DYNISHA NAPOLEON KEVIN NAPOLEON JASMINE NAPOLEON SHANZANIA NAPOLEON JEVIN NAPOLEON CHARANYCE NAPOLEON AND JESSICA NAPOLEON INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR DECEASED MOTHER EVA NAPOLEON v. LAMMICO AND WILLIAM CURRAN (2023)

In this writ application, the defendants, William J. Curran, M.D. and Louisiana Medical Malpractice Insurance Company (LMMIC), seek review of the trial court's judgment of September 8, 2022, granting the plaintiffs’ (Dynisha Napoleon, Kevin Napoleon, Jasmine Napoleon, Shanzania Napoleon, Jevin Napoleon, Charanyce Napoleon and Jessica Napoleon, individually and on behalf of their deceased mother, Eva Napoleon) motion for new trial.

A jury trial was held April 4-7, 2022, and the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants. The trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury verdict on April 21, 2022. Notice of signing of the judgment was mailed on April 25, 2022. Subsequently, on May 4, 2022, the plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and in the alternative, a motion for new trial. A hearing on the motion took place on August 5, 2022. On September 8, 2022, the trial court rendered a written judgment denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict but granting the motion for new trial.

The trial court's discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial is great, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2000-0445 (La. 11/28/00), 774 So.2d 84. In Davis, the Court recognized that “when the trial judge is convinced by his examination of the facts that the judgment would result in a miscarriage of justice, a new trial should be ordered.” Davis, 2000-0445, p. 10, 774 So.2d at 93, quoting Lamb v. Lamb, 430 So.2d 51 (La.1983). Under La. C.C.P. art. 1973, a new trial motion may be granted for good grounds in any case.

Here, the majority affirms the decision of the trial court to vacate the jury's verdict in favor of the defendant for unspecified reasons. Since the trial court did not provide written reasons for the granting of the new trial, the majority surmises that the trial court's decision was based upon discretionary grounds under article 1973 as there was evidence of jury confusion. In support, the majority points to the First Circuit's decision in Haney v. Lewis, 2013-2053 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/8/14), 2014 WL 4410862 as factually similar. I disagree.

First, I do not believe the jury was confused, but rather sought clarification and confirmation regarding its two questions to the trial court during deliberations. The two questions concerned medical records: the first a note with the notation “radiology w/o nurse” and the second was to confirm whether any radiological studies had been ordered while the decedent, Eva Napoleon, was a patient at St. Bernard Parish Hospital. In my opinion the queries were nothing more than clarifying or confirming information contained in medical records that had been submitted into evidence jointly by the parties.

At this point, the trial court acted precisely, appropriately and correctly by instructing the jury that their questions could not be answered, but that they should rely upon their notes, the actual medical records and documents entered into evidence during the trial along with their recollection of the testimony of the witnesses.

Further, I believe the facts in Haney are inapposite to those of this case. In Haney, the jury discussed and ultimately decided on an issue of informed consent. By stipulation, the issue of informed consent had been removed from consideration by the jury and no mention of it or the law applying thereto were provided in the court's instructions. The jury in Haney was clearly confused.

Although the granting or denying of a motion for new trial rests within the wide discretion of the trial court, the discretion of the court is limited. Davis v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. and Development, 2011-0625 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/2/11), 78 So.3d 190. The fact that a determination on a motion for new trial involves judicial discretion does not imply that the trial court can freely interfere with any verdict with which it disagrees. Guillory v. Lee, 2009-0075 (La. 6/26/09), 16 So.3d 1104, 1131; Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2000-0445 (La. 11/28/00), 774 So.2d 84, 93. The discretion by which the trial court has to grant a new trial must necessarily be tempered by the court's respect of, and obligation not to usurp the fact finding responsibility of the jury.

There is no evidence to suggest that the jury failed to follow the law applicable to this case as read to them by the trial court at the conclusion of trial. The evidence considered by this jury included expert opinions given by each side which conflicted. As such, the jury's verdict was reasonable and supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence and testimony presented. In the end the verdict represented a decision by the jury that gave greater weight to the defendant's experts than the plaintiffs’ experts.

A motion for new trial that is granted by a trial court judge under La. C.C.P. art. La. C.C.P. art. 1973 must be based on “good grounds” for doing so. Horton v. Mayeaux, 2005-1704 (La. 5/30/06), 931 So.2d 338. Further, this good ground must be based on the trial court's belief that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Burris v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., 94-0921 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 652 So.2d 558.

The standard to grant a new trial under La. C.C.P. art. 1973 involving jury confusion is such that the confusion must “be substantial enough to mislead the jury to the extent that it was prevented from dispensing justice.” Provosty v. Arc Constr., LLC, 2015-1219 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/2/16), 204 So.3d 623. The district court's breadth of discretion to order a new trial varies with the facts and circumstances of each case. Myles v. Hosp. Serv. Dis. No. 1 of Tangipahoa Parish, 2017-1014 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/6/18), 248 So.3d 545.

However, the discretionary power to grant a new trial under La. C.C.P. art. 1973 must be exercised with caution, as a successful litigant is entitled to the benefits of a favorable jury verdict. The fact that determination for a new trial involves judicial discretion does not imply that the trial court can freely interfere with any verdict with which it disagrees. Burris, 652 So.2d at 562. Additionally, in granting a new trial, it is necessary for the trial judge to state an articulable reason or reasons as to why he is exercising his discretionary powers under La. C.C.P. art. 1973. Johnson v, Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 2000-0980 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/25/01), 792 So.2d 892; Horton v. Mayeaux, 2005-1704 (La. 5/30/06), 931 So.2d 338; Burris, 652 So.2d at 562.

In the instant case, the district court failed to give reasons or identify any grounds for granting a new trial under 1973. As such, I feel the district court abused its discretion.

For the above and foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion. I would grant the defendants’ writ application, reverse the trial court's judgment granting the plaintiffs’ motion for new trial, and reinstate the jury verdict.

DYSART, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS