CASIMIER v. AUDUBON NATURE INSTITUTE INC (2026)

This is a workers’ compensation case. Appellant, Idell S. Casimier (“Ms. Casimier”),¹ appeals the Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”) May 9, 2022 judgment, which dismissed with prejudice all of her claims against Appellee, Audubon Nature Institute (“Audubon”). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the OWC's judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 13, 2018, Ms. Casimier was employed by Audubon and was working at Audubon's Aquarium of the Americas facility ² when she allegedly collapsed and sustained injuries to her shoulder and knees. Quite some time later, acting in a pro se capacity¸ on June 7, 2021, Ms. Casimier filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation/Form 1008 with the OWC, naming Audubon as her employer.³

Ultimately, the matter was set for trial on May 4, 2022. The record reflects that Ms. Casimier, still acting in a pro se capacity, appeared and participated in a pre-trial conference with the OWC judge and counsel for Audubon. In that conference, Audubon offered to settle Ms. Casimier's claim for $5,000.00 (five thousand dollars), which she promptly rejected. After being informed by the OWC judge that in the absence of an agreement the trial would go forward as scheduled, Ms. Casimier—apparently unhappy with the proceedings—left the building. Prior to exiting, the OWC judge warned Ms. Casimier that the trial would go forward even in her absence. At the trial, because Ms. Casimier was not present, counsel for Audubon moved to have her claim dismissed, which the OWC judge orally granted, noting that the claim would be dismissed with prejudice. A signed, written judgment reflecting that ruling was issued on May 9, 2022, dismissing Ms. Casimier's claim with prejudice. Notice of judgment was mailed the following day.

This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Assignments of Error

Ms. Casimier asserts the district court erred in five respects: (1) dismissing her claim with prejudice “without knowing abandonment”; (2) failing to consider her age, injury, and lack of counsel; (3) failing to consider attorney neglect; (4) failing to conduct a full merits hearing; and (5) imposing an excessive sanction. After a brief review of the law cited by Audubon and a preliminary matter, we will address the only issue pertinent to our review.

Relevant Law and Standard of Review

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1672(A)(1) instructs that:

A judgment dismissing an action shall be rendered upon application of any party, when the plaintiff fails to appear on the day set for trial. In such case, the court shall determine whether the judgment of dismissal shall be with or without prejudice.

“A decision to grant an involuntary dismissal is subject to the manifest error and abuse of discretion standard of review.” Peterson v. Rochon, 21-0365, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/21), 332 So.3d 208, 211 (citing Brooks v. Tradesmen Int'l, Inc., 03-1871, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/04), 883 So.2d 444, 446). “In deciding whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice pursuant to [La. C.C.P. art.] 1672(A), a trial court is afforded great discretion, as the trial judge is more familiar with the conditions and requirements of their trial docket.” Brooks, 03-1871 at p. 3, 883 So.2d at 446 (citing Malter v. McKinney, 310 So.2d 696, 698 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975). “Therefore, a trial court's decision to dismiss a case with or without prejudice is reviewed on appeal pursuant to an abuse of discretion and manifest error standard.” Id. “However, in cases of workers’ compensation, rules of procedure are to be liberally construed.” Id. (citing Piper v. Dillard's Dep't Store, 621 So.2d 865 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1993)).

Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal

At the outset we note that Ms. Casimier has not briefed any of her assigned errors, as required by the Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4), which provides:

All assignments of error and issues for review shall be briefed. The court may deem as abandoned any assignment of error or issue for review which has not been briefed.

Instead, she sets forth the following arguments/statements as to why her claim should not have been dismissed with prejudice: she did not knowingly abandon her claim; dismissal with prejudice is reserved for extreme misconduct; she was injured, confused and abandoned by counsel; and the court denied her a full hearing, violating fairness and due process. Nevertheless, this Court has explained that “[w]here pro se litigants are concerned, in the interest of justice, Louisiana appellate courts will read pro se filings indulgently and attempt to construe a brief as though assignments of error were properly made.” Lewis v. Dep't of Human Servs., 17-0608, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/21/18), 242 So.3d 675, 679 (quoting Richard v. Hawthrone, 15-559, p. 8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/12/16), 192 So.3d 273, 278). “However, even with the leeway or patience extended to a pro se litigant in the form of liberally construed pleadings, the pro se claimant is required to meet her burden of proof.” Id. (quoting Greenwood Cmty. Ctr. v. Calep, 48,737, p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14), 132 So.3d 470, 474.

Dismissal with Prejudice

After review of the applicable law in this case, we find the dispositive issue before this Court is whether dismissal of Ms. Casimier's claim with prejudice was procedurally appropriate. Relying on Peterson and a handful of other cases decided by this Court, Audubon takes the position that dismissal with prejudice was warranted because: (1) Ms. Casimier did not file a pre-trial statement or trial exhibit list as ordered by the district court; and (2) by leaving the courthouse, Ms. Casimier demonstrated a knowing and willful choice to abandon her claim.

