STATE v. BRADFORD (2026)

Defendant, Derrick Bradford, appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant's conviction and sentence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 3, 2024, the State filed a bill of information charging Defendant with possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1.¹ On September 9, 2024, Defendant pled not guilty at his arraignment. The matter proceeded to trial by jury. At the conclusion of trial, on June 17, 2025, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding Defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1.

On July 8, 2025, Defendant filed motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal. On July 14, 2025, the district court conducted a hearing and denied Defendant's post-trial motions. On that same date and immediately thereafter, the trial court sentenced Defendant to the statutory minimum sentence of five years at hard labor.²

FACTS

New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) Officer Derrick Burmaster testified that on July 9, 2024, he was “dispatched to 8015 Brevard Street to investigate an aggravated assault with a firearm” resulting from an alleged road-rage incident between neighbors. Upon his arrival to the scene, he spoke to the two female victims who provided Officer Burmaster with a description of Defendant, the firearm involved, and his vehicle. The victims further informed Officer Burmaster that Defendant fled the scene, and provided “his direction of flight.” Officer Burmaster also spoke to a male “witness across the street” who stated that he observed from his window Defendant “aim a gun at a downward low ready position, and he heard, ‘I will kill you,’ coming from his mouth” while looking at the two female victims. Officer Burmaster testified that his body-worn camera was not activated, but confirmed that the eyewitness's statement corroborated the victims’ description of the incident. Upon Defendant's arrival back to the scene, Officer Burmaster arrested Defendant, issued Miranda warnings, and conducted a search incident to arrest, which yielded no weapons or contraband.

Detective Jack Kounlavong, the lead detective on this case with NOPD, testified that he arrived to the scene and that one of the female victims provided him with video footage from an iPhone. He testified that the video, subsequently published to the jury, depicted “a male, dark-complected, with a bag with a little dark object of some kind. It couldn't be definitive of what kind of firearm it was but it looked like a firearm.”³ Det. Kounlavong testified that a search of the NOPD database revealed that Defendant was a convicted felon. Det. Kounlavong stated that he “did author a search warrant for the house and for the vehicle,” but did not recover a firearm.

Mr. Alex Duarte testified that both Defendant and one of the victims each resided separately in an apartment complex located at 8015 Brevard Avenue, directly across the street from his residence. He testified that on July 9, 2024, he heard arguing outside, so he looked out of his window and observed “Defendant pull out a gun and the words came out, ‘I will kill you bitch,’ and he said it more than once.” Mr. Duarte called the police and reported the situation. He explained that he had “witnessed these two parties get into altercations often,” although it had never gotten so “heated,” and he was concerned for the victims’ safety.

Upon observing the video evidence introduced at trial, Mr. Duarte stated that the footage accurately depicted the incident. He testified that he observed defendant holding “a handgun somewhere between three inches or six inches of a barrel [and] it was either silver or black. He grabbed it with his right arm or right hand, held it. He pointed it toward the victims but not directly at them.” Mr. Duarte testified that Defendant fled from the scene in his vehicle after learning that the police had been called.

Agent Anthony Lindsey, a Louisiana Probation and Parole agent, testified that he had been supervising Defendant since November of 2024, when he inherited Defendant's case from another agent who retired, and that Defendant was still under his supervision at the time of trial. Agent Lindsey testified that Defendant had a “predicate conviction” resulting from a 1994 armed robbery, and that Defendant still remained under state supervision for that conviction.  ⁴

ERRORS PATENT

Prior to reviewing the merits of any criminal appeal, this Court is tasked with examining the record for any errors patent in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920. “An error patent is one ‘that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.’ ” State v. Dixon, 25-0105, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/10/25), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 3540914, at * 7 (quoting La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2)).

The record reflects that the trial judge failed to observe the mandatory twenty-four hour delay for sentencing required after denying Defendant's motion for new trial pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 873. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a defendant's pronouncement of his readiness for sentencing may operate as an express waiver of the twenty-four-hour sentencing delay, but a defendant's mere participation in the sentencing hearing is insufficient to constitute an express waiver required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 873. State v. Kisack, 2016-0797, p. 7 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1201, 1205. “Nonetheless, an error in failing to observe the statutory sentencing delay may still be found harmless.” State v. Kisack, 16-0797, p. 7 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1201, 1205-06.

In this case, the trial judge sentenced defendant immediately following the denial of Defendant's post-trial motions. Although Defendant and his counsel participated in the sentencing hearing, the record is devoid of any indication of an express waiver of the mandatory delay required under La. C.Cr.P. art. 893. Therefore, we find that the trial judge erred in sentencing Defendant immediately after the denial of his post-trial motions. Nevertheless, under the circumstances presented in this case, we find the error does not require corrective action.

