ASHA MCDOWELL SELLERS v. JOHNATHON SELLERS (2026)

This appeal arises from a custody relocation dispute regarding the minor child (“child”) born of the marriage between Asha McDowell-Sellers (“Asha”) and Johnathon Sellers (“John”). Following a lengthy relocation trial, the trial court granted Asha's request to relocate to New Jersey, as doing so was in the best interest of the child.

After consideration of the record before this Court and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment, granting Asha's relocation request.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

John and Asha were married in 2019. In 2020, one child was born of the marriage. Asha filed for divorce in 2021. John's petition for divorce followed approximately a month later. The parties were granted a divorce in 2023. In July 2021, Asha indicated in her divorce pleadings and a letter to John, of her desire to relocate to New Jersey with the child.

On April 12, 2022, John picked up the child from daycare and kept him from his mother until June 20, 2022.¹ John would only return with the child when Asha agreed to sign an interim custody agreement.

Over the course of approximately a year and a half, the trial court conducted a twelve-day relocation trial. Concluding Asha's relocation was in the best interest of the child, the trial court selected Asha as the domiciliary parent and granted her permanent relocation request.

On appeal, John asserts numerous assignments of error all concerning the trial court's decision to grant Asha's relocation.²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A trial court's determination in a relocation matter is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned an [sic] appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” Curole v. Curole, 2002-1891, p. 4 (La. 10/15/02), 828 So.2d 1094, 1096. “ ‘[T]o determine whether the trial court's ultimate conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion, an appellate court must accept each factual finding the trial court made in arriving at that conclusion, unless the particular factual finding is manifestly erroneous.’ ” Murray v. Murray, 2024-0264, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/5/24), 398 So.3d 688, 696 (quoting LaGraize v. Filson, 2014-1353, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/15), 171 So.3d 1047, 1054).

TESTIMONY

The relocation trial transpired on twelve days over the course of almost fifteen months. The extensive testimony is recounted below.

Johnathon Sellers

John testified that he served in the military for twenty-one years with a current rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He serves as the Brigade Chaplain and is an ordained Baptist minister. John does not work fulltime. He receives military disability, as well as payment for military drills/training, and runs an AirBnB out of the unused side of the matrimonial domicile, a duplex ³ . John stated he received Asha's letter in July 2021, wherein she indicated she desired to relocate to New Jersey.⁴ John believed Asha also restated her wish to relocate in her petition for divorce. There was no formal custody agreement from July 2021 to June 2022.

John averred that Asha had exclusive custody of the child beginning in July 2021 through February 2022. However, he admitted he knew Asha and the child moved to the home of her friend, Lori Williams (“Lori”), after Asha filed for divorce because he helped them move. John also took a voluntary deployment, which spanned months during this time. Additionally, John testified that during this almost eight-month period he never communicated to Asha that he wanted to see the child and he never tried to pick the child up from daycare. John maintained that he relayed his desire to see his child to his attorney. John stated that he did not speak with Asha once she filed for divorce until February 2022.

In February 2022, after returning from a voluntary deployment, John attempted to pick up the child from daycare, but was informed he was no longer on the approved pick-up list. Following this, John filed a petition for protection from abuse on behalf of himself and the child, contending Asha had prevented him from seeing the child for seven months. Shortly thereafter, Asha placed his name back on the pick-up list. John's petition for protection from abused was dismissed on his own motion the same month. Again, John stated that he did not inform Asha during this time period of July 2021 to February 2022 that he wanted to see the child. During that time, John recounted that he did receive text messages from Asha letting him know she and the child were evacuating for Hurricane Ida and when they returned. John never responded. Further, Asha texted John that the child had COVID and requested to use the AirBnB side of the matrimonial domicile to quarantine with the child. John testified that there was “no medical documentation to verify it,” but that he responded thusly, “Asha there is a restraining order ⁵ in place, and you will have to find another place to isolate. If you show up, I will call the police. If you want to handle it civilly, you need to have your lawyer contact my lawyer ASAP.” While John blamed his previous attorney for the text response, he testified, “I had no proof or evidence or support from her that even [sic] the claim about my [child] having COVID was even true or not.”

