Power of Court to Compel Appropriation or Expenditure of Funds for Judicial Purposes, 59 A.L.R.3d 569, 617 (1974) (discussing cases and noting that courts have “held it to be within the inherent power of the courts to compel the appropriation or expenditure of public funds to compensate attorneys appointed by the courts” to protect this important judicial function). In general, protection of the judiciary's independence is necessary because, “the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power,” having “no influence over either the sword or the purse[.]” See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 (1788). In Louisiana, the 22nd JDC has limited funding with the collection of select fees and costs, some of which are statutorily mandated by the Louisiana legislature.²

Applicable Statutes

In Louisiana, the funding obligations for the 22nd JDC are set forth by statute. STPG does not claim that it has no discretion with respect to mandatory funding. In contrast, the 22nd JDC argues that the applicable statutes only provide the minimum but do not bar further funding. Two main statutes apply to funding obligations: La. R.S. 33:4713 and La. R.S. 33:4715. They provide in relevant part:

§ 4713. Providing quarters for court and parish officers

A. Each parish shall provide and bear the expense of a suitable building and requisite furniture for the sitting of the district and circuit courts and such offices, furniture, and equipment as may be needed by the clerks and recorders of the parish for the proper conduct of their offices and shall provide such other offices as may be needed by the sheriffs of these courts and by the tax collectors and assessors of the parish and shall provide the necessary heat and illumination therefor.

§ 4715. Providing parish court-house and jail

The police jury of each parish shall provide a good and sufficient court-house, with rooms for jurors, and a good and sufficient jail, at such place as they may deem most convenient for the parish at large, provided that when the seat of justice is established by law, they shall not have power to remove it.

The Louisiana legislature has set forth mandatory items that must be funded.³ However, the Louisiana legislature does not expressly limit the local government's funding obligation to the statutorily mandated expenses. We find this weighs heavily in favor of the 22nd JDC. STPG may pay other expenses requested by the 22nd JDC in an effort to maintain the court. According to the record before us STPG has historically funded the 22nd JDC, including subscriptions and dues related to the law library, insurance, accounting fees, IT personnel, travel for continuing education, automobile expenses, computers, postage, cleaning services, and security. STPG explains that its statutorily mandated funding obligations to the various political subdivisions for 2023 were in excess of available funding sources, resulting in a shortfall for all political subdivisions in excess of $13,000,000.00 compared to the budget requests for 2023.

The 22nd JDC submitted its 2024 budget request on June 15, 2023, and requested $3,207,183.75 in funds from the St. Tammany Parish general fund. For the 2024 budget year, STPG elected to fund all but $60,703.00 of the 22nd JDC's $3,207,183.75 budget request. The 22nd JDC argues that withholding any amount of funds, without an explanation, leads to a bad precedent and allows STPG to have unfettered discretion as to future budgets. STPG argues that based on statutory law, STPG is obligated to pay only $693,514.34 of the claimed 22nd JDC personnel costs.

There is much rhetoric by STPG, in its brief, trying to define statutory language in an attempt to limit its funding obligation. STPG also argues there is no affirmative language in the Louisiana Constitution that requires the local governments to provide more than the statutory mandated funding to the district courts. STPG admits that it has exercised its discretion to fund the 22nd JDC at or near the requested amount year after year because STPG believes that a strong and well-funded judicial system is valuable to the parish. Conversely, as noted by the 22nd JDC, the Louisiana Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution or the applicable statutes limit local governments to fund the courts only the minimum as statutorily required.

Jurisprudence

STPG and the 22nd JDC cite to jurisprudence they believe supports their respective positions; however, none are directly on point. These cases involve funding for different offices, different statutes, different governing bodies, and different parishes. Nonetheless, the cases cited may inform this Court how to proceed. As such, we now examine the case-law.

