STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TYRICK HILLS (2022)

The defendant, Tyrick Hills, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, designating two assignments of error. We affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On October 15, 2018, Alex Morena drove his truck to Dove Lane in Thibodaux to sell several pounds of marijuana to the defendant. Kyle Duet, Morena's cousin, was in the front passenger seat of the truck. Morena knew the defendant from a previous drug deal. Morena parked in the parking lot of an apartment complex. Shortly thereafter, the defendant arrived and got in the backseat of the truck behind Morena. According to Duet, while the defendant was “checking out” the marijuana, two assailants armed with pistols and wearing bandanas over their faces approached either side of the truck. One of the assailants said it was a “stick-up”. As Morena tried to drive away, the assailants shot Morena and Duet. Duet was shot in the leg, and Morena was shot in the arm, chin, and neck. Morena died at the scene. The defendant took a bag of marijuana, Morena's phone and wallet, and left the scene.

Matthew Holmes testified that earlier in the day before the shooting, the defendant and several people were at Holmes's apartment in Thibodaux. According to Holmes, the defendant set up the plan to rob Morena of his marijuana.

Following the shooting, Duet identified the defendant, who was taken in for questioning by Lieutenant Varick Taylor, Jr., with the Thibodaux Police Department. In his statement, the defendant identified the assailants with guns and admitted to Lieutenant Taylor that the defendant knew about the planned robbery. The defendant, however, told Lieutenant Taylor that Kevon Southall, who shot Morena, was the one who set up everything.

The defendant testified at trial. He stated he had nothing to do with the shooters, he did not know them, and he did not participate in the robbery. According to the defendant, he made up the story about being involved in order to satisfy Lieutenant Taylor. The defendant also insisted that Kevon Southall was not at the scene of the shooting.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for second degree murder.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2). The parties to crimes are classified as principals and accessories after the fact. La. R.S. 14:23. Principals are all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime. La. R.S. 14:24. Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime are principals. An individual may be convicted as a principal only for those crimes for which he personally has the requisite mental state. State v. Wright, 2001-0322 (La. 12/4/02), 834 So.2d 974, 983, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 833, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 62 (2003). The State may prove a defendant guilty by showing that he served as a principal to the crime by aiding and abetting another. State v. Huey, 2013-1227 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/18/14), 142 So.3d 27, 30, writ denied, 2014-0535 (La. 10/3/14), 149 So.3d 795, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1198, 135 S.Ct. 1507, 191 L.Ed.2d 443 (2015). Further, when two or more persons embark on a concerted course of action, each person becomes responsible for not only his own acts but also for the acts of the other. See State v. Smith, 2007-2028 (La. 10/20/09), 23 So.3d 291, 296 (per curiam).

The defendant argues herein that he “jokingly” contemplated robbing Morena because the defendant did not have enough money to buy the marijuana. According to the defendant, he was not armed and was susceptible of being shot just as Morena and Duet were shot. The defendant suggests that Holmes, also a marijuana dealer, testified at trial to eliminate two of his competitors. Finally, the defendant contends that the two unidentified assailants were not identified with him and that the State failed to establish he, the defendant, was responsible for the shooting; as such, the defendant did not have the specific intent to commit a robbery.

The defendant's assertions of innocence are belied by the testimony of Holmes and the defendant's own inculpatory statement. According to the testimony of Holmes, several hours before the armed robbery, the defendant and several other people were at Holmes's apartment on Louise Street in Thibodaux. The defendant told Holmes that he was going to buy marijuana from Morena. Morena had several pounds of marijuana to sell. The defendant had $1,300.00, which was not enough to purchase the marijuana; as such, the defendant took a picture of a “wad” of money with his (the defendant's) phone and told Holmes he was going to send the picture to Morena. Realizing he was short on money, the defendant told Holmes that he was going to “jack” Morena for the marijuana. Holmes also testified that the last thing the defendant told him before the defendant left his apartment was that he was not going to rob Morena.

Holmes testified that the people who were with the defendant at Holmes's apartment were “four young black males[,]” whom Holmes did not know. According to Holmes, three of the unknown males had handguns. Two of the guns were Glocks and one was a Springfield.