On April 12, 2022, the child was scheduled for a dental appointment. However, John testified that he picked the child up from daycare and traveled to Florida without discussing the matter with Asha. John contends his attorney advised him to take the child and not return until an interim custody agreement was in place.⁶ An e-mail from John's previous attorney indicated she labeled this as a “power play.” John let Asha believe he would return with the child after Easter, but he did not. John did not return with the child until seventy days passed. John testified that while he was keeping the child from Asha, they returned to New Orleans several times, but he did not let Asha see the child. John did not inform Asha of the child's location, but John stated “she knew that my family is located in Jacksonville.” John testified that having Asha sign an interim custody judgment was a condition for him returning to New Orleans with the child. John conceded that he did not think it was in the child's best interest to be away from Asha for seventy days and he knew the child was still nursing.

John admitted that his previous attorney never told him to take the child and not tell Asha. He also confessed that his previous lawyer did not advise him that it was alright to take and keep the child for seventy days. Moreover, John confirmed that there was a time period wherein he did not allow Asha's family to participate in FaceTime calls and that he refused Asha access to the matrimonial domicile in order to retrieve the child's belongings and equipment. One of the messages John sent in the Family Wizard program stated, “[The child] can communicate with your family and whomever else you choose during your custodial time once the judgment is completed.” John also acknowledged that he placed an Apple Air Tag in Asha's vehicle, but alleged it was for security purposes.

John iterated that he completed the recommended counseling and co-parenting class. He stated that relocating the child to New Jersey would be devastating and that he had no connections to New Jersey.

Asha McDowell-Sellers

Asha testified that she obtained her Master's Degree as a teacher, with certifications in English and Social Studies. She stated that she was fearful often during her marriage, contending John could be violent and verbally abusive, citing an instance where she was thrown against a wall and contending John would “call her out of her name.” During the marriage, Asha stated that John did not want to be left alone with the child because the crying made him physically ill. Asha detailed one incident wherein John “slammed” the child down in the bassinet because the child would not stop crying, and he covered the child's mouth. Asha recounted that she and John discussed possibly moving to New Jersey prior to their divorce. She was offered about $20,000 a year more for a job in New Jersey and believed she could not afford to remain in New Orleans.

After she filed for divorce in July 2021, Asha testified that John disappeared for approximately eight months after helping her and the child move into Lori's home. During that time, John did not really see the child and Asha was locked out of the matrimonial domicile.

Asha testified that John took the child from daycare without warning, on April 12, 2022, even though he knew the child had a dental appointment. She was unable to reach John until April 13, when John informed her he was taking the child to Florida for Easter and would return the following Monday. John did not return with the child that Monday. Asha stated that John kept the child until June 20, 2022, during which time, the child was still nursing. Asha never knew where her child was, as John permitted her very limited access to the child via FaceTime and also blurred the background on FaceTime to inhibit Asha from discerning his location. When John did permit Asha to FaceTime with the child, it was during her work hours as a teacher, which made the calls difficult for her. John would also hang up on FaceTime if her family joined the call. Asha also stated that John would not regularly check the Family Wizard application for messages. Asha sent repeated Family Wizard messages asking where the child was, when she could see the child, and to please return the child to New Orleans.

Once John returned to New Orleans with the child for the interim custody hearing, Asha testified that she agreed to the interim custody agreement just to see her child. Asha believed she was under duress when she signed the agreement because she would “have literally said anything to get her child back.” Asha did note that John had been an active father since they signed the interim custody agreement.

If allowed to relocate to New Jersey, Asha would assist with paying travel costs for John to see the child, but she did not believe she could afford to pay all of the costs. In New Jersey, she and the child would live in her parents’ house with them and her sister. She stated that her parents and her sister would be able to watch the child and help provide care. Additionally, Asha was accepted into a Doctoral program. Thus, Asha contends she can better herself and lower her cost of living by relocating.

Martha Bujanda

Ms. Bujanda testified that she operates Mental Health Counseling and Custody Evaluations and has been in private practice since 1983. Since 1997, Ms. Bujanda has conducted approximately five hundred custody evaluations with approximately ten to twelve of those concerning relocation. The trial court disqualified Ms. Bujanda as a relocation expert and instead qualified her as an expert in mental health and custody evaluation.⁷

Ms. Bujanda met with John, Asha, and Asha's father. She met with John for an additional visit because the child appeared extra sleepy and was acting out of the ordinary. She did not meet with Asha for an additional visit. Ms. Bujanda did not interview any of John's friends or family. Ms. Bujanda believed that John had the child's best interests in mind and that he would not intentionally harm the child.⁸ Ms. Bujanda recommended John undergo therapy for power and control issues.