 McCain v. Grant Parish Police Jury

The 22nd JDC cites to McCain v. Grant Par. Police Jury, 440 So. 2d at 1372, in support of its argument that the judiciary must have its expenses covered when they are reasonably necessary for the function of the administration of the court. In McCain, the 35th Judicial District Court submitted a proposed budget for telephone services, maintenance of equipment, typewriters, copier, recording equipment, judge's office supplies, and judge's office reference materials in the total amount of $11,400.00. However, the parish government only allocated a total of $2,500.00 for the judge's office expenses, which led to the judge receiving past due notices for the foregoing expenses. Id. at 1371. The judge filed two suits: a petition for mandamus for the past due bills and a petition for declaratory judgment, for future expenses. Id. at 1371. The McCain court had before it a res nova issue of whether a district court had the power to compel a police jury to budget the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred to provide the basic needs of an efficient, effective court. Id. at 1372. The McCain court upheld the trial judge, ordering that past due bills be paid and ordering the local government to amend its budget to provide for future expected expenditures of the court. Id. at 1373.

 Caldwell v. City of Shreveport

STPG argues that Caldwell v. City of Shreveport, 2023-00182 (La. 11/17/23), 374 So. 3d 112, presents a similar issue as the one before this Court wherein the relevant statutes only require the physical office to be maintained. In Caldwell, the city marshal filed a petition for writ of mandamus requiring the city to pay “all reasonable and necessary expenses” of the marshal's office, including operational expenses. Id. at 113. The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately held that “[t]he plain language of La. R.S. 13:1889 limits the City's funding obligation” to the physical offices of the marshal. Id. at 116. In reaching its decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court looked at the rules of statutory interpretation and the plain language of the relevant statutes which required only that the City “shall furnish ․ suitable offices” and pay for the “expenses and maintenance of the ․ offices.” Caldwell, 374 So. 3d at 116. Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court dismissed the marshal's petition for writ of mandamus.

 Pineville City Court v. City of Pineville

The 22nd JDC and STPG cite Pineville City Court v. City of Pineville, 2022-00336 (La. 1/27/23), 355 So. 3d 600, wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court looked at the local government's funding obligations for the Pineville City Court. Previously, the Pineville City Court was fully funded by the City of Pineville. In the past, the City Court reimbursed the City for forty percent of those expenses. In November 2020, the Pineville City Court informed the City of Pineville that it would no longer reimburse the forty percent as it had done in the past. The City paid the City Court forty percent less than its requested budget amount.

In response, the City Court filed a petition for writ of mandamus requiring the City to “fully fund City Court at the previously requested amounts,” arguing that those costs were “reasonable and necessary for its operation.” Id. at 602. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that a mandamus action was improper since “[i]t is abundantly clear that Pineville is funding City Court above the minimum set out by the Legislature.” Id. at 608. The Pineville court continued and explained “[t]he statutory language at issue, and the nature of the demand by City Court, clearly have discretional elements left to the governing authorities.” Id.

In his concurrence, Justice Genovese agreed “that the Pineville City Court employed the wrong procedural vehicle in its pursuit of adequate funding for its court.” But, Justice Genovese wrote separately “to opine that that does not preclude its right to pursue, via ordinary proceedings, funding from the City of Pineville that is reasonable and necessary for the constitutionally authorized operation of the Pineville City Court.” Id. at 609.

While none of these cases provide the parties a concise road map with respect to how district court expenses are to be paid, we glean some general themes: (1) the local government has discretion with respect to its own budget; (2) court requests must be legitimately related to the function of its office; (3) expenses must be reasonably necessary to the functioning and administration of the court; and (4) Louisiana courts recognize the inherent (but not unlimited) authority of the court to compel payment of reasonable and necessary expenses incurred to provide basic needs of an efficient and effective court.

Judicial Role

Indeed, without adequate funding, the 22nd JDC's ability to serve its citizens is hindered. “[I]f the judiciary's status as a co-equal branch of government is diminished by failure of the state to fund its operations at the district court level, the independence of the judiciary – so sacrosanct and necessary an ingredient of American constitutional government – is seriously eroded.” I. Jackson Burson, Jr., Not Endowed by their Creator: State Mandated Expenses of Louisiana Parish Governing Bodies, 50 La. L.Rev. 635, 679 (1990).

Because of the stance taken by the 22nd JDC, namely that STPG is obligated to fully fund its entire budget request every year, STPG sought a declaratory judgment from the trial court to identify its statutory funding obligations. The Louisiana Attorney General has opined on the issue of funding for court expenses, and when asked for guidance stated:

The solution to this financial dilemma may be resolved by following the theme expressed by the court that a spirit of mutual cooperation among the various branches of government must exist in determining the expenses which are reasonably necessary to the functioning and administration of the court.