The sentencing transcript in this case reflects that Defendant was sentenced one month after his conviction and that the trial judge sentenced Defendant to the statutory minimum sentence of five years. The transcript further reflects that Defense counsel indicated, “that's the sentence I was asking for․ .” Counsel further stated that, “[Defendant's] sister․.was prepared to speak, but this was the outcome we're looking for. We appreciate the Court's sentence.” Moreover, on appeal, Defendant does not challenge the excessiveness of his five-year sentence. Accordingly, under the facts and circumstances of this case, we find the trial court's error to be harmless and does not require corrective action. See State v. Moffett, 17-0769, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/18), 247 So.3d 908, 911.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error on appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him at trial, contending that the State failed to meet its burden to prove “that fewer than ten years had elapsed since [Defendant] completed the sentence for the armed robbery conviction.”

This Court has recently discussed the applicable standard of review on appeal when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim:

When appellate courts review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, they apply the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). State v. Dukes, 19-0172, p.7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/19), 281 So.3d 745, 752. Under the Jackson standard, the court must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to support a rational trier of fact's finding that all of the elements of a crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. See also State v. Tate, 01-0658, p. 4 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, 928.

The appellate court must review the record in its entirety. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La. 1988). “If rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted.” Id.

State v. Blue, 24-0737, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/21/25), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 2416819, writ denied, 25-01203 (La. 3/18/26), 427 So.3d 1238 (internal quotations omitted).

In this case, Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, which provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of․a crime of violence as defined in R.S. 14:2(B) which is a felony or simple burglary․to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon.” However, the prohibitions of La. R.S. 14:95.1 do not apply to any person who has “not been convicted of․any felony for a period of ten years from the date of completion of sentence, probation, [or] parole․.” for the previous conviction. La. R.S. 14:95.1(C).

“To convict a person of being a felon in possession of a firearm under La. R.S. 14:95.1, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that Defendant has been convicted of a felony enumerated in this statute; (2) that subsequent to that conviction, Defendant possessed a firearm; (3) that a period of less than ten years has elapsed since Defendant's completion of his sentence, parole, or probation for the prior conviction; and (4) that Defendant had the general intent to commit the offense.” State v. Williamson, 22-657, p. 17 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/5/23), 364 So.3d 572, 584 (quoting State v. Bryant, 21-240, p. 12 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/22/21), 333 So.3d 495, 502); see also State v. Jones, 99-2595, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/8/00), 773 So.2d 234, 240.

On appeal, Defendant does not challenge that he has a previous conviction for armed robbery or that his previous conviction falls under the designated felonies to which the prohibitions of La. R.S. 14:95.1 apply. Rather, Defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to prove that “fewer than ten years had elapsed since [Defendant] completed the sentence for the armed robbery conviction.”

The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Defendant was previously convicted of armed robbery in 1994. At trial, the state presented the testimony of Agent Lindsey, a probation and parole agent, who testified that Defendant was still under active state supervision for his previous armed robbery conviction. The exception provided for in La. R.S. 14:95.1(C) only applies when more than ten years has elapsed “from the date of completion of sentence, probation, [or] parole․.” The state presented evidence to demonstrate that Defendant, who remained under active state supervision, had not yet completed his “sentence, probation, [or] parole” and, thus, the ten-year calculation had not yet begun to run. This assignment lacks merit.

 DECREE

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm Defendant's conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1.

AFFIRMED

My dissent is not related to the merits of the majority's ruling to affirm the conviction and sentence of Defendant/Appellant, Derrick Bradford (“Mr. Bradford”). Instead, I dissent based on the majority's order to deny Mr. Bradford's request to receive and review the record so that he may file a pro se brief. Although Mr. Bradford is represented by appellate counsel, this representation does not prohibit or preclude the filing of pro se assignments of error through the briefing process.

Here, Mr. Bradford's request for leave to file a pro se supplemental brief was made on May 2, 2026, via mail, in compliance with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-13.¹ See also Storage Properties Properties, L.L.C. v. Donahue-Favret Contractors, Inc., 2011-2558, p. 1 (La. 2/3/12), 82 So.3d 1231, where the Court determined that a mailed writ application filed within the district court's deadlines was timely in accordance with Uniform Rules —Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-13. The request was physically received and lodged by the Clerk of Court on May 12, 2026. This matter was docketed for review on May 13, 2026.²

The majority's order recognizes that a timely counseled brief has been filed on his behalf. What is not considered, however, is the denial of Mr. Bradford's request to file a pro se brief may impinge on his opportunity to fully exercise a defendant's right to post conviction relief. Post conviction proceedings are time-sensitive. A defendant has exactly two years from the date his conviction and sentence become final to file an application for post-conviction relief (“APCR”), unless an exception applies. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8.³ Moreover, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to grant an untimely application for post conviction relief. See State v. Patterson, 2016-1104, p. 9, (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/7/18), 241 So.3d 433, 442-43. Most importantly, La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 precludes review of an error that should have been filed on appeal.⁴ At present, because this Court has denied Mr. Bradford's request to file a pro se brief, we cannot say whether any pro se assignment of error alleged by Mr. Bradford would be subject to the 930.4 time delays.