Ms. Bujanda did not recommend granting Asha's requested relocation. Ms. Bujanda believed that relocation would significantly alter John's relationship with the child and was not in the child's best interest. She found that at the child's age, there was no way to maintain a relationship with John from another city. Accordingly, she recommended a 50/50 custody arrangement without a designated domiciliary parent, and a parenting coordinator.

Lori Williams

Lori, Asha's good friend, was in the Army working in counterintelligence when she met John in 2015 through her now ex-husband. After Asha filed for divorce, she and the child moved in with Lori. John was aware of the child's location during this time, as he assisted Asha with assembling furniture. Lori testified that she never witnessed physical, emotional, or financial abuse. However, Asha told her that John had slammed her against a wall. Asha also spoke with Lori about verbal and financial abuse in the marriage. After Asha filed for divorce, John locked Asha out of their residence so she could not access all of the child's belongings. Whenever Asha attempted to retrieve the child's items, John would call the sheriff.

Lori stated that the day John took the child without notice, Asha was unable to reach John. Asha was still nursing the child, and during the almost three months the child was kept away, Asha became a shell of herself. Once Asha agreed to the interim custody agreement, she was able to see the child. Lori testified that Asha was under duress and was doing whatever was necessary to see the child again.

Lori was aware that John was paying Asha's car note, Asha and the child's health insurance, and, at some point, began paying one hundred dollars a month for child support.

Patrick McDowell 9

Evelyn McDowell

Dr. Evelyn McDowell (“Dr. Evelyn”), Asha's mother, has a PhD in accounting and philosophy. Dr. Evelyn stated that Asha told her John grabbed her by her throat during the marriage and that she witnessed emotional abuse. Asha told her mom that John yelled and cussed at her. John told Dr. Evelyn that he “made Asha better.”

When John took the child in April 2022, Asha was still nursing and was inconsolable. John would not allow Dr. Evelyn to see or speak to the child during this time. In fact, John informed Dr. Evelyn that FaceTime was only for Asha and not her family. Further, because Asha was unaware of her child's location, Dr. Evelyn accompanied Asha to Florida to search for the child. Dr. Evelyn also asked John's mother to ask John to return the child.

Janelle McDowell

Janelle McDowell (“Janelle”), Asha's sister, testified that John would belittle Asha, call her ungrateful, and cuss at her. At one point during Asha's pregnancy, Asha informed Janelle that John had picked her up and thrown her against a wall. Asha also told Janelle that John dropped the child into the bassinet because the crying made him physically ill. Further, John said his sleep was important, so he took sleeping pills and wore ear plugs. Based on this, Asha explained to Janelle that the couple's plans for John to take care of the child would not work and daycare was needed. In addition, John would not let the child FaceTime with her. She was with Asha when John's tracker was found in Asha's vehicle.

RELOCATION

“Louisiana's relocation statutes retain the ‘best interest of the child’ standard as the fundamental principle governing decisions made pursuant to its provisions.” Curole, 2002-1891, p. 4, 828 So.2d at 1096. “The person proposing relocation has the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is made in good faith and is in the best interest of the child.” La. R.S. 9:355.10. “ ‘[J]urispurdence has defined the meaning of the term good faith․as a legitimate or valid reason for the move.’ ” Murray, 2024-0264, p. 6, 398 So.3d at 695 (quoting McLain v. McLain, 2007-0752, pp. 13-14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/12/07), 974 So.2d 726, 734). This Court opined thusly:

[l]egitimate reasons for relocation include: to be close to significant family or other support networks; for significant health reasons; to protect the safety of the child or another member of the child's household from a significant risk of harm; to pursue a significant employment or educational opportunity; or to be with one's spouse (or equivalent) who is established, or is pursuing a significant employment or educational opportunity in another location. Id.

State ex rel. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Whittington, 2015-1118, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/18/16), 193 So.3d 1234, 1239.

Once a good faith determination is made for relocation, La. R.S. 9:355.14(A) provides that the courts:

shall consider all relevant factors in determining whether relocation is in the best interest of the child, including the following:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the relationship of the child with the person proposing relocation and with the non-relocating person, siblings, and other significant persons in the child's life.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on the child's physical, educational, and emotional development.

(3) The feasibility of preserving a good relationship between the non-relocating person and the child through suitable physical custody or visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.