In support of its first assertion, Audubon cites to the cases of Hebert v. C.F. Bean Corp., 00-1029 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/25/01), 785 So.2d 1029 and Brower v. Quick Serv. Body Shop, 377 So.2d 878 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1979) for the premise that dismissal is appropriate when a plaintiff appears for trial unprepared to proceed. Those cases are easily distinguishable from the case sub judice. In both Hebert and Brower the plaintiffs did not appear at trial, but their unprepared counsel did. Neither case dealt with a workers’ compensation claim, and each case was dismissed without prejudice.

Next, Audubon distinguishes the cases previously decided by this Court in Peterson, Brooks and the recent case of Feliciano v. Hutson, 25-0335 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/4/25), 424 So.3d 70. We do not find the need to recite the facts of those cases because, as Audubon admits in its brief, those cases are all factually dissimilar from the case at hand. We will, however, highlight the tenets set forth in those cases applicable to the matter now before us. In Feliciano, we reiterated “that litigants appearing pro se should generally be given more latitude than litigants represented by counsel, as they are at a disadvantage having no formal training in the law and rules of procedure.” 25-0335 at pp. 2-3, 424 So.3d at 72 (citing In Re: Med. Rev. Panel Claim of Scott, 16-0145, pp. 14-15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/14/16), 206 So.3d 1049, 1058). In Brooks, we recognized that “a dismissal with prejudice [may deny a pro se litigant] the opportunity to have his day in court.” 03-1871, p. 5, 883 So. 2d at 447. And in Peterson, we concluded that “[i]f the record does not contain evidence of a plaintiff's act of ‘willfulness, bad faith, or fault,’ a single failure of a plaintiff to appear may not be sufficient support for a dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, with prejudice.” 21-0365 at pp. 4-5, 332 So.3d at 211 (citation omitted). Of these three cases, only the Brooks Court was faced with a workers’ compensation claim, and that Court and all the other decisions cited by Audubon utilized La. C.C.P. art. 1672 to reach their conclusions.

Notwithstanding this line of jurisprudence, and though not raised by the parties, we find, sua sponte, that the statutory scheme applicable to involuntary dismissal in OWC cases—specifically LAC 40:I.5705—to be controlling over the more general rule found in La. C.C.P. art. 1672. This Court has consistently noted, “[T]he general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute controls over a broader, more general statute.” Green v. Phipps-Green, 25-0006, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/19/25), 416 So.3d 1, 5 (alteration in original) (quoting Schindler v. Russ, 22-0533, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/8/22), 346 So.3d 309, 317). In reference to OWC claims, the authority for this approach is codified in La. R.S. 23:1310.1(C), which establishes:

The assistant secretary [of the OWC] shall have the authority to adopt reasonable rules and regulations, including the rules of procedure before the workers’ compensation judges, according to the procedures established by the Administrative Procedure Act. All rules and regulations, properly approved and promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act, shall be consistent with the Workers’ Compensation Law and shall be binding in the administration of that law.

Louisiana Administrative Code 40:I.5705 provides, in relevant part:⁴

A. A claim may be dismissed without prejudice after contradictory hearing properly noticed by the court on the judge's own motion or on ex parte motion of a party for the following reasons:

* * *

4. where a claimant fails to appear for any properly noticed conference or hearing;

* * *

C. Any order of dismissal shall allow for reinstatement of the action within 30 days for good cause shown.

D. The workers’ compensation judge may order the claim dismissed, with prejudice, after a contradictory hearing, when it is shown that more than 90 days has elapsed since a claim was dismissed for any reason listed in Subsection A of this Section and no good cause has been shown for reinstatement.

Thus, we find that when the OWC judge dismissed Ms. Casimier's claim with prejudice the court abused its discretion by failing to comply with the process laid out in § 5705. A plain reading of this code reveals that, pursuant to paragraph A, as an initial step, an OWC court may dismiss a claim without prejudice for failure to appear at a hearing, following a contradictory hearing. After that hearing, if the dismissal is granted, the claimant then has thirty days to seek reinstatement of the claim by demonstrating good cause for their absence pursuant to paragraph C. Finally, pursuant to paragraph D, if after the lapse of ninety days a claimant fails to show good cause, an OWC court may dismiss a claim with prejudice—but only following a contradictory hearing. The record reflects that the court failed to follow any of these directives. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the OWC court to comply with the procedural safeguards as delineated by LAC 40:I.5705.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the May 9, 2022 judgment of the OWC court, which dismissed Ms. Casimier's claim with prejudice, and remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

FOOTNOTES

1.   The case caption indicates that Ms. Casimier's first name is “Idell,” which is consistent with the disputed claim form filed with the OWC. However, Ms. Casimier's handwritten notice of appeal and brief to this Court indicate that her first name is “Idella.”

2.   This facility has since been renamed as the Audubon Aquarium.

3.   Ms. Casimier also named Risk Management Services, Inc. as administrator, but this entity was later dismissed from the case pursuant to an August 12, 2021 judgment.

4.   We note that this was the version in effect at the time of Ms. Casimier's hearing. Section 5705 has since been amended by Louisiana Works, Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration, LR 51:1622 (October 2025), the only change being to substitute the word “party” for “claimant” under subparagraph A(4).

Judge Paula A. Brown