Lieutenant Taylor testified that, pursuant to his interview of the defendant, four more people were arrested, namely, Ron Brown, Saharol Holmes, Tandell Azema, and Kevon Southall. In his testimony, the defendant identified these same four people who were at Holmes's apartment before the robbery.

In his statements to Lieutenant Taylor, the defendant said that it “was supposed to be a jack”; that it was a “lick” that “went south.” The defendant indicated five people, including himself, were at or near the scene. The defendant identified the same four people noted above, namely, Kevon Southall, Tandell,¹ Brown, and Holmes. The defendant told Lieutenant Taylor that he got in Morena's truck in the back on the driver-side behind Morena. The defendant indicated that his accomplices knew to “hit the truck” when the defendant opened the door. According to the defendant, Kevon Southall approached the driver's side, and Tandell approached the passenger's side, while Holmes and Brown were lookouts. Kevon Southall hopped in the back of the truck. The defendant laid down on the floorboard of the backseat. Kevon Southall, armed with a handgun, shot Duet and then shot Morena. The two gunmen fled. The defendant stated that he took Morena's phone and a bag of weed, then left the scene. Afterward, the defendant and all the others met up at Malcolm Southall's house. According to the defendant, Tandell did not shoot anyone; rather, Kevon Southall shot both victims.

Lieutenant Taylor testified that several shell casings, .40 caliber and 9mm, were found at the scene of the shooting. The casings were sent to the crime lab, and it was determined that the 9mm bullets were shot from a Glock handgun, which was later found in the possession of Kevon Southall. According to Lieutenant Taylor, Kevon Southall had gone “on the run” and was later apprehended in Mississippi. When taken into custody, two guns were found on Kevon Southall, one of which was the 9mm Glock used in the killing of Morena.

In his inculpatory statement, while he admitted to being part of the plan to rob Morena, the defendant maintained that it was Kevon Southall who set up the drug deal. Also, according to the defendant, at Holmes's apartment, Kevon Southall took the defendant's phone from the defendant and took the picture of the wad of money to send to Morena. Holmes testified, however, that while at his apartment, the defendant set up the drug deal.

Regardless of who set up the deal, the defendant actively participated in the plan to rob Morena of his marijuana. Whether the defendant knew that the victims were going to be shot, and one killed, is of no moment. The defendant, along with accomplices, engaged in an armed robbery that resulted in a death and, as such, he was a principal to the felony second degree murder of Morena where specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm was not required. See La. R.S. 14:24 & 14:30.1(A)(2); Smith, 23 So.3d at 296. See also State v. Alexander, 2021-1346 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/13/22), 344 So.3d 705, 713 (“Whether a defendant actually fires the bullet that strikes and kills a victim is of no consequence and the defendant may be convicted as a principal to the crime.” (quoting State v. Massey, 2011-357 (La. App. 5th Cir. 3/27/12), 91 So.3d 453, 463-64, writ denied, 2012-0991 (La. 9/21/12), 98 So.3d 332)).

In his testimony, the defendant indicated that he did not know the shooters and had nothing to do with them. He further insisted that he was not a participant in the robbery. The guilty verdict of the jury, however, was a direct refutation of the defendant's theory of innocence and his own self-serving testimony.

The factfinder can accept or reject the testimony of any witness. To resolve conflicting testimony relative to factual matters, the factfinder must make credibility determinations and weigh the evidence. State v. Eby, 2017-1456 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/6/16), 248 So.3d 420, 426, writ denied, 2018-0762 (La. 2/11/19), 263 So.3d 1153. See State v. Mire, 2014-2295 (La. 1/27/16), 269 So.3d 698, 700-01 (per curiam). The Jackson standard of review does not permit a reviewing court to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for the factfinder's, assess the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh evidence. State v. McGhee, 2015-2140 (La. 6/29/17), 223 So.3d 1136, 1137 (per curiam); State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 422 (per curiam). Thus, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the factfinder, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict based on an exculpatory hypothesis of mitigatory circumstances presented to it, and rationally rejected. Eby, 248 So.3d at 426-27.

