EAST BATON ROUGE TEACHERS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION v. LATASHA SMITH (2022)

Plaintiff/appellant, East Baton Rouge Teachers Federal Credit Union (EBRTFCU), appeals from a trial court judgment failing to award post-judgment interest in its suit to recover the unpaid debt on a promissory note executed by defendant/appellee, Latasha S. Smith. For the reasons that follow, we remand this matter to the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 17, 2019, EBRTFCU filed suit on a promissory note against Latasha S. Smith. In its petition, EBRTFCU alleged that Ms. Smith executed a promissory note on July 11, 2018, in favor of EBRTFCU in the amount of $1,200.00, together with interest at the rate of 18% per year, together with “reasonable attorney's fees” which EBRTFCU alleged to be 25% of principal and interest.

EBRTFCU alleged that, despite demand, Ms. Smith has not made any payments on the note since August 10, 2018, and therefore, under the terms of the note, it was declaring the entire unpaid balance due and payable, together with interest, late charges, and attorney's fees. Accordingly, EBRTFCU sought judgment against Ms. Smith for $1,242.50, together with interest on $1,166.50 of that amount from the date of judicial demand at the rate of 18% per year until satisfied, as well as $76.00 in interest which accrued prior to the date of filing the suit. EBRTFCU also sought attorney's fees in the amount of 25% of the principal and interest and all court costs, including, but not limited to, any money paid to a private process server to serve documents in the suit. Ms. Smith answered the petition, and raised the affirmative defenses of estoppel, malice, intent, extinguishment of the obligation, and payment.

The matter eventually went to trial on February 24, 2022; however, neither Ms. Smith nor her attorney were present at the trial. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of EBRTFCU and against Ms. Smith for the payoff amount as of the date of the trial of $2,109.07, together with an attorney's fee of 25% and “all costs,” which were stated as including, but not limited to, any money paid to a private process server to serve documents in the suit, as well as court costs. The judgment further denied any post-judgment interest.

EBRTFCU now appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in limiting its judgment to the payoff amount as of the date of trial and in denying any post-judgment interest.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

On May 13, 2022, this court, ex propio motu, issued a rule to show cause due to an apparent defect in the trial court's judgment, citing D'Luca v. Kirkland, 2020-0713, 2020-0714 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/21), 321 So. 3d 411, 413-414 and U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for RFMSI 2005S7 v. Pumas, 2021 - 0585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So. 3d 246, 249. Specifically, this court noted that the judgment at issue includes an award for “all costs” and further specifies that the term “costs ․ includes (but is not limited to) any money paid to a private process server to serve documents in this suit[,]” but that this language does not specify the amount of costs for the proceeding, nor does it specify the costs of the private process server. Consequently, because the precise amount of the “costs” awarded in the judgment cannot be determined from the judgment alone, this court ordered the parties to show cause why the appeal should or should not be dismissed or remanded.

A valid judgment must be precise, definite, and certain. Moreover, a final appealable judgment must contain decretal language, and it must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Company, Inc., 2017-1250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/18), 268 So. 3d 1044, 1046. These determinations should be evident from the language of the judgment without reference to other documents in the record. Advanced Leveling, 268 So. 3d at 1046.

As noted above, the judgment at issue herein provides:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there be judgment herein in favor of East Baton Rouge Teachers Federal Credit Union and against defendant(s) Latasha Smith ․ for the payoff amount as of the date of the trial (February 24, 2022) for the sum of $2,109.07 together with an attorney's fee of Twenty-Five Percent (25%) and for all costs. The term “costs” as used herein includes (but is not limited to) any money paid to a private process server to serve documents in this suit, and court cost[s].

In its response to the show cause order, EBRTFCU asserts that D'Luca and U.S. National Bank are distinguishable because those cases involved costs that are not court costs or costs to be determined at a later date or by reference to extrinsic evidence. EBRTFCU asserts that the costs awarded in the judgment at issue herein are court costs, which are expressly granted by statute pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:4533, and are merely service and court costs, which are continuing in nature in a civil collection case.

Costs shall be paid by the party cast and may be taxed by a rule to show cause. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1920. Costs that shall be taxed include “costs of the clerk, sheriff, witness’ fees, costs of taking depositions and copies of acts used on the trial, and all other costs allowed by the court.” LSA-R.S. 13:4533. However, as recognized by this court in Edwards v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 2013-0186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/27/13), 2013 WL 7122542, *5 (unpublished), while fees paid to the sheriff for service are specifically contemplated or provided for by LSA-R.S. 13:4533, fees paid to a private process server are not taxable as “court costs” pursuant to that or any other statute. Therefore, because the judgment does not specify an amount for this award and otherwise leaves its determination for a later date, we find that this omission renders the judgment indefinite, and therefore, it is not a valid final judgment. See Gulfsouth Credit, LLC v. Conway, 2022-0499 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22),___So. 3d___, 2022 WL 16706953

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this matter is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to sign an amended final judgment that is precise, definite, and certain and contains proper decretal language. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1918(A),¹ 1951,² and 2088(A)(12)³ as amended by 2021 La. Acts 259, § 2 (eff. Aug. 1, 2021). It is further ordered that the record in this pending appeal shall be supplemented with such amended final judgment within 15 days of this opinion.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Comments—2021(a) to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1918 indicate that a lack of proper decretal language in a judgment that is otherwise a final judgment does not divest the appellate court of jurisdiction. Instead, the final judgment shall be corrected to include proper decretal language by an amendment in accordance with Article 1951.

2.   Comments—2021 to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1951 indicate that the amendments to Article 1951 and Article 2088 allow the trial court to retain jurisdiction to correct, on its own motion or after remand from the appellate court, the lack of proper decretal language in a final judgment. This article does not allow the court to make substantive changes to a final judgment.

3.   Comments—2021(c) to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2088 indicate that as of August 1, 2021, subparagraph (A)(12) of Article 2088 allows a trial court to retain jurisdiction after an order of appeal is granted to amend a final judgment to correct any deficiencies in the decretal language.

WHIPPLE, C.J.