(4) The child's views about the proposed relocation, taking into consideration the age and maturity of the child.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by either the person seeking or the person opposing the relocation, either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the other party.

(6) How the relocation of the child will affect the general quality of life for the child, including but not limited to financial or emotional benefit and educational opportunity.

(7) The reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the relocation.

(8) The current employment and economic circumstances of each person and how the proposed relocation may affect the circumstances of the child.

(9) The extent to which the objecting person has fulfilled his financial obligations to the person seeking relocation, including child support, spousal support, and community property, and alimentary obligations.

(10) The feasibility of a relocation by the objecting person.

(11) Any history of substance abuse, harassment, or violence by either the person seeking or the person opposing relocation, including a consideration of the severity of the conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation.

(12) Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

Further, “[t]he court may not consider whether the person seeking relocation of the child may relocate without the child if relocation is denied or whether the person opposing relocation may also relocate if relocation is allowed.” La. R.S. 9:355.14(B). While we are required to consider all twelve factors, we are permitted to give certain ones more weight than others. Coulon v. Coulon, 2022-0619, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/9/22), 351 So.3d 823, 827.

The record reflects Asha is attempting to relocate in good faith. She is seeking a higher paying teaching job, an advanced degree, and utilizing her family as a support network.

Having found good faith, we must review the factors governing the best interest of the child. First, the trial court explored “[t]he nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the relationship of the child with the person proposing relocation and with the non-relocating person” and other significant people in the child's life. La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(1). The trial court found that Asha has been the child's primary caregiver since birth and that John was inconsistently present for the first eighteen months of the child's life. The trial court specifically noted the eight months after Asha filed for divorce wherein John refused to communicate with Asha. While the trial court stated that both parties were currently capable of caring for the child, the trial court found that “a holistic view of the resources available to each of the parties leads this Court to the conclusion that [the child] would benefit from being in New Jersey.” Both sets of grandparents live outside of Louisiana, and the child has no family outside of John in New Orleans. While a relocation to New Jersey could place a burden on the paternal relatives, the trial court noted there was no evidence Asha would interfere in their relationship with the child, whereas the record demonstrated John's proclivity to prevent Asha and her family from seeing and calling the child.

Second, the trial court weighed “[t]he age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on the child's physical, educational, and emotional development.” La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(2). The child was five years old at the time of trial. Due to the young age of the child, the impacts of a relocation would be manageable, as the child has yet to develop strong relationships within the daycare and education system. The trial court found that relocating to New Jersey would provide Asha and the child with “significantly better educational and economic opportunities.” Moreover, the trial court stated: “the availability and proximity of [Asha]’s parents provide for an enhanced network of support and care for [the child] and, which in turn, allows [Asha] more flexibility and time to improve her career for the future of the family.”

Third, the trial court examined “[t]he feasibility of preserving a good relationship between the non-relocating person and the child through suitable physical custody or visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.” La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(3). The frequency, distance, and cost of travel is not an easy burden to overlook. However, the trial court found the “logistical burden” would be “slightly less” for John due to his flexible work schedule, as compared to Asha's rigid schedule as a teacher. Additionally, the trial court noted that a “structured physical custody and visitation judgment” could actually assist in preserving the parties’ relationships with the child. While Ms. Bujanda believed that there was no substitute for in-person contact, she did not “address whether the inclusion and implementation of physical custodial periods” could “help preserve the parent-child relationship.” The trial court determined this factor was neutral and concluded “that a relocation will lessen the speed at which [the child's] relationship with [John] will develop, but believes that progress may still be made through various methods of communication and physical custodial periods.”

Fourth, considering “the child's views about proposed relocation,” as instructed in La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(4), provides no relevant support or opposition to relocation. As the trial court found, the child is five years old and is not old enough “to express a preference concerning the proposed relocation.”

Fifth, the trial court considered “[w]hether there is an established pattern of conduct by either the person seeking or the person opposing the relocation, either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the other party.” La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(5). Finding this factor favors relocation, the trial court noted the time John took the child for seventy days without notice to Asha and how John prevented Asha from knowing the child's location. During this time, the child was still nursing. John restricted Asha's ability to FaceTime the child and prevented her family from participating. Asha repeatedly asked for an update on the child's condition and for the child to be returned. However, as the evidence shows, those requests remained largely unanswered.