After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence supports the guilty verdict. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant was guilty of the second degree murder of Alex Morena. See Calloway, 1 So.3d at 418.

This assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues his inculpatory statement should have been suppressed. Specifically, the defendant contends that Lieutenant Taylor refused to help him unless he confessed, and he believed that admitting guilt was the only way to protect himself and his family.

Before a confession can be introduced into evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. La. R.S. 15:451. Confessions obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the exertion of any improper influence, are involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of constitutional law. State v. Brown, 481 So.2d 679, 684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985), writ denied, 486 So.2d 747 (La. 1986). Nevertheless, the voluntariness of a confession is determined by the totality of the circumstances, with the ultimate focus on whether the statement was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice or the result of an overborne will. State v. Turner, 2016-1841 (La. 12/5/18), 263 So.3d 337, 399, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 555, 205 L.Ed.2d 355 (2019). It must also be established that an accused who makes a confession during custodial interrogation was first advised of his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

Since the general admissibility of a confession is a question for the trial court, its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony are accorded great weight and will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. State v. Anderson, 2006-2987 (La. 9/9/08), 996 So.2d 973, 994, cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1165, 129 S.Ct. 1906, 173 L.Ed.2d 1057 (2009). However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751. The trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a confession is admissible. Anderson, 996 So.2d at 995. The direct testimony of the interviewing police officer can be sufficient to prove a defendant's statement was freely and voluntarily given. See State v. Sims, 310 So.2d 587, 589-90 (La. 1975); State v. Maten, 2004-1718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 711, 721, writ denied, 2005-1570 (La. 1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544.

Although the burden of proof is generally on the defendant to prove the grounds recited in a motion to suppress evidence, such is not the case with the motion to suppress a confession. In the latter situation, the burden of proof is with the State to prove the confession's admissibility. La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(D). The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made freely and voluntarily. State v. Seward, 509 So.2d 413, 417 (La. 1987). See State v. Smith, 409 So.2d 271, 272 (La. 1982); State v. Smith, 2016-1284 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/12/17), 2017 WL 1378237 *9 (unpublished). Therefore, if the defendant alleges police misconduct in eliciting a confession, the State must specifically rebut those allegations. State v. Blank, 2004-0204 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, 103, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S.Ct. 494, 169 L.Ed.2d 346 (2007).

The motion to suppress hearing established that the defendant was interviewed twice by Lieutenant Taylor, once on October 16, 2018, and again on October 19, 2018. The first interview was over two hours, and the second interview was about eighteen minutes. The defendant was Mirandized, waived his rights, and signed a Miranda form in both interviews. The defendant never invoked his right to remain silent or asked for an attorney in either interview. Lieutenant Taylor indicated that he did not cause duress or intimidate the defendant, he did not threaten him, and he did not promise anything or induce a confession. Both interviews were played for the trial court.

In the first interview, the defendant indicated that he walked to Dove Lane and got into Morena's truck with $8,000.00. Morena had five pounds of marijuana. When the assailants arrived, Morena put the truck in reverse and tried to drive away. The defendant then heard gunshots, saw a dead body, and was shocked. The assailants took the money and the marijuana. The defendant said he got out of the truck and took Morena's phone and a bag of marijuana, which he threw in the “cut.” Lieutenant Taylor insisted that the defendant knew more. Lieutenant Taylor told the defendant that Duet's version was different from the defendant's and that people were saying that the defendant set up this robbery.

Because of the information he had, Lieutenant Taylor told the defendant that he knew the defendant's “homeboys” shot Morena. The defendant denied this. After further questioning by Lieutenant Taylor and informing the defendant that he knew the defendant's car was at Dove Lane, the defendant admitted that he had lied about going on foot. Lieutenant Taylor told the defendant that he did not think the defendant shot the victims, but that the defendant knew who did and that they were his “homeboys.”

Finally, the defendant admitted to Lieutenant Taylor that it was supposed to be a “jack” that “went south.” The defendant identified all the people involved, including the two assailants with guns who approached either side of Morena's truck. The defendant told Lieutenant Taylor that Kevon Southall shot both victims. In his second statement, the defendant provided only a few more details of the incident. He said that after Morena was killed, everyone met up at Malcolm Southall's house. The defendant said that when he drove to the scene, Saharol and Ron (Holmes and Brown) were with him in his car. The defendant also said that Kevon Southall got into the backseat of the truck before he shot the victims.

