TAYLOR v. GUSTE HOMES RESIDENT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (2026)

Guste Homes Resident Management Corporation (“Guste”) appeals the judgment of the trial court that awarded Joddice Taylor (“Taylor”) $1,800 in damages for a claim of wrongful eviction. For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court judgment.

Facts

Nelson Ragas (“Ragas”) and Taylor both lived in the Guste residential building for approximately three years. Ragas was the tenant and the only signatory to the lease with Guste. Taylor was Ragas’ long-time companion and romantic partner, having lived together with him for about 15 years. For reasons not shown on the record, Taylor did not become a tenant under the provisions of the lease herself, but instead signed an addendum naming herself as Ragas’ “live-in aide.” The addendum gave Taylor strictly limited rights to share the apartment with Ragas. It provided, in pertinent part, that:

I understand that I will be allowed to remain in the unit only as long as the above-named person employs me. If under any circumstances, I am found to be in violation of the Lease Agreement and/or House Rules; my employer will terminate my services and require that I vacate the premises immediately.

I also understand that If my employer moves out of Public Housing AND/OR LIHTC Program, is evicted, abandon (sic) the unit, or dies, I am not entitled to any benefits of the Public Housing AND/OR LIHTC Program and will have to vacate immediately.

Taylor was the only witness who testified at trial.¹ According to her testimony, she delivered Ragas’ rent check to Guste on January 3, 2022. Ragas died later that same day. On January 5, 2022, Taylor notified Guste's property manager (“Wilson”) of Ragas’ death. Wilson was already aware of Ragas’ death and told Taylor that she needed to vacate the apartment in three weeks.

Taylor testified that, later in the day on January 5, Wilson met her in the apartment along with another Guste employee. Wilson ordered her to leave immediately. She was not allowed to take her clothes, medications or any other personal items. Taylor hired an attorney who filed this suit seeking to gain access to the Guste apartment in order to retrieve her belongings.

Prior proceedings

Taylor filed this suit in First City Court of New Orleans on January 13, 2022.² In her petition, Taylor prayed for an injunction restoring her possession of the apartment and damages as compensation for out-of-pocket expenses caused by displacement, inconvenience, and mental anguish. By a “Consent Agreement on Preliminary Injunction,” the parties acknowledged that Taylor was granted access to the apartment effectively from January 26 until February 16, 2022. According to trial testimony, Taylor did not occupy the apartment for that entire period, choosing instead to inventory and retrieve Ragas’ property as well as her own belongings and vacate the premises.³ Taylor testified that she put Ragas’ belongings in a storage unit. As Taylor was unemployed, she was unable to maintain payments on the storage unit. Eventually, the possessions in the storage unit were seized and sold by the storage unit operator.

After trial, the district court rendered judgment on March 3, 2025, in Taylor's favor holding that Guste wrongfully evicted her and awarding compensation for mental anguish. Guste appeals that judgment.

Assignments of error

Guste argues that the trial court erred by (1) applying Louisiana law instead of federal law to this dispute arising from occupancy of federally subsidized housing; and (2) assessing damages in the amount of $1,800 for conversion and mental anguish when there was no evidence to support such an amount.

Standard of review

This court has previously held that it will apply the manifest error standard in reviewing findings of fact in proceedings involving eviction from federally subsidized housing. Findings of law are subject to de novo review. Guste Homes Resident Mgmt. Corp. v. Thomas, 2020-0110, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/29/20), 302 So. 3d 1181, 1183. This standard will guide our opinion.

Application of federal law

Guste argues in brief that the trial court failed to apply federal law to this case that arises from the occupancy of a federally subsidized housing unit. While there is merit to such an argument, Guste fails to point to any federal standard that governs the eviction of the occupant of a subsidized apartment. Guste cites several federal cases in which live-in aides are mentioned but none of the cases deals with eviction of a live-in aide. This court's own research also fails to find any applicable law that might address Taylor's eviction from Ragas’ apartment without notice or opportunity to contest the eviction. To the extent that federal regulations address eviction from subsidized housing, the federal law would also militate against Taylor's eviction without notice or judicial intervention. For example, 24 CFR 247.6 provides:

(a) General. The landlord shall not evict any tenant except by judicial action pursuant to State or local law and in accordance with the requirements of this subpart.

․

(c) State and local law. A tenant may rely on State or local law governing eviction procedures where such law provides the tenant procedural rights which are in addition to those provided by this subpart, except where such State or local law has been preempted under part 246 of this chapter or by other action of the United States.

The federal regulations demand more notification to tenants prior to eviction than our state laws would provide. 24 CFR 247.4(c) dictates the timing of a notice to vacate from a federally subsidized housing development:

Where the termination notice is based on material noncompliance with the rental agreement or material failure to carry out obligations under a state landlord and tenant act pursuant to § 247.3(a)(1) or (2), the time of service shall be in accord with the rental agreement and state law. ․ The landlord must not provide tenants with a termination notice prior to the day after the rent is due according to the lease. The landlord also must not proceed with filing an eviction if the tenant pays the alleged amount of rent owed within the 30-day notification period.

While these regulations do provide some general guidance, they do not specifically address the eviction of a live-in aide. The regulations are consistent in directing housing managers back to state law whenever it is not in direct conflict with the regulations. Because the question presented here is not addressed by federal law, the trial court was correct in applying Louisiana law.