Additionally, John required that Asha sign the interim custody agreement before he would return the child. As noted by the trial court, “Mr. Sellers explicitly responded that the return of [the child] was contingent on [Asha]’s acceptance of his attorney's proposed interim judgment.” Further, Ms. Bujanda stated in her report that John “admitted using the time the child was out to negotiate a custody agreement.” As the trial court found, “[t]hese actions demonstrated that John “does not have a pattern of promoting [the child's] relationship with [Asha].” John's behaviors cannot be negated by contending he was acting solely on advice from counsel, as his actions connote agreement with the tactics.

At trial, John alleged Asha kept the child from him for approximately eight months after filing for divorce. The record does not support this assertion. John admitted that Asha remained in contact with him, that he knew where Asha and the child were living, and where she worked. The evidence admitted documented that Asha kept John informed of her evacuation plans for Hurricane Ida, as well as updates on schooling and finances. Asha also informed John that the child was diagnosed with COVID and needed a place to isolate. John admitted he made no personal attempts to see the child during this time. There is no evidence Asha would thwart John's relationship with the child.

Sixth, the trial court examined “[h]ow the relocation of the child will affect the general quality of life for the child, including but not limited to financial or emotional benefit and educational opportunity.” La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(6). The trial court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of relocation. As opposed to New Orleans, the child would have a larger support network in New Jersey consisting of maternal grandparents and Asha's sister. The family all resides in the same home. Asha's family has agreed to assist with childcare. The trial court also noted that the relocation would afford Asha the opportunity to save money on rent and childcare, which would provide more money for the child. This support network does not exist in New Orleans.

Seventh, the trial court reviewed “[t]he reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the relocation.” La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(7). The trial court found that this factor also weighed in favor of relocation. Asha is seeking a better life for herself and for the child in New Jersey. John contends the relocation is an attempt at alienation. However, the record demonstrates no attempt on Asha's part to prevent John from having access to or shared custody of the child. Contrarily, John has demonstrated his ability to prevent Asha and her family from accessing the child in any way.

Eighth, as to “[t]he current employment and economic circumstances of each person and how the proposed relocation may affect the circumstances of the child,” the trial court found in favor of relocation. La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(8). Asha testified that she is earning almost $20,000 more per year teaching in New Jersey. Asha was also accepted into a Doctoral program, which would enhance Asha's long-term economic earning potential. As the trial court stated, “[i]mprovement of a parent's circumstances often results in improvements in their child's life.”

On the other hand, the trial court found, “[a] review of the record does not provide information as to [John's] professional and economic advancement opportunities were he to remain in New Orleans versus New Jersey.”

Ninth, the trial court considered “[t]he extent to which the objecting person has fulfilled his financial obligations to the person seeking relocation, including child support, spousal support, and community property, and alimentary obligations.” La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(9). The trial court determined this factor was neutral because “[n]one of the facts present give cause for the Court to be concerned that any financial obligations set by Court order would be disobeyed by either of the parties.”

Tenth, “[t]he feasibility of a relocation by the objecting person” must be examined. La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(10). The trial court found that John's position with the military does not require him to reside in Louisiana. While John testified that there were no positions in the military available in New Jersey, he did not state whether non-military positions were available. Noting that La. R.S. 9:355.14(B) requires the trial court to consider whether the objecting party “could” relocate instead of “may” relocate, the trial court deemed this factor neutral.

Eleventh, the trial court analyzed “[a]ny history of substance abuse, harassment, or violence by either the person seeking or the person opposing relocation, including a consideration of the severity of the conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation.” La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(11). The trial court found this factor weighed “significantly” in Asha's favor. The testimony presented demonstrated that John “threw [Asha] against the wall” when she was pregnant “and called her names.” Janelle testified that John “often called [Asha] an ‘ungrateful mother****er’, ‘b***h’, and more in front of their son.”¹⁰ Asha testified that John acted aggressively towards the child as a baby by “slamming” the baby down into the bassinet because of too much crying. John would also cover the child's mouth or put blankets over the child because of the crying. Further, the evidence demonstrated John placed a tracker in Asha's vehicle, that he locked her out of the matrimonial domicile, and called the police on her when she attempted to retrieve the child's belongings.

Twelfth, the trial court weighed “[a]ny other factors affecting the best interest of the child.” La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)(12). The trial court found that there was no issue of substance abuse, alcohol abuse, or instability, as well as no physical limitations of the parties. While both Asha and John have mental health diagnoses, it has not prevented them from caring for the child.