The defendant argues in his brief that he “randomly” gave Lieutenant Taylor the names of his two friends to satisfy the lieutenant's “quest” for more information and in the hope that this would gamer the lieutenant's help. According to the defendant, Lieutenant Taylor manipulated him by repeatedly telling him that he could not help him unless the defendant gave him “more”; and that such help included Lieutenant Taylor looking out for the defendant's family, including his son and his mother. The defendant asserts that Lieutenant Taylor used inducements and promises of leniency to get him to implicate himself in the shooting.

We note initially that Lieutenant Taylor never told the defendant he would help him by looking out for his family. He, instead, told the defendant that he needed to think about his own family: “Your homeboys did that. I ain't... saying you did it. I don't believe you -- your homeboys did that shit, bruh. You know what I'm saying? That's why I'm telling you right now, dawg. That's the reason I'm telling you ․ think about you, your baby, your mama, bruh.”

Later in the interview, Lieutenant Taylor told the defendant:

Cause what I'm about to show you is gonna prove that you did not run and went through no cut like you told me. ․ Cause once you're out of my hands there ain't nothing I could, you know what I'm saying, do or I could say to help you. So, let's figure this s--- out in here at this round table, bruh. Cause when the s---, you know what I'm saying, get out this building -- that's it.

In denying the motion to suppress the statement, the trial court stated, in pertinent part:

There was no point in time when the defendant did not believe that Mr. Taylor, Detective Taylor was not a police officer. There was no time during the investigation where he made a promise to try and obtain leniency, try and obtain any particular plea agreement, try and reduce the charge or anything else. All he said was let's get this worked out in here. There's always going to be some inducement to get the individual to talk, some trickery if you will or whatever, but there was no promises. There was no undue influence. There was no inducement. There was no fear.

As far as him smoking marijuana, he certainly appeared to be very coherent. I saw no indication of it. Detective Taylor also testified that he did not detect any intoxication level that may be concerning.

We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. There is nothing in the record before us that suggests the defendant was intimidated, threatened, or induced to confess based on fear or duress. Moreover, despite the defendant's contentions, Lieutenant Taylor never made promises to the defendant, much less promises of leniency. The defendant has failed to point to any instances of inappropriate conduct by Lieutenant Taylor. Any comments to the defendant by Lieutenant Taylor that he needed to tell the truth, or that he could help himself or his family by confessing, were not promises or inducements designed to extract a confession. See State v. Petterway, 403 So.2d 1157, 1159-1160 (La. 1981); State v. Dison, 396 So.2d 1254, 1258 (La. 1981). Further, a confession is not rendered inadmissible because officers “exhort or adjure” an accused to tell the truth, provided the exhortation is not accompanied by an inducement in the nature of a threat or which implies a promise of reward. State v. Robertson, 97-0177 (La. 3/4/98), 712 So.2d 8, 31, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 882, 119 S.Ct. 190, 142 L.Ed.2d 155 (1998). See State v. Peters, 546 So.2d 829, 832 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 552 So.2d 378 (La. 1989).

Considering the testimony of Lieutenant Taylor and the transcript of the defendant's statements, the trial court did not err in finding that the statements were freely and voluntarily given after the defendant was Mirandized. The defendant offered no testimony or evidence at the suppression hearing. We find that the defendant's allegation that he was induced to confess by promises is unsupported by the record. See State v. Roddy, 33,112 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 4/7/00), 756 So.2d 1272, 1276-77, writ denied, 2000-1427 (La. 5/11/01) 791 So.2d 1288. Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to suppress his statement.

This assignment of error is without merit.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his statement, the defendant identified the assailant on the passenger side of the truck as Pete Tandell and stated that Tandell “didn't shoot the dude.” When Lieutenant Taylor asked, “Azema?” the defendant responded, “Yeah, Tandell didn't shoot the dude,”

McDONALD, J.

Holdridge J. concurs