STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF v. << (2023)

The State filed a delinquency petition in case number 117008 against C.Y.¹ based on the alleged commission of armed robbery with the use of a firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.3. After an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated C.Y. delinquent, as alleged in the petition. After a disposition hearing,² C.Y. was committed to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Juvenile Justice (DPSC/OJJ), for forty-two months, with credit for time served.³ C.Y. now appeals, arguing that the adjudication is illegal and should be reversed as he was adjudicated of a non-crime under a penal provision as opposed to a substantive offense. After a thorough review of the record and the assignment of error, we affirm the adjudication; however, we vacate the disposition and remand for a new disposition hearing with instructions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 26, 2022, Kili Julian reported to police that she was robbed at gunpoint when she arrived at her apartment on Florida Boulevard in Baton Rouge.⁴ According to Julian's testimony, as she was pulling into her parking spot that afternoon, she saw two individuals walking in the complex. She proceeded to park, collect her belongings, and exit her vehicle. At that point, the two individuals approached her and asked for her keys. One of them, whom Julian identified in a prehearing photographic lineup and in court as the juvenile in this case, C.Y., was holding a gun. The other perpetrator, another juvenile later identified by the police as K.A., stood by.

Julian attempted to “prolong” the situation by telling the juveniles that she has a family and that they did not have to do what they were doing. However, the juveniles continued to ask for her keys, which, as she informed them, were inside of her vehicle. They told her to get the keys out of the car, as C.Y. pointed the gun at her, Julian retrieved the keys, but did not hand them over. She held onto the keys as K.A. attempted to “yank” them from her. As she further attempted to “talk them into not doing it,” K.A. screamed, “shoot this ‘B’.” Julian then let go of the keys, and C.Y. took her cell phone.

Julian walked to her nearby apartment and began banging on the front door, causing her significant other, Anthony Bell, to open the door. Bell testified that when he opened the door, he saw the juveniles but did not get a good look at them. He observed that one was running and pointing a gun at him while the other was in Julian's vehicle. As Julian ran inside the apartment, Bell, who was armed with a gun, stood in their apartment doorway and fired into Julian's vehicle, which he noted was reversing towards their apartment door. Bell then slammed and locked the apartment door. He and Julian then ran into the hallway with their two-year-old child.⁵

K.A. was injured in the incident, thereafter hospitalized, and subsequently identified. Julian's cell phone and a 9mm pistol were recovered from C.Y.’s bedroom during the subsequent execution of a search warrant for his home. After being advised of his Miranda ⁶ rights during a recorded police interview in the presence of his father, C.Y. fully confessed to the offense, stating he and K.A. wanted to “get a car” and “ride around,” intending to find a car that someone left running.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In the sole assignment of error, C.Y. argues that the State erred in alleging a violation of La. R.S. 14:64.3 in the petition, as the statute merely provides an additional penalty for committing an armed robbery with a firearm and is not a substantive offense. The juvenile notes that appellate courts have either tacitly or explicitly recognized that La. R.S. 14:64.3 standing alone does not charge a valid offense but instead constitutes a sentencing enhancement provision. C.Y. argues that the adjudication and disposition by the juvenile court is based on a “non-crime” and contends that the delinquency petition in this case deprived him of the constitutionally-guaranteed notice of the charges against him.

In juvenile delinquency proceedings, a juvenile is entitled under the due process and adequate notice guarantees of the Louisiana Constitution to be given timely written notice, in advance of the adjudicatory hearing, of the specific charge or factual allegations against him. La. Const. art. I, §§ 2 & 13; State in Interest of Batiste, 367 So. 2d 784, 787 (La. 1979). The statutory requirements for a petition are outlined in La. Ch.C. art. 844(B), which states, “[a]llegations of fact shall be simple, concise, and direct and shall be set forth in numbered paragraphs.․ Allegations of fact may be made on information and belief.” Louisiana Children's Code article 845(A)(3) and (A)(4) provides that the petition shall include facts which show the child is delinquent and the statute or ordinance which the child is alleged to have violated. The purpose of the delinquency petition is to give the juvenile notice and an opportunity to defend. State in Interest of P.H., 18-1080, p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/2/18), 2018 WL 5733011, *2. Thus, the issue in this case is whether the petition provided adequate notice as required by the federal ⁷ and state constitutions.