Overall, the trial court found “that all the best interest factors were considered in concluding that it is in the [child's] best interest to relocate to New Jersey.” The trial court judge is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses. Dash Bldg. Materials Ctr., Inc. v. Henning, 560 So.2d 653, 654 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990). The relocation request required a “fact-intensive inquiry, involving the weighing and balancing of factors.” Smith v. Smith, 2007-0260, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/13/08), 977 So.2d 1114, 1117. In the instant matter, the trial court weighed twelve days of witness testimony. Only one of those witnesses was an expert. After reviewing the extensive testimony and evidence, the trial court made many factual findings as we extensively recounted above. Our review does not reveal manifest error in those findings. As such, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Asha's request for relocation.

DECREE

For the above-mentioned reasons, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Ms. McDowell's relocation request, as the relocation would be in the best interest of the child. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Specific details will be elucidated in the review of testimony.

2.   Specifically, John contends:1. The trial court erred in granting relocation because [Asha] did not timely and properly provide notice of relocation to [John] pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. § 9:355.5.2. The trial court erred in granting relocation because [Asha] did not satisfy her very heavy burden of proof and failed to show that her relocation attempt is made both in good faith.3. The trial court erred in granting relocation because [Asha] did not satisfy her very heavy burden of proof under LA. REV. STAT. § 9:355.14 and failed to show that her relocation attempt would be in the best interests of the child.4. The trial court erred when it weighed [John's] act of bringing the child to Florida from April 2022 to June 2022 against [John's] opposition to relocation when applying the LA. REV. STAT. § 9:355.14 factors.5. The trial court erred in disqualifying Martha Bujanda as a relocation expert and failing to consider her opinion that relocation was not in the best interests of the child.

3.   Asha was included on the refinanced mortgage on the matrimonial domicile, but John did not donate a portion of the home ownership to her.

4.   John contends Asha failed to provide sufficient notice of her desire to relocate pursuant to La. R.S. 9:355.5 and her failure to provide notice is fatal to her request to relocate. This contention lacks merit. “A party's failure to provide notice is a factor which the trial court may consider when determining whether to grant relocation. La. R.S. 9:355.6(1).” Murray, 2024-0264, p. 15, 398 So.3d at 700. It is not fatal to the relocation request. Id.

5.   John filed for a temporary restraining order in December 2021, contending Asha withdrew some funds from the community account without his approval. A mutual temporary restraining order was issued prohibiting them:from alienating, encumbering, or disposing of community property in any form whatsoever, prohibiting them from entering the community home and removing the contents pending further order from the court, prohibiting them from scheduling Airbnb clients at the matrimonial domicile (specifically the area attached thereto), prohibiting them from withdrawing large sums of money from community accounts including, but not limited to, the Airbnb account.

6.   A series of e-mails from John's previous attorney, whom he later fired, were entered into evidence. The attorney told John that there was no custody agreement in place preventing him from taking the child. On April 17, 2022, the attorney also suggested that she was “leaning toward” advising John to remain in Florida until she spoke with a judge the next day. Further, in the e-mails, the previous attorney suggested that John not reveal his exact location.

7.   John contends the trial court erred by disqualifying Ms. Bujanda as an expert in relocation. While the parties agreed to a consent judgment, which provided that Ms. Bujanda was appointed as a custody evaluator, the judgment did not state she would be considered an expert in relocation.“A trial court's decision to qualify or disqualify an expert will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” Anderson v. City of New Orleans, 2024-0252, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/1/24), 390 So.3d 402, 405. The trial court found that Ms. Bujanda had limited experience with child custody relocations and that Ms. Bujanda utilized an outdated version of the statute when formulating her recommendation. Given these findings, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion by limiting Ms. Bujanda's qualifications. We further note that “[t]he effect and weight to be given to expert testimony is within the broad discretion of the trial judge.” Gulf Outlet Marina, Inc. v. Spain, 2002-1589, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/25/03), 854 So.2d 386, 394 (quoting Lanasa v. Harrison, 2002-0026, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/7/02), 828 So.2d 602, 605).

8.   Ms. Bujanda testified that she omitted concerns about John kicking and/or beating one of the family dogs, but she believed it was not intentional.

10.   The usage of this type of language by John directed towards Asha was corroborated by the audiotaped conversation entered into evidence.

Judge Rosemary Ledet