Moreover, Mr. Bradford's entitlement to file a pro se brief was highlighted in State v. Melon, 1995-2209 (La. 9/22/95), 660 So2d 466. In Melon, the Supreme Court opined “this Court has indicated that the meaningful access to the courts guaranteed by La. Const. art. I, Sections 2, 19, and 22 requires courts to accept and consider post-verdict pro se filings from represented defendants.” 660 So.2d at 466-67. Further, La. Const. Art. 1, Section 9, provides that “[n]o person shall be subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or property without the right of judicial review based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the judgment is based.”

In conformity with Melon, I take judicial notice of this Court's policy to allow a defendant access to the complete record to permit the filing of a pro se brief, even when represented by counsel. Therefore, it is my position that in light of Mr. Bradford's request to file a pro se brief, this Court's review of the record, evidence, and applicable law is incomplete without granting that request. Allowing a brief delay in exercising our jurisdiction over direct appeals in this criminal matter in no way harms the administration of justice,⁵ but rather, facilitates Mr. Bradford's right to a meaningful appeal. Accordingly, I would grant Mr. Bradford's motion and order the Clerk of Court to forward the appeal record to the appropriate custodian of records in the Department of Corrections for Mr. Bradford's use to prepare his pro se brief.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's order to deny Mr. Bradford's motion for leave to file a supplemental brief for the same reasons assigned in my dissent to the majority opinion.

I re-urge my position to grant Mr. Bradford's request to receive the record for the purpose of filing his pro se brief. I would order the Clerk of Court to forward the appeal record to the appropriate custodian of records in the Department of Corrections for Mr. Bradford's use to prepare his pro se brief. Finally, I would order the Clerk of Court to set Mr. Bradford's briefing deadline not to exceed 60 days from the issuance of the order.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The bill of information also charged Defendant with two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of La. R.S. 14:37.4. Upon conclusion of trial, the jury could not reach a verdict on these charges and the trial court declared a mistrial as to those counts. The record contains a minute entry, which indicates that on August 1, 2025, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to the aggravated assault charges. Defendant's aggravated assault charges are not at issue in this appeal.

2.   The trial court determined that Defendant was indigent and waived the mandatory fine.

3.   The short video, published to the jury, depicts a man standing next to and behind a vehicle shouting and cursing in the direction of the person recording the video. The voices of two women can also be heard loudly insulting and cursing at the man. The man held a bag in his left hand and an object that appeared to be a firearm in his right hand.

4.   The state introduced a portion of the certified packet of conviction for record purposes only.

1.   Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-13, states, in part, “[a]ll documents and required copies to be filed in a Court of Appeal shall be legible and shall be filed with the clerk. Filing may be accomplished by personal delivery or by mail addressed to the clerk.”

2.   Admittedly, appellate briefs had been submitted by January 2026. Nevertheless, on February 26, 2026, Mr. Bradford, through counsel, was compelled to comply with this Court's order to supplement the record with missing evidence.

3.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 930.8(A) states, in relevant part, that “[n]o application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922, ․”

4.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 930.4 provides the following:A. Any claim for relief which was fully litigated in an appeal from the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction and sentence shall not be considered.B. If the application alleges a claim of which the petitioner had knowledge and inexcusably failed to raise in the proceedings leading to conviction, the court shall deny relief.C. If the application alleges a claim which the petitioner raised in the trial court and inexcusably failed to pursue on appeal, the court shall deny relief.D. If the application alleges a claim seeking to apply a new rule of criminal procedure that has been held by the United States Supreme Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court to be nonretroactive, the court shall deny relief.H. The limitations set forth in this Article shall be jurisdictional and shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney.

5.   Louisiana Constitution Article 5, Section 10 states:Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, a court of appeal has appellate jurisdiction of (1) all civil matters, including direct review of administrative agency determinations in worker's compensation matters as heretofore or hereafter provided by law, (2) all matters appealed from family and juvenile courts, and (3) all criminal cases triable by a jury, except as provided in Section 5, Paragraph (D)(2) of this Article. It has supervisory jurisdiction over cases which arise within its circuit.

Judge Monique G. Morial