LAKEVIEW LOAN SERVICING LLC v. TRUEHILL (2026)

In this appeal, a debtor challenges a trial court's order denying his motion for a temporary restraining order to stop a sheriff's sale of the debtor's mortgaged immovable property. We also address the debtor's writ application which was referred to this panel for decision, a pending rule to show cause, and two exceptions filed after the appeal was lodged and argued. After review, we dismiss the appeal and the writ application and pretermit the exceptions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 8, 2025 ¹ , Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC (Lakeview) filed a Petition for Mortgage Foreclosure by Executory Process with Appraisal and named Harrison Truehill as the defendant. Lakeview alleged that Mr. Truehill had defaulted on a promissory note that was secured by a mortgage on immovable property he owned in Ascension Parish, Louisiana. Lakeview was the holder of the promissory note and the assignee of the mortgage, copies of which were filed with the petition. Pursuant to Lakeview's petition, the trial court signed an Order on January 14, 2025, directing the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office to seize and sell Mr. Truehill's property to satisfy the outstanding debt. The Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office issued a Notice of Seizure to Mr. Truehill notifying him that a sheriff's sale was scheduled for April 2, 2025.

On February 3, 2025, Mr. Truehill, as a pro se litigant, responded by filing an “Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction To Stay Sheriff's Sale and Grant Motion for Summary Judgment.” He sought to enjoin Lakeview from proceeding with the sheriff's sale in state court while related federal court litigation was pending and further sought summary judgment due to Lakeview's alleged bad faith acts. Additionally, on February 10, 2025, Mr. Truehill filed “Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Sheriff Sale Notice of Seizure, [and] Request for Temporary Restraining Order ․” Among other relief, Mr. Truehill again sought to enjoin Lakeview from proceeding with the foreclosure and sheriff's sale pending resolution of the federal litigation. Mr. Truehill filed a “PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO),” which the trial court denied on March 26, 2025.

On April 25, 2025, Mr. Truehill filed an “Appellate Brief” captioned as being filed in this Court, but actually filed in the trial court, wherein he sought reversal of the March 26, 2025 Order. And, on May 5, 2025, he filed a “Motion to Forward Notice of Appeal and Record to the First Circuit Court of Appeal.” Also on May 5, 2025, the trial court signed an Order stating “THE COURT finds that the pro se litigant intends to appeal the trial court's ruling(s). Therefore, the Court [is] treating the filing as a Motion to Appeal.” The trial court's May 5th Order also directed its clerk to transmit the full record of the case to this Court. On July 29, 2025, this Court lodged Mr. Truehill's appeal under civil appeal number 2025 CA 0748.

Meanwhile, on May 2, 2025, Mr. Truehill filed a letter addressed to this Court's Clerk of Court asking that his appeal be recognized as timely filed. This Court interpreted the May 2nd letter as a writ application and assigned it civil writ number 2025 CW 0408. In due course, this Court referred the writ to this panel to be decided with Mr. Truehill's appeal.²

On August 5, 2025, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause Order ordering the parties to show cause by briefs why Mr. Truehill's appeal should or should not be dismissed, because it appeared that the trial court's March 26, 2025 Order was a nonappealable ruling under La. C.C.P. art. 3612.

PEREMPTORY EXCEPTIONS

As an initial matter, we first address a procedural issue. Although not filed in the trial court below, Mr. Truehill has now filed two peremptory exceptions with this Court pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 927 raising the objections of “compromise” and no right of action. For reasons that follow, we conclude this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction with regard to the March 26, 2025 Order, and accordingly, we pretermit Mr. Truehill's exceptions. Accord Hernandez v. Excel Contractors, Inc., 2018-1091 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/13/19), 275 So.3d 278, 282.

REVIEW OF MARCH 26, 2025 ORDER

We now turn to the issue raised in this Court's Rule to Show Cause Order. The defendant in an executory proceeding may arrest the seizure and sale of property by injunction, wherein he can assert various defenses and procedural objections. See La. C.C.P. arts. 2642(A), 2751 and 2752. Although the defendant may apply for a preliminary injunction in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 3602, the court shall not issue a temporary restraining order to arrest the seizure and sale of immovable property. See La. C.C.P. art. 2752(A). Further, there shall be no appeal from an order relating to a temporary restraining order. La. C.C.P. art. 3612(A).

The trial court's March 26, 2025 Order, reproduced below, denied Mr. Truehill's request for a temporary restraining order to stop the April 2, 2025 sheriff's sale and also denied his request for a hearing on his motion for a preliminary injunction.

This Court's appellate jurisdiction extends to final judgments and to interlocutory judgments when expressly allowed by law. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1841, 2083(A) and (C). As stated, La. C.C.P. art. 3612(A) prohibits an appeal from an order relating to a temporary restraining order. Further, a judgment that denies a request to set a hearing is an interlocutory judgment, and Mr. Truehill points to no law that expressly allows an appeal from a judgment denying a request to set a hearing on a preliminary injunction. See Ramsey v. Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC, 56,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/25/26), 429 So.3d 1204, 1206–07 (order resetting a summary judgment hearing is interlocutory); Pelican Homestead and Savings Association v. Wolcott, 405 So.2d 1247, 1248 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1981) (order setting a date for evidentiary hearing is interlocutory). Thus, this Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over the March 26, 2025 Order, because it is not a final judgment and there is no law expressly allowing an appeal from this type of interlocutory judgment.

The proper procedural vehicle to contest an interlocutory judgment is an application for supervisory writs. See La. C.C.P. art. 2201; Sorenson v. Avenue Plaza Owners Association, Inc., 2025-01506 (La. 12/8/25), 424 So.3d 609, 610-11. Although this Court has discretion to convert an appeal to an application of supervisory writs, it may only do so if the appeal would have been timely had it been filed as a supervisory writ application. Matter of Succession of Pierre, 2023-1322 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/31/24), 391 So.3d 686, 689. In this case, the applicable delay for filing a writ application began when the trial court clerk mailed the March 26, 2025 Order. See La. C.C.P. art. 1914(B) (prior to its amendment by 2025 La. Acts No. 250, § 3). However, the record herein does not show when notice of the March 26, 2025 Order was mailed. Thus, it is not clear whether Mr. Truehill's April 25, 2025 Motion to Appeal (improperly titled “Appellate Brief”) would have been timely had it been filed as a supervisory writ application. Nor is it clear if his May 5, 2025 “Motion to Forward Notice of Appeal and Record to First Circuit Court of Appeal” would have been timely had it been filed as a supervisory writ application. Nevertheless, we decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction, finding the criteria set forth in Herlitz Construction Company v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d 878 (La. 1981) (per curiam), are not satisfied. See Matter of Succession of Pierre, 391 So.3d at 689-90; Myers v. Diaz, 2022-0445 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22), 354 So.3d 78, 81, n.3.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction in this matter. Pursuant to this Court's Rule to Show Cause Order, we dismiss this appeal. We else deny the writ application assigned 2025 CW 0408. We pretermit the two peremptory exceptions. We assess appeal costs to Harrison Truehill.

APPEAL DISMISSED; WRIT DENIED; PEREMPTORY EXCEPTIONS PRETERMITTED.

I disagree with the majority's decision to dismiss the appeal. The majority declined to exercise supervisory jurisdiction, finding the criteria set forth in Herlitz Construction Company v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d 878 (La. 1981) (per curiam) was not satisfied. Consequently, plaintiff was denied any review. However, given that the record is unclear as to the timeliness of plaintiff's filings, I would have had the record supplemented to make such a determination. In the event the filings were timely, I would have exercised supervisory jurisdiction and addressed the merits.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Ascension Parish Clerk of Court stamped the petition as being “FAX FILED” on January 8, 2024, and separately stamped the petition as physically filed on January 14, 2025. Based on other documents in the record, it appears the “FAX FILED” stamp should have read “January 8, 2025” rather than “January 8, 2024.”

2.   On April 2, 2025, Mr. Truehill filed a petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Louisiana. This Court issued an Interim Order holding his writ application in abeyance pending notification that the automatic stay in the bankruptcy case had been lifted. (FCCA 8/18/25 Interim Order) The bankruptcy court later dismissed Mr. Truehill's bankruptcy case, and this Court then referred his writ to be decided with this appeal. In Re: Harrison A. Truehill, Case No. 25-10268 (Bankr. M.D.La. 6/10/25).

GREENE, J.

McClendon, C.J. dissents and assigns reasons.