Applicable Louisiana law

The issue raised by Taylor is whether Guste is entitled to evict an occupant of an apartment using self-help with no prior notice and no court proceeding whatsoever. The statutory law and jurisprudence of this state answers that question with a resounding “no.”

Guste relies on the proposition that Taylor is not a tenant. She is an occupant. We agree. However, under Louisiana law, occupants are afforded mandatory procedural protections similar to those of tenants. The bare-knuckle eviction process employed by Guste in this case does not meet the basic standards required by state law.

The sole question presented here is whether a property owner or manager may remove a person from a legally occupied premises and deprive them of their possessions without any court proceedings whatsoever. The answer to this question is found in La. C.C.P. art. 4702, which provides that:

When an owner of immovable property wishes to evict the occupant therefrom, after the purpose of the occupancy has ceased, the owner, or his agent, shall first cause a written notice to vacate the property to be delivered to the occupant.

This notice shall allow the occupant five days from its delivery to vacate the premises.

This article most closely addresses the situation in which the parties found themselves on January 5, 2022. Taylor was an occupant and the purpose of her occupancy as a live-in aide had ceased. Rent had been paid for the month, but Ragas’ death required Taylor to vacate. Article 4702 was the correct guide for initiating Taylor's eviction.

Article 4702’s written notice to vacate is clearly mandatory as evidenced by the use of the word, “shall,” in the first paragraph of the article. Jurisprudence emphasizes the necessity of the notice. “The notice to vacate is an essential part of the summary eviction procedure provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 4701. Without this notice, there can be no judgment issued under La. C.C.P. art. 4701.” JoAnn Place v. Ricard, 2022-0456, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/22), 356 So. 3d 518, 528 (quoting Kushi Healthcare, L.L.C. v. St. James Behavioral Health Hosp., Inc., 2015-0007 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/5/15), 174 So.3d 1192.)

While La. C.C.P. art. 4731(A) implies that a waiver is permissible,⁴ there is no waiver of the notice in Ragas’ lease or in the live-in aide addendum. Guste argues that Taylor's acknowledgment of her status as a non-tenant acts as a waiver. That argument is without merit. Furthermore, even if the acknowledgment is deemed to constitute a waiver of Taylor's right to notice, it does not obviate the need for court proceedings to evict her.

It is well established that the five-day notice to vacate is merely the prelude to the actual court proceeding to evict an occupant. La. C.C.P. art. 4731 identifies to property owners the next step to take in an orderly eviction. That article provides that the occupant may be cited summarily to show cause why he should not be ordered to deliver possession of the premises to the lessor or owner.

Assessment of damages

In this case, Guste failed all the legal prerequisites to removing Taylor from the apartment she had called home for three years. For this reason, we affirm that portion of the trial court's judgment that held that Taylor's eviction was wrongful and move to a determination of damages. Jurisprudence provides the district courts or our state great latitude in determining the amount of damages due to a person who is wrongfully evicted:

In Fo–Coin Co. v. Drury, 349 So.2d 382 (La.App. 4 Cir.1977), this Court reiterated that damages from wrongful eviction are not only contractual but also are delictual. This Court stated that “[w]hen a lessor takes the law in his hands by unlawfully dispossessing a tenant, he commits a trespass and is liable for general damages.” Id. at 384. La. C.C. art. 2324.1, which applies to tort liability, also provides that “[i]n the assessment of damages ․ much discretion must be left to the judge or jury.”

Duhon v. Briley, 2012-1137, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/13), 117 So. 3d 253, 260. In Duhon, this court noted that the measure of damages is the loss sustained by the obligee in addition to general damages. The trial court, in the case sub judice, noted that Guste had deprived Taylor of her possessions when it locked her out of her apartment. This constituted a tort of conversion according to the court's reasons. However, the judgment does not award Taylor any damages for the loss of the furniture, fixtures or other items that were ultimately lost as a result of Taylor's inability to pay for their storage. This is appropriate under the facts of the case. Although Taylor suffered actual loss of material possessions, that loss cannot be attributed to the wrongful eviction. Instead, the trial court focused on Taylor's mental anguish and the accompanying general damages associated with it.

The trial court noted that Taylor “cried a lot and experienced significant stress because she had nowhere to move. She also could not sleep most nights due to the stress she was experiencing.” We agree that the manner in which Taylor was unceremoniously removed from the apartment was shocking and humiliating. An appellate court should not substitute its judgment on the amount of general damages awarded by the trial court in the absence of manifest error. Finding no such error in the record as a whole, we agree with the trial court's assessment of damages.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the manner in which Guste dispossessed Taylor breached every applicable procedural standard. The total absence of any judicial intervention in the process is the essence of a wrongful eviction. The damages awarded are nominal in amount and are supported by Taylor's testimony. For these reasons and those above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   There were stipulations regarding the testimony that would have been supplied by other witnesses. None of those stipulations is relevant to this opinion.

2.   Initially, Taylor named Housing Authority of New Orleans (“HANO”) as a defendant. Taylor voluntarily dismissed HANO prior to trial.

3.   Under the provisions of Ragas’ will, Taylor was his sole and universal legatee.

4.   Article 4731 provides, in part, that, “If the lessee or occupant fails to comply with the notice to vacate ․ or ․ has waived his right to notice to vacate by written waiver contained in the lease, ․ the lessor ․ may cause the lessee or occupant to be cited summarily by a court of competent jurisdiction to show cause why he should not be ordered to deliver possession of the premises to the lessor or owner.” (emphasis added).

Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome

JENKINS, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT.