ESTATE OF OPAL STELLA REEVES VIOLA v. CYNTHIA ANGONA LACASSIN GUILLORY (2023)

I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion. I would reverse the trial court's judgment, which found in favor of Cynthia Angona Lacassin Guillory and dismissed the lawsuit against her.

Opal's estate contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that the Certificate of Deposit Accounts (CDs) were not owned by Joseph Viola at the time of his death. The majority opines that the trial court did not make a finding that the CDs were not owned by Joseph at the time of his death, because it was not specifically stated in the judgment. I disagree.

The judgment in this case renders judgment in favor of Cynthia and dismisses all claims asserted against her. It makes no findings of fact. In its oral ruling, the trial court specifically states, “I don't believe that the funds that were Payable on Death[,] were part of the decedent's estate.” The trial court further states, “I find that the [payable-on-death] funds were never brought into the Estate of Joseph Viola.” While it is true that written and oral reasons do not form part of the judgment, an appellate court is entitled to use the trial court's reasons to gain insight into the judgment. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507. “A trial court's reasons for judgment may elucidate the trial court's thought process when reaching factual findings.” Keo v. Heng, 22-130, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/26/22), ___So.3d___, ___ n.9. Accordingly, in my opinion, the trial court made a finding of fact in its oral ruling that Joseph did not own the CDs at the time of his death. This finding led the trial court to rule in favor of Cynthia. Further, based on the record and law, this finding of fact is erroneous.

First, the parties entered seven stipulations into the record. Stipulation Number Seven states, “Subsequent to the death of Joseph Viola, Cynthia Angona Lacassin Guillory withdrew $216,483.91 from three accounts at American Bank that were owned by Joseph Viola at the time of his death.” Stipulation Number Seven then lists the three American Bank & Trust Company Certificate of Deposit accounts at issue in this case. “A stipulation has the effect of a judicial admission or confession, which binds all parties and the court.” Ellis v. Heinzen, 22-67, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/26/22), ___So.3d___, ___, writ denied, 22-1710 (La. 1/25/23), ___So.3d___ (quoting R.J. D'Hemecourt Petroleum, Inc. v. McNamara, 444 So.2d 600, 601 (La.1983) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820, 105 S.Ct. 92, 83 L.Ed.2d 39 (1984). A stipulation is law of the case. Id.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 872 defines an “estate” as:

The estate of a deceased means the property, rights, and obligations that a person leaves after his death, whether the property exceeds the charges or the charges exceed the property, or whether he has only left charges without any property. The estate includes not only the rights and obligations of the deceased as they exist at the time of death, but all that has accrued thereto since death, and the new charges to which it becomes subject.

It has been stipulated that Joseph owned the accounts at the time of his death. Therefore, and in accordance with La.Civ.Code art. 872, the CDs are part of Joseph's estate. Consequently, I find the trial court erred when it found that the CDs were not owned by Joseph Viola at the time of his death and had to be “brought into the estate.”

While this issue was not addressed in the majority opinion, I find that Opal's estate has a right of action to bring this suit against Cynthia. The CDs at issue were opened by Joseph with presumably community funds. Upon Opal's death, one-half of their community funds were owned by her estate. Therefore, one-half of the money used to open the CDs was owned by Opal's estate. Joseph did not have usufruct over this money. Cynthia was named as the payable-on-death beneficiary for the CDs. Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:314 is the relevant statute for payable-on-death accounts. This statute absolves the bank of any liability or adverse claim against it by a creditor for disbursement of the funds in the account. La.R.S. 6:314(E). However, La.R.S. 6:314(F) (emphasis added) specifically states that “[t]he provisions of this Section shall not prohibit any right of forced heirship or the collation or collection of funds due to any spouse, heir, legatee, creditor, or other person having rights or claims to funds of the deceased depositor.”

The statute is clear that any creditor with claims to the funds in the account has a right to collect those funds. Joseph is deceased, and the funds at issue are now in Cynthia's possession. Opal's estate is a creditor with a “claim[ ] to funds of the deceased depositor,” having obtained a money judgment against Joseph's estate in the amount of $251,333.27, plus interest and costs.

In its oral ruling, the trial court finds that Opal's estate does not have a cause of action based on La.Civ.Code art. 961. Louisiana Civil Code Article 961 relates to the effect of acceptance of a succession. It states, “Acceptance obligates the successor to pay estate debts in accordance with the provisions of this Title and other applicable laws.” Cynthia did not receive the funds at issue in this case through Joseph's succession. They were transferred to her, and she received them as the payable-on-death beneficiary, also known as a non-probatable asset, albeit still assets. As such, La.Civ.Code art. 961 does not apply to this case.

Further, the majority opinion finds that Opal's estate “has failed to establish that it has a cognizable cause of action as judgment creditor against Cynthia.” This conclusion is based on La.Civ.Code art. 1419, which states:

When there is an administration and a creditor asserts and establishes his claim after payment has been made to other creditors or distribution of the estate in whole or in part has been made to successors pursuant to a court order, the claim of the creditor must be satisfied in the following order: first, from the assets remaining under administration in the estate; next, from the successors to whom distribution has been made; and then from unsecured creditors who received payments, in proportion to the amounts received by them, but in this event the creditor may not recover more than his share.

(Emphasis added.)

It is my opinion that the majority misconstrues the petition's allegations and the relief sought. The petition does not allege that petitioner is a judgment creditor of Cynthia, rather it alleges that “Petitioner is a Judgment Creditor of the Estate of Joseph Viola.”

Further, Cynthia argues that Joseph's estate “is currently still open and under administration” and “there has been no judgment of possession issued by the Court in the succession making any distribution of estate assets to any heirs.” As such, La.Civ.Code art. 1419 also does not apply to this matter. Louisiana Civil Code Article 1419 only applies when a creditor asserts his claim after there has been payment or distribution of the estate pursuant to a court order. This is supported by the revision comments to La.Civ.Code art. 1419, which state that the article modernizes the older version of the law, but “does not change the basic thrust of prior law where new creditors appear after distribution is made.” (Emphasis added.) See La.Civ.Code arts. 1067 and 1068 of the Civil Code of 1870.

Regardless of whether La.Civ.Code art. 1419 applies, that issue should have been raised as an exception of prematurity by Cynthia in the trial court. It was not. An exception of prematurity is a dilatory exception that must be filed prior to or in the answer. La.Code Civ.P. art. 928. The prematurity objection is waived unless pleaded therein. La.Code Civ.P. art. 926. The court may not supply the exception of prematurity.

Opal's estate is a judgment creditor of Joseph's estate, pursuant to a judgment rendered on November 4, 2019. The funds at issue were part of Joseph's estate at the time of his death, and they are now in Cynthia's possession. Opal's estate has a right to bring this claim and has a valid cause of action. For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court and render judgment in favor of the Estate of Opal Stella Reeves Viola.

SAVOIE, J. dissents and assigns written reasons.