BROCKMEIER v. GEORGIA PACIFIC LLC (2017)

Relator, Union Carbide Corporation, seeks review of the trial court's judgment on July 25, 2017, on the denial of their motion for mistrial. During opening statements, Plaintiff's counsel made the following argument to the Jury:

So who's at fault here? I keep saying Union Carbide, and I haven't really explained too much as to why. But Union Carbide and Georgia-Pacific, they're at fault. Georgia-Pacific's not here. They took responsibility. They're not here at this trial.

Union Carbide say it's not - they didn't do it. They don't want to take ownership of it. So what did Union Carbide and Georgia-Pacific do together that caused this exposure to Mr. Brockmeier? They made Georgia-Pacific Ready Mix.

It is well-settled law that compromises and offers to compromise are not admissible ¹ . Moreover, La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 1631 provides, in pertinent part, “[a] court on its own motion, or on the motion of any party, after hearing may grant a mistrial.” This court, in Lewis v. Time Savers Inc., 599 So.2d 442 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992); citing Searle v. Travelers Insurance Co., 557 So.2d 321 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990), summarized the standards applicable to review a denial of a motion for mistrial, as follows:

[A] motion for mistrial in a civil case should be granted under the following circumstances: (1) when, before the trial ends and the judgment is rendered, the trial judge determines that it is impossible to reach a proper judgment because of some error or irregularity and (2) where no other remedy would provide relief to the moving party. Motions for mistrial should also be granted upon proof of prejudicial misconduct occurring during a jury trial, which cannot be cured by admonition or instructions.

Id. at 323. (Citations omitted.)

While the trial court is granted great discretion in determining whether to grant a mistrial, the trial court's judgment denying a motion for mistrial may be reversed if: (1) the conduct complained of makes it impossible for the jury to reach a proper verdict; (2) no other remedy would provide relief to the complaining party; or (3) the admission of the question resulted in “prejudicial misconduct” to the complaining party. See Lewis v. Time Savers, supra.

After a review of the record, this Court finds that the statements made by Plaintiff's counsel during his opening arguments had a prejudicial effect, which cannot be cured by instruction or admonition.

Accordingly, we grant the Relator's writ application and reverse the judgment denying the Relator's motion for mistrial.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See La. Code Evid. art. 408.