On motion of the child, prior to disposition, a delinquency adjudication shall be vacated and the child discharged if, after contradictory hearing, the court finds that the delinquent act charged in the petition is not based upon an offense which is punishable under a valid statute. La. Ch.C. art. 887(A)(2). In this case, the petition, in pertinent part, specifically states, “[o]n or about March 26[,]2022 the [juvenile] violated 14:64.3-Use of Firearm during Armed Robbery - the [juvenile], while armed with a firearm, robbed K.J.” In ruling on C.Y.’s motion to vacate the adjudication, the juvenile court noted that the issue is whether C.Y. had sufficient notice of what he was being accused of and whether the allegation meets due process. The juvenile court noted that despite the statutory citation, the language and content of the petition alleges C.Y. used a firearm during the armed robbery of Julian. The juvenile court further noted that C.Y. did not raise the issue prior to the adjudication. Hence, the juvenile court concluded, “I do find that the allegation listed in the petition is sufficient to give the [juvenile] notice of the charges and, therefore, meets the sufficiency of due process.” The juvenile court, thus, denied the motion to vacate.

As noted above, La. Ch.C. art. 845(A)(3) provides that the petition for delinquency shall set forth with specificity facts which show the child is a delinquent child. See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 464 (which requires that an indictment or bill of information be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the facts constituting the offense charged). As further noted, La. Ch.C. art. 845(A)(4) requires the petition to specify the statute the child is accused of violating. We have found no rule in the Children's Code to guide us in addressing an error or omission in citation when the actual language used to show the child is delinquent provides adequate notice of the allegation. On authority of La. Ch.C. art. 803, we look to the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure for assistance in addressing the issue. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 464 provides that an error in the citation, or its omission, shall not be grounds to reverse a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. See also La. Ch.C. art. 844(C) (“Failure to comply with formal requirements of [Article 844] shall not be grounds for dismissal of a petition or invalidation of the proceedings unless it results in substantial prejudice.”). Thus, to determine if there was sufficient notice of the offense alleged, we look to the recitation of facts in the petition describing the criminal conduct as opposed to the statutory citation provided therein.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:64(A) defines armed robbery as “the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:64.3(A), “[w]hen the dangerous weapon used in the commission of the crime of armed robbery is a firearm, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for an additional period of five years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” Comparing the language in the petition to the statutes at issue, we find that C.Y. was sufficiently notified by the wording of the petition of the crime which he was being accused of, as the petition details that he committed a robbery while armed with a firearm. Thus, it is clear that C.Y. was accused of an offense punishable under a valid statute. La. Ch.C. art. 887(A)(2). See State v. Burton, 12-1321, p. 9 (La. App. 4th Cir. 5/8/13), 116 So. 3d 863, 869-70, writ denied, 13-1177 (La. 11/15/13), 125 So. 3d 1103.

Likewise, the record reflects that C.Y. was not misled by the omission of the statutory citation for armed robbery, and therefore, the error does not warrant reversal of the adjudication or disposition in this case. See State v. Cousin, 11-0615, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/11), 2011 WL 5429566, *2, writ denied, 11-2730 (La. 4/9/12), 85 So. 3d 696 (in which the defendant therein raised the same argument raised by the juvenile in this case, and this court stated, “it is well settled that an error in statutory citation in a bill of information does not warrant reversal of a conviction where the defendant did not object to the citation, had no doubt as to the charge against him, and was not misled.”). C.Y. was not prejudiced by the omission of the statutory citation for armed robbery. Accordingly, the sole assignment of error lacks merit.

DISPOSITION ERRORS

Under the authority of La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), this court routinely examines the record for errors patent, whether or not such a request is made by the accused. See State in Interest of Handy, 559 So. 2d 795, 795 n.1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (wherein this court noted the propriety of patent error review in juvenile cases, despite the absence of any explicit authority for doing so in the Children's Code). We are limited in our patent error review to errors discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. La. C.Cr. P. art. 920(2).

As previously stated, at the disposition hearing, the juvenile court committed C.Y. to the DPSC/OJJ for forty-two months, with credit for time served. Under La. R.S. 14:64.3, an additional, consecutive penalty of five years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence was required. As imposition of the five-year sentence mandated by La. R.S. 14:64.3 alone would extend the disposition beyond C.Y.’s twenty-first birthday, the maximum disposition that the juvenile court could impose would be commitment to the custody of the DPSC/OJJ until the age of twenty-one, with credit for time served. See La. Ch.C. art. 898(E)(5). The juvenile court, instead, imposed commitment for a duration of forty-two months, with credit for time served. The disposition was imposed on October 19, 2022, and the juvenile court ordered that C.Y. be taken into physical custody within fourteen days, which would have been by November 2, 2022. Thus, the disposition would terminate no later than May 2, 2026, one month and twenty-two days short of C.Y.’s twenty-first birthday, with credit for time served. Hence, the length of the disposition imposed appears to be illegally lenient See State in Interest of T.J., 15-1944, p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/3/16), 2016 WL 3131644, * 2 (“[j]ust as an adult offender has no right to an illegally lenient sentence, a juvenile has no right to an illegally lenient disposition.”).

The juvenile court also failed to require that C.Y. be confined in a secure placement without benefit of probation or suspension of imposition or execution of sentence as mandated by La. Ch.C. art. 897.1(C). The juvenile court further failed to advise C.Y. of the two-year period for applying for post conviction relief as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(C). Although the Children's Code contains no similar provision to La. C.Cr.P. art 930.8(C), Louisiana courts have held that this notice should be given to juveniles. State in Interest of T.J., 15-1944 at p. 5, 2016 WL 3131644 at * 2.

CONCLUSION

Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the adjudication is affirmed. The disposition, however, is vacated, and the matter is remanded for a new disposition hearing with the following instructions. The juvenile court shall inform C.Y. of the two-year prescriptive period for filing post conviction relief as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(C). Further, the judgment of disposition and the minute entry should reflect such notice regarding post conviction relief being provided to C.Y. Finally, the new disposition shall state that it is imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of imposition or execution of sentence and that C.Y. be confined in a secure placement as mandated by La. Ch.C. art. 897.1(C).⁸ See State in Interest of D.P., 18-1431, p. 8 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/28/19), 2019 WL 968056, at *4; State in Interest of T.J., 15-1945, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/15/16), 2016 WL 1545167, *3.

ADJUDICATION AFFIRMED; DISPOSITION VACATED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW DISPOSITION HEARING WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   C.Y.’s date of birth is June 24, 2005. He was sixteen years old at the time of the alleged offense and seventeen years old at the time of adjudication. As a minor, he will be referred to by his initials to ensure his confidentiality. See Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2.

2.   Prior to the disposition hearing, C.Y. filed a motion to vacate the adjudication based on the issue raised in the instant appeal. The juvenile court denied the motion.

3.   The juvenile court ordered the DPSC/OJJ to place C.Y. in a facility to provide individual and family counseling, employment readiness, substance use counseling, and education. The juvenile court also ordered C.Y. to cooperate with the DPSC/OJJ and the rules of the placement facility.

4.   Julian testified that the incident occurred “probably” at 2:00 or 3:00 p.m., but the officer who responded to the scene, Detective Danny Forbes with the Baton Rouge Police Department, testified that it occurred at “around 5:30 p.m.” Though she was uncertain as to the time of the incident, Julian confirmed that it was still daylight at the time, and she was able to see the perpetrators. Detective Forbes further confirmed that it was still daylight when he arrived at the scene within an hour of the incident.

5.   There was no clear indication that C.Y. fired his gun in the incident. Bell did not testify that he heard gunshots prior to firing his own gun. Julian testified that she and her baby were in the hallway when she heard “immediate gunfire.” Bell fired a .40 caliber Glock 22, and eight shell casings, for which the caliber was not specified, were recovered by the apartment front door.

6.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

7.   See U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14 (providing that persons shall not be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”)

8.   Considering the unique nature of juvenile proceedings and the vast discretion of the juvenile court in imposing a disposition, we find that correcting the disposition errors would involve more than a ministerial correction. See State in Interest of T.J., 15-1944, p. 4 n.4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/3/16), 2016 WL 3131644, at *2 n.4. We further recognize that a juvenile court (in cases involving mandatory minimum sentences) is to consider and impose its disposition according to the criteria set forth in State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So. 2d 672. See State ex rel. A.A.S., 98-1505 (La. 10/16/98), 726 So. 2d 900, 901; State in Interest of E. S., 18-0463, p. 24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/18), 2018 WL 4523957, at *11, aff'd in part; rev'd in part on other grounds, 18-01763 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So. 3d 1046. Because it is within the juvenile court's discretion to impose a different period of confinement, we vacate the illegal disposition and remand this matter for a new disposition hearing and imposition of a disposition that complies with Article 897.1. State in Interest of T.J., 15-1944 at pp. 4-5, 2016 WL 3131644, at *2.

GUIDRY, C.J.