1984WL192222, 1984-85 La. Op. Att'y Gen. 12 (1984).⁴ The attorney general further advised that “[i]n view of [McCain] the police jury should attempt to pay․ from such other available funds which may legally be used for such purpose.” Id. See also 1988 WL 489651, La. Op. Att'y. Gen. 1988-246. We agree. In order for the three branches of government to function, there must be a spirit of cooperation among the local government and the district courts. All parties must confer in good faith about expenses that are necessary and reasonable. After analyzing the total revenues available to the parish and the necessary expenditures which must be paid, the parties should strive to resolve budgetary issues.

Since there are no constitutional nor statutory provisions explaining the extent to which local governments should fund the courts, this Court must harmonize statutes, jurisprudence, and the Constitution when addressing this subject matter. See La. C.C. art. 13; see also Hollingsworth v. City of Minden, 2001-2658, 828 So. 2d 514, 517 (La. 06/21/02). This Court hopes to provide guidance to prepare courts and local governments for different budget scenarios, including potentially an extreme general fund budget shortfall. Further, this Court is mindful of our limited, inherent power to compel reasonable and necessary appropriations in specific circumstances. See Pineville City Ct. v. City of Pineville, 2022-00336 (La. 1/27/23), 355 So. 3d 600, 607-08 (“[T]he inherent powers of the judiciary should be used sparingly and only to the extent necessary to insure judicial independence and integrity.”)

Herein, the trial court noted in its Reasons for Judgment the “legislative branch of state government has let stand sparse statutory provisions which identify those expenses for which a parish is statutorily mandated to provide.” However, we believe this was the legislature's intent. Courts’ needs vary. The legislature could amend the relevant statutes to provide a ceiling for court funding, but it has not. Therefore, the status quo dictates that La. R.S. 33:4713 and 33:4715 allow for each local government to assess costs for the operation for its own courts.⁵ Further, as a practical matter, the legislature could not have intended to require the courts of this state to rely on their own mandatory funds as the primary source of revenue to operate their offices.

We find the trial court erred when it read the relevant statutes narrowly, finding that STPG is only obligated to funding items set forth by statute. Because each budget and expenditure varies, funding must be determined on a case-by-case basis. If an impasse remains, after good faith discussions, and STPG and the 22nd JDC disagree as to the proposed yearly budget, either party can seek review. The party who seeks review will bear the burden of proving whether the requested funding is a reasonable and necessary cost to the performance of the court's mandated function. After reviewing the evidence submitted by all parties, the court, as the trier of fact, will determine what expenses the parish government must fund. In other words, there must be legal basis to oppose the expenses; or, in the alternative evidence that the requested items are reasonable and necessary.

Based on the record before us, STPG, despite being given several opportunities at trial, did not provide reasons for withholding funds in this case. Specifically, since the 22nd JDC deemed its entire budget reasonable and necessary, the trial court will need to review STPG's reasons for withholding $60,703.00. As such, under the circumstances of this case, we find the trial court abused its discretion in rendering the partial declaratory judgment in favor of STPG.

Custom

The 22nd JDC additionally argues that STPG funded their entire budget in the past, and because of this custom STPG must fund their entire budget in the future. Though custom can be a relevant factor when assessing funding needs, the need to budget is a fiscal matter that must be negotiated on a yearly basis. Since the ever-changing budget to operate the court and availability of funds vary year to year, we cannot hold that funding provided for one year, in and of itself, is deemed an approval for future budget requests. Therefore, we find the 22nd JDC's argument that STPG bound itself by custom to pay all expenses requested by the 22nd JDC unpersuasive.

Answer

STPG answered the appeal asking this Court to allocate any awarded monies between St. Tammany and Washington Parish. However, we pretermit consideration of the answer to the appeal and deny same. Likewise, we deny the motion to dismiss the answer filed by the 22nd JDC.

CONCLUSION

Based on the aforementioned reasons, this Court reverses the March 18, 2024 declaratory judgment in favor of St. Tammany Parish Government in its entirety. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The answer to the appeal and motion to dismiss the answer to the appeal are denied. Costs of the appeal in the amount of $6,818.50 are to be borne by appellee, St. Tammany Parish Government.

REVERSED AND REMANDED; ANSWER TO APPEAL AND MOTION TO DISMISS ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED.

I agree with the result reached by the majority and write separately to emphasize that cases pertaining to funding the judiciary are reviewed on a case by case basis. I agree with the majority that after good faith discussions, if the local government and the judiciary remain at an impasse, the party who seeks review bears the burden that they are acting reasonable. In the instant matter, being STPG took legal action, the burden is on STPG to explain why the judicial budget request would not be funded at the requested level. In sum, STPG argues it is not statutorily obligated to fully fund the request, therefore, it should prevail. I agree with the majority that this reasoning is not sufficient.

In the instant matter, I personally do not believe that a $60,703.00 reduction in a proposed $3,207,183.75 funding request is unreasonable. However, the amount of the shortfall is not the issue. The reason for the shortfall is the issue. The record is void of any reasonable explanation given by STPG as to why the requested judicial funding was reduced. STPG was given several opportunities to explain why roughly $60,000 was not funded, and not one parish official could testify as to the reason funds were withheld from the judiciary. Had any STPG official testified to a reasonable reason for the $60,000 shortfall, the burden would have shifted to the judiciary to justify their budget request. Being STPG did not state a valid reason for the shortfall, I agree with the majority that the trial court abused its discretion in rendering judgment in favor of STPG.

I concur with the majority opinion. I write separately to reiterate the importance of several key points. I agree that the separation of powers doctrine requires that the judiciary receive adequate funding if it is to function as a co-equal branch of state government. Konrad v. Jefferson Parish Council, 520 So.2d 393, 397 (La. 1988). I also agree that the statutory minimum funding requirements contained in La. R.S. 33:4713, 4715, 13:961 and La. Ch.C. art. 419 do not adequately provide the necessary funds for the 22nd JDC to carry out its full constitutional responsibilities as part of a co-equal branch of state government. Further, I agree that a declaratory judgment action is one means by which STPG's reasonable funding obligations to the 22nd JDC may be resolved. To that end, I agree that, in this case, this matter should be remanded so that STPG, the party who filed the declaratory judgment action, should be given the opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the 22nd JDC's funding requests.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While there are multiple amended petitions against other defendants, those claims are not at issue on this appeal.

2.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:996.29 provides, in part, that St. Tammany Parish clerk of court “shall collect” a fee from every person filing a civil suit or proceeding, who is not otherwise exempted by law from the payment of court costs, and the sheriff “shall collect” certain court costs taxed against convicted defendants and place all amounts in the “Judicial Expense Fund for the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court.”Louisiana R.S. 15:571.11(A)(1)(a) provides that certain fines, fees, and forfeitures collected in criminal courts, “shall be paid” and deposited into the Criminal Court Fund. Those funds can in turn be used in “defraying the expenses of the criminal courts of the parish” including recording and transcribing of testimony, statements, charges, and other proceedings in the trial of indigent persons charged with the commission of felonies, in defraying their expenses in the preparation of records in appeals in such cases, for all expenses and fees of the petit jury and grand jury, for witness fees, for attendance fees of the sheriff and clerk of court, for costs and expenses of a parish law library, and for other expenses related to the judges of the criminal courts and the office of the district attorney.

3.   Examples of other funding requirements among the parishes: La. R.S. 13:961 (court reporters) and La. Ch. Code art. 419 (personnel for the juvenile court).

4.   A response by the Louisiana Attorney General to a letter from Mrs. Judith G. Kelly, Secretary Treasurer of the Police Jury, Parish of East Feliciana, asking several questions relating to the Criminal Court Fund and the responsibility of the police jury for the payment and support of the district court and the district attorney's office.

5.   We mention that other than petitioning this Court for relief from its funding obligations, STPG may have other recourse for funding including: (1) to increase revenues to meet its funding obligations, (2) petition the legislature to amend the mandatory funding obligations, or (3) pursue a readjustment of its debts pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4741 and Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC § 901, et seq.

BALFOUR, J.

Theriot, J., agrees with outcome and assigns reasons